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THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION, 

NATURAL AND REVEALED, 

TO THE 

CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. 

TO WHICH ABE ADDED 

TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY, 
AND THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 

/ 

By JOSEPH BUTLER, LL.D., 

U 

LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM. 

“ Ejus (Analogic) haec vis est, ut id quod dubium est, ad aliquid simile, de 
quo non quaeritur, referat, ut incerta certis probet.” — 

Quinct., Inst. Orat ., i, i, c. 6. 


WITH A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, COPIOUS NOTES, 
AND AN AMPLE INDEX. 

% 

THE WHOLE EDITED BY 

Rev. JOSEPH CUMMINGS, D.D., LL.D., 


PRESIDENT OJ WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY. 

/ 



HITCHCOCK & WALDEN. 

1875. 

r 



Entered according' to Act of Congress, in the year 1S75, by 

NELSON & PHILLIPS, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 


The Library 
of Congress 

WASHINGTON 


EDITOR’S PREFACE. 


T N preparing this edition of Butler’s Analogy the 
A Editor has endeavored to adapt it to Students, 
and to render, in a simple and concise form, the aid 
they need. 

The marginal titles, presenting the subjects of the 
paragraphs, and constituting an analysis of the sev- 
eral chapters, are an important part of his work. 

He has given much attention to the text, which, 
with a few corrections obviously necessary, is that 
of the second edition, prepared by the Right Rev. 
William Fitzgerald, D.D., Lord Bishop of Cork, 
Cloyne, and Ross, published in London in i860. 
Dr. Fitzgerald has given a collation of Butler’s first 
edition of his work, which is a literary curiosity, and 
shows the singular pains he took with his style, in 
which he has commonly been censured for care- 
lessness. 

The Editor of this edition has taken the liberty to 
break up several long paragraphs into two or more, 
in order that their meaning may more readily be 
apprehended. 

The Index has been made very full and complete. 


4 


Editor’s Preface. 


It will afford great help to those who may wish to 
understand the work, or make occasional references 
to the sentiments of the author. 

The Editor has taken from other editions, and from 
Dr. Chalmers, all the material he deemed of special 
value, and has added a few notes of his own. 

He was led to prepare this edition with special 
reference to the wants of Students in our higher in- 
stitutions of learning, but he hopes it will be found 
acceptable to Teachers, to Ministers, and to all others 
who desire a thorough acquaintance with this great 
work. 

The Biographical Sketch was written by Professor 
Henry Rogers, author of “ The Eclipse of Faith,” 
“The Supernatural Origin of the Bible,” etc. It 
was prepared for the “Encyclopaedia Britannica.” 
The same sketch is prefaced to the excellent edition 
prepared by Rev. J. T. Champlin, D.D. 

*** All the Notes except the Author’s are inclosed in brackets. 
Dr. Fitzgerald is the author of the notes signed “ F.” 

Middletown, May , 1875. 


SKETCH OF JOSEPH BUTLER. 


J OSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham — one of the 
most profound and original thinkers this or any other 
country ever produced — well deserves a place among 
the dii majores of English philosophy, with Bacon, 
Newton, and Locke. 

The following brief sketch will comprise an outline 
of his life and character, some remarks on the pecul- 
iarity of his genius, and an estimate of his principal 
writings. 

He was born at Wantage, in Berkshire, May 1 8, 1692. 
His father, Thomas Butler, had been a linen-draper in 
that town, but before the birth of Joseph, who was the 
youngest of a family of eight, had relinquished business. 
He continued to reside at Wantage, however, at a 
house called the Priory, which is still shown to the 
curious visitor. 

Young Butler received his first instructions from the 
Rev. Philip Barton, a clergyman, and master of the 
grammar school at Wantage. The father, who was a 
Presbyterian, was anxious that his son, who early gave 
indications of capacity, should dedicate himself to the 
ministry in his own communion, and sent him to a Dis- 
senting academy at Gloucester, then kept by Mr. Samuel 
Jones. “Jones,” says Professor Fitzgerald with equal 
truth and justice, “ was a man of no mean ability or eru- 
dition;” and adds, with honorable liberality, “could 
number among his scholars many names that might 


6 


Analogy of Religion. 


confer honor on any university in Christendom.”* He 
instances among others Jeremiah Jones, the author 
of the excellent work on the Canon ; Seeker, after- 
ward Archbishop of Canterbury ; and two of the most 
learned, acute, and candid apologists for Christianity 
England has produced — Nathaniel Lardner and Samuel 
Chandler. 

The academy was shortly afterward removed to 
Tewkesbury. While yet there Butler first displayed his 
extraordinary aptitude for metaphysical speculation in 
the letters he sent to Clarke on two supposed flaws in 
the reasoning of the recently published a priori demon- 
strations ; one respecting the proof of the Divine omni- 
presence, and the other respecting the proof of the unity 
of the “necessarily existent Being.” It is but just to 
Clarke to say that his opponent subsequently surren- 
dered both objections. Whether the capitulation be 
judged strictly the result of logical necessity will de- 
pend on the estimate formed of the value of Clarke’s 
proof of the truths in question — truths which are hap- 
pily capable of being shown to be so, independently of 
any such a priori metaphysical demonstration. In this 
encounter, Butler showed his modesty not less than his 
prowess. He was so afraid of being discovered, that he 
employed his friend Seeker to convey his letters to the 
Gloucester post-office, and bring back the answers. 

About this time he began to entertain doubts of the 
propriety of adhering to his father’s Presbyterian opin- 
ions, and, consequently, of entering the ministry of that 
communion ; doubts which at length terminated in his 
joining the Church of England. His father, seeing all 
opposition vain, at length consented to his repairing to 

* Life of Butler , prefixed to Professqr Fitzgerald’s very valuable 
edition of the Analogy, Dublin, 1849. The memoir is derived chiefly 
from Mr. Bartletfls more copious “ Life it is very carefully compiled, 
and is frequently cited in the present article. 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


7 


Oxford, where he was entered as a commoner of Oriel 
College, March 17, 1714. Here he early formed an inti- 
mate friendship with Mr. Edward Talbot, second son of 
the Bishop of Durham, a connection to which his future 
advancement was in a great degree owing. 

The exact period at which Butler took orders is not 
known, but it must have been before 1717, as by that 
date he was occasionally supplying Talbot’s living, 
at Hendred, near Wantage. In 1718, at the age of 
twenty-six, he was nominated preacher at the Rolls, on 
the united recommendation of Talbot and Dr. Samuel 
Clarke. 

At this time the country was in a ferment. What is 
called the “ Bangorian Controversy,” and which origin- 
ated in a sermon of Bishop Hoadley, “On the Nature 
of Christ’s Kingdom,” (a discourse supposed to imperil 
“ all ecclesiastical authority,”) was then raging. One 
pamphlet which that voluminous controversy called 
forth has been attributed to Butler. “ The external 
evidence, however, is,” as Mr. Fitzgerald judges, “but 
slight ; and the internal, for the negative, at least equal- 
ly so.” The writer says, “ On the whole, I feel unable 
to arrive at any positive decision on the subject.” 
Readers curious respecting it may consult Mr. Fitzger- 
ald’s pages, where they will find a detail of the circum- 
stances which led to the publication of the pamphlet, 
and the evidence for and against its being attributed to 
Butler. 

In 1721 Bishop Talbot presented Butler with the liv- 
ing of Haughton, near Dorkington, and Seeker (who 
had also relinquished nonconformity, and after some 
considerable fluctuations in his religious views had at 
length entered the Church) with that of Haugton-le- 
Spring. In 1725 the same liberal patron transferred 
Butler to the more lucrative benefice of Stanhope. 

He retained his situation of preacher at the Rolls till 


8 


Analogy of Religion. 


the following year, (1726,) and before quitting it, pub- 
lished the celebrated Fifteen Sermons delivered there ; 
among the most profound and original discourses which 
philosophical theologian ever gave to the world. As 
these could have been but a portion of those he preached 
at the Rolls, it has often been asked what could become 
of the remainder? We agree with Mr. Fitzgerald in 
thinking that the substance of many was afterward 
worked into the Analogy. That many of them were 
equally important with the Fifteen may be inferred 
from Butler’s declaration in the preface, that the selec- 
tion of these had been determined by “ circumstances 
in a great measure accidental.” At his death, Butler 
desired his manuscripts to be destroyed ; this he -would 
hardly have done, had he not already rifled their chief 
treasures for his great work. Let us hope so, at all 
events ; for it would be provoking to think that dis- 
courses of equal value with the Fifteen had been wan- 
tonly committed to the flames. 

After resigning his preachership at the Rolls, he re- 
tired to Stanhope, and gave himself up to study and the 
duties of a parish priest. All that could be gleaned of 
his habits and mode of life there has been preserved by 
the present Bishop of Exeter, his successor in the living 
of Stanhope eighty years after, and it is little enough. 
Tradition said that “Rector Butler rode a black pony, 
and always rode very fast ; that he was loved and re- 
spected by all his parishioners ; that he lived very retired, 
was very kind, and could not resist the importunities of 
common beggars, who, knowing his infirmity, pursued 
him so earnestly as sometimes to drive him back into his 
house as his only escape.” The last fact the bishop 
reports doubtful ; but Butler’s extreme benevolence is 
not so. 

In all probability, Butler in this seclusion was medi- 
tating and digesting that great work on which his fame, 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


9 


and what is better than fame, his usefulness, principally 
rests, the Analogy. “ In a similar retirement,” says 
Professor Fitzgerald, “The Ecclesiastical Polity of 
Hooker, The Intellectual System of Cudworth, and The 
Divine Legation of Warburton — records of genius 
‘ which posterity will not willingly let die ’ — were ripened 
into maturity.” Queen Caroline once asked Arch- 
bishop Blackburne whether Butler was not “dead.” 
“ No,” said he, “but he is buried” It was well for pos- 
terity that he was thus, for awhile, entombed. 

He remained in this meditative seclusion seven years. 
At the end of this period, his friend Seeker, who thought 
Butler’s health and spirits were failing under excess of 
solitude and study, succeeded in dragging him from his 
retreat. Lord Chancellor Talbot, at Seeker’s solicita- 
tion, appointed him his chaplain in 1733, and in 1736 
a prebendary of Rochester. In the same year, Queen 
Caroline, who thought her Court derived as much luster 
from philosophers and divines as from statesmen and 
courtiers — who had been the delighted spectator of the 
argumentative contests of Clarke and Berkeley, Hoadley 
and Sherlock — appointed Butler clerk of the closet, and 
commanded his “ attendance every evening from seven 
till nine.” 

It was in 1736 that the celebrated Analogy was pub- 
lished, and its great merits immediately attracted pub- 
lic attention. It was perpetually in the hands of his 
royal patroness, and passed through several editions 
before the author’s death. Its greatest praise is that it 
has been almost universally read, and never answered. 
“I am not aware,” says Mr. Fitzgerald, “that any of 
those whom it would have immediately concerned have 
ever attempted a regular reply to the Analogy; but 
particular parts of it have met with answers, and the 
whole, as a whole, has been sometimes unfavorably 
criticised.” Of its merits, and precise position in rela- 


IO 


Analogy of Religion. 


tion “ to those whom it immediately concerns,” we shall 
speak presently. 

Some strange criticisms on its general character in 
Tholuck’s Vermischte Scriften , showing a singular infe- 
licity in missing Butler’s true “ stand-punkt ,” as Tho- 
luck’s own countrymen would say, and rather unreason- 
ably complaining of obscurity, considering the quality 
of German theologico-philosophical style in general, are 
well disposed of by Professor Fitzgerald. (Pp. 47-50.) 

About this time Butler had some correspondence 
with Lord Kaimes, on the Evidences of Natural and Re- 
vealed Religion. Kaimes requested a personal interview, 
which Butler declined in a manner very characteristic 
of his modesty and caution. It was, “ on the score of 
his natural diffidence and reserve, his being unaccus- 
tomed to oral controversy, and his fear that the cause 
of truth might thence suffer from the unskillfulness of 
its advocate.” 

Hume was a kinsman of Lord Kaimes, and when pre- 
paring his treatise of Human Nature for the press, was 
recommended by Lord Kaimes to get Butler’s judgment 
on it. “Your thoughts and mine,” says Hume, “agree 
with respect to Dr. Butler, and I should be glad to be 
introduced to him.” The interview, however, never 
took place, nor was Butler’s judgment obtained. One 
cannot help speculating on the possible consequences. 
Would it have made any difference? 

In the year 1737 Queen Caroline died, but on her 
death-bed recommended her favorite divine to her hus- 
band’s care. In 1 738 Butler was accordingly made Bishop 
of Bristol, in place of Dr. Gooch, who was translated to 
Norwich. This seems to have been a politic stroke 
of Walpole, “who probably thought,” says Fitzgerald, 
“ that the ascetic rector of Stanhope was too unworldly 
a person to care for the poverty of his preferment, or 
perceive the slight which it implied.” In the reply, 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. ii 

however, in which Butler expresses his sense of the 
honor conferred, he shows that he understood the posi- 
tion of matters very clearly. The hint he gave seems 
to have had its effect, for in 1740 the king nominated 
him to the vacant Deanery of St. Paul’s, whereupon he 
resigned Stanhope, which he had hitherto held in com- 
mendam. The revenues of Bristol, the poorest see, did 
not exceed £400. 

A curious anecdote of Butler has been preserved by 
his domestic chaplain, Dr. Tucker, afterward Dean of 
Gloucester. He says : “ His custom was, when at Bris- 
tol, to walk for hours in his garden in the darkest night 
which the time of year could afford, and I had fre- 
quently the honor to attend him. After walking some 
time, he would stop suddenly and ask the question, 
‘ What security is there against the insanity of individ- 
uals? The physicians know of none, and as to divines 
we have no data, either from Scripture or from reason, 
to go upon in relation to this affair.’ ‘ True, My Lord, 
no man has a lease of his understanding any more than 
of his life ; they are both in the hands of the Sovereign 
Disposer of all things.’ He would then take another 
turn, and again stop short : ‘ Why might not whole com- 
munities and public bodies be seized with fits of insani- 
ty, as well as individuals ? ’ ‘ My Lord, I have never 

considered the case, and can give no opinion concern- 
ing it.’ ‘Nothing but this principle, that they are lia- 
ble to insanity equally at least with private persons, can 
account for the major part of those transactions of which 
we read in history.’ I thought little of that odd conceit 
of the bishop at that juncture ; but I own I could not 
avoid thinking of it a great deal since, and applying 
it to many cases.” 

In 1747, on the death of Archbishop Potter, it is said 
that the primacy was offered to Butler, who declined it, 
with the remark that “ it is too late for me to try to 


12 


Analogy of Religion. 


support a falling Church.” If he really said so it must 
have been in a moment of despondency, to which his 
constitutional melancholy often disposed him. No such 
feeling, at all events, prevented his accepting the bish- 
opric of Durham in 1750, on the death of Dr. Edward 
Chandler. About the time of his promotion to this dig- 
nity he was engaged in a design for consolidating and 
extending the Church of England in the American Col- 
onies. With this object he drew up a plan marked by 
his characteristic moderation and liberality; the project, 
however, came to nothing. 

Soon after his translation to the see of Durham, But- 
ler delivered and published his charge on the Use and 
Importance of External Religion, which gave rise, in 
conjunction with his erection of a “ white marble cross ” 
over the communion table in his chapel at Bristol, and 
one or two other slight circumstances, to the ridiculous 
and malignant charge of popery; a charge, as Mr. Fitz- 
gerald observes, “ destitute of a shadow of positive evi- 
dence, and contradicted by the whole tenor of Butler’s 
character, life, and writings.” 

The revenues from his see were lavishly expended in 
the support of public and private charities,* while his 
own mode of life was most simple and unostentatious. 
Of the frugality of his table the following anecdote is 
proof: “A friend of mine, since deceased, told me,” 
says the Rev. John Newton, “ that when he was a young 
man he once dined with the late Dr. Butler, at that 

* Butler must have been of a naturally munificent as well as benev- 
olent disposition. He was extremely fond, it appears, of planning 
and building; a passion not always very prudently indulged, or with- 
out danger, in early days, of involving him in difficulties ; from which, 
indeed, on one occasion Seeker’s intervention saved him. He spent 
large sums in improving his various residences. It was probably in 
the indulgence of the love of ornamentation to which this passion led 
that the “ marble cross,” and other imprudent symbols which were so 
ridiculously adduced to support the charge of popery, originated. 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


13 


time Bishop of Durham ; and, though the guest was 
a man of fortune, and the interview by appointment, 
the provision was no more than a joint of meat and a 
pudding. The bishop apologized for his plain fare by 
saying that it was his way of living ; ‘ that he had long 
been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and 
money in entertainments, and was determined that it 
should receive no countenance from his example.’ ” No 
prelate ever owed less to politics for his elevation, or 
took less part in them. If he was not “ wafted to his 
see of Durham,” as Horace Walpole ludicrously said, 
“on a cloud of metaphysics,” he certainly was not car- 
ried there by political intrigue or party maneuvers. He 
was never known to speak in the House of Peers, though 
constant in his attendance there. 

He had not long enjoyed his new dignity before 
symptoms of decay disclosed themselves. He repaired 
to Bath in 1752, in the hope of recovering his health, 
where he died, June 16, in the sixtieth year of his age. 

His face was thin and pale, but singularly expressive 
of placidity and benevolence. “ His white hair,” says 
Hutchinson,* “ hung gracefully on his shoulders, and 
his whole figure was patriarchal.” He was buried in the 
cathedral of Bristol, where two monuments have been 
erected to his memory. They record in suitable in- 
scriptions (one in Latin by his chaplain, Dr. Foster, and 
the other in English by the late Dr. Southey) his virtues 
and genius. Though epitaphs, they speak no more than 
simple truth. 

A singular anecdote is recorded of his last moments. 
As Mr. Fitzgerald observes, “ it wants direct testimony,” 
but is in itself neither uninstructive nor incredible, for 
a dying hour has often given strange vividness and in- 
tensity to truths neither previously unknown nor unin- 
fluential. It is generally given thus: “When Bishop 
* History of Durham , vol. i, p. 578 ; cited in Fitzgerald’s “ Life.” 


Analogy of Religion. 


14 

Butler lay on his death-bed, he called for his chaplain 
and said, ‘ Though I have endeavored to avoid sin, and 
to please God to the utmost of my power ; yet, from the 
consciousness of perpetual infirmities, I am still afraid 
to die.’ ‘My Lord,’ said the chaplain, ‘you have for- 
gotten that Jesus Christ is a Saviour.’ ‘True,’ was the 
answer, ‘ but how shall I know that he is a Saviour for 
me ? ’ ‘ My Lord, it is written, Him that cometh unto 

me, I will in nowise cast out.’ ‘ True,’ said the bishop, 
‘ and I am surprised that though I have read that Script- 
ure a thousand times over, I never felt its virtue till this 
moment; and now I die happy.’” 

The genius of Butler was almost equally distinguished 
by subtilty and comprehensiveness, though the latter 
quality was perhaps the most characteristic. In his 
juvenile correspondence with Clarke — already referred 
to — he displays an acuteness which, as Sir James Mack- 
intosh observes, “ neither himself nor any other ever 
surpassed an analytic skill, which, in earlier ages, 
might easily have gained him a rank with the most re- 
nowned of the schoolmen. But in his mature works, 
though they are every-where characterized by subtle 
thought, he manifests in combination with it qualities 
yet more valuable : patient comprehensiveness in the 
survey of complex evidence, a profound judgment and 
a most judicial calmness in computing its several ele- 
ments, and a singular constructive skill in combining the 
materials of argument into a consistent logical fabric. 
This “ architectural power ” of mind may be wholly or 
nearly wanting, where the mere analytic faculty may 
exist in much vigor. The latter may even be possessed 
in vicious excess, resulting in little more than the dis- 
integration of the subjects presented to its ingenuity. 
Synthetically to reconstruct the complex unity, when 
the task of analysis is completed, to assign the recipro- 
cal relations and law of subordination of its various 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


5 


parts, requires something more. Many can take a watch 
to pieces who would be sorely puzzled to put it together 
again. 

Butler possessed these powers of analysis and synthe- 
sis in remarkable equipoise. What is more, he could 
not only recombine, and present in symmetrical har- 
mony, the elements of a complex unity when capable of 
being subjected to an exact previous analysis — as in his 
remarkable sketch of the Moral Constitution of Man — 
but he had a wonderfully keen eye for detecting remote 
analogies and subtle relations where the elements are 
presented intermingled or in isolation, and insusceptible 
of being presented as a single object of contemplation 
previous to the attempt to combine them. This is the 
case with the celebrated Analogy. In the Sermons on 
Human Nature, he comprehensively surveys that nature 
as a system or constitution; and after a careful analysis 
of its principles, affections, and passions, views these 
elements in combination, endeavors to reduce each of 
these to its place, assigns to them their relative impor- 
tance, and deduces from the whole the law of subordi- 
nation — which he finds in the Moral Supremacy of Con- 
science, as a key-stone to the arch — the ruling principle 
of the “ Constitution.” In the Analogy he gathers up 
and combines, from a wide survey of scattered and dis- 
jointed facts, those resemblances and relations on which 
the argument is founded, and works them into one of 
the most original and symmetrical logical creations to 
which human genius ever gave birth. The latter task 
was by far the more gigantic of the two. To recur to 
our previous illustration, Butler is here like one who 
puts a watch together without being permitted to take 
it to pieces — from the mere presentation of its disjointed 
fragments. In the former case he resembled the physi- 
ologist who has an entire animal to study and dissect; 
in the latter he resembled Cuvier, constructing out of 


6 


Analogy of Religion. 


disjecta membra — a bone scattered here and there — an 
organized unity which man had never seen except in 
isolated fragments. 

All Butler’s productions — even his briefest — display 
much of this “ architectonic ” quality of mind ; in all he 
not only evinces a keen analytic power in discerning 
the “ differences,” (one phase of the philosophic genius, 
according to Bacon, and hardly the brightest,) but a still 
higher power of detecting the “ analogies ” and “ resem- 
blances of things,” and thus of showing their relation 
and subordination. These peculiarities make his writ- 
ings difficult ; but it makes them profound, and it gives 
them singular completeness. 

It is not difficult to assign the precise sphere in which 
Butler, with eminent gifts for abstract science in general, 
felt most at home. Facts show us, not only that there 
are peculiarities of mental structure which prompt men 
to the pursuit of some of the great objects of thought and 
speculation rather than others — peculiarities which cir- 
cumstances may determine and education modify ; but 
which neither circumstances nor education can do more 
than determine or modify; but that even in relation to 
the very same subject of speculation, there are minute 
and specific varieties of mind, which prompt men to ad- 
dict themselves rather to this part of it than to that. 
This was the case with Butler. Eminently fitted for the 
prosecution of metaphysical science in general, it is al- 
ways the philosophy of the moral nature of man to which he 
most naturally attaches himself, and on which he best 
loves to expatiate. Neither Bacon nor Pascal ever re- 
volved more deeply the phenomena of our moral nature, 
or contemplated its inconsistencies, its intricacies, its 
paradoxes, with a keener glance or more comprehensive 
survey, or drew from such survey reflections more orig- 
inal or instructive. As in reading Locke the young 
metaphysician is perpetually startled by the palpable 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 17 

apparition, in distinct, sharply defined outline, of facts of 
consciousness which he recognizes as having been par- 
tially and dimly present to his mind before — though too 
fugitive to fix, too vague to receive a name; so in read- 
ing Butler he is continually surprised by the statement 
of moral facts and laws which he then first adequately 
recognizes as true, and sees in distinct vision face to 
face. It is not without reason that Sir James Mackin- 
tosh says of the sermons preached at the Rolls, “ That 
in them Butler has taught truths more capable of being 
exactly distinguished from the doctrines of his predeces- 
sors, more satisfactorily established by him, more compre- 
hensively applied to particulars, more rationally connect- 
ed with each other, and therefore more worthy of the name 
of discovery , than any with which we are acquainted.” 

His special predilections for the sphere of speculation 
we have mentioned are strikingly indicated in his choice 
of the ground from which he proposes to survey the ques- 
tions of morals. “ There are two ways,” says he, in the 
preface to his three celebrated sermons on Human Na- 
ture, “ in which the subject of morals may be treated. 
One begins inquiring into the abstract relations of 
things ; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what 
the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their 
economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to 
determine what course of life it is which is correspond- 
ent to this whole nature.” As might be expected, from 
the tendencies of his mind, he selects his latter course. 

The powers of observation in Butler must have been, 
in spite of his studious life and his remarkable habits 
of abstraction, not much inferior to his keen faculty of 
introspection, though this last was undoubtedly the 
main instrument by which he traced so profoundly the 
mysteries of our nature. There have doubtless been 
other men, far less profound, who have had a more 
quick and more vivid perception of the peculiarities 
2 


1 8 Analogy of Religion. 

of character which discriminate individuals, or small 
classes of men, (evincing after all, however, not so 
much a knowledge of man as a knowledge of men j) 
still the masterly manner in which Butler often sketch- 
es even these, shows that he must have been a very 
sagacious observer of those phenomena of human na- 
ture which presented themselves from without, as w r ell 
as of those which revealed themselves from within. In 
general, however, it is the characteristics of man , the 
generic phenomena of our nature, in all their complex- 
ity and subtilty, that he best loves to investigate and 
exhibit. The spirit of his profound philosophy is mean- 
time worthy both of the Christian character and ample 
intellect of him who excogitated it. It is the very re- 
verse of that of the philosophical satirist or caricaturist ; 
however severely just the foibles, the inconsistencies, 
the corruptions of our nature, it is a philosophy every- 
where compassionate, magnanimous, and philanthropic. 
Its tone, indeed, like that of the philosophy of Pascal, 
(though not shaded with the same deep melancholy,) is 
entirely modulated by a profound conviction of the 
frailty and ignorance of man, of the little we know com- 
pared with what is to be known, and of the duty of 
humility, modesty, and caution, in relation to all those 
great problems of the universe, which tempt and exer- 
cise man’s ambitious speculations. His constant feeling 
amid the beautiful and original reasonings of the Anal- 
ogy, is identical with that of Newton when, reverting at 
the close of life to his sublime discoveries, he declared 
he seemed only like a child who had been amusing him- 
self with picking up a few shells on the margin of the 
ocean of universal truth, while the infinite still lay un- 
explored before him. In a word, it is the feeling, not 
only of Pascal and of Newton, but of all the profoundest 
speculators of our race, whose grandest lesson from all 
they learned was the vanishing ratio of man’s knowledge 


i9 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 

to man’s ignorance. Hence the immense value (if only 
as a discipline) of a careful study of Butler’s writings to 
every youthful mind. They cannot but powerfully 
tend to check presumption, and teach modesty and 
self-distrust. 

The feebleness of Butler’s imagination was singularly 
contrasted with the inventive and constructive qualities 
of his intellect, and the facility with which he detected 
and employed “ analogies ” in the way of argument. 
He is, indeed, almost unique in this respect. Other 
philosophic minds, (Bacon and Burke are illustrious ex- 
amples,) which have possessed similar aptitudes for 
“ analogical ” reasoning, have usually had quite suffi- 
cient of the kindred activity of imagination to employ 
“ analogies ” for the purpose of poetical illustration. If 
Butler possessed this faculty by nature in any tolerable 
measure, it must (as has been the case with some other 
great thinkers) have been repressed and absorbed by 
his habits of abstraction. His defect in this respect is, 
in some respects, to be regretted, since unquestionably 
the illustrations which imagination would have supplied 
to argument, and the graces it would .have imparted to 
style, would have made his writings both more intelligi- 
ble and more attractive. It is said that once, and once 
only, “ he courted the muses,” having indited a solitary 
“ acrostic to a fair cousin ” who for the first and, as it 
seems, the only time, inspired him with the tender 
passion. But, as one of his biographers says, we have 
probably no great reason to lament the loss of this frag- 
ment of his poetry. 

Butler’s composition is almost as destitute of wit as 
of the graces of imagination. Yet is he by no means 
without that dry sort of humor which often accompanies 
very vigorous logic, and, indeed, is in some instances 
inseparable from it ; for the neat detection of a sophism, 
or the sudden and unexpected explosion of a fallacy, ' 


20 


Analogy of Religion. 


produces much the same effect as wit on those who are 
capable of enjoying close and cogent reasoning. There 
is also a kind of simple, grave, satirical pleasantry, with 
which he sometimes states and refutes an objection, by 
no means without its piquancy. 

As to the complaint of obscurity, which has been so 
often charged on Butler’s style, it is difficult to see its 
justice in the sense which it has usually been preferred. 
He is a difficult author, no doubt, but he is so from the 
close packing of his thoughts, and their immense gener- 
ality and comprehensiveness ; as also from what may be 
called the breadth of his march, and from occasional 
lateral excursions for the purpose of disposing of some 
objection which he does not formally mention, but which 
might harass his flank ; it certainly is not from inde- 
terminate language or (ordinarily) involved construction. 
All that is really required in the reader, capable of un- 
derstanding him at all, is to do just what he does with 
lyrical poetry, (if we may employ an old, and yet in this 
one point not inapt comparison ;) he must read suffi- 
ciently often to make all the transitions of thought fa- 
miliar, he must let the mind dwell with patience on each 
argument till its entire scope and bearing are properly 
appreciated. Nothing certainly is wanting in the method 
or arrangement of the thoughts, and the diction seems 
to us selected with the utmost care and precision. In- 
deed, as Professor Fitzgerald justly observes, a colla- 
tion of the first with the subsequent editions of the 
Analogy (the variations are given in Mr. Fitzgerald’s 
edition) will show, by the nature of the alterations, what 
pains Butler bestowed on a point on which he is errone- 
ously supposed to have been negligent. In subjects so 
abstruse, and involving so much generality of expression, 
the utmost difficulty must always be experienced in se- 
lecting language which conveys neither more nor less 
than what is intended ; and this point Butler must have 


21 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 

labored immensely, it may be added successfully, since 
he has at least produced works which have seldom giv- 
en rise to disputes as to his meaning. Though he may 
be difficult to be understood, few people complain of 
his being liable to be tfzmmderstood. In short, it may 
be doubted whether any man of so comprehensive a 
mind, and dealing with such abstract subjects, ever con- 
densed the results of twenty years’ meditations into so 
small a compass with so little obscurity. No doubt 
greater amplification would have made him more pleas- 
ing, but it may be questioned whether the perusal of his 
writings would have been so useful a discipline, and 
whether the truths he has delivered would have fixed 
themselves so indelibly as they now generally do in the 
minds of all who diligently study him. It is the result 
of the very activity of mind his writings stimulate and 
demand. But, at any rate, if precision in the use of 
language, and method and consecutiveness in the 
thoughts, are sufficient to rebut the charge of obscurity, 
Butler is not chargeable with the fault in the ordinary 
sense. We must never forget what Whately in his 
Rhetoric has so well illustrated — that perspicuity is a 
“ relative quality.” To the intelligent, or those who are 
willing to take sufficient pains to understand, Butler will 
not seem chargeable with obscurity. The diction is 
plain, downright Saxon-English, and the style, however 
homely, has, as the writer just mentioned observes, the 
great charm of transparent simplicity of purpose and 
unaffected earnestness. 

The immortal Analogy has probably done more to si- 
lence the objections of infidelity than any other ever 
written, from the earliest “ apologies ” downward. It 
not only most critically met the spirit of unbelief in the 
author’s own day, but is equally adapted to meet that 
which chiefly prevails in all time. In every age some of 
the principal, perhaps the principal, objections to the 


22 


Analogy of Religion. 


Christian Revelation have been those which men’s pre- 
conceptions of the Divine character and administration — 
of what God must be, and what God must do — have sug- 
gested against certain facts in the sacred history, or cer- 
tain doctrines it reveals. To show the objector then 
(supposing him to be a theist, as nine tenths of all such 
objectors have been) that the very same or similar dif- 
ficulties are found in the structure of the universe and 
the divine administration of«ir, is to wrest every such 
weapon completely from his hands, if he be a fair rea- 
soner and remains a theist at all. He is bound by strict 
logical obligation either to show that the parallel diffi- 
culties do not exist, or to show how he can solve them, 
while he cannot solve those of the Bible. In default of 
doing either of these things, he ought either to renounce 
all such objections to Christianity, or abandon theism al- 
together. It is true, therefore, that though Butler leaves 
the alternative of atheism open, he hardly leaves any oth- 
er alternative to nine tenths of the theists who have ob- 
jected to Christianity. 

It has been sometimes said, by way of reproach, that 
Butler does leave that door open ; that his work does not 
confute the atheist. The answer is, that it is not its ob- 
ject to confute atheism ; but it is equally true, that it 
does not diminish by one grain any of the arguments 
against it. It leaves the evidence for theism — every 
particle of it — just where it was. Butler merely avails 
himself of facts which exist, undeniably exist, (whether 
men be atheists or theists,) to neutralize a certain class 
of objections against Christianity. And, as the exhibi- 
tion of such facts as form the pivot on which Butler’s 
argument turns does not impugn the truth of theism, but 
leaves its conclusions, and the immense preponderance 
and convergence of evidence which establish them, just 
as they were, so it is equally true that Butler has suffi- 
ciently guarded his argument from any perversion ; for 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


23 


example, in Part I, chap, vi, and Part II, chap. viii. He 
has also, with his accustomed acuteness and judgment, 
shown that, even on the principles of atheism itself, its 
confident assumption that, if its principles be granted, 
a future life, future happiness, future misery, is a 
dream — cannot be depended on; for since men have 
existed, they may again ; and if in a bad condition now, 
in a worse hereafter. It is not, on such an hypothesis, 
a whit more unaccountable that man’s life should be re- 
newed or preserved, or perpetuated forever, than that 
it should have been originated at all. On this point 
he truly says, “ That we are to live hereafter is just 
as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as 
well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now 
alive, is; and therefore nothing can be more absurd 
than to argue from that scheme that there can be no 
future state.” 

It has been also alleged that the analogy only “ shifts 
the difficulty from revealed to natural religion,” and that 
“ atheists might make use of the arguments, and have 
done so.” The answer is, not only (as just said) that the 
arguments of Butler leave every particle of the evidence 
for theism just where it was, and that he has sufficient- 
ly guarded against all abuse of them ; but that the facts, 
of which it is so foolishly said that the atheist might 
make ill use, had always been the very arguments which 
he had used, and of which Butler only made a new and 
beneficial application. The objections with which he 
perplexes and baffles the deist, he did not give to the 
atheist’s armory; he took them from thence merely to 
make an unexpected and more legitimate use of them. 
The atheist had never neglected such weapons, nor was 
likely to do so, previous to Butler’s adroit application of 
them. The charge is ridiculous. As well might a man, 
who had wrested a stiletto from an assassin to defend 
himself, be accused of having put the weapon into the 


24 


Analogy of Religion. 


assassin’s hands ! It was there before ; he merely wrest- 
ed it thence. It is just so with Butler. 

Further, we cannot but think that the conclusiveness 
of Butler’s work as against its true object, The Deist, 
has often been underrated by many even of its genuine 
admirers. Thus Dr. Chalmers, for instance, who gives 
such glowing proofs of his admiration of the work, and 
expatiates in a congenial spirit on its merits, affirms 
that “ those overrate the power of analogy who look to it 
for any very distinct or positive contribution to the Chris- 
tian argument. To repel objections, in fact, is the great 
service which analogy has rendered to the cause of Rev- 
elation, and it is the only service which we seek for at 
its hands.” * This, abstractedly, is true ; but in /act, 
considering the position of the bulk of the objectors, that 
they have been invincibly persuaded of the truth of 
theism, and that their objections to Christianity have 
been exclusively or chiefly of the kind dealt with in the 
Analogy , the work is much more than an argumentumad 
hominetnj it is not simply of negative value. To such 
objectors it logically establishes the truth of Christianity, 
or it forces them to recede from theism, which the bulk 
will not do. If a man says, “ I am invincibly persuad- 
ed of the truth of proposition A, but I cannot receive 
proposition B, because objections a (3 y are opposed to 
it; if these were removed, my objections would cease;” 
then, if you can show that a (3 y equally apply to the 
proposition A, his reception of which, he says, is based 
on invincible evidence, you do really compel such a 
man to believe that not only B may be true, but that it 
is true, unless he be willing (which few in the parallel 
case are) to abandon proposition A as well as B. This 
is precisely the condition in which the majority of deists 
have ever been, if we may judge from their writings. 
It is usually the a priori assumption, that certain facts 

* Prelections on Butler , etc., p. 7. 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


25 


in the history of the Bible, or some portions of its doc- 
trine, are unworthy of the Deity, and incompatible with 
his character or administration, that has chiefly excited 
the incredulity of the deist ; far more than any dissatis- 
faction with the positive evidence which substantiates 
the Divine origin of Christianity. Neutralize these ob- 
jections by showing that they are equally applicable to 
what he declares he cannot relinquish — the doctrine of 
theism — and you show him, if he has a particle of logical 
sagacity, not only that Christianity may be true, but 
that it is so ; and his only escape is by relapsing into 
atheism, or resting his opposition on other objections of 
a very feeble character in comparison, and which, prob- 
ably, few would have ever been contented with alone ; 
for apart from these objections which Butler repels, the 
historical evidence of Christianity — the evidence on be- 
half of the integrity of its records, and the honesty and 
sincerity of its founders, showing that they could not 
have constructed such a system if they would, and would 
not, supposing them impostors, if they could — is stronger 
than that for any fact in history. 

In consequence of this position of the argument, But- 
ler’s book, to large classes of objectors, though practi- 
cally an argumentum ad hominem , not only proves Chris- 
tianity may be true, but in all logical fairness proves it 
is so. This he himself, with his usual judgment, points 
out. He says : “And objections, which are equally ap- 
plicable to both natural and revealed religion, are, 
properly speaking, answered by its being shown that 
they are so , provided the former be admitted to be true." 

The praise which Mackintosh bestowed on this great 
work is alike worthy of it and himself. “ Butler’s great 
work, though only a commentary on the singularly orig- 
inal and pregnant passage of Origen, which is so honestly 
prefixed to it as a motto, is, notwithstanding, the most 
original and profound work extant in any language on 


26 


Analogy of Religion. 


the Philosophy of Religion.”* The favorite topics of 
the Sermons are, of course, largely insisted on in the 
Analogy : such as the “ignorance of man;” the restric- 
tions which the limitations of his nature and his position 
in the universe should impose on his speculations ; his 
subjection to “probability as the guide of life;” the 
folly and presumption of pronouncing, h priori , on the 
character and conduct of the Divine Ruler from our 
contracted point of view, and our glimpses of but a very 
small segment of his universal plan. These topics 
Butler enforces with a power not less admirable than 
the sagacity with which he traces the analogies between 
the “ Constitution and Course of Nature,” and the dis- 
closures of “ Divine Revelation.” These last, of course, 
form the staple of the argument ; but to enforce the 
proper deductions from them the above favorite topics 
are absolutely essential. 

It has been sometimes, though erroneously, surmised 
that Butler was considerably indebted to preceding 
writers. That in the progress of the long deistical con- 
troversy many theologians should have caught glimpses 
of the same line of argument, is not wonderful. The 
constant iteration by the English deists of that same 
class of difficulties to which the Analogy replies, could 
not fail to lead to a partial perception of the powerful 
instrument it was reserved for Butler effectually to wield. 
It has been here as with almost every other great intel- 
lectual achievement of man ; many minds have been 
simultaneously engaged by the natural progress of events 
about the same subject of thought; there have been 
“coming shadows” and “vague anticipations,” perhaps 

* A far different and utterly inconsistent judgment in all respects 
is reported, in his “ Life,” to have fallen from him. But as Professor 
Fitzgerald shows, it is so strangely, and, indeed, amusingly contrary 
to the above, that it must have been founded on some mistake of 
something that must have been said in conversation. 


27 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 

even simultaneous inventions or discoveries ; and then 
ensues much debate as to the true claimants. Thus it 
was in relation to the calculus, the analysis of water, 
the invention of the steam-engine, and the discovery of 
Neptune. 

In the present case, however, there can be no doubt 
that the merit of the systematic construction of the en- 
tire argument rests with Butler. Nor would it have much 
detracted from his merit, even if he had derived far 
larger fragments of the fabric from his contemporaries 
than we have any reason to believe he did. They 
would have been but single stones; the architectural 
genius which brought them from their distant quarries 
and polished them, and wrought them into a massive 
evidence, was his alone. 

Professor Fitzgerald has truly remarked, that the work 
of Dr. James Foster against Tindal (an author Butler 
evidently has constantly in his eye) presents some curi- 
ous parallelisms with certain passages of the Analogy. We 
have ourselves noted in Conybeare’s reply to the same 
infidel writer (published six years before the Analogy) 
other parallelisms not less striking. But it seems quite 
improbable that Butler should have derived aid from 
any such sources, since his work was being excogitated 
for many years before it was published ; nay, as we have 
seen, it may be conjectured that he largely transfused 
into it portions of the sermons delivered so long before 
at the Rolls, and of which a far greater number must 
have been preached than the fifteen he published ; so 
that, perhaps, it is more near the truth to say that con- 
temporary writers had been indebted to him than he to 
them. 

The “ pregnant sentence ” from Origen, however, is 
not the only thing which may have suggested to Butler 
his great work. Berkeley, in a long passage of the 
“Minute Philosopher,” cited by Mr. Fitzgerald, clearly 


28 


Analogy of Religion. 


lays down the principle on which such a work as the 
Analogy might be constructed. 

The spirit of the Analogy is admirable. Though em- 
inently controversial in its origin and purpose ; and 
though the author must constantly have had the deistical 
writers of the day in his eye, his work is calm and dig- 
nified, and divested of every trace of the controversial 
spirit. He does not even mention the names of the 
men whose opinions he is refuting ; and if their systems 
had been merely some new minerals or aerolites dropped 
upon the world from some unknown sphere, he could 
not have analyzed them with less of passion. 

Of Butler’s ethical philosophy, as expounded especial- 
ly in the Sermons on Human Nature , Sir James Mackin- 
tosh’s remarks prefixed to this Encyclopaedia* super- 
sede further notice in the present brief article. But it 
may be remarked in general of the sermons preached at 
the Rolls, that though not so much read (if we except, 
perhaps, the three just mentioned) as the Analogy , they 
are to the full as worthy of being read ; they deserve 
all that is so strikingly said of them in the Preliminary 
Dissertation. Some of them fill one with wonder at the 
sagacity with which the moral paradoxes in human na- 
ture are investigated and reconciled. Take, for exam- 
ple, the sermon on Balaam. The. first feeling in many 
a mind on reading the history in the Old Testament is, 
that man could not so act in the given circumstances. 
We doubt if ever any man deeply pondered the sermon 
of Butler, in which he dwells on the equally unaccount- 
able phenomena of human conduct, less observed, in- 
deed, only because more observable, and questioned 
any longer man’s powers of self-deception, even to such 
feats of folly and wickedness as are recorded of the ' 
prophet. 

The editions of Butler’s writings, separately or alto- 
* Encyclopaedia Britannica. 


Sketch of Joseph Butler. 


29 


gether, have been numerous, and it is impossible within 
the limits of this article to specify them, still less to do 
justice to the literature which they have produced. His 
commentators have been many and most illustrious : 
seldom has a man who wrote so little engaged so many 
great minds to do him homage by becoming his expo- 
nents and annotators. It may be permitted, however, to 
mention with deserved honor the remarks of Sir James 
Mackintosh, prefixed to this Encyclopaedia ; the “ Pre- 
lections ” of Dr. Chalmers on the Analogy; the valuable 
“Essay” of Dr. Hampden on the “Philosophical Evi- 
dences of Christianity;” some beautiful applications of 
Butler’s principle in Whately’s “ Essays on the Pecul- 
iarities of Christianity;” and the admirable edition of 
the Analogy by Professor Fitzgerald, which is enriched 
by many very acute and judicious notes, and by a 
copious and valuable index. 


ADVERTISEMENT PREFIXED TO THE FIRST 
EDITION. 


I F the reader should meet here with any thing which 
he had not before attended to, it will not be in 
the observations upon the constitution and course of 
nature, these being all obvious ; but in the application 
of them : in which, though there is nothing but what 
appears to me of some real weight, and therefore of 
great importance, yet he will observe several things 
which will appear to him of very little, if he can think 
things to be of little importance which are of any real 
weight at all upon such a subject as religion. How- 
ever, the proper force of the following treatise lies in 
the whole general analogy considered together. 

It is come, I know not how, to be taken for granted, 
by many persons, that Christianity is not so much a 
subject of inquiry, but that it is now at length discov- 
ered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as 
if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among 
all people of discernment, and nothing remained but to 
set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as 
it were, by way of reprisals for its having so long inter- 
rupted the pleasures of the world. On the contrary, 
thus much, at least, will be here found — not taken for 
granted, but proved — that any reasonable man who will 
thoroughly consider the matter may be as much assured 
as he is of his own being, that it is not, however, so clear 
a case that there is nothing in it. There is, I think, 
strong evidence of its truth ; but it is certain no one 
can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the con- 
trary. And the practical consequence to be drawn from 
this is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it. 
May , 1736. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 

Sketch of Joseph Butler 5 

Introduction 33 



PART I. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION. 

Chapter 

I. Of a Future Life 45 

II. Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pun- 
ishments, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER 69 

III. Of the Moral Government of God 84 

IV. Of a State of Probation, as Implying Trial, Dif- 

ficulties, and Danger 113 

V. Of a State of Probation, as Intended for Moral 

Discipline and Improvement 124 

VI. Of the Opinion of Necessity, Considered as In- 
fluencing Practice 152 

VII. Of the Government of God, Considered as a 
Scheme or Constitution, Imperfectly Compre- 
hended 171 

Conclusion.... 184 


32 


Contents. 


PART II. 

OF REVEALED RELIGION. 

Chapter Page 

I. Of the Importance of Christianity 191 

II. Of the Supposed Presumption against a Revela- 
tion, Considered as Miraculous 212 

III. Of our Incapacity of Judging what were to be 

Expected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, 
from Analogy, that it must Contain Things 
Appearing Liable to Objections 222 

IV. Of Christianity, Considered as a Scheme or Con- 

stitution, Imperfectly Comprehended 240 

V. Of the Particular System of Christianity ; the 
Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemp- 
tion of the World by him 249 

VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation; 

AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF 
OF IT 271 

VII. Of the Particular Evidence for Christianity . . 292 

VIII. Of the Objections which may be made against 
Arguing from the Analogy of Nature to Re- 
ligion * 333 

Conclusion 347 

DISSERTATIONS. 

I. Of Personal Identity 35 7 

II. Of the Nature of Virtue 365 

Index 377 


INTRODUCTION. 


P ROBABLE Evidence is essentially distinguished 
from Demonstrative by this, that it admits of de- 
grees ; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral 
certainty to the very lowest presumption. Difference be- 
We cannot, indeed, say a thing is probably SSneSSSSt 
true upon one very slight presumption for tive Evidence, 
it ; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides 
of a question, there may be some against it ; and though 
there be not, yet a slight presumption does not beget 
that degree of conviction which is implied in saying a 
thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible 
presumption is of the nature of a probability appears 
from hence — that such low presumption, often repeated, 
will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man’s hav- 
ing observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords 
some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, 
that it may happen again to-morrow. But the observa- 
tion of this event for so many days, and months, and 
ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives 
us a full assurance that it will. 

2. That which chiefly constitutes Probability is ex- 
pressed in the word likely , that is, like some truth * or 
true event ; like it in itself, in its evidence, in Likeness con- 
some more or fewer of its circumstances. f biiity. 

* Verisimile. 

f [“ Like it in itself,” seems to indicate the case in which we have 
ascertained the whole nature of the truth or known fact ; for example, 
ascertained the whole of the conditions upon which a given conse- 
3 


34 


Analogy of Religion. 


For when we determine a thing to be probably true — • 
suppose that an event has or will come to pass — it is 
from the mind’s remarking in it a likeness to some 
other event which we have observed has come to pass. 
And this observation forms, in numberless daily in- 
stances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that 
such event has or will come to pass ; according as the 
observation is, that the like event has sometimes, most 
commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, 
come to pass at like distances of time, or place, or upon 

like occasions. Hence arises the belief that 

Illustrations. ......... ... 

a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow 
up to the stature and strength of a man ; that food will 
contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want 
of it for such a number of days, be its certain destruc- 
tion. So, likewise, the rule and measure of our hopes 
and fears concerning the success of our pursuits ; our 
expectations that others will act so and so in such cir- 
cumstances ; and our judgment that such actions proceed 
from such principles ; — all these rely upon our having 
observed the like, to what we hope, fear, expect, judge ; 
I say upon our having observed the like, either with re- 
spect to others or ourselves. And thus, whereas the 
prince * who had always lived in a warm climate natu- 
rally concluded, in the way of analogy, that there was no 
such thing as water’s becoming hard, because he had al- 
ways observed it to be fluid and yielding ; — we, on the 
contrary, from analogy, conclude that there is no pre- 
sumption at all against this; that it is supposable there 

quence takes place. This is the case of a strict induction. “ Like in 
its evidence,” when the same testimony or proof which we have found 
Credible for some cases leads us to believe something else. “ Like it 
in some more or fewer of its circumstances,” refers to analogies, in the 
popular sense of the term, as before explained. — F.] 

* The story is told by Mr. Locke, in the chapter^on Probability. 
Essay on the Human Understanding, book iv, chap, xv, § 5. 


Introduction. 


35 


may be frost in England any given day in January next ; 
probable that there will on some day of the month ; and 
that there is a moral certainty, that is, ground for an 
expectation, without any doubt of it, in some part or 
other of the winter. 

3. Probable Evidence, in its very nature, affords but 
an imperfect kind of information, and is to be consid- 
ered as relative only to beings of limited probability the 
capacities. For nothing which is the possi- fjSuktion^and 
ble object of knowledge, whether past, pres- Practlce - 
ent, or future, can be probable to an Infinite Intelli- 
gence ; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely, as it 
is in itself, certainly true or certainly false. But, to us, 
probability is the very guide of life. 

From these things it follows, that in questions of diffi- 
culty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory 
evidence cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of 
examination be, that there appears, upon the whole, any, 
even the lowest, presumption on one side, and none on the 
other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in 
the lowest degree greater, this determines the question, 
even in matters of speculation ; and, in matters of prac- 
tice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, 
in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that 
presumption, or low probability, though it be so low as 
to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth.* 
For surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do 
what, upon the whole, appears according to the best of 
his judgment to be for his happiness, as what he cer- 
tainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of 
great consequence, a reasonable man will think it con- 

11* This course is reasonable, but more is required in religion. Its 
evidence must be sufficient not only to show how its duties may be 
performed, and to indicate the prudence of obedience, but strong 
enough to cause full belief in a reasonable mind. Belief is a condi- 
tion of salvation, and is involved in full submission to God.] 


36 


Analogy of Religion. 


cerns him to remark lower probabilities and presump- 
tions than these ; such as amount to no more than show- 
ing one side of a question to be as supposable and cred- 
ible as the other ; nay, such as but amount to much less 
even than this. For numberless instances might be men- 
tioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a 
man would be thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who 
would not act, and with great application, too, not only 
upon an even chance, but upon much less, and where the 
probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.* 
4. It is not my design to inquire further into the 
nature, the foundation, and measure of probability ; or 
Analogy of whence it proceeds, that likeness should be- 
KdthstendSg get that presumption, opinion, and full con- 
objections. viction which the human mind is formed to 
receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce 
in every one ; or to guard against the errors to which 
reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the 
subject of logic,f and is a part of that subject which has 
not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed, I shall 
not take upon me to say how far the extent, compass, and 
force of analogical reasoning can be reduced to general 
heads and rules, and the whole be formed into a system. 
But though so little in this way has been attempted by 
those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and 
the exercise of them, this does not hinder but that we may 
be, as we unquestionably are, assured that analogy is of 
weight, in various degrees, toward determining our judg- 
ment, and our practice. Nor does it in any wise cease 
to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either 
given to dispute, or who require things to be stated with 
greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of 
in practical matters, may find other cases, in which it is 
not easy to say whether it be, or be not, of any weight ; 

* See part ii, chap. vi. 

[f See Mills’ System of Logic, book iii, chap, xx.] 


Introduction. 


3 7 


or instances of seeming analogies, which are really of 
none. It is enough to the present purpose to observe, 
that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, 
just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a 
question but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be 
seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and 
not in that of a square. 

5. Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* 
has with singular sagacity observed, that “ he who be- 
lieves the Scripture to have proceeded from 

Ongen’s re- 

Him who is the Author of Nature, may well mark— its appii- 

1 . cation. 

expect to find the same sort of difficulties in 
it as tire found in the constitution of nature.” And in 
a like way of reflection, it may be added, that he who 
denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon ac- 
count of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, 
deny the world to have been formed by him. On the 
other hand, if there be an analogy, or likeness, between 
that system of things and dispensation of Providence 
which revelation informs us of, and that system of 
things and dispensation of Providence* which experi- 
ence, together with reason, informs us of, that is, the 
known course of nature, this is a presumption that 
they have both the same author and cause, at least 
so far as to answer objections against the former be- 
ing from God, drawn from any thing which is analog- 
ical or similar to what is in the latter, which is ac- 
knowledged to be from him ; for an author of nature is 
here supposed. 

* Xpr/ [lev tol ye tov air at; napadet-dpevov tov KnaavTog tov Koapov 
elvai Tavrag rag ypa<j>dg neneloOcu, bn baa nepl Trjg icrioeog diravra 
Tolg (tjtovol tov Tvepl avrr/g loyov, rain a nal tt egl tuv ygatyuv. Phi- 
local., p. 23, Ed. Cant. [This sagacious remark is, however, strange- 
ly misapplied by Origen to the establishment of one of his favorite 
theories — that there is a mystical meaning in every word, and even 
letter, of Scripture. — F.] 


38 


Analogy of Religion. 


6. Forming our notions of the constitution and gov- 
ernment of the world upon reasoning, without founda- 
tion for the principles which we assume, whether from 
the attributes of God or any thing else, is building 

a world upon hypothesis, like Descartes. 

Hypothesis 1 ' r ’ . 

vain— Analogy Forming our notions upon reasoning from 

allowable. ... , . . . . .. , , 

principles which are certain, but applied to 
cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like 
those who explain the structure of the human body, and 
the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathe- 
matics, without sufficient data,) is an error much akin 
to the former ; since what is assumed in order to make 
the reasoning applicable is hypothesis. But it must be 
allowed, just to join abstract reasonings with the ob- 
servation of facts, and argue from such facts as are 
known to others that are like them ; from that part of 
the divine government over intelligent creatures which 
comes under our view, to that larger and more general 
government over them which is beyond it ; and, from 
what is present, to collect what is likely, credible, or 
not incredible, will be hereafter. 

7. This method, then, of concluding and determining 
being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we can- 

This method n0t ^ Ut aCt U P 0n common pursuits of 

conclusive — a P - life; being evidently conclusive, in various 
degrees, proportionable to the degree and 
exactness of the whole analogy or likeness ; and having 
so great authority for its introduction into the subject 
of religion, even revealed religion, my design is to apply 
it to that subject in general, both natural and revealed ; 
taking for proved that there is an intelligent author of 
nature, and natural governor of the world. For as 
there is no presumption against this prior to the proof 
of it, so it has been often proved, with accumulated evi- 
dence, from this argument of analogy and final causes, 
from abstract reasonings, from the most ancient tradition 


Introduction. 


39 


and testimony, and from the general consent of mankind. 
Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be denied by 
the generality of those who profess themselves dissatis- 
fied with the evidence of religion. 

8. As there are some who, instead of thus attending 
to what is in fact the constitution of nature, form their 
notions of God’s government upon hypothe- ula 

sis, so there are others who indulge them- tions— their re- 
selves in vain and idle speculations, how 
the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than 
it is ; and upon supposition that things might, in imag- 
ining that they should, have been disposed and carried 
on after a better model than what appears in the pres- 
ent disposition and conduct of them. Suppose, now, a 
person of such a turn of mind to go on with his reveries, 
till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of 
nature as appearing to him the best — one shall scarce 
be thought guilty of detraction against human under- 
standing if one should say, even beforehand, that the 
plan which this speculative person would fix upon, 
though he were the wisest of the sons of men, prob- 
ably would not be the very best, even according to 
his own notions of best j whether he thought that to be 
so which afforded occasions and motives for the exer- 
cise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of 
the greatest happiness; or that these two were neces- 
sarily connected, and ran up into one and the same plan. 
However, it may not be amiss, once for all, to see what 
•would be the amount of these emendations and imagin- 
ary improvements upon the system of nature, or how 
far they would mislead us. And it seems there could 
be no stopping till we came to some such conclusions 

[* In an illustration of these idle speculations, see Bayle's Response 
aux Questions d'un Provincial. See also notes to the Articles 
Manichseus, Origen, Paulicians, in Bayle’s Critical Dictionary. Fitz- 
gerald supposes Butler had Bayle in mind in this passage.] 


40 


Analogy of Religion. 


as these : — That all creatures should at first * be made as 
perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever be- 
ing ; that nothing, to be sure, of hazard or danger should 
be put upon them to do, (some indolent persons would 
perhaps think, nothing at all,) or certainly, that effectual 
care should be taken that they should, whether necessa- 
rily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do what 
was right and most conducive to happiness, which would 
be thought easy for infinite power to effect ; either by 
not giving them any principles which would endanger 
their going wrong, or by laying the right motive of ac- 
tion, in every instance, before their minds continually in 
so, strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them 
to act conformably to it ; and that the whole method of 
government by punishments should be rejected as ab- 
surd ; as an awkward, roundabout method of carrying 
things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose for 
which it would be supposed creatures were made, 
namely, happiness. 

9. Now, without considering what is to be said in 
particular to the several parts of this train of folly and 
No faculties extrava g ance > what has been above intimat- 
for such specu- e d is a full, direct, general answer to it. 
shown in little namely, that we may see beforehand that we 

affairs, etc. J J 

have not faculties for this kind of specula- 
tion. For though it be admitted, that, from the first 
principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or deter- 
mine some ends to be absolutely in themselves prefera- 
ble to others, and that the ends now mentioned, or, if 
they run up into one, that this one is absolutely the best, 
and, consequently, that we must conclude the ultimate 
end designed in the constitution of nature and conduct 
of Providence is the most virtue and happiness possible, 
yet we are far from being able to judge what particular 


[* That is, from birth, without the results of experience.] 


Introduction. 


4i 

disposition of things would be most friendly and assist- 
ant to virtue ; or what means might be absolutely nec- 
essary to produce the most happiness in a system of 
such extent as our own world may be, taking in all that 
is past and to come, though we should suppose it de- 
tached from the whole of things. Indeed, we are so far 
from being able to judge of this that we are not judges 
what may be the necessary means of raising and con- 
ducting one person to the highest perfection and happi- 
ness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs of the 
present life, we find men of different educations and 
ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each 
other. Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral 
perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him. 
And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral 
character to such as will consider what a practical proof 
is, because it is the voice of God speaking in us. And 
from hence we conclude, that virtue must be the happi- 
ness, and vice the misery, of every creature ; and that 
regularity, and order, and right, cannot but prevail final- 
ly, in a universe under his government. But we are in no 
sort judges what are the necessary means of accomplish- 
ing this end. 

io. Let us, then, instead of that idle, and not very in- 
nocent, employment of forming imaginary models of a 
world, and schemes of governing it, turn our compare the 
thoughts to what we experience to be the ture h S S Rehg- 
conduct of nature with respect to intelli- ion * 
gent creatures ; which maybe resolved into general laws 
or rules of administration, in the same way as many of 
the laws of nature respecting inanimate matter may be 
collected from experiments. And let us compare the 
known constitution and course of things with what is 
said to be the moral system of nature ; the acknowl- 
edged dispensations of Providence, or that government 
which we find ourselves under, with what religion 


42 


Analogy of Religion. 


teaches us to believe and expect, and see whether they 
are not analogous and of a piece. And upon such a 
comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very 
much so; that both may be traced up to the same 
general laws, and resolved into the same principles 
of Divine conduct. 

n. The analogy here proposed to be considered is of 
pretty large extent, and consists of several parts; in 
_ A x , some more, in others less exact. In some 

The extent o? . ’ . 

Analogy— what few instances, perhaps, it may amount to a 
real practical proof, in others not so ; yet in 
these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise. 
It will undeniably show, what too many want to have 
shown them, that the system of religion, both natural 
and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior to 
the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that 
of nature be so too. And it will afford an answer to 
almost all objections against the system both of natural 
and of revealed religion ; though not, perhaps, an answer 
in so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree 
an answer, to the objections against the evidence of it ; 
for objections against a proof, and objections against 
what is said to be proved, the reader will observe, are 
different things: 

12. Now the Divine government of the world, implied 
in the notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, 
contains in it, — That mankind is appointed 
vine Govern- to live in a future state, (chap, i;) that there 

ment contains. , .. , - , . . . 

every one shall be rewarded or punished, 
(chap, ii ;) rewarded or punished respectively for all 
that behavior here which we comprehend under the 
words virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil, (chap, 
iii ;) that our present life is a probation, a state of trial 
(chap, iv) and of discipline (chap, v) for that future one, 
notwithstanding the objections which men may fancy 
they have, from notions of necessity, against there being 


Introduction. 


43 


any such moral plan as this at all, (chap, vi ;) and what- 
ever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom 
and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made 
known to us at present, (chap, vii ;) that this world be- 
ing in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and conse- 
quently of ruin, and the sense both of their condition 
and duty being greatly corrupted among men, this gave 
occasion for an additional dispensation of Providence, 
of the utmost importance, (part ii, chap, i,) proved by 
miracles, (chap, ii,) but containing in it many things ap- 
pearing to us strange, and not to have been expected, 
(chap, iii ;) a dispensation of Providence, which is a 
scheme or system of things, (chap, iv,) carried on 
by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in 
order to the recovery of the world, (chap, v;) yet not 
revealed to all men, nor proved with the strongest pos- 
sible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed ; but 
only to such a part of mankind, and with such par- 
ticular evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit. 
Chap, vi, vii. 

13. The design, then, of the following Treatise will 
be to show that the several parts principally objected 
against in this moral and Christian dispen- The design of 
sation, including its scheme, its publication, this Treatise * 
and the proof which God has afforded us of its truth ; 
that the particular parts principally objected against in 
this whole dispensation are analogous to what is expe- 
rienced in the constitution and course of nature or 
providence ; that the chief objections themselves which 
are alleged against the former, are no other than what 
may be alleged with like justness against the latter, 
where they are found in fact to be inconclusive ; and that 
this argument from analogy is in general unanswer- 
able, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion, 
(chap, viii,) notwithstanding the objections which may 
seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there 


44 


Analogy of Religion. 


may be for difference of opinion as to the particular de- 
gree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a 
general account of what may be looked for in the fol- 
lowing Treatise. And I shall begin it with that which 
is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears — 
all our hopes and fears which are of any consideration — • 
I mean a Future Life. 


THE 


ANALOGY OF RELIGION. 


PART I. 

OF NATURAL RELIGION. 


CHAPTER I. 

OF A FUTURE LIFE.* 

S TRANGE difficulties have been raised by some con- 
cerning personal identity, or the sameness of living 
agents, implied in the notion of our existing 

° r & Difficulties — 

now and hereafter, or in any two successive the question^ to 

moments ; which whoever thinks it worth 

while may see considered in the first ^Dissertation at 

the end of this Treatise. But, without regard to any of 

them here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, 

and the several changes which we have undergone, and 

those which we know we may undergo without being 

destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or 

may not, have upon' us ; and whether it be not from 

thence probable that we may survive this change, and 

exist in a future state of life and perception. 

2. I. From our being born into the present world in 

[* Chalmers regards this chapter as the least satisfactory in the 
book, because it is infected with the obscure metaphysics of the age. 
He particularly alludes, to what Butler says of the indivisibility of 
consciousness, and his argument based on this. The argument is 
analyzed and severely criticised in Duke’s Systematic Analysis of the 
Analogy, Appendix I. See also Whately’s Essays on Some of the 
Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, page 63.] 


[Part I. 


46 Analogy of Religion. 

the helpless, imperfect state of infancy, and having ar- 
„ rived from thence to mature age, we find it 

The law of & . 

change indicates to be a general law of nature, in our own 

a future life. . 

species, that the same creatures, the same 
individuals, should exist in degrees of life and percep- 
tion, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffer- 
ing, in one period of their being greatly different from 
those appointed them in another period of it. And in 
other creatures the same law holds. For the difference 
of their capacities and states of life at their birth (to go 
no higher) and in maturity ; the change of worms into 
flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers 
by such change ; and birds and insects bursting the 
shell, their habitation, and by this means entering into 
a new world, furnished with new accommodations for 
them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them 
— these are instances of this general law of nature. 
Thus all the various and wonderful transformations of 
animals are to be taken into consideration here. But 
the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, 
in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as different 
from our present, in mature age, as it is possible to con- 
ceive any two states or degrees of life can be. There- 
fore, that we are to exist hereafter in a state as different 
(suppose) from our present as this is from our former, is 
but according to the analogy of nature; according to a 
natural order or appointment of the very same kind 
with what we have already experienced.* 

* [I am not sure that this, at least at the present stage of the ar- 
gument, is a perfectly fair statement of the matter. For there is this 
essential difference between the state in which death appears to place 
us, and any state previously known by experience — that in the former 
we seem wholly deprived of any bodily organization. Previous expe- 
rience might, indeed, go the length of showing that a thinking being 
might continue the same, and retain the exercise of its living powers, 
under infinite varieties of organization. But this surely is a different 
thing from continuance without any organization whatever, nor capa- 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


47 


3. II. We know that we are endued with capacities 
of action, of happiness, and misery ; for we are con- 
scious of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and of _ 

rr • • , The law of 

suffering pain. Now, that we have these continuance in- 
. .... , , dicates the same 

powers and capacities before death, is a pre- 
sumption that we shall retain them through and after 
death ; indeed, a probability of it abundantly sufficient 
to act upon, unless there be some positive reason to 
think that death is the destruction of those living pow- 
ers : because there is in every case a probability that 
all things will continue as we experience they are, in all 
respects, except those in which we have some reason to 
think they will be altered. This is that kind * of pre- 
sumption or probability from analogy, expressed in the 
very word continuance , which seems our only natural 
reason for believing the course of the world will con- 
tinue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience 
or knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it 
seems our only reason for believing that any one sub- 
stance now existing will continue to exist a moment 
longer, the Self-existent Substance only excepted. Thus 

ble of being reached by the present proof, unless we take in some 
such additional considerations as Butler proceeds to allege after- 
ward. However, it is to be remembered that natural religion does 
not necessarily teach that we shall exist hereafter without any bodily 
organization, — for we may pass, at death, into a bodily organization, 
inappreciable by our present senses, for any thing we know to the 
contrary, — and revealed religion does expressly teach that, in at 
least one part of our future existence, we shall have a corporeal or- 
ganization. In effect, the ancient theistical philosophers, who held a 
future state of retribution, almost universally supposed the soul to 
pass into or retain some other body after its separation from the pres- 
ent ; either, as in the vulgar metempsychosis, passing into another 
gross body of the same kind, or retaining a certain ethereal vehicle 
of its own. — F.] 

* I say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean to 
affirm that there is the same degree of conviction, that our living 
powers will continue after death, as there is that our substances will. 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


48 


if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was 
not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of 
action, there would be no apprehension that any other 
power or event, unconnected with this of death, would 
destroy these faculties just at the instant of each crea- 
ture’s death ; and therefore no doubt but that they 
would remain after it : which shows the high probabili- 
ty that our living powers will continue after death, un- 
less there be some ground to think that death is their 
destruction.* For if it would be in a manner certain 
that we should survive death, provided it were certain 
that death would not be our destruction, it must be 
highly probable that we shall survive it, if there be no 
ground to think death will be our destruction. 

4. Now, though I think it must be acknowledged that 
prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life 
ivo reasons commonly insisted upon, there would arise 
ibr fear. a general confused suspicion that in the 

great shock and alteration which we shall undergo by 
death, we, that is, our living powers, might be wholly 
destroyed ; yet, even prior to those proofs, there is really 
no particular distinct ground or reason for this appre- 
hension at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must 
arise either from the reason of the thing, or from the 
analogy of Nature. 


* Destruction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoida- 
bly ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living be- 
ing, so as that the same living being shall be incapable 0 f ever per- 
ceiving or acting again at all ; or the destruction of those means and 
instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its present 
state of perception and of action. It is here used in the former 
sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. 
The loss of a man’s eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter 
sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living 
powers in the former sense to be possible. We have no more reason 
to think a being endued with living powers ever loses them during its 
whole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them. 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


49 


But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that 
death is the destruction of living agents, because we 
know not at all what death is in itself: but „ , 

l r • rr , , i • , Not fr ° m the 

only some ot its effects, such as the dissolu- reason of the 
lion of flesh, skin, and bones. And these 
effects do in nowise appear to imply the destruction of 
a living agent. And besides, as we are greatly in the 
dark upon what the exercise of our living powers de- 
pends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers them- 
selves depend upon ; the powers themselves, as distin- 
guished not only from their actual exercise, but also 
from the present capacity of exercising them ; and as op- 
posed to their destruction : for sleep, or however,* a 
swoon, shows us not only that these powers exist when 
they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion 
does in inanimate matter, but shows also that they exist 
when there is no present capacity of exercising them ; or 
that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as 
well as the actual exercise of them, maybe suspended, and 
yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed. Since, 
then, we know not at all upon what the existence of our 
living powers depends, this shows further, there can no 
probability be collected from the reason of the thing, 
that death will be their destruction : because their ex- 
istence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affect- 
ed by death ; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of 
this king of terrors. So that there is nothing more cer- 
tain than that the reason of the thing shows us no con- 
nection between death and the destruction of living 
agents. 

Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole anal- 
ogy of Nature to afford us even the slight- Not from anai- 
est presumption that animals ever lose their °sy° fNature - 
living powers ; much less, if it were possible, that they 
lose them by death ; for we have no faculties wherewith 
* [However, in the sense of at least , or rather.] 


4 


50 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


to trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what be- 
comes of them. This event removes them from our 
view. It destroys the sensible proof, which we had be- 
fore their death, of their being possessed of living pow- 
ers, but does not appear to afford the least reason to 
believe that they are then, or by that event, deprived 
of them. 

And our knowing that they were possessed of these 
powers, up to the very period to which we have faculties 
capable of tracing them, is itself a probability of their 
retaining them beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a 
sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very 
great and astonishing changes which we have experi- 
enced ; so great, that our existence in another state of 
life, of perception and of action, will be but according 
to a method of providential conduct, the like to which 
has been already exercised, even with regard to our- 
selves ; according to a course of nature, the like to 
which we have already gone through. 

5. However, as one cannot but be greatly sensible 
how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make 
_ . the voice of reason even distinctly heard in 

presumptions, this case, as we are accustomed, from our 

1. We are com- . . 

pound, so dis- youth up, to indulge that forward delusive 

cerptible. it , , 

faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere, 
(of some assistance, indeed, to apprehension, but the 
author of all error :) as we plainly lose ourselves in gross 
and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that 
we are acquainted with what, indeed, we are wholly 
ignorant of — it may be proper to consider the imaginary 
presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising 
from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices ; and to 
show how little they can really amount to, even though 
we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them. And, 

I. All presumption of death’s being the destruction 
of living beings, must go upon supposition that they are 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


5i 


compounded, and so discerptible. But since conscious- 
ness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem 
that the subject in which it resides must be so too. For 
were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one 
and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradic- 
tion to suppose part of this motion to exist and part not 
to exist — that is, part of this matter to move, and part 
to be at rest — then its power of motion would be indi- 
visible ; and so also would the subject in which the 
power inheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this 
could be divided into two, one part might be moved and 
the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition. 

In like manner, it has been argued,* and for any thing 
appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the percep- 
tion or consciousness which we have of our own exist- 
ence is indivisible, so as that it is a contradiction to 
suppose one part of it should be here and the other 
there ; the perceptive power, or the power of conscious- 


* See Dr. Clarke’s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the Defenses of it. 

[This celebrated controversy was occasioned by a strange book of 
Dodwell’s entitled An Epistolary Discourse Touching the Natural 
Mortality of the Human Soul, etc., in which he maintained that the 
human soul is naturally mortal, but supernaturally immortalized by 
the Holy Spirit, conferred in the sacrament of baptism, when per- 
formed by legitimately ordained ministers. Dr. Clarke answered his 
book and wrote four tracts on the controversy. Anthony Collins 
wrote “ in support of Dodwell’s views of the natural mortality of the 
soul.”— F. 

Ancient writers believed the soul to be indivisible. Cicero makes 
Cato say, “ The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without 
parts or mixture ; it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish.” And 
again, “ I could never believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping 
from senseless matter ; or that such a release will not enlarge and 
improve its powers. ... I am persuaded that I shall only begin 
truly to live when I cease to live in this world.” Xenophon reports 
Cyrus as saying, in his last moments, “ O, my son, do not imagine 
that when death has taken me from you I shall cease to exist.” — 
Malcom.] 


52 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


ness, is indivisible too; and consequently the subject 
in which it resides, that is, the conscious being. Now 
upon supposition that the living agent each man calls 
himself is thus a single being, which there is at least 

no more difficulty in conceiving than in con- 

Our organized . . . y 

bodies not our- ceiving it to be a compound, and of which 

selves. 

there is the proof now mentioned ; it follows 
that our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part 
of ourselves, than any other matter around us. And it 
is as easy to conceive how matter, which is no part of 
ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner 
which our present bodies are, as how we can receive im- 
pressions from, and have power over, any matter. It is 
as easy to conceive, that we may exist out of bodies 
as in them ; that we might have animated bodies of any 
other organs and senses wholly different from these now 
given us, and that we may hereafter animate these same 
or new bodies variously modified and organized, as to 
conceive how we can animate such bodies as our pres- 
ent. And, lastly, the dissolution of all these several 
organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have success- 
ively animated them, would have no more conceivable 
tendency to destroy the living beings, ourselves, or de- 
prive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception 
and of action, than the dissolution of any foreign mat- 
ter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, 
and making use of for the common occasions of life. 

6. II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living 
agent cannot, indeed, from the nature of the thing, be 

This proved properly proved by experimental observa- 
byexpenence. t ions. But as these fall in with the suppo- 
sition of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude cer- 
tainly, that our gross organized bodies, with which we 
perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, 
are no part of ourselves, and therefore show us that we 
have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours ; 


Chap. IJ 


Of a Future Life. 


53 


even without determining whether our living substance 
be material or immaterial. For we see by experience 
that men may lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and 
even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain 
the same living agents. And persons can trace up the 
existence of themselves to a time when the bulk of their 
bodies was extremely small in comparison of what it is 
in mature age : and we cannot but think that they might 
then have lost a considerable part of that small body, 
and yet have remained the same living agents, as they 
may now lose great part of their present body and re- 
main so. And it is certain, that the bodies of all ani- 
mals are in a constant flux, from that never-ceasing attri- 
tion which there is in every part of them. Now, things 
of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish between 
these living agents, ourselves, and large quantities of 
matter, in which we are very nearly interested ; since 
these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily course 
of succession, and changing their owners ; while we are 
assured that each living agent remains one and the same 
permanent being.* And this general observation leads 
us on to the following ones. 

(i.) That we have no way of determining by experi- 
ence what is the certain bulk of the living being each 
man calls himself ; and yet, till it be deter- Balk ofiiving 
mined that it is larger in bulk than the solid being ' 
elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground 
to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort 
of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it, of 
the living being, even though it should not be absolutely 
indiscerptible. 

(2.) From our being so nearly related to, 
and interested in. certain systems of matter, fJJ£e£ig he liv * 
suppose our flesh and bones, and afterward 
ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents, 
* See Dissertation I. 


54 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed, 'not- 
withstanding such alienation ; and consequently these 
systems of matter not being ourselves : it follows, fur- 
ther, that we have no ground to conclude any other, 
suppose internal systems of matter, to be the living agents 
ourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude 
this but from our relation to, and interest in, such other 
systems of matter; and therefore we can have no rea- 
son to conclude what befalls those systems of matter at 
death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have 
already, several times over, lost a great part, or perhaps 
the whole, of our body, according to certain common es- 
tablished laws of nature ; yet we remain the same living 
agents ; when we shall lose as great a part, or the whole, 
by another common established law of nature, death, 
why may we not also remain the same ? That the alien- 
ation has been gradual in one case, and in the other 
will be more at once, does not prove any thing to the 
contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those 
many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly ap- 
propriated to us ourselves ; why should we imagine death 
will be so fatal to us? Nor can it be objected, that 
Objection — what is thus alienated, or lost, is no part of 
partoftheoS^ our original solid body, but only adventi- 
nai body. tious matter because we may lose entire 
limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and 
vessels of the original body : or if this be not admitted, 
we have no proof that any of these solid parts are dis- 
solved or alienated by death ; though, by the way, we 
are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventi- 
tious matter, while it continues united to and distend- 
ing the several parts of our solid body. But after all, 
the relation a person bears to those parts of his body to 
which he is the most nearly related, what does it appear 
to amount to but this, that the living agent and those 
parts of the body mutually affect each other? And the 


Chap. IJ 


Of a Future Life. 


55 


same thing, the same thing in kind though not in degree, 
may be said of all foreign matter which gives us ideas, 
and which we have any power over. From these ob- 
servations the whole ground of the imagination is re- 
moved, that the dissolution of any matter is the destruc- 
tion of a living agent, from the interest he once had in 
such matter. 

(3.) If we consider our body somewhat more distinct- 
ly, as made up of organs and instruments of perception 
and of motion,, it will bring us to the same _ . . 

’ n _ The body com - 

conclusion. Thus, the common optical ex- posed of organs, 
periments show, and even the observation 
how sight is assisted by glasses shows, that we see with 
our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses. Nor is 
there any reason to believe that we see with them in 
any other sense ; any other, I mean, which would lead 
us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like is to 
be said of hearing : and our feeling distant solid matter 
by means of somewhat in our hand, seems an instance 
of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering. 
All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is 
no part of our body, being instrumental in preparing 
objects for, and conveying them to, the perceiving power, 
in a manner similar or like to the manner in which our 
organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are, in 
a like way, instruments of our receiving such ideas from 
external objects as the Author of nature appointed those 
external objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. 
However,* glasses are evidently instances of this ; namely, 
of matter which is no part of our body preparing objects 
for, and conveying them toward, the perceiving power, 
in like manner as our bodily organs do. And if we see 
with our eyes only, in the same manner as we do with 
glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy, 

* [In the sense of at least, at any rate. The case is presented as 
one that will not be disputed.] 


56 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


of all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing 
here said, to affirm that the whole apparatus of vision, 
or of perception by any other of our senses, 

Perception not 1 ' 

traceable to its can be traced through all its steps quite up 

source. .... - . . 

to the living power of seeing, or perceiving; 
but that so far as it can be traced by experimental ob- 
servations, so far it appears that our organs of sense 
prepare and convey on objects, in order to their being 
perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, with- 
out affording any shadow of appearance that they them- 
selves perceive. And that we have no reason to think 
our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances 
of persons losing some of them, the living beings them- 
selves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. 
It is confirmed also by the experience of dreams; by 
which we find we are at present possessed of a latent, 
and what would otherwise be an unimagined, unknown 
power of perceiving* sensible objects in a sstrong and 
lively a manner without our external organs of sense as 
with them. 

7. So, also, with regard to our power of moving or 
directing motion by will and choice : upon the destruc- 
„ tion of a limb, this active power remains, as it 

after the organs evidently seems, unlessened ; so as that the 
are destroyed. jj v j n g beings w ho has suffered this loss, 

would be capable of moving as before, if it had another 
limb to move with. It can walk by the help of an arti- 
ficial leg, just as it can make use of a pole or a lever to 
reach toward itself, and to move things beyond the 
length and the power of its natural arm : and this last it 
does in the same manner as it reaches and moves, with 
its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor 
is there so rquch as any appearance of our limbs being 
endued with a power of moving or directing themselves ; 
though tl^ey are adapted, like the several parts of a roa- 
$ pftyat is, of imagining or cqnpeivipg,] 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


57 


chine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; 
and some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of 
motion to other parts of it. 

8. Thus a man determines that he will look at such 
an object through a microscope ; or, being lame, sup- 
pose, that he will walk to such a place with illustrations* 
a staff a week hence. His eyes and his the microscope, 

r . , ... , staff, etc. 

feet no more determine in these cases than 
the microscope and the staff. Nor is ther£ any ground 
to think they any more put the determination in prac- 
tice, or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the mov- 
ers, in any other sense than as the microscope and the 
staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense 
and our limbs are certainly instruments which the living 
persons, ourselves, make use of to perceive and move 
with :* there is not any probability that they are any 
more ; nor, consequently, that we have any other kind 

* [“ S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts 
with his instruments only, or with his hands also ? ” 

“ A . With his hands also.” 

“ S. Does he use his eyes also in making shoes ? ” 

“A. Yes.” 

“ S. The shoemaker, then, and harper are different from the hands 
and eyes they use ? ” 

“ A. It appears so.” 

“ S. Does a man then use his whole body ? ” 

“ A . Certainly.” 

“ S. But he who uses, and that which he uses, are different ? ” 

“A. Yes.” 

“ S. A man, then, is something different from his own body?” 
— Plato, Alcibi. Piim ., p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed. 

“ It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, 
and not those pai*ts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind. 
Neither are we bodies ; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to 
thy body. What ever is done by thy mind is done by thee.” — Cicero, 
Tusc. Dispute I, 20, 46 and 22, 52. 

“ The mind of each man is the man ; not that figure which may 
be pointed out with the finger.” — Cicero, de Rep ., book vi, § 24. — 
Malcom.] 


58 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


of relation to them than what we may have to any other 
foreign matter formed into instruments of perception 
and motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff, (I say, 
any other kind of relation, for I am not speaking of the 
degree of it;) nor, consequently, is there any probabili- 
ty that the alienation or dissolution of these instru- 
ments is the destruction of the perceiving and moving 
agent. 

9. And thus our finding, that the dissolution of mat- 
ter in which living beings were most nearly interested is 

General con- not their dissolution ; and that the destruc- 
tion. tion Q f severa i of the organs and instruments 

of perception, and of motion belonging to them, is not 
their destruction ; shows demonstratively that there is 
no ground to think that the dissolution of any other 
matter, or destruction of any other organs and instru- 
ments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living 
agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have no 
reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation 
to any thing which we find dissolved by death. 

10. But it is said, these observations are equally ap- 
plicable to brutes ; and it is thought an insuperable dif- 

Objections rei ^ cu ^y> ^ iat they should be immortal, and 
l* 1 invidious tes ' ^ consequence, capable of everlasting hap- 
piness. Now this manner of expression is 
both invidious and weak ; but the thing intended by it 
is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural 
or moral consideration. For, first, Suppose the invidi- 
ous thing designed in such a manner of expression were 
really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural 
immortality of brutes; namely, that they must arrive 
at great attainments, and become rational and moral 
agents.; even this would be no difficulty, since we know 
not what latent powers and capacities they may be en- 
dued with. There was once, prior to experience, as 
great presumption against human creatures, as there is 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


59 


against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of 
understanding which we have in mature age, for we can 
trace up our own existence to the same original with 
theirs. And we find it to be a general law of nature, 
that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and re- 
ligion should be placed in a condition of being in which 
they are altogether without the use of them for a con- 
siderable length of their duration, as in infancy and 
childhood. And great part of the human species go out 
of the present world before they come to the exercise 
of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, sec- 
ondly, The natural immortality of brutes does not, in 
the least, imply that they are endued with w , 
any latent capacities of a rational or moral 
nature. And the economy of the universe might re- 
quire that there should be living creatures without any 
capacities of this kind. And all difficulties, as to the 
manner how they are to be disposed of, are so apparent- 
ly and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is won- 
derful they should be insisted upon by any, but such 
as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with 
the whole system of things. There is, then, absolute- 
ly nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetor- 
ically urged against the greatest part of the natural 
proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human 
minds: I say, the greatest part; for it is less applicable 
to the following observation, which is more peculiar to 
mankind * 

* [This objection caused great perplexity formerly, and led Des 
Cartes, in order to evade its force, to maintain that brutes are little 
more than machines — an opinion maintained by leading materialists 
of the present day. The immortality of brutes is discussed in Des 
Cartes on the Passions ; Baxter on the Nature of the Soul ; Hume’s 
Essays, Essay ix ; Search’s Light of Nature ; Cheyne’s Philosophical 
Principles ; Wagstaff on the Immortality of Brutes ; Edwards’ Crit- 
ical and Philosophical Exercitations ; Watts’ Essays, Essay ix ; Colli- 
ber’s Inquiry; Locke on the Understanding, book ii, chap, ix ; 


6o 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


ii. III. That as it is evident our present powers and 
capacities of reason, memory, and affection, do not de- 
pend upon our gross body, in the manner in 

Reason, mem- x t 1 . 

ory, etc., depend which perception by our organs of sense 

not on the body 

as perception, does, so they do not appear to depend upon 
it at all in any such manner as to give 
ground to think that the dissolution of this body will be 
the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, 
as it will of our powers of sensation, or to give ground 
to conclude, even, that it will be so much as a suspen- 
sion of the former. 

Human creatures exist at present in two states of life 
and perception, greatly different from each other; each 
of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar 
enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are 
affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of them, 
we may be said to exist, or live, in a state of sensation. 
When none of our senses are affected, or appetites grat- 
ified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we may 
be said to exist or live in a state of reflection. Now it 
is by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved 
by death is any way necessary to the living being, in 
this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For 
though from our present constitution and condition of 
Power of re- being, our external organs of sense are nec- 
penSt of de ' essary for conveying in ideas to our reflect- 
death. i n g powers, as carriages and levers and 

scaffolds are in architecture ; yet when these ideas are 
brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the most in- 
tense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and 
feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, 
without any assistance from our senses ; and without 
any at all, which we know of, from that body which will 

Ditton on the Resurrection ; Willis’ De Anima Brutse ; Bayle’s Dic- 
tionary, under the articles Pereira and Rorarius ; Polignac’s Anti- 
Lucretius.] 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


6 1 


be dissolved by death. It does not appear, then, that 
the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, 
in any degree, necessary to thinking; to our intellectual 
enjoyments or sufferings : nor, consequently, that the 
dissolution or alienation of the former by death will be 
the destruction of those present powers, which render us 
capable of this state of reflection. 

12. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, 
which do not at all affect our present intellectual pow- 
ers, and this affords a presumption, that Mortal diseas 
those diseases will not destroy these present powe?s°of refl2 
powers. Indeed, from the observations made tlon * 
above,* it appears that there is no presumption, from 
their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution 
of the body is the destruction of the living agent.f And 
by the same reasoning it must appear, too, that there is 
no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, 
that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of 
our present reflecting powers ; but instances of their not 
affecting each other afford a presumption to the con- 
trary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our 
present reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts 
even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction 
of them. Several things, indeed, greatly affect all our 
living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of 
them ; as, for instance, drowsiness, increasing till it ends 
in sound sleep : and from hence we might have imagined 
it would destroy them, till we found, by experience, the 
weakness of this w r ay of judging. But in the diseases 
now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of 
probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the 
reflecting powers which we have at present ; for in those 
diseases, persons, the moment before death, appear to 

* Pages 52-54. 

\ [Observe the distinction between the “ living agent ” or living 
powers and “ reflecting powers.”] 


62 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


be in the highest vigor of life. They discover appre- 
hension, memory, reason, all entire ; with the utmost 
force of affection, sense of a character of shame and 
honor; and the highest mental enjoyments and suffer- 
ings, even to the last gasp; and these surely prove even 
greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now 
what pretense is there for thinking that a progressive 
disease, when arrived to such a degree — I mean that 
degree which is mortal — will destroy those powers, which 
were not impaired, which were not affected by it, dur- 
ing its whole progress, quite up to that degree? And if 
death, by diseases of this kind, is not the destruction of 
our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought 
that death by any other means is. 

13. It is obvious that this general observation may be 
carried on further : and there appears so little connec- 

r. ^ x tion between our bodily powers of sensa- 

Death will not . 1 

even suspend tion and our present powers of reflection, 

them. ... 

that there is no reason to conclude that 
death, which destroys the former, does so much as sus- 
pend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt our continu- 
ing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do 
now. For suspension of reason, memory, and the affec- 
tions which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, 
nor is implied in our notion of it. And our daily expe- 
riencing these powers to be exercised, without any as- 
sistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will 
be dissolved by death ; and our finding often, that the 
exercise of them is so lively to the last ; these things 
afford a sensible apprehension that death may not, per- 
haps, be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of 
these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings 
which it implies ;* so that our posthumous life, what- 

* There are three distinct questions relating to a future life here 
considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents? If 
not, Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflec- 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


63 


ever there may be in it additional to our present, yet 
may not be entirely beginning anew, but going on. 
Death may, in some sort, and in some respects, answer 
to our birth, which is not a suspension of the faculties 
which we had before it, or a total change of the state of 
life in which we existed when in the womb, but a con- 
tinuation of both, with such and such great alterations. 

14. Nay, for aught we know of ourselves — of our pres- 
ent life, and of death — death may immediately, in the 
natural course of things, put us into a high- 

. . . - ... Death may in- 

er and more enlarged state of life, as our troduce us to a 
birth does ;* a* state in which our capacities hlgher 8tate ‘ 
and sphere of perception and of action may be much 
greater than at present. For as our relation to our ex- 
ternal organs of sense renders us capable of existing in 
our present state of sensation, so it may be the only 
natural hinderance to our existing, immediately and of 
course, in a higher state of reflection. The truth is, 
reason does not at all show us in what state death natu- 
rally leaves us. But were we sure that it would suspend 
all our perceptive and active powers, yet the suspension 
of a power and the destruction of it are effects so totally 
different in kind, as we experience from sleep and a 
swoon, that we cannot in anywise argue from one to the 


tion, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sen- 
sation ? and, if not, Whether it be the suspension or discontinuance 
of the exercise of these present reflecting powers? Now, if there be 
no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less 
for the next, and less still for the first. 

* This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brahmins : 
No/ii&iv fiev yap dr/ tov fiev kvOdde (3lov, ug dv aicpr/v Kvotievuv elvar 
tov de tidvarov, yeveoiv elg tov ovTug (3tov, nai tov evdaipova Tolg tpiloo- 
Qtyrjoaai. — Lib. xv, p. 1039. Ed. Amst., 1707. To which opinion, 
perhaps, Antoninus may allude in these words : vvv 7repi i ueve/.g, 

ttote epftpvov kit ttjc yaarphg Trig yvvautog gov k&ldr), ovrug kudexeadai 
T7]V d)pav EV 7/ TO IpVxdpLOV GOV TOV k?lVTpOV T0VT0V kuTTEGELTai. Lib. 

ix, c. 3. 


6 4 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


other ; or conclude, even to the lowest degree of probabil- 
ity, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to sus- 
pend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, 
will be sufficient to destroy them. 

15. These observations together may be sufficient to 
show how little presumption there is that death is the 

Analogy from destruction of human creatures. However, 
plants fanciful, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may 
lead us to imagine it is — the supposed likeness which is 
observed between the decay of vegetables and of living 
creatures. And this likeness is indeed sufficient to af- 
ford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the 
field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. 
But in reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that 
there appears no ground even for the comparison, as to 
the present question ; because one of the two subjects 
compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal 
and chief thing in the other, the power of perception 
and of action ; and which is the only thing we are in- 
quiring about the continuance of. So that the destruc- 
tion of a vegetable is an event not similar, or analogous, 
to the destruction of a living agent. 

16. But if. as was above intimated, leaving off the de- 
lusive custom of substituting imagination in the room of 

v , . experience, we would confine ourselves to 
what we do know and understand ; if we 
would argue only from that, and from that form our ex- 
pectations, it would appear at first sight that as no proba- 
bility of living beings ever ceasing to be so, can be con- 
cluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be 
collected from the analogy of Nature ; because we can- 
not trace any living beings beyond death. But as we 
are conscious that we are endued with capacities of per- 
ception and of action, and are living persons, what we 
are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we fore- 
see some accident or event which will endanger those 


Chap. I.] Of a Future Life. 65 

capacities, or be likely to destroy us ; which death does 
in nowise appear to be. 

17. And thus, when we go out of this world, we may 
pass into new scenes, and a new state of life and action, 
just as naturally as we came into the pres- The future 
ent. And this new state may naturally be statenaturaL 
a social one. And the advantages of it, advantages of 
every kind, may naturally be bestowed, according to some 
fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in propor- 
tion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the ad- 
vantages of that future natural state should not be be- 
stowed, as these of the present in some measure are, by 
the will of the society, but entirely by His more immedi- 
ate action upon whom the whole frame of nature depends, 
yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their be- 
ing distributed here by the instrumentality of men. 
And, indeed, though one were to allow any confused, 
undetermined sense which people please to put upon 
the word natural , it would be a shortness of thought 
scarce credible to imagine that no system or course of 
things can be so, but only what we see at present;* 
especially while the probability of a future life, or the 
natural immortality of the soul, is admitted upon the 
evidence of reason ; because this is really both admit- 
ting and denying, at once, a state of being different from 
the present to be natural. But the only distinct mean- 
ing of that word is, stated ’ fixed, or settled j Meaning of 
since what is natural as much requires and natural - 
presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so — that is, 
to effect it continually, or at stated times — as what is 
supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once. 
And from hence it must follow, that persons’ notion of 
what is natural will be enlarged in proportion to their 
greater knowledge of the works of God, and the dispen- 
sations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity 
* See part ii, chap, ii, and part ii, chap. iii. 


5 


66 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


in supposing, that there may be beings in the universe 
whose capacities, and knowledge, and views may be so 
extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may 
to them appear natural ; that is, analogous or conforma- 
ble to God’s dealings with other parts of his creation ; 
as natural as the visible known course of things appears 
to us. For there seems scarce any other possible sense 
to be put upon the word, but that only in which it is 
here used : similar, stated, or uniform. 

18. This credibility of a future life, which has been 
here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy our 
„ curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes 

Probable evi- ... .. , 

denceofafuture of religion, in like manner as a demonstra- 

JJf e 6ff6CtiV8 ^ 

as demonstra- tive proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a 
demonstrative one, of a future life, would 
not be a proof of religion. For that we are to live here- 
after is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism, 
and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are 
now alive is; and therefore nothing can be more absurd 
than to argue from that scheme that there can be no fu- 
ture state. But as religion implies a future state, any 
presumption against such a state is a presumption against 
religion. And the foregoing observations remove all 
presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a very consider- 
able degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of 
religion ; which, if believed, would greatly open and dis- 
pose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence 
of the whole. 

NOTE. 

[As peculiar difficulty is often found in gaining a connected view 
of the whole argument in this important chapter, it seems advisable 
to subjoin an abstract of it. 

We must remember that there are three questions involved in the 
subject of this chapter : — 

Does death destroy the living agent we call ourself? 

Does it destroy our powers of thinking, willing, etc. ? 

Does it destroy the exercise of those powers ?] 


Chap. I.] 


Of a Future Life. 


67 


Now the presumption in nature is always for the continuance of 
what we know to exist ; and, therefore, the antecedent presumption, 
in each of these three cases, is in favor of the negative. It is the 
same kind of presumption in each case, but it is much stronger in the 
two former than in the latter, because, though there are some appear- 
ances that might lead us to conjecture that death may interrupt the 
exercise of our living powers, there are none to favor the supposition 
of its destroying them or ourselves. 

We are bound, then, to presume that we shall continue through 
and after death in the enjoyment and exercise of our present living 
powers, unless something appears from the reason of the thing, or the 
analogy of nature, to make us think that death destroys us, or those 
powers, or, at least, the exercise of them. 

Now, nothing of this sort can be concluded directly, at least with 
respect to the two first questions, from the analogy of nature, because 
death removes a being wholly from our experience ; and, so far as any 
analogy can be drawn from other changes any way similar to death, 
we know that they do not destroy the living agent or its powers, even 
where (as in the case of sleep or a swoon) they suspend the exercise 
of those powers. 

Any presumption from the nature of the thing must be founded 
upon the probability that we are discerptible, and that our substance 
is actually discerped by death, since all we know of death is the effect 
which it produces in dissipating the grosser parts of our bodies. 

Now, the absolute oneness of living agents cannot, indeed, be 
proved by actual observation, but it seems to follow as a consequence 
from what we know of the unity of consciousness ; and all that we 
observe falls as a consequence in with it, and, at any rate, certainly 
proves that our gross organized bodies are not ourselves ; whence it 
will follow, that we can have no reason to presume that what de- 
stroys them must needs destroy us. 

1. For we see by experience that men lose their limbs, their organs 
of sense, and even the greatest part of their bodies, and yet remain 
the same living agents. Nay, it is probable that most men do, in 
their growth and decline from infancy to age, lose the whole frame 
of their body more than once, and yet remain the same ; whence it 
appears that, even though we are material, we cannot determine the 
bulk of the living agent, nor, consequently, conclude that it is affected 
by the dissolution of death. 

2. Since the dissolution of systems of matter with which we are so 
nearly connected as our bodies, is not the destruction of ourselves, we 
can have no reason to think that we are any system of matter at all. 

3. Since the loss of organs or limbs involves not the destruction of 


68 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


the powers of perception or will, we must consider those limbs and 
organs merely as instruments ; and then the destruction of those in- 
struments will no more involve a presumption of the destruction of 
the powers they ministered to, than the destruction of any other in- 
struments of perception or motion, as an eye-glass or a walking-stick ; 
while the phenomena of dreaming show us that we have, in some 
cases, the power of receiving the impressions ordinarily conveyed by 
the organs of sense, without the aid of those organs. 

It is no objection to the previous arguments that they apply equal- 
ly to brutes as to men. 

1. For, even if it were implied in the notion of their immortality, 
that brutes should hereafter become rational and moral agents, this 
is no more impossible than that a child should become such an agent, 
which we know, in fact, to be true. 

2. The economy of the world may require the future as much as 
the present existence of brute natures, for any thing we know to the 
contrary. 

However, there are other arguments for a future life to be enjoyed 
by man, which do not hold equally for brutes. 

We exist, at present, in two different states, sensation and reflec- 
tion ; and though, for the exercise of our powers of sensation, we or- 
dinarily (except in the case of dreaming) require the instruments of 
bodily organs, we cannot perceive that our powers of reflection de- 
pend upon the body, even for their present exercise ; nay, the ob- 
serving that severe illness has no tendency to impair them, even up 
to the point of death, makes it probable that death does not suspend 
their exercise. 

We can thus trace, to some extent, some of our living powers up 
to death, and find them unaffected by it ; and, with respect to oth- 
ers, it is not impossible that our present bodily organs, while they are 
the means of giving us one sort of sensations, may be the impedi- 
ment to receiving others ; or that the connection of the mind with 
the present body may be the limitation of its perceptivity to a nar- 
row sensorium, so that death may be a change analogous to birth, 
and introduce us to a higher state of being. — Fitzgerald] 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 


69 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUN- 
ISHMENTS, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER. 



HAT which makes the question concerning a fu- 


X ture life to be of so great importance to us is, our 
capacity of happiness and misery. And The question 
that which makes the consideration of it to wheSi^TmpoT 
be of so great importance to us is, the sup- tant 
position of our happiness and misery hereafter depend- 
ing upon our actions here. Without this, indeed, curi- 
osity could not but sometimes bring a subject in which 
we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts ; espe- 
cially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect 
of our own. But reasonable men would not take any 
further thought about hereafter than what should hap- 
pen thus occasionally to rise in their minds, if it were 
certain that our future interest no way depended upon 
our present behavior: whereas, on the contrary, if there 
be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to 
think it does, then there is reason also for the most active 
thought and solicitude to secure that interest ; to behave 
so as that we may escape that misery, and obtain that 
happiness, in another life, which we not only suppose 
ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is 
put in our own power. And whether there be ground 
for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve to be 
most seriously considered, were there no other proof of 
a future life and interest than that presumptive one 
which the foregoing observations amount to. 

2. Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and 


7o 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. 
For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our ac- 
„ , tions ; and we are endued by the Author of 

and pain chiefly our nature with capacities of foreseeing 

inourpower. 

these consequences. We find by experience 
he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusively 
of our own care and attention to provide ourselves with, 
and to make use of that sustenance, by which he has 
appointed our lives shall be preserved, and without 
which he has appointed they shall not be preserved at 
all. And in general, we foresee that the external things 
which are the objects of our various passions, can 
neither be obtained nor enjoyed without exerting our- 
selves in such and such manners ; but by thus exerting 
ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects in which 
our natural good consists ; or by this means God gives 
us the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not 
that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment but 
by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and 
care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in toler- 
able ease and quiet : or, on the contrary, we may, by 
rashness, ungoverned passion, willfulness, or even negli- 
gence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. 
And many do please to make themselves extremely mis- 
erable ; that is, to do what they know beforehand will ren- 
der them so. They follow those ways the fruit of which 
they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be 
disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. 
This every one observes to be the general course of 
things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by 
experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own 
follies. 

3. Why the Author of nature does not give his crea- 
Why has God tures promiscuously such and such percep- 
thus ordered ? tions, without regard to their behavior; why 
he does not make them happy without the instrumen- 


7 * 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of' God. 

tality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing 
any sufferings upon themselves — is another matter.* 
Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature 
of things which we are unacquainted with, (chap, vii ;) 

* [Butler here hints at several possible solutions of the old athe- 
istical dilemma. God prevents not evil, either because he cannot, or 
because he will not. If he cannot, he is not Almighty : if he will 
not, he is not All-good. Butler shows us that neither conclusion can 
be safely drawn. The supposition that God cannot remove these 
evils does not necessarily imply any defect in power ; because, for 
any thing we know to the contrary, the removal of them might in- 
volve a contradiction, and not to be able to do what is self-contra- 
dictory and impossible in the notion of it, is plainly no limitation of 
power. The supposition that, though he can, he will not remove 
them, does not necessarily imply a defect of benevolence, even tak- 
ing benevolence in the sense of a simple desire of causing the great- 
est possible amount of happiness. Because it is possible that the 
happiness resulting from a good use made of a state of trial by free 
beings may, in the nature of it, be so much greater than what would 
result from any other method, as to make the sum of happiness so 
obtained, even when all the present incidental miseries have been 
deducted from it, larger than could be procured by providing against 
their contingency. Nor, even supposing that God’s not choosing to 
remove the sources of these evils implied a defect of benevolence in 
the sense explained above, would it be certain that it implied a de- 
fect of benevolence, as it is a real perfection. For supreme benev- 
olence may not be a disposition simply to make beings happy, but to 
make good beings happy. — F.] 

[Some minds have great perplexity and trouble over the origin of 
evil and the permission of sin, and cannot see how they are recon- 
ciled with the Divine wisdom and goodness. God certainly did not 
will any sin and its consequent evil, but he did choose to create man, 
and in so doing to incur their liability. A voluntary being can 
sin, and while in the free exercise of his powers cannot be prevented 
by any external force from so doing. The only way God could 
prevent sin would be to bind nature fast in fate and not leave free the 
human or any other will. 

The origin of evil involves no mystery in the Divine government, 
but is to be ascribed to the wickedness of voluntary beings, which 
God does all he consistently can to prevent. He has provided a 
remedy for sin, offered forgiveness to all, and provided a compensa- 


72 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


or less happiness, it may be, and upon the whole, would 
be produced by such a method of conduct than is by 
the present : or, perhaps, Divine goodness, with which, 
if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, 
may not be a bare single disposition to produce hap- 
piness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, 
the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect 
Mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave 
suitably to the nature which he has given them ; to the 
relations which he has placed them in to each other ; and 
to that which they stand in to himself ; that relation to 
himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary ;* 
and which is the most important one of all. Perhaps, 1 
say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this 
moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself, as well as 
upon account of its being essentially conducive to the 
happiness of his creation. Or the whole end for which 
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly 
beyond the reach of our faculties : there may be some- 
what in it as impossible for us to have any conception 
of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colors. 
But however this may be, it is certainly matter of uni- 
versal experience, that the general method of Divine 
administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capaci- 
ties to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we 
act so and so, we shall have such enjoyments ; if so and so, 

tion for those who suffer in consequence of others’ folly and crime. 
All who will accept his favor may be saved. 

When we ask was it wise to permit evil, we ask was it wise to create 
free agents ; surely it will be admitted, that, on the whole, good will 
result to the universe and glory to God from the existence of angels 
and men. 

Evil, in the sense of mistakes resulting from ignorance and imper- 
fection, is necessarily connected with a limited progressive being. 
We presume no one will claim it were better such being did not exist.] 

* [Our relation to God is necessary because we are his creatures, 
but our relation to other beings God might change.] 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 


73 


such sufferings ; and giving us those enjoyments, and mak- 
ing us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our actions. 

4. “ But all this is to be ascribed to the general course 
of nature.” * True. This is the very thing which I 
am observing. It is to be ascribed to the objection— ah 
general course of nature; that is, not surely cribed° to 3 the 
to the words or ideas, course of nature , but courseofnature - 
to Him who appointed it, and put things into it : or to 
a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy, 
called natural, (pp. 64, 65,) and which necessarily im- 
plies an operating agent. For when men find them- 
selves necessitated to confess an author of nature, or 

* [The terms “ nature ” and course of nature are used in various 
senses. Some affirm that the frame of nature is a machine construct- 
ed so as to go on of itself, according to the fixed laws of its mecha- 
nism, so as to require no further act in the Deity but that which origi- 
nally created it. See Law’s Notes on King’s Origin of Evil, chap, v, 
§ 5, sub. 4, note 75. 

This representation of the world as a great machine, going on 
without God’s agency, as a clock goes without the assistance of the 
clock maker, is the notion of materialism, and excludes God’s gov- 
ernment from the world. The believers of this theory regard the 
forces of nature as inhering in matter. Others, as does Dr. Clarke, 
regard the forces of nature as the immediate and continual operation 
of God or intermediate spirits upon matter. 

“ The terms nature, and powers of nature, and course of nature, and 
the like, are nothing but empty words, and signify merely that a 
thing usually or frequently comes to pass. The raising the human 
body out of the dust of the earth, we call a miracle ; the generation 
of a human body in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other 
reason but because the power of God effects, one usually, the other 
unusually. The sudden stoppage of the sun (or earth) we call a mir- 
acle, the continual motion of the sun (or earth) we call natural, for 
the very same reason only, of the one being usual and the other un- 
usual. Did men rise usually out of the grave, as corn grows out of 
seed sown, we should certainly call that also natural ; and did the sun 
(or earth) constantly stand still, we should then think that to be nat- 
ural, and its motion, at any time, would be miraculous.” — Clarke’s 
Controversy with Leibnitz, p. 351, Fifth Reply, 107-109. Modified 
from Fitzgerald’s note.] 


74 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


that God is the natural governor of the world, they must 
not deny this again, because his government is uniform ; 
they must not deny that he does all things at all, because 
he does them constantly ; because the effects of his acting 
are permanent, whether his acting be so or not ; though 
there is no reason to think it is not. In short, every 
man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the 
forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil, or ob- 
taining good : and if the natural course of things be the 
appointment of God, and our natural faculties of knowl- 
edge and experience are given us by him, then the good 
and bad consequences which follow our actions are his 
appointment, and our foresight of those consequences is 
a warning given us by him how we are to act. 

5. “Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompanying 
every particular gratification of passion, intended to put 

us upon gratifying ourselves in every such 

Is pleasure a . r . 

reason for grat- particular instance, and as a reward to us 

ification? . . 

for so doing? No, certainly. Nor is it to 
be said that our eyes were naturally intended to give us 
the sight of each particular object to which they do or 
can extend ; objects which are destructive of them, or 
which, for any other reason, it may become us to turn 
our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt but that our eyes 
were intended for us to see with. So neither is there 
any doubt but that the foreseen pleasures and pains be- 
long to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce 
mankind to act in such and such manners.* 

6. Now from this general observation, obvious to 
every one, that God has given us to understand he has 
appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequences 

* [Man has various faculties of mind and body whose office and 
design will be apparent on examination. The ultimate design of the 
exercise of their powers is not in any case mere animal gratification, 
but intellectual and moral improvement and happiness. The per- 
version of these powers is sin, and causes shame and misery.] 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 


75 


of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of 
our acting in ’another, and of our not acting at all ; and 
that we find the consequences, which we 

A . We are under 

were beforehand informed of, uniformly to God’s govern- 

r .. ment of rewards 

iollow ; we may learn that we are at present and punish- 
actually under his government, in the strict- 
est and most proper sense ; in such a sense, as that he 
rewards and punishes us for our actions. An author of 
nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction of 
reason as a matter of experience that we are thus under 
his government ; under his government, in the same 
sense as we are under the government of civil magis- 
trates. Because the annexing pleasure to some actions, 
and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and 
giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those 
whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of gov- 
ernment. Whether the pleasure or pain which thus fol- 
lows upon our behavior be owing to the Author of na- 
ture’s acting upon us every moment which we feel it, 
or to his having at once contrived and executed his own 
part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to 
the matter before us. For if civil magistrates could 
make the sanctions of their laws take place, without in- 
terposing at all, after they had passed them ; without 
a trial, and the formalities of an execution : if they were 
able to make their laws execute themselves, or every 
offender to execute them upon himself, we should be 
just in the same sense under their government then, as 
we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more 
perfect manner. 

Vain is the ridicule with which one foresees some 
persons will divert themselves, upon find- Eidicule rel _ 
ing lesser pains considered as instances of ative tojittie 
divine punishment. There is no possibility 
of answering or evading the general thing here intended, 
without denying all final causes. For final causes being 


76 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must 
be admitted too, as instances of them. And if they are 
— if God. annexes delight to some actions and uneasiness 
to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act 
so and so — then he not only dispenses happiness and 
misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for 
example, the pain which we feel upon doing what tends 
to the destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near 
approaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be ap- 
pointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing 
what thus tends to our destruction ; this is altogether as 
much an instance of his punishing our actions, and con- 
sequently of our being under his government, as declar- 
ing, by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so he 
would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it whether 
it be greater or less. 

7. Thus we find, that the true notion or conception 
of the Author of nature is that of a master or governor, 
True notion of prior to the consideration of his moral attri- 
butes. The fact of our case, which we find 
by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or 
government over us at present, by rewarding and pun- 
ishing us for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense 
of these words, and even in the same sense as children, 
servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those 
who govern them. 

And thus the whole analogy of nature — the whole 
present course of things — most fully shows, that there is 
nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion, 
that God will reward and punish men for their actions 
hereafter; nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the 
notion of rewarding and punishing, for the whole course 
of nature is a present instance of his exercising that 
government over us which implies in it rewarding and 
punishing. 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 


n 


8. But, as divine punishment is what men chiefly ob- 
ject against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be 
proper to mention some circumstances in Analogy be- 
the natural course of punishments at pres- 2dfaturepSn- 
ent, which are analogous to what religion ishments - 
teaches us concerning a future state of punishment ; in- 
deed, so analogous, that as they add a further credibil- 
ity to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious appre- 
hension of it in those who will attend to them. 

It has been now observed, that such and such miseries 
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence 
and willfulness, as well as actions more commonly and 
more distinctly considered as vicious ; and that these 
consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly 
natural punishments annexed to such actions. For the 
general thing here insisted upon is, not that we see a 
great deal of misery in the world, but a great deal w r hich 
men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which 
they might have foreseen and avoided. Now the cir- 
cumstances of these natural punishments particularly 
deserving our attention are such as these : That often- 
times they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, 
actions which procure many present advantages, and are 
accompanied with much present pleasure ; for instance, 
sickness and untimely death is the consequence of in- 
temperance, though accompanied with the highest mirth 
and jollity : That these punishments are often much 
greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by 
the actions of which they are the punishments or conse- 
quences : That though we may imagine a constitution 
of nature in which these natural punishments, which are 
in fact to follow, would follow immediately upon such 
actions being done, or very soon after ; we find, on the 
contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a 
great while, sometimes even till long after the actions 
occasioning them are forgotten ; so that the constitution 


78 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


of nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort or 
degree of presumption of final impunity : That after 
such delay, these natural punishments or miseries often 
come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and 
at once — however, the chief misery often does : That as 
certainty of such distant misery following such actions 
is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions, 
they have seldom a distinct full expectation of its fol- 
lowing:* and many times the case is only thus, that 
they see in general, or may see, the credibility, that in- 
temperance, suppose, will bring after it diseases ; civil 
crimes, civil punishments ; when yet the real probability 
often is, that they shall escape : but things notwithstand- 
ing take their destined course, and the misery inevitably 
follows at its appointed time, in very many of these 

cases. Thus also though youth may be al- 

Youthful 6 , j r 

thoughtlessness leged as an excuse for rashness and folly, as 

no excuse. , ,, . . . , , , 

being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly 
foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and 
profligate ; this does not hinder but that these conse- 
quences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the 
whole course of mature life. Habits contracted, even 
in that age, are often utter ruin : and men’s success in 
the world, not only in the common sense of worldly suc- 
cess, but their real happiness and misery, depends in a 
great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in 
which they pass their youth ; which consequences they, 
for the most part, neglect to consider, and perhaps sel- 
dom can properly be said to believe beforehand. It 
requires also to be mentioned, that in numberless cases 
the natural course of things affords us opportunities for 
procuring advantages to ourselves at certain times 
which we cannot procure when we will ; nor ever recall 
the opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed, 
the general course of nature is an example of this* If, 
* See part ii, chap. vi. 


Chap. II J Of the Government of God. 79 

during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile 
and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life 
for want of those acquirements which they neglected 
the natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets 
his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year is 
lost to him beyond recovery. In like manner, though 
after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up 
to a certain degree , it is often in their power, for instance, 
to retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and char- 
acter, at least in good measure ; yet real reformation 
is, in many cases, of no avail at all toward Real re f 0 rma- 
preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, aiwayfprevent 
infamy, naturally annexed to folly and ex- misery - 
travagance, exceeding t/iat degree. There is a certain 
bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which being 
transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in 
the natural course of things. It is, further, very much 
to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, 
want of attention,* not looking about us to see what we 
have to do, are often attended with consequences alto- 
gether as dreadful as any active misbehavior from the 
most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil government 
being natural, the punishments of it are so too ; and 
some of these punishments are capital, as the effects of 
a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that 
many natural punishments are final f to him who incurs 


* Part ii, chap. vi. 

f The general consideration of a future state of punishment most 
evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of 
these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this 
doctrine as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe that 
Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future pun- 
ishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a 
like manner of expression and description as the Scripture does. So 
that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revela- 
tion, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinc- 
tion between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at the end 


8o 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


them, if considered only in his temporal capacity ; and 
seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove 
the offender out of the way of being further mischiev- 
ous, or as an example, though frequently a disregarded 
one, to those who are left behind. 

9. These things are not what we call accidental, or to 
be met with only now and then ; but they are things of 

These are es- every day’s experience ; they proceed from 
eentiai analogies. g enera q i aws? very general ones, by which 

God governs the world, in the natural course of his prov- 
idence.* And they are so analogous to what religion 
teaches us concerning the future punishment of the 
wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would 
naturally be expressed in the very same words and man- 
ner of description. In the book of Proverbs, for in- 
stance, Wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most 

of this world ; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. 
Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should finally, and 
upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked ; 
but it could not be determined, upon any principles of reason, wheth- 
er human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through 
other states of life and being before that distributive justice should, 
finally and effectually, take place. Revelation teaches us, that the 
next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of 
this justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mystery of 
God , the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, 
shall then be finished ; and he will take to him his great power, and 
will reign , by rendering to every one according to his works. 

* [The paragraph of this chapter where the enumeration of these 
resemblances is given, presents us with one of the finest triumphs of 
the analogical argument, and in which its power as a weapon of de- 
fense appears to great advantage, cutting down, as with a scythe, a 
whole army of these objections, which are most frequent in the 
mouths of adversaries, being not only the most plausible in them- 
selves, but the most formidable in point of effect, from a certain 
tone of generous denunciation against all arbitrary and tyrannical 
will in which they are propounded, and so as to associate the 
semblance of a protesting and moral indignancy with thje infidel 
cause. — Ghalmers.] 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 8i 

public places of resort, and as rejected when she offers 
herself as the natural appointed guide of human life. 
“ How long,” speaking to those who are passing through 
it, “ how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the 
scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowl- 
edge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour out 
my Spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto 
you.” But upon being neglected, “Because I have 
called and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, 
and no man regarded ; but ye have set at naught all my 
counsel, and would none of my reproof : I also will 
laugh at your calamity; I will mock when your fear 
cometh ; when your fear cometh as a desolation, and your 
destruction cometh as a whirlwind ; when distress and 
anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon 
me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but 
they shall not find me.” This passage, every one sees, 
is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative ; 
but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended 
is expressed more literally in the following words : “ For 
that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear 
of the Lord. . . . Therefore shall they eat of the fruit 
of their own way, and be filled with their own devices. 
For the security of the simple shall slay them, and 
the prosperity of fools shall destroy them.” And the 
whole passage is so equally applicable to what we ex- 
perience in the present world concerning the conse- 
quences of men’s actions, and to what religion teaches 
us is to be expected in another, that it may be questioned 
which of the two was principally intended. 

io. Indeed, when one has been recollecting the prop- 
er proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, 
nothing, methinks, can give one so sensible p reS ent pun- 
an apprehension of the latter, or representa- ofThS 

tion of it to the mind, as observing that future * 
after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and 
6 


82 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


warnings whicfy people meet with in the ways of vice, 
and folly, and extravagance : warnings from their very 
nature ; from the examples of others ; from the lesser 
inconveniences which they bring upon themselves ; from 
the instructions of wise and virtuous men ; after these 
have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed ; after the 
chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their 
follies, have been delayed for a great while ; at length 
they break in irresistibly, like an armed force ; repent- 
ance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to aggra- 
vate their distress ; the case is become desperate ; and 
poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and 
death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them 
beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an 
account of what is in fact the general constitution of 
nature. 

ii. It is not in any sort meant, that according to 
what appears at present of the natural course of things, 

They meet ob- men are always .uniformly punished in pro- 
tu C re°punish- fu ’ portion to their misbehavior ; but that there 
meats. are ver y many instances of misbehavior pun- 

ished in the several ways now mentioned, and very 
dreadful instances too, sufficient to show what the laws 
of the universe may admit ; and if thoroughly considered, 
sufficient fully to answer all objections against the cred- 
ibility of a future state of punishments from any imagina- 
tions that the frailty of our nature and external tempta- 
tions almost annihilate the guilt of human vices : as 
well as objections of another sort ; from necessity ; from 
suppositions that the will of an infinite being cannot 
be contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of offense 
and provocation.* 

such reflec- 12. Reflections of this kind are not with- 
in S ye t U impor- out the 1 r terrors to serious persons, the most 
tant to repress f ree f rom enthusiasm, and of the greatest 

* See chap, iv and vi. 


Chap. II.] Of the Government of God. 


83 


strength of mind ; but it is fit things be stated and con- 
sidered as they really are. And there is, in the present 
age,* a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be 
hereafter under the government of God, which nothing 
but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the 
side of Atheism can justify, and which makes it quite 
necessary that men be reminded and, if possible, made 
to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus 
presumptuous, even upon the most skeptical principles. 
For may it not be said of any person, upon his being 
born into the world, he may behave so as to be of no 
service to it, but by being made an example of the woe- 
ful effects of vice and folly ; that he may, as any one 
may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the 
hands of civil justice; or in some other course of ex- 
travagance shorten his days ; or bring upon himself in- 
famy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had 
been better for him, even with regard to the present 
world, that he had never been born. And is there any 
pretense of reason for people to think themselves secure, 
and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them act 
as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analo- 
gous to this with regard to a future and more general 
interest, under the providence and government of the 
same God ? 

* [The age immediately following the corrupt reign of Charles II. 
For a vivid picture of the state of morals in his reign see Macaulay’s 
History of England, vol. i, p. 140. — Champlin.] 


8 4 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


CHAPTER III. 

OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.* 

A S the manifold appearance of design and of final 
causes in the constitution of the world prove it to 
be the work of an intelligent mind, so the 

Final causes ...... . . , • 

prove an inteiii- particular final causes of pleasure and pam, 

gent Governor. distributed amon g his creatures, prove that 
they are under his government — what may be called, his 

* [The subject of the present chapter is as distinct from that of the 
former, as the generic idea of a government is distinct from the more 
particular idea of it as possessed of a certain character, or as being of 
a certain kind and species. If certain actions are followed up by 
pleasure and others by pain, and these are known beforehand, so 
that the agent can foresee the consequence of his doings, even as he 
would have done if under a proclaimed law, which told at the same 
time of its own rewards and its own penalties, these are enough of 
themselves to constitute a government having its regulations which 
are known, and its sanctions which are executed. So much for gov- 
ernment in the general ; but should it be found among these general 
phenomena, that those actions which are righteous were followed up 
by pleasure, and those actions which are wicked were followed up by 
pain, this would present us with a moral government enveloped, as 
it were, in the general and natural ; and it is to the manifestations 
of such a government in the course and constitution of nature that 
the author now addresses his observations. — Chalmers.] 

[This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive ar- 
gument. If in this world we have proofs that God is a moral gov- 
ernor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral govern- 
ment hereafter, we hav4 only to supply an intermediate consideration, 
namely, that God must be unchangeable. The argument assumes a 
substantive form : because admitted facts as to this world, exhibiting 
the very principles on which God’s government goes at present, com- 
pel us not only to suppose that the principles of God’s government 
will remain, but to believe so. — Malcom.] 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


85 


natural government of creatures endued with sense and 
reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than 
seems usually attended to when we speak of God’s nat- 
ural government of the world. It implies government 
of the very same kind with that which a master exer- 
cises over his servants, or a civil magistrate over his 
subjects. These latter instances of final causes as really 
prove an intelligent governor of the world, in the sense 
now mentioned, and before (chap, ii) distinctly treated 
of, as any other instances of final causes prove an intel- 
ligent maker of it. 

But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to de- 
termine any thing certainly concerning the moral char- 
acter of the Author of nature, considered in 

1 .Not necessa- 

this relation of governor ; does not ascertain rflyamoraigov- 

. ernor. 

his government to be moral, or prove that 
he is the righteous Judge of the world. Moral govern- 
ment consists, not barely in rewarding and punishing 
men for their actions^ which the most tyrannical person 
may do ; but in rewarding the righteous and punishing 
the wicked ; in rendering to men according to their ac- 
tions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection 
of moral government consists in doing this, with regard 
to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to 
their personal merits or demerits. 

2. Some men seem to think the only character of the 
Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevo- 
lence. This, considered as a principle of God not sim- 
action, and infinite in degree, is a disposi- 
tion to produce the greatest possible happi- & overnor - 
ness, without regard to persons’ behavior, otherwise 
than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. 
And supposing this to be the only character of God, 
veracity and justice in him would be nothing but be- 
nevolence conducted by wisdom. Now surely this 
ought not to be asserted unless it can be proved ; for 


86 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a 
subject. And whether it can be proved or not, is not 
the thing here to be inquired into; but whether, in the 
constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous gov- 
ernment be not discernibly planned out ; which neces- 
sarily implies a righteous governor. There may possi- 
bly be in the creation beings to whom the Author of 
nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all 
characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence ; for it 
is the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is 
not, incompatible with justice : but he manifests him- 
self to us under the character of a righteous governor. 
He may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely 
benevolent, in the sense now explained ; but he is, for 
he has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct 
of the world that he is, a governor over servants, as he 
rewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the 
constitution and conduct of it, he may also have given, 
besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages 
of conscience, clear and distinct intimations that his 
government is righteous or moral — clear to such as 
think the nature of it deserving their attention, and yet 
not to every careless person who casts a transient reflec- 
tion upon the subject.* 

This govern- 3. But it is particularly to be observed that, 
moral 1S but hl not the divine government, which we experience 
perfect. ourselves under in the present state, taken 

* The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being 
universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged 
against natural religion as well as against revealed. And therefore 
the consideration of th&n belongs to the first part of this Treatise, 
as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged 
against revealed religion, I chose to consider them in the second 
part. And the answer to them there, (chap, vi,) as urged against 
Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against 
the religion of nature ; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to 
that chapter. 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


87 


alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral gov- 
ernment.* And yet this by no means hinders, but that 
there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral 
in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be 
carried on to some degree ; enough to give us the appre- 
hension that it shall be completed, or carried on to that 
degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall ; 
but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine 
administration be seen than can in the present life. 
And the design of this chapter is to inquire, how far this 
is the case ; how far, over and above the moral nature 
(Dissertation II) which God has given us, and our natu- 
ral notion of him, as righteous governor of those his 
creatures to whom he has given this nature, (chap, vi ;) 
I say how far, besides this, the principles and beginnings 
of a moral government over the world may be discerned, 
notwithstanding and amid all the confusion and dis- 
order of it. 

4. Now, one might mention here, what has Difficuityofthe 
been often urged with great force, that in the greater hap- 

, , • , piness of virtue. 

general less uneasiness and more satisfaction 

are the natural consequences f of a virtuous than of a 

* [Butler seems here to indicate the distinction between religious 
and irreligious optimism. Irreligious optimism considers the present 
state of things as absolutely the best. Religious optimism considers 
it as imperfect in itself, but necessary for bringing about that state 
which is absolutely the best possible. But this best possible must, as 
Bishop Hamilton (on the Attributes, p. 189) has very truly re- 
marked, be understood with reference to such beings as men ; not to 
mean the best possible scheme of created things, because no such 
scheme can be conceived. The difference between finite and infinite 
perfection must always be infinite, so that however excellent we may 
suppose any one scheme of created things, there will still remain the 
possibility of another more perfect, in infinitutn. See on the general 
subject of the two schemes of optimism, Warburton’s Reply to Cron- 
saz’ Criticism on Pope, and Johnson’s Review of Jenyn’s Essay upon 
the Origin of Evil. — F.] 

f See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry Concerning Virtue, part ii. 


88 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


vicious course of life, in the present state, as an instance 
of a moral government established in nature ; an instance 
of it, collected from experience and present matter of fact. 
But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh 
and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each among 
themselves, and also against each other, so as to make 
an estimate, with any exactness, of the overplus of hap- 
piness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, 
that, amid the infinite disorders of the world, there may 
be exceptions to the happiness of virtue, even with re- 
gard to those persons whose course of life, from their 
youth up, has been blameless ; and more with regard to 
those who have gone on for some time in the ways of 
vice, and have afterward reformed. For suppose an in- 
stance of the latter case ; a person with his passions in- 
flamed, his natural faculties of self-government impaired 
by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about 
him, like so many harpies, craving for their accustomed 
gratification, — who can say how long it might be before 
such a person would find more satisfaction in the rea- 
sonableness and present good consequences of virtue, 
than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it ? 
Experience also shows, that men can, to a great degree, get 
over their ‘sense of shame, so as that by professing them- 
selves to be without principle, and avowing even direct 
villainy, they can support themselves against the infamy 
of it. But as the ill actions of any one will probably be 
more talked of, and oftener thrown in his way, upon his 
reformation ; so the infamy of them will be much more 
felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is re- 
covered. Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be 
put to the account of former vices ; yet it will be said, 
they are in part the consequences of reformation. S'till 
I am far from allowing it doubtful whether virtue, upon 
the whole, be happier than vice in the present world : 
but if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous admin- 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 89 

istration may, beyond all question, be found in nature, 
if we will attentively inquire after them. And, 

5. I. In whatever manner the notion of God’s moral 
government over the world might be treated, if it did 
not appear whether he were, in a proper God naturally a 
sense, our governor at all ; yet when it is moral s° vernor - 
certain matter of experience, that he does manifest him- 
self to us under the character of a governor, in the sense 
explained, (chap, ii,) it must deserve to be considered 
whether there be not reason to apprehend that he may 
be a righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to 
be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method 
of rewards and punishments, according to some settled 
rules of distribution, it is surely a question to be asked, 
What presumption is there against his finally rewarding 
and punishing them according to this particular rule, 
namely, as they act reasonably or unreasonably, virtu- 
ously or viciously? since rendering man happy or mis- 
erable by this rule certainly falls in, much more falls in, 
with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than 
doing so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding 
and punishing actions by any other rule would appear 
much harder to be accounted for by minds formed as 
he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then 
more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us 
that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and 
the wicked miserable, cannot, however, possibly be con- 
sidered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more 
than an expectation that a method of government al- 
ready begun shall be carried on — the method of reward- 
ing and punishing actions ; and shall be carried on by a 
particular rule, which unavoidably appears to us, at first 
sight, more natural than any other, the rule which we 
call Distributive Justice. Nor, 

6. II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tran- 
quillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being the 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


90 


natural consequences of prudent management of our- 
selves and our affairs; and rashness, profli- 

Prudence re- . . . 

warded; impru- gate negligence, and willful folly, bringing 
dence punished. 0 , • • , rc 

after them many inconveniences and sutter- 
ings, these afford instances of a right constitution of 
nature : as the correction of children, for their own 
sakes and by way of example, when they run into dan- 
ger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education. 
And thus, that God governs the world by general fixed 
laws ; that he has endued us with capacities of re- 
flecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing 
the good and bad consequences of our behavior, plainly 
implies some sort of moral government ; since from such 
a constitution of things it cannot but follow that pru- 
dence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue 
and vice,* must be, as they are, respectively rewarded 
and punished. 

7. III. From the natural course of things, vicious ac- 
tions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mis- 
chievous to society; and besides punish- 

Society pun- . 

ishes all vice as ment actually inflicted upon this account, 
there is also the fear and apprehension of it 
in those persons whose crimes have rendered them ob- 
noxious to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of fear 
being itself often a very considerable punishment. The 
natural fear and apprehension of it, too, which restrains 
from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against 
them. It is necessary to the very being of society that 
vices destructive of it should be punished as being so ; 
the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty : which punish- 
ment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an in- 
stance of a kind of moral government, naturally estab- 
lished and actually taking place. And since the certain 
natural course of things is the conduct of providence, 
or the government of God, though carried on by the in- 
* See Dissertation II. 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 91 

strumentality of men, the observation here made amounts 
to this, that mankind find themselves placed by him in 
such circumstances as that they are unavoidably ac- 
countable for their behavior, and are often punished, 
and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the 
view of their being mischievous or eminently beneficial 
to society. 

If it be objected that good actions, and such as are 
beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case 
of persecution and in other cases, and that objection rei- 
ill and mischievous actions are often re- fshm^tofgood 
warded, it may be answered distinctly, first, actions ’ etc - 
that this is in no sort necessary, and consequently not 
natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and there- 
fore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be 
punished ; and in the next place, that good actions are 
never punished, considered as beneficial to society, nor 
ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being hurt- 
ful to it.* So that it stands good, without any thing on 
the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author 
of nature has as truly directed that vicious actions, con- 
sidered as mischievous to society, should be punished, 
and put mankind under a necessity of thus punishing 
them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve 
our lives by food. 

8. IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such , 

* [These vicious actions are never rewarded because they are vicious, 
but though they are vicious ; and virtuous actions are sometimes pun- 
ished, yet never as virtuous, or never because virtuous, but though 
virtuous. — Chalmers.] 

[Dr. Mandeville, in his “Fable of the Bees,” alleges that private 
vices are often public benefits, and that luxury is necessary to the 
well-being of society. Others have maintained the same opinion. 

See this doctrine refuted in Browne on the Characteristics, Essay 
ii, § 5 ; Warburton’s Divine Legation, book i, § 6 ; Berkeley’s Mi- 
nute Philosopher, dialogue ii. See also Whately, and other writers, 
on Political Economy. — F.] 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


92 

is actually rewarded, and vice, as such , punished ; which 
, . seems to afford an instance, or example, not 

Natural vir- 
tue, as such, re- only of government, but of moral govern- 
warded. Actions J & . 

and qualities dis- ment begun and established : moral in the 
tinguished. . , , . , r 

strictest sense, though not in that perfection 
of degree which religion teaches us to expect. In order 
to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between 
actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to them, 
which we call virtuous or vicious. The gratification it- 
self of every natural passion must be attended with 
delight ; and acquisitions of fortune, however made, are 
acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment. 
An action, then, by which any natural passion is grati- 
fied or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, 
abstracted from all consideration of the morality of such 
action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this 
case is gained by the action itself, not by the morality, 
the virtuousness or viciousness of it, though it be, per- 
haps, virtuous or vicious. Thus to say such an action 
or course of behavior procured such pleasure or advan- 
tage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is 
quite a different thing from saying that such good or 
bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action 
or behavior. In one case, an action, abstracted 'from 
all moral consideration, produced its effect ; in the oth- 
er case — for it will appear that there are such cases — the 
morality of the action, the action under a moral consider- 
ation, that is, the virtuousness or viciousness of it, pro- 
duced the effect. Now I say virtue, as such, naturally 
procures considerable advantages to the virtuous ; and 
vice, as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience, 
and even misery, to the vicious, in very many instances. 
The immediate The immediate effects of virtue and vice 
and Ct vice Tiixs- upon the mind and temper are to be men- 
trate this. tioned as instances of it. Vice, as such, is 
naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


93 


uncommonly with great disturbance and apprehension. 
That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters 
and in familiar speech, we call being vexed with one’s 
self, and in matters of importance and in more serious 
language, remorse, is an uneasiness naturally arising 
from an action of a man’s own, reflected upon by him- 
self as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, that is, vicious, in 
greater or less degrees; and this manifestly is a different 
feeling from that uneasiness which arises from a sense 
of mere loss or harm. What is more common than to 
hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding 
— but, however, he has the satisfaction that he cannot 
blame himself for it ; or on the contrary, that he has the 
uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing ? Thus, 
also, the disturbance and fear which often follow upon a 
man’s having done an injury, arise from a sense of his 
being blameworthy ; otherwise there would, in many 
cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to 
fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward 
security and peace, and a mind open to the several grat- 
ifications of life, are the natural attendants of innocence 
and virtue ; to which must be added, the complacency, 
satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany 
the exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship, 
benevolence. 

And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears 
of future punishment, and peaceful hopes of hopes and 
a better life in those who fully believe or ture. 
have any serious apprehension of religion;* because 

* [When one supposes he is about to die there comes over him a 
fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before, 
for the stories which are told about Hades , that such as have prac- 
ticed wrong must there suffer punishment, although made light of for 
awhile, then torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who 
is conscious of innocence has a pleasant and good hope which will 
support old age. — Plato, Repub., i, § 5- — Malcom.] 


94 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satis- 
faction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great 
part of the world, even by men who have thought most 
thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no one 
can say how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction 
may be, or what, upon the whole, it may amount to. 

In the next place, comes in the consideration that all 
honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest 
Also the dis- and good men, as such, and to discounte- 

position of good 0 . . . 

men toward the nance the vicious, as such, and do so in 
virtuous and the . . . 

vicious. some degree — indeed, in a considerable de- 

gree ; from which favor and discouragement cannot but 
arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. And 
though the generality of the world have little regard to 
the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed 
to have less to that of others, when they themselves are 
not concerned, yet, let any one be known to be a man 
of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored, and good 
offices will be done him from regard to his character, 
without remote views, occasionally, and in some low 
degree, I think, by the generality of the world, as it hap- 
pens to come in their way. Public honors, too, and ad- 
vantages, are the natural consequences, are sometimes, 
at least, the consequences, in fact, of virtuous actions, 
of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, 
considered in the view of being virtuous. And some- 
times even death itself, often infamy and external incon- 
veniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. 
For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, 
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or 
fear of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bring- 
ing about revolutions which make a figure even in the 
history of the world. For it is plain, men resent inju- 
ries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely un- 
der the notion of having received harm, but of having 
received wrong ; and they have this resentment in be- 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


95 


half of others, as well as of themselves. So, likewise, 
even the generality are, in some degree, grateful, and 
disposed to return good offices, not merely because such 
a one has been the occasion of good to them, but under 
the view that such good offices implied kind intention and 
good desert in the doer. To all this may be added two 
or three particular things, which many per- The ru i e Q f bo- 
sons will think frivolous ; but to me noth- “^nmen^es- 
ing appears so which at all comes in toward tablished - 
determining a question of such importance, as whether 
there be or be not a moral institution of government, 
in the strictest sense moral, visibly established and be- 
gun in nature. The particular things are these : that 
in domestic government, which is doubtless natural, 
children and others also are very generally punished for 
falsehood, and injustice, and ill behavior, as such, and re- 
warded for the contrary; which are instances where ve- 
racity, and justice, and right behavior, as such, are natu- 
rally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more 
or less considerable in degree : that though civil govern- 
ment be supposed to take cognizance of actions in no 
other view than as prejudicial to society, without re- 
spect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are 
immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality 
of them very greatly contributes, in different ways, to 
bring offenders to justice; and that entire absence of all 
crime and guilt, in the moral sense, when plainly ap- 
pearing, will almost of course procure, and circum- 
stances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the 
penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many cases, though 
by no means in all. 

9. Upon the whole, then, besides the good turns' 

and bad effects of virtue and vice upon men’s a5 u th of ap $rt!S,' 
own minds, the course of the world does, in etc - 
some measure, turn upon the approbation and disappro- 
bation of them, as such, in others. The sense of well 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


96 

and ill doing, the presages of conscience, the love of 
good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, 
resentment, gratitude ; all these, considered in them- 
selves and in their effects, do afford manifest real in- 
stances of virtue, as such, naturally favored, and of vice, 
as such, discountenanced, more or less, in the daily 
course of human life ; in every age, in every relation, in 
every general circumstance of it. That God has given 
us a moral nature,* may most justly be urged as a proof 
of our being under his moral government ; but that he 
has placed us in a condition which gives this nature, as 
one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does un- 
avoidably operate, that is, influence mankind to act, so 
as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance 
and punish vice ; this is not the same, but a further ad- 
ditional proof of his moral government ; for it is an in- 
stance of it. The first is a proof that he will finally 
favor and support virtue effectually ; the second is an 
example of his favoring and supporting it at present, in 
some degree. 

10. If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it 
arises that virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, 
_ _ . as such, is punished, and this rule never in- 

rewarded and verted, it will be found to proceed, in part, 

Vice punished. . .... r 7 

immediately from the moral nature itself 
which God has given us ; and also, in part, from his 
having given us, together with this nature, so great a 
power over each other’s happiness and misery. For, 
first , it is certain that peace and delight, in some degree 
and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present 
effect of virtuous practice ; an effect arising immediately 
from that constitution of our nature. We are so made 
that well-doing, as such, gives us satisfaction, at least, 
in some instances; ill-doing, as such, in none. And, 
secondly , from our moral nature, joined with God’s hav- 
* See Dissertation II. 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


97 


ing put our happiness and misery in many respects in 
each other’s power, it cannot but be that vice, as such, 
some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, 
and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself de- 
testable ; and the villain will by no means be able al- 
ways to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will 
be able to escape this further punishment which man- 
kind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the no- 
tion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on 
the side of vice to answer this, because there is nothing 
in the human mind contradictory, as the 

. J 1 Nothing in the 

logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue con- mind contradic- 
sists in a regard to what is right and reason- 
able, as being so ; in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, 
in themselves : and there is surely no such thing as a 
like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it 
be thought that there are instances of an approbation of 
vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake, (though it 
does not appear to me that there is any such thing at 
all,) but supposing there be, it is evidently monstrous ; 
as much so as the most acknowledged perversion of any 
passion whatever. Such instances of perversion, then, 
being left out as merely imaginary, or, however, unnat- 
ural ; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and 
from our condition in the respects now described, that 
vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored, 
as such, by others, upon some occasions, and happy in 
itself, in some degree. For what is here insisted upon 
is, not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus dis- 
tinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in 
some degree ; though the whole good and bad effect of 
virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. 
But that they must be thus distinguished, in some de- 
gree, is in a manner necessary ; it is matter of fact of 
daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of 
human affairs. 


98 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


11. It is not pretended but that, in the natural course 
of things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed 

„ , by other rules than only the personal merit 

How happi- J J 1 

ness and misery and demerit of characters. They may some- 
are distributed. . ..... - . 

times be distributed by way of mere disci- 
pline. There may be the wisest and best reasons why 
the world should be governed by general laws, from 
whence such promiscuous distribution, perhaps, must 
follow ; and also why our happiness and misery should 
be put in each other’s power, in the degree which they 
are. And these things, as in general they contribute to 
the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such ; so 
they often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, 
which is impossible, but to the rendering persons pros- 
perous though wicked, afflicted though righteous; and, 
which is worse, to the rewarding some actions , though 
vicious, and punishing other actions , though virtuous. 
But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the 

Naturally dia- conduct of Providence, plainly declaring it- 
self for virtue, by way of distinction from 
vice, and preference to it. For, our being so constituted 
as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and dis- 
countenanced, rewarded and punished respectively as 
such, is an intuitive proof of the intent of nature that 
it should be so ; otherwise the constitution of our mind, 
from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, 
would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because vir- 
tuous actions are sometimes punished and vicious ac- 
tions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though 
this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are 
done, by means of some natural passion, yet this may be, 
as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of 
such passion, implanted in us for other, and those very 
good, purposes. And indeed these other and good pur- 
poses, even of every passion, may be clearly seen. 

12. We have then a declaration, in some degree of 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


99 


present effect, from Him who is supreme in nature, which 
side he is of, or what part he takes; a God declares 
declaration for virtue and against vice. So forvirtue - 
far, therefore, as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and 
justice, to equity and charity, and the right of the case, 
in whatever he is concerned, so far he is on the side of 
the divine administration, and co-operates with it ; and 
from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret sat- 
isfaction and sense of security, and implicit hope of 
somewhat further. And, 

13. V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary ten- 
dencies of virtue, which, though not of present effect, 
yet are at present discernible in nature, and This hope con- 
so afford an instance of somewhat moral in g a ™^endendea 
the essential constitution of it. There is, ofvirtue - 
in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to 
produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a 
greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For 
instance, good and bad men would be much more re- 
warded and punished as such, were it not that justice is 
often artificially eluded, that characters are not known, 
and many who would thus favor virtue and discourage 
vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes. 
These tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with 
regard to individuals. But it may require more particu- 
larly to be considered, that power in a society, by being 
under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and 
has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power 
not under the direction of it ; in like manner as power, 
by being under the direction of reason, increases, and 
has a tendency to prevail over brute force. There are 
several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior, 
strength to that of men ; and possibly the sum of the 
whole strength of brutes may be greater than that of 
mankind : but reason gives us the advantage and supe- 
riority over them, and thus man is the acknowledged 


100 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superior- 
ity considered by any as accidental ; but as what reason 
has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain. 
And yet, perhaps, difficulties may be raised about the 
meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue 
has the like tendency. 

14. To obviate these difficulties, let us see more dis- 
tinctly how the case stands with regard to reason, which 

is so readily acknowledged to have this ad- 

Tendencyofrea- 

son to triumph vantageous tendency. Suppose, then, two 

over brute force. . . 

or three men of the best and most improved 
understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten 
times the number of beasts of prey ; would their reason 
secure them the victory in this unequal combat ? Power, 
then, though joined with reason, and under its direction, 
cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, 
though merely brutal, unless the one bears some pro- 
portion to the other. Again, put the imaginary case, 
that rational and irrational creatures were of a like ex- 
ternal shape and manner; it is certain, before there 
were opportunities for the first to distinguish each other, 
to separate from their adversaries and to form a union 
among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in 
several respects, upon great disadvantage, though united 
they might be vastly superior ; since union is of such 
efficacy that ten men, united, might be able to accom- 
plish what ten thousand of the same natural strength 
and understanding, wholly ununited, could not. In this 
case, then, brute force might more than maintain its 
ground against reason, for want of union among the 
rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land 
upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts ; a number 
of men, who, by the regulations of civil government, the 
inventions of art, and the experience of some years, 
could they be preserved so long, would be really suffi- 
cient to subdue the Wild beasts, and to preserve them- 


Chap. IIIJ Moral Government of God. ioi 

selves in security from them ; yet a conjuncture of acci- 
dents might give such advantage to the irrational animals 
as that they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, 
the whole species of rational ones. Length of time, 
then, proper scope and opportunities for reason to exert 
itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over 
brute force. 

Further still : there are many instances of brutes suc- 
ceeding in attempts which they could not have under- 
taken had not their irrational nature ren- 

. . Supposed tri- 

dered them incapable of foreseeing the dan- umph of brutes. 

. Inverted order. 

ger of such attempts, or the fury of passion 
hindered their attending to it; and there are instances 
of reason and real prudence preventing men’s undertak- 
ing what, it hath appeared afterward, they might have 
succeeded in by a lucky rashness. And in certain con- 
junctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, 
may have their advantages. So that rational animals 
have not necessarily the superiority over irrational ones ; 
but how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently pos- 
sible that in some globes the latter may be superior. 
And were the former wholly at variance and disunited, 
by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, 
and consequent rage and malice against each other, 
while the latter were firmly united among themselves by 
instinct, this might greatly contribute to the introducing 
such an inverted order of things. For every one would 
consider it as inverted ; since reason has, in the nature 
of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force, notwith- 
standing the possibility it may not prevail, and the ne- 
cessity which there is of many concurrent circumstances 
to render it prevalent. 

Now I say, virtue in a society has a like v^e^Tupc- 
tendency to procure superiority and addi- riorit y> Ac- 
tional power, whether this power be considered as the 
means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining 


102 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

other advantages. And it has this tendency, by render- 
ing public good an object and end to every member of the 
society : by putting every one upon consideration and 
diligence, recollection and self-government, both in or- 
der to see what is the most effectual method, and also 
in order to perform their proper part, for obtaining and 
preserving it ; by uniting a society within itself, and so 
increasing its strength, and, which is particularly to be 
mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. 
For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benev- 
olence, or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by 

them, is — nobody knows what. 

15. And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible 
dispensations of Providence, to be in any sort analogous 

Same tenden to w ^ at a PP ears I or tha.t both together make 
cy throughout up one uniform scheme, the two parts of 

the universe. ... , ... . . . . . 

which, the part which we see, and that which 
is beyond our observation, are analogous to each other ; 
then there must be a like natural tendency in the de- 
rived power, throughout the universe, under the direc- 
tion of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is 
not under its direction ; as there is in reason, derived 
reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force. But 

then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may 
actually produce what it has a tendency to produce, the 
like concurrences are necessary as are to the prevalence 
of reason. There must be some proportion between 
the natural power or force which is, and that which is 
not, under the direction of virtue : there must be suffi- 
cient length of time ; for the complete success of virtue, 
as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be 
otherwise than gradual : there must be, as one may 
speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive 
enough, proper occasions and opportunities for the vir- 
tuous to join together, to exert themselves against law- 
less force, and to reap the fruit of their united labors. 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


103 


Now indeed it is to be hoped that the disproportion be- 
tween the good and the bad, even here on earth, is not 
so great, but that the former have natural TT . J 

. # # Hinderances 

power sufficient to their prevailing to a con- may be removed 

. . . in a future state. 

siderable degree, if circumstances would 
permit this power to be united. For much less, very 
much less, power, under the direction of virtue, would 
prevail over much greater, not under the direction of it.* 
However, good men over the face of the earth cannot 
unite ; as for other reasons, so because they cannot be 
sufficiently ascertained of each other’s characters. And 
the known course of human things, the scene we are 
now passing through, particularly the shortness of life, 
denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects. 
The natural tendency which we have been considering, 
though real, is hindered from being carried into effect in 
the present state, but these hinderances maybe removed 
in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the Christian allu- 

* [With reference to this point Fitzgerald quotes a forcible passage 
from Coleridge : “ Often have I reflected with awe on the great and 
disproportionate power which an individual of no extraordinary tal- 
ents or attainments may exert by merely throwing off all restraint of 
conscience. . . . It is not vice, as vice, which is thus mighty, but sys- 
tematic vice. The abandonment of all principle of right enables the 
soul to choose and act upon a principle of wrong, and to subordinate 
to this one principle all the various vices of human nature. For it 
is a mournful truth, that as devastation is incomparably an easier 
work than production, so may all its means and instruments be more 
easily arranged into a scheme and system.” (Friend, i, 158, 159 ; 
Pickering, 1837.) 

As soon as it is understood that bad men make no profession of vir- 
tue, and have thrown off all the restraints of conscience, their power 
declines. 

There is an intensity and continuity of effort in great wickedness, 
rarely manifested by most men who are esteemed as good, in the 
usual sense of the word. Moreover, the results of wickedness are 
more striking and directly manifest to the senses than the influence 
of virtue, which is often more quiet and unobserved, though more 
abiding and really more powerful.] 


104 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


sion, is militant here, and various untoward accidents 
contribute to its being often overborne ; but it may com- 
bat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail com- 
pletely, and enjoy its consequent rewards in some future 
states.* Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps 
despised and oppressed here, there may be scenes in 
eternity lasting enough, and in every other way adapted 
to afford it a sufficient sphere of action, and a sufficient 
sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in 
fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and this state 
be a progress toward a future one, as childhood is toward 
mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only 
among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous 
creatures in that future state. For virtue, from the very 
nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some 
degree, among all who are endued with it and known to 
each other; so as that by it a good man cannot but 
recommend himself to the favor and protection of all 
virtuous beings throughout the whole universe, who can 
be acquainted with his character, and can any way 
interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. 

And one might add, that suppose all this advanta- 
geous tendency of virtue to become effect among one or 
more orders of creatures, in any distant scenes and peri- 
ods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious creatures, 
throughout the universal kingdom of God ; this happy 
effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of exam- 
ple, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them 
who are capable of amendment, and being recovered to 
a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan of 

* [This is an instance of Butler’s care to avoid assuming more than 
his premises will warrant. He is arguing here on the foot of reason 
alone ; and, as he had before observed that mere reason could not 
show that probation would terminate with this life, so he speaks here 
of the supposition (consistent with such a state of knowledge) of its 
passing through some state qr states of militancy hereafter, — F.J 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 105 

Providence were enlarged, in any sort proportionable to 
what late discoveries have enlarged our views with re- 
spect to the material world, representations of this kind 
would not appear absurd or extravagant. However, 
they are not to be taken as intended for a literal delin- 
eation of what is in fact the particular 

1 These are sup- 

Scheme of the universe, which cannot be positions— what 

. . , ... . . they show. 

known without revelation ; for suppositions 
are not to be looked on as true because not incredible, 
but they are mentioned to show that our finding virtue 
to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority 
and advantages is no objection against its having, in 
the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure 
them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly 
show this ; for they show that these hinderances are so 
far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily 
conceive how they may be removed in future states, and 
full scope be granted to virtue. And all these advan- 
tageous tendencies of it are to be considered as decla- 
rations of God in its favor. This, however, is taking a 
pretty large compass ; though it is certain that as the 
material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless 
and immense, there must be some scheme of Providence 
vast in proportion to it. 

16. But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and 
we shall see this happy tendency of virtue by imagining 
an instance not so vast and remote ; by The 
supposing a kingdom or society of men upon o^virtue^m a 
it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of 
many ages; to which, if you please, may be given a sit- 
uation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such 
a state there would be no such thing as faction, but men 
of the greatest capacity would, of course, all along, have 
the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, 
and they would share it among themselves without envy. 
Each of these would have the part assigned him to 


o 6 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


which his genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, 
who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, 
and think themselves very happy, by being under the 
protection and guidance of those who had. Public de- 
terminations would really be the result of the united 
wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be 
executed by the united strength of it. Some would 
in a higher way contribute, but all would in some 
way contribute to the public prosperity, and in it 
each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And 
as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be un- 
known among themselves, so they would be sufficiently 
secured from it in their neighbors. For cunning and 
false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, 
and accompanied with faction and intestine treachery; 
these, on one hand, would be found mere childish folly 
and weakness when set in opposition against wisdom, 
public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other, 
allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their 
force. Add the general influence which such a king- 
dom would have over the face of the earth, by way of 
example particularly, and the reverence which would be 
paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and 
the world must gradually come under its empire ; not 
by means of lawless violence, but partly by what must 
be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other 
kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it thiough- 
out a course of ages, and claiming its protection, one 
after another, in successive exigencies. The head of it 
would be a universal monarch, in another sense than 
any mortal has yet been, and the eastern style would be 
literally applicable to him, that all people , nations , and 

No such state ^ an S ua S' es should serve him. And though, in- 
yet a tendency deed, our knowledge of human nature, and 

toward it. . . . . r . , , , . 

the whole history of mankind, show the im- 
possibility, without some miraculous interposition, that 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


107 


a number of men here on earth should unite in one so- 
ciety or government, in the fear of God and universal 
practice of virtue, and that such a government should con- 
tinue so united for a succession of ages ; yet, admitting 
or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. 
And thus, for instance, the wonderful power and pros- 
perity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scripture 
would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what 
is predicted of them ; that the “ people should be all 
righteous, and inherit the land forever;” were we to un- 
derstand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, 
sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions 
of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to 
pass in the present known course of nature ; but suppose 
them to come to pass, and then the dominion and pre- 
eminence promised must naturally follow, to a very 
considerable degree. 

17. Consider now the general system of religion ; that 
the government of the world is uniform, and one, and 
moral ; that virtue and right shall finally Tendency of 
have the advantage, and prevail over fraud feJt U morai’ fov- 
and lawless force — over the deceits as well ernment - 

as the violence of wickedness — under the conduct 
of one supreme governor ; and from the observations 
above made it will appear that God has, by our rea- 
son, given us to see a peculiar connection in the sev- 
eral parts of this scheme, and a tendency toward the 
completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue; 
which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral 
in the essential constitution of things. If any one should 
think all this to be of little importance, I desire him to 
consider what he would think if vice had, essentially 
and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies, or if 
virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones. 

18. But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all 
these natural effects, and these natural tendencies of 


io 8 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout the 
universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed 
way as here at present upon earth ; virtue 

Objection— J r l . * _ 

things now and sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed ; 

hereaftermaygo . . ... 

on in the same vice sometimes punished, sometimes suc- 
mixe way. cess f u i * xhe answer to which is, that it is 
not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, 
properly to prove God’s perfect moral government over 
the world, or the truth of religion, but to observe what 
there is in the constitution and course of nature to con- 
firm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known, and 
that the weight of the foregoing observations to this 
purpose may be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and 
pain are, indeed, to a certain degree, say to a very high 
degree, distributed among us without any apparent re- 
gard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were 
there nothing else, concerning this matter, discernible 
in the constitution and course of nature, there would be 
no ground, from the constitution and course of nature, 
to hope or to fear that men would be rewarded or pun- 
ished hereafter according to their deserts; which, how- 
ever, it is to be remarked, implies that even then there 
would be no ground, from appearances, to think that 
vice, upon the whole, would have the advantage, rather 
than that virtue would. And thus the proof of a future 
state of retribution would rest upon the usual known ar- 
guments for it ; which are, I think, plainly unanswerable, 
and would be so though there were no additional con- 
firmation of them from the things above insisted on. But 
these things are a very strong confirmation of them. For, 

God not indif- in. First, They show that the Author of 

ferent to virtue _ . 

and vice. nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice 
They amount to a declaration from him, determinate, 

* [The objection is taken from Hume. Compare D. Stewart, Act- 
ive Powers, vol. ii, pp. 226, etc. Archbishop Whately’s Essays on 
Peculiarities of Christian Religion, note, Essay I, § 6. — F.] 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 109 

and not to be evaded, in favor of one and against the 
other ; such a declaration as there is nothing to be set 
over against, or answer, on the part of vice. So that 
were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to 
determine, from the course of nature only, whether it were 
most probable that the righteous or the wicked would 
have the advantage in a future life, there can be no 
doubt but that he would determine the probability to be 
that the former would. The course of nature, then, in 
the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real practi- 
cal proof of the obligations of religion. 

20. Secondly, When, conformably 'to what religion 
teaches us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice 
as such, so as that every one shall, upon the Future distrib- 
whole, have his deserts,' this distributive same in kind, dif^ 
justice will not be a thing different in kind , ferentm degree, 
but only in degree , from what we experience in his present 
government. It will be that in effect , toward which we 
now see a tendency. It will be no more than the comple- 
tion of that moral government, the principles and begm- 
ning of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, dis- 
cernible in the present constitution and course of nature. 
And from hence it follows, 

21. Thirdly, That as under the natural government 
of God our experience of those kinds and degrees of 
happiness and misery which we do experi- Expectation of 
ence at present, gives just ground to hope ffof pSh- 
for and to fear higher degrees and other ments - 
kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state 
admitted ; so, under his moral government, our experi- 
ence that virtue and vice are, in the manners above- 
mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, 
in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to 
fear that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher 
degree hereafter. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this 
alone is not sufficient ground to think that they actually 


IIO 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather 
than in a lower: but then, 

22. Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from 
the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For 

these tendencies are essential, and founded 

This expectation . . 

— how strength- m the nature of things: whereas, the hin- 

derances to their becoming effect are, in 
numberless cases, not necessary, but artificial only. 
Now it may be much more strongly argued that these 
tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punish- 
ments of virtue and vice which arise directly out of the 
nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the ac- 
cidental hinderances of them will. And if these hinder- 
ances do not remain, those rewards and punishments 
cannot but be carried on much further toward the per- 
fection of moral government, that is, the tendencies of 
virtue and vice will become effect ; but when, or where, 
or in what particular way, cannot be known at all but 
by revelation. 

23. Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral govern- 
ment implied in God’s natural government, (page 89;) 

Recapitulation, virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and 
punished as beneficial and mischievous to society, 
(page 90,) and rewarded and punished directly as vir- 
tue and vice, (page 91, etc.) The notion, then, of a 
moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natu- 
ral ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitu- 
tion and course of nature ; and the execution of this 
scheme is actually begun in the instances here men- 
tioned. And these things are to be considered as a 
declaration of the Author of nature for virtue, and 
against vice ; they give a credibility to the supposition 
of their being rewarded and punished hereafter, and 
also ground to hope and to fear that they may be re- 
warded and punished in higher degrees than they are 
here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for 


Chap. III.] Moral Government of God. 


i 1 1 


religion, from the constitution and course of nature, is 
carried on further by observing that there are natural 
tendencies, and in innumerable cases only artificial hin- 
derances, to this moral scheme being carried on much 
further toward perfection than it is at present, (page 
99> etc.) The notion, then, of a moral scheme of gov- 
ernment much more perfect than what is seen, is not a 
fictitious but a natural notion ; for it is suggested to our 
thoughts by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice. 
And these tendencies are to be considered as intima- 
tions, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the 
Author of nature, of much greater rewards and punish- 
ments to follow virtue and vice than do at present. 
And, indeed, every natural tendency, which is to con- 
tinue, but which is hindered from becoming effect by 
only accidental causes, affords a presumption that such 
tendency will, some time or other, become effect : * a 
presumption in degree proportionable to the length of 
the duration through which such tendency will con- 
tinue. And from these things together arises a real 
presumption that the moral scheme of government es- 
tablished in nature shall be carried on much further 

* [The Archbishop of Dublin (Pol. Econ., lect. ix) has pointed out 
the ambiguity of the word tendency , which has been the occasion of 
much confusion of thought. Tendency toward a result sometimes 
(and strictly) only means the existence of a cause which, if operating 
unimpeded, would produce the result. But commonly it is used to 
imply the existence of such a state of things as makes it likely that 
the result will actually be produced, that is, in Butler’s language, that 
the hinderances to its operation are accidental ; such as do not act 
steadily and uniformly against the cause, as such, but only occasion- 
ally, and in consequence of its connection with other things with 
which it may or may not be united. There is the clear presumption 
in favor of continuance (noticed by Butler, part i, chap, i) for the 
tendency which we see steadily and uniformly operating, while there 
is nothing like the same presumption for the continuance of those 
causes of hinderances which are not permanent in their action, nor 
uniform in their nature. — F.] 


1 12 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


toward perfection hereafter, and, I think, a presumption 
that it will be absolutely completed. But from these 
things, joined with the moral nature which God has 
given us, considered as given us by him, arises a prac- 
tical proof * that it will be completed; a proof from 
fact, and therefore a distinct one, from that which is 
deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations — the 
fitness and unfitness of actions. 


* See this proof drawn out briefly, chap. vi. 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 


ii3 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF A STATE OF PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, 
DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.* 



HE general doctrine of religion, that our present 


X life is a state of probation for a future one, com- 
prehends under it several particular things Difference be- 
distinct from each other. But the first and an^mora^gov^ 
most common meaning of it seems to be, that ernment 
our future interest is now depending, and depending 
upon ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunities 

* [It might be, and often is, indeed, made an objection to the re- 
ligious system, that our way to the everlasting blessedness which it 
proposes should be beset with so many lures which tempt us aside 
from the prosecution of it ; and, on the other hand, that so many 
hardships and difficulties should be attendant on our steadfast perse- 
verance in that way. The thing complained of is, that our great and 
ultimate good should have been made of such difficult attainment, 
insomuch that the frail powers of humanity, either for the achieve- 
ment of what is good or the resistance of what is evil, are so greatly 
overtasked, as in the great majority of instances to be overborne. 
Now in this chapter we are presented with a complete and conclusive 
analogy, which, if it do not establish the reality of our religious trial, 
at least serves to vindicate it against the exceptions which we have 
just enumerated. Whatever doubt we may stand in regarding those 
doctrines which respect the future and the unseen, there can be no 
quarreling with present and actually observed facts. If the doctrine 
be, that the way to our eternal good is a way of labor and self-denial, 
it is in perfect analogy with the fact that this is the way to our tem- 
poral good also. It is quite palpable that often many toils must be 
undergone, and many temptations resisted, ere we can secure the most 
highly-prized advantages of the life that now is ; and the conclusion 
is, not that similar toils and temptations must, but that they may be , 
the precursors and the preparatives of our happiness in another state 
of being. — Chalmers.] 


8 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


114 


here for that good and bad behavior which God will re- 
ward and punish hereafter ; together with temptations 
to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other. 
And this is, in great measure, the same with saying that 
we are under the moral government of God, and to give 
an account of our actions to him. For the notion of a 
future account, and general righteous judgment, implies 
some sort of temptations to what is wrong, otherwise 
there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong, nor 
ground for judgment or discrimination. But there is this 
difference, that the word probation is more distinctly and 
particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or dif- 
ficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of 
the danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the 
words moral government. A state of probation, then, as 
thus particularly implying in it trial, difficulties, and dan- 
ger, may require to be considered distinctly by itself. 

2. And as the moral government of God, which re- 
ligion teaches us, implies that we are in a state of trial 
This is a state with regard to a future world; so also his 
toean f d r for e the natural government over us implies that we 
present world. are j n a G f trial, in the like sense, with 

regard to the present world. Natural government, by 
rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial, 
as moral government does moral trial. The natural 
government of God here meant (chap, ii) consists in 
his annexing pleasure to some actions and pain to oth- 
ers, which are in our power to do or forbear, and in giv- 
ing us notice of such appointment beforehand. This 
necessarily implies that he has made our happiness and 
misery, or our interest, to depend in part upon ourselves. 
And so far as men have temptations to any course of 
action which will probably occasion them greater tem- 
poral inconvenience and uneasiness than satisfaction, so 
far their temporal interest is in danger from themselves, 
or they are in a state of trial with respect to it. Now 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 


i 15 

people often blame others, and even themselves, for 
their misconduct in their temporal con- implied in our 
cerns. And we find many are greatly want- censures - 
ing to themselves, and miss of that natural happiness 
which they might have obtained in the present life ; 
perhaps every one does in some degree. But many 
run themselves into great inconvenience, and into ex- 
treme distress and misery, not through incapacity of 
knowing better, and doing better f or themselves, which 
would be nothing to the present purpose, but through 
their own fault. And these things necessarily imply 
temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or 
less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or hap- 
piness. Every one too, without having religion in his 
thoughts, speaks of the hazards which young people run 
upon their setting out in the world — hazards from other 
causes than merely their ignorance and unavoidable ac- 
cidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being con- 
trary to men’s worldly interest or good, temptations to 
these must at the same time be temptations to forego 
our present and our future interest. 

Thus in our natural or temporal capacity we are in a 
state of trial, that is, of difficulty and danger, analogous, 
or like, to our moral and religious trial. This will more 
distinctly appear to any one who thinks it worth while 
more distinctly to consider what it is which constitutes 
our trial in both capacities, and to observe how mankind 
behave under it. 

3. And that which constitutes this our trial, in both 
these capacities, must be somewhat either in our ex- 
ternal circumstances or in our nature. For, This trial orig- 
on the one hand, persons may be betrayed oT’na- 

into wrong behavior upon surprise, or over- ture> 
come upon any other very singular and extraordinary ex- 
ternal occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved 
their character of prudence and of virtue : in which 


1 1 6 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part L 


cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of 
these persons, would impute it to such particular ex- 
ternal circumstances. And on the other hand, men who 
have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or 
have some particular passions in excess, will seek oppor- 
tunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, to gratify 
themselves in these respects, at the expense of their 
wisdom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would 
say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and 
passions. And the account of this last case is, that par- 
ticular passions are no more coincident with prudence, 
or that reasonable self-love, the end of which is our 
worldly interest, than they are with the principle of 
virtue and religion, but often draw contrary ways to one 
as well as to the other ; and so such particular passions 
are as much temptations to act imprudently with regard 
to our worldly interest as to act viciously.* However, 
as when we say, men are misled by external circum- 
Both unite in stances of temptation, it cannot but be un- 
derstood that there is somewhat within them- 
selves to render those circumstances temptations, or to 
render them susceptible of impressions from them ; so, 
when we say they are misled by passions, it is always 
supposed that there are occasions*, circumstances, and 
objects, exciting these passions, and affording means for 
gratifying them. And therefore temptations from with- 
in and from without coincide, and mutually imply each 
other. Now the several external objects of the appe- 
tites, passions, and affections being present to the senses, 
or offering themselves to the mind, and so exciting emo- 
tions suitable to their nature, not only in cases where 
they can be gratified consistently with innocence and 
prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet 
can be gratified imprudently and viciously ; this as real- 

* See Sermons preached at the Rolls, 1726, 2d ed., 205, etc. Pref., 
p. 25, etc. Serm., p. 21, etc. 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 


ii7 


ly puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their 
present interest or good as their future, and as really 
renders self-denial necessary to secure one as the other ; 
that is, we are in a like state of trial with respect to 
both, by the very same passions excited by the very 
same means. Thus mankind having a temporal inter- 
est depending upon themselves, and a prudent course 
of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions inor- 
dinately excited, whether by means of example or by 
any other external circumstance, toward such objects, 
at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be 
gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temp- 
tations dangerous, and too often successful temptations, 
to forego a greater temporal good for a less, that is, to 
forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, 
for the sake of a present gratification. This is a de- 
scription of our state of trial in our temporal capacity. 
Substitute now the word future for temporal, and virtue 
for prudence, and it will be just as proper a description 
of our state of trial in our religious capacity, so analo- 
gous are they to each other.* 

4. If, from consideration of this our like state of trial 
in both capacities, we go on to observe further how man- 
kind behave under it, we shall find there are . 

some who have so little sense of it that they fewness with 

. reference to the 

scarce look beyond the passing day ; they present and fu- 
are so taken up with present gratifications 
as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no 
regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any 
more than to their happiness in another. Some appear 
to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in 

* [If because of these things we must give up the God of religion, 
we should give up the God of nature also. If we persist in our ob- 
jection notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude 
either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous deity, or that 
there is no deity at all.— Chalmers.] 


1 18 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

their worldly concerns as much as in religion. Others 
are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away 
by the like passions against their better judgment, and 
feeble resolutions, too, of acting better. And there are 
men, and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly 
avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, 
to be their law of life ; and who, in open defiance of 
every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of 
vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and 
little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some 
of them, under the apprehension of the consequences of 
wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most 
moderate way, human creatures are not only continually 
liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that 
they often actually do so, with respect to their temporal 
interests as well as with respect to religion. 

Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our 
temporal and our religious capacity, as they proceed from 
the same causes and have the same effect upon men’s 
behavior, are evidently analogous and of the same kind. 

5. It may be added, that as the difficulties and dan- 
gers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are 
Similar diffi- greatly increased, and one is ready to think, 
bad'educatS^T * n a manner wholly made by the ill behavior 
etc> of others ; by a wrong education, wrong in 

a moral sense, sometimes positively vicious ; by general 
bad example ; by the dishonest artifices which are got 
into business of all kinds ; and in very many parts of 
the world, by religion’s being corrupted into supersti- 
tions which indulge men in their vices ; so in like man- 
ner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in 
respect to our present interest, and our danger of being 
led aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased by a 
foolish education, and after we come to mature age, by 
the extravagance and carelessness of others whom we 
have intercourse with, and by mistaken notions, very 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 


i 19 

generally prevalent and taken up from common opinion, 
concerning temporal happiness and wherein it consists. 
And persons, by their own negligence and folly in their 
temporal affairs, no less than by a course of vice, bring 
themselves into new difficulties, and by habits of indul- 
gence become less qualified to go through them ; and 
one irregularity after another embarrasses things to such 
a degree that they know not whereabout they are, and 
often makes the path of conduct so intricate and per- 
plexed that it is difficult to trace it out ; difficult even 
to determine what is the prudent or the moral part. 
Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of life, 
youth ; wrong, I mean, considering ourselves only in 
our temporal capacity, without taking in religion ; this, 
in several ways, increases the difficulties of right behav- 
ior in mature age ; that is, puts us into a more disad- 
vantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity. 

6. We are an inferior part of the creation of God : 
there are natural appearances of our being in a state of 
degradation, (part ii, chap, v ;) and we cer- our unfavora- 
tainly are in a condition which does not seem , groSdforTom^ 
by any means, the most advantageous we p 19,1 ^ 
could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral 
capacity, for securing either our present or future inter- 
est. However, this condition, low and careful and un- 
certain as it is, does not afford any just ground of com- 
plaint. For as men may manage their temporal affairs 
with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in 
tolerable ease and satisfaction by a moderate degree of 
care; so likewise with regard to religion, there is no 
more required than what they are well able to do, and 
what they must be greatly wanting to themselves if they 
neglect.* And for persons to have that put upon them 

* [This is an unsatisfactory statement, but judging of sentiments 
that are incorrect, or expressions imperfectly guarded, it is only just 
to take into consideration the well-known views of the author. But- 


120 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


which they are well able to go through, and no more, we 
naturally consider as an equitable thing, supposing it 
done by proper authority. Nor have we any more rea- 
son to complain of it, with regard to the Author of na- 
ture, than of his not having given us other advantages 
belonging to other orders of creatures. 

7. But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state 
of trial which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered 
Trial credible credible by its being throughout uniform, 
ftv to^tiTcon- and of a piece with the general conduct of 
ditions. Providence toward us, in all other respects 

within the compass of our knowledge. Indeed, if man- 
kind, considered in their natural capacity as inhabitants 
of this world only, found themselves from their birth to 
their death in a settled state of security and happiness, 
without any solicitude or thought of their own, or if they 

ler did not reject the doctrine of the fall of man. The criticism of 
Chalmers on this passage seems to us harsh when he says of Butler, 
“We fear that he here makes the first, though not the only, exhibi- 
tion which occurs in the work of his meager and moderate theology. 
There seems no adequate view in the passage of man’s total inability 
for what is spiritually and acceptably good ; for by the very analogy 
which he institutes, the doctrine of any special help to that obedience 
which qualifies for heaven is kept out of sight. . . . There is no ac- 
count made here of that peculiar helplessness which obtains in matters 
of religion, and does not obtain in the matters of ordinary prudence, 
yet a helplessness which forms no excuse, lying as it does in the resolute, 
and, by man himself, unconquerable aversion of his will to God and 
holiness.” That the argument, properly used, is good, Chalmers ad- 
mits when he says, “ There is nothing in this (helplessness) to break 
the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms 
the great and undoubted achievements of this volume, and with which, 
perhaps, it were well if both its author and its readers would agree to 
be satisfied. The analogy lies here, that if a man wills to obtain 
prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experi- 
ence and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills 
to attain to blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what 
religion prescribes, and in conformity with the declaration that he 
who seeketh findeth, most certainly make it good.] 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 121 

were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences 
and distress by carelessness or the folly of passion, 
through bad example, the treachery of others, or the 
deceitful appearances of things ; were this our natural 
condition, then it might seem strange, and be some pre- 
sumption against the truth of religion, that it represents 
our future and more general interest, as not secure of 
course, but as* depending upon our behavior, and re- 
quiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. 
For it might be alleged, “What you say is our condi- 
tion in one respect is not in any wise of a sort with what 
we find, by experience, our condition is in another. 
Our whole present interest is secured to our hands with- 
out any solicitude of ours, and why should not our fu- 
ture interest, if we have any such, be so too ? ” But 
since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the vol- 
untary denying ourselves many things which we desire, 
and a course of behavior far from being always agreeable 
to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a com- 
mon decent and common prudent part, so as to pass 
with any satisfaction through the present world, and be 
received upon any tolerable good terms in it ; since this 
is the case, all presumption against self-denial and at- 
tention being necessary to secure our higher interest is 
removed. 

Had we not experience, it might, perhaps, speciously 
be urged that it is improbable any thing of hazard and 
danger should be put upon us by an infinite Being, when 
every thing which is hazard and danger in our manner 
of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and 
misery, is now already certain in his foreknowledge. 
And, indeed, why any thing of hazard and Why are we 
danger should be put upon such frail creat- danger? 
ures as we are, may well be thought a difficulty in spec- 
ulation ; and cannot but be so till we know the whole, or, 
however, much more, of the case. But still the consti- 


122 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


tution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery 
are trusted to 'our conduct, and made to depend upon it. 
Somewhat, and in many circumstances a great deal too, 
is put upon us, either to do or to suffer, as we choose. 
And all the various miseries of life which people bring 
upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might 
have avoided by proper care, are instances of this ; 
which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and 
undetermined as their conduct, and left to be determined 
by it. 

8. These observations are an answer to the objections 
against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying 
what this chap- temptations, and real danger of miscarrying 
ter shows. with regard to our general interest, under 
the moral government of God ; and they show, that if 
we are at all to be considered in such a capacity, and 
as having such an interest, the general analogy of Prov- 
idence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger 
of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, 
by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us 
in that capacity. For we have a present interest, under 
the government of God which we experience here upon 
earth. And this interest, as it is not forced upon us, so 
neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our ac- 
quisition ; in such sort, as that we are in danger of miss- 
ing it, by means of temptations to neglect or act contrary 
to it ; and without attention and self-denial, must and 
do miss of it. It is then perfectly credible, that this 
may be our case with respect to that chief and final 
good which religion proposes to us. 

NOTE. 

[To the forcible reasoning of this chapter, many will object that the 
difference between temporal and eternal things is so vast the cases 
are not analogous. It cannot be denied, for it is a matter of open and 
daily observation, that loss, misery, and punishment follow neglect and 
misconduct here ; but the doctrine is resisted and resented as an in- 


Chap. IV.] Of a State of Trial. 


123 


credible outrage, that a ruined eternity should follow from the same 
causes. But the analogy is complete in kind , and the difference be- 
tween the two hardships is only in degree. This difference of degree 
of suffering can form no basis for an objection unless it can be shown 
that similar results should not follow from similar causes in the two 
states of being. The principle would seem plain, that if there is in- 
justice in the one case there is injustice in the other. What would be 
wrong on a great scale is wrong on a small one. Many seem ready 
to acquiesce in the operation of an unjust principle to smaller mat- 
ters which they would regard as intolerable in things of higher mo- 
ment. But he that is unjust in that which is least is unjust in much. 
The admission that the divine government is unjust in what may 
seem to be little and temporary matters would impeach the righteous- 
ness of God and destroy all reverence for his character. 

It would be well for those who are ready to claim that the good- 
ness manifested to man is a compensation for what they admit is an 
injustice to the lower orders of animals, in their suffering and de- 
struction, to remember the consequences to which their principles 
would lead. 

The admission of this doctrine might force on our attention the 
uncomfortable suggestion that our happiness, present and future, may 
be sacrificed, and as a compensation there may be increased blessed- 
ness given to beings far higher and nobler than we. Once admit in- 
justice in any part of the divine government, and there is no conceiv- 
able limit to the extent to which it may be carried. There is no 
injustice in the dependence on each other of different orders of beings, 
or in any part of God’s government. We know but parts of his ways 
and but little of his universe, but all the analogies of nature as well 
as the teachings of his Word assure us he has doife all things well. 
He is just and holy in all his ways, and there is no unrighteousness 
in him. Consult Chalmers.] 


124 


Analogy of Religion. 


LPart I. 


CHAPTER V. 

of a state of probation, as intended for moral 

DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT .* 

F ROM the consideration of our being in a probation- 
state of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally 
Probation de- arises the question, how we came to be 
pfoTement "Si placed in it. But such a general inquiry as 
virtiie. this would be found involved in insuperable 

difficulties. For though some of these difficulties would 
be lessened by observing that all wickedness is volun- 
tary, as is implied in its very notion, and that many of 
the miseries of life have apparent good effects, yet when 
we consider other circumstances belonging to both, and 
what must be the consequence of the former in a life to 
come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and 
presumption to pretend to give an account of the whole 
reasons of this matter ; the whole reasons of our being 
allotted a condition out of which so much wickedness 
and misery, so circumstanced, would in fact arise. 
Whether it be not beyond our faculties not only to find 
out, but even to understand, the whole account of this ; 
or, though we should be supposed capable of under- 
standing it, yet, whether it would be of service or 
prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say. 
But as our present condition can in nowise be shown 

* [The present chapter stands in the same relation to the one pre- 
ceding it, which that on the moral does to that on the natural gov- 
ernment of God. It still treats of probation, but of probation with a 
particular end — even that of schooling men in the practice, so as to 
confirm them in the habits, of virtue. — Chalmers.] 


Chap.V.J Of a State of Moral Discipline. 125 

inconsistent with the perfect moral government of God, 
so religion teaches us we were placed in it that we 
might qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for 
another state, which is to follow it. And this, though 
but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the 
inquiry now mentioned, yet is a more satisfactory an- 
swer to another, which is of real and of the utmost im- 
portance to us to have answered — the inquiry, What is our 
business here ? The known end, then, why we are placed 
in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty is, 
our improvement in virtue and piety, as the requisite 
qualification for a future state of security and happiness. 

1. Now the beginning of life, considered as an educa- 
tion for mature age in the present world, appears plainly 
at first sight, analogous to this our trial for 

_ & ? , . . Probation of 

a future one; the former being, in our tem- youth, its anal- 

• 0 • • ogy . 

poral capacity, what the latter is in our re- 
ligious capacity. But some observations common to 
both of them, and a more distinct consideration of each, 
will more distinctly show the extent and force of the 
analogy between them ; and the credibility which arises 
from hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that 
the present life was intended to'be a state of discipline 
for a future one. 

2. I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed 
for a particular way of life, to which the nature, the ca- 
pacities, temper, and qualifications of each Man’s adapta- 
species are as necessary as their external en?an?to the 
circumstances. Both come into the notion fature 8tate - 
of such state, or particular way of life, and are constitu- 
ent parts of it. Change a man’s capacities or character 
to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be 
changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a 
human course of life and human happiness ; as incapa- 
ble as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were 
placed in a world where he had no sphere of action, nor 


126 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affec- 
tions of any sort. One thing is set over against another, 
as an ancient writer expresses it.* Our nature corre- 
sponds to our external condition. Without this corre- 
spondence there would be no possibility of any such 
thing as human life and human happiness : which life 
and happiness are, therefore, a result from our nature 
and condition jointly ; meaning by human life, not liv- 
ing in the literal sense, but the whole complex notion 
commonly understood by those words. So that without 
determining what will be the employment and happi- 
ness, the particular life, of good men hereafter, there 
must be some determinate capacities, some necessary 
character and qualifications, without which persons can- 
not but be utterly incapable of it ; in like manner as 
there must be some without which men would be inca- 
pable of their present state of life. Now, 

3. II. The constitution of human creatures, and in- 

, . deed, of all creatures which come under 

Adaptation ac- 
quired through our notice, is such, as that they are ca- 
pable of naturally becoming qualified for 
states of life, for which they were once wholly un- 
qualified. In imagination, we may indeed conceive 
of creatures, as incapable of having any of their fac- 
ulties naturally enlarged, or as being unable natural- 
ly to acquire any new qualifications ; but the faculties 
of every species known to us are made for enlargement, 
for acquirements of experience and habits. We find 
ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only 
of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving 
truth, but also of storing up our ideas and knowledge by 
memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of 
having different momentary impressions made upon us, 

* [All things are double one against another: and He hath made 
nothing imperfect. One thing establisheth the good of another : and 
who shall be filled with beholding his glory ! — Eccles. xlii, 24, 25.] 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 127 

but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and 
of settled alterations in our temper or character. The 
power of the two last is the power of habits. But nei- 
ther the perception of ideas, nor knowledge of any sort, 
are habits, though absolutely necessary to the forming 
of them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, 
which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are 
greatly improved by exercise. Whether the word habit 
is applicable to all these improvements, and in particu- 
lar how far the powers of memory and of habits may be 
powers of the same nature, I shall not inquire. But 
that perceptions come into our minds readily and of 
course, by means of their having been there before, 
seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any par- 
ticular kind of action proceeding from being accustomed 
to it. And aptness to recollect practical observations 
of service in our conduct is plainly habit in many cases. 
There are habits of perception and habits of action. 
An instance of the former is our constant and even in- 
voluntary readiness in correcting the impressions of our 
sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to sub- 
stitute judgment in the room of sensation, impercepti- 
bly to ourselves. And it seems as if all other associa- 
tions of ideas, not naturally connected, might be called 
passive habits, as properly as our readiness in under- 
standing languages upon sight, or hearing of words. 
And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an 
instance of the latter, of active habits. 

For distinctness, we may consider habits as belonging 
to the body or the mind, and the latter will Habits of body 
be explained by the former. Under the ondmmd - 
former are comprehended all bodily activities or mo- 
tions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing 
to use ; under the latter, general habits of life and con- 
duct, such as those of obedience and submission to au- 
thority, or to any particular person ; those of veracity, 


128 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


justice, and charity ; those of attention, industry, self- 
government, envy, revenge. And habits of this latter 
kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the 
former. And in like manner, as habits belonging to the 
body are produced by external acts, so habits of the 
mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical 
principles; that is, by carrying them into act, or acting 
upon them — the principles of obedience, of veracity, 
justice, and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by 
any external course of action otherwise than as it pro- 
ceeds from these principles ; because it is only these 
inward principles exerted which are strictly acts of 
obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So, 
likewise, habits of attention, industry, self-government, 
are in the same manner acquired by exercise ; and hab- 
its of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in out- 
ward act or in thought and intention, that is, inward act ; 
for such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do 
well are properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce 
upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to 
beget in others that practical sense of it which a man 
really has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, there- 
fore, may and will contribute toward forming good hab- 
its. But going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, 
talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it — this is so 
far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a 
habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may 
harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it 
gradually more insensible, that is, form a habit of insen- 
sibility to all moral considerations. For, from our very 
faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, 
grow weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the 
mind, are felt less sensibly.; being accustomed to danger 
begets intrepidity, that is, lessens fear; to distress, les- 
sens the passion of pity ; to instances of others’ morality, 
lessens the sensible apprehension of our own. 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 129 

And from these two observations together, that prac- 
tical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated 
acts, and that passive impressions grow As active habits 
weaker by being repeated upon us, it must 
follow that active habits may be gradually 81003 grow weak, 
forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon 
such and such motives and excitements, while these 
motives and excitements themselves are, by proportion- 
able degrees, growing less sensible ; that is, are contin- 
ually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits 
strengthen. And experience confirms this ; for active 
principles, at the very time that they are less lively in 
perception than they were, are found to be somehow 
wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character, 
and become more effectual in influencing our practice. 
The three things just mentioned may afford instances 
of it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of 
passive fear and active caution ; and by being inured to 
danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the 
same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception 
of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to 
pity, and actively to relieve it ; but let a man set him- 
self to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed per- 
sons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly af- 
fected with the various miseries of life with which he 
must become acquainted ; when yet, at the same time, 
benevolence, considered not as a passion but as a prac- 
tical principle of action, will strengthen ; and while he 
passively compassionates the distressed less, he will ac- 
quire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend 
them. So also, at the same time that the daily instances 
of men’s dying around us give us daily a less sensible 
passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, 
such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a 
practical regard to it in serious men ; that is, to forming 
a habit of acting with a constant view to it. 

9 


130 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


And this seems again further to show, that passive im- 
pressions made upon our minds by admonition, experi- 
ence, example, though they may have a remote efficacy, 
and a very great one, toward forming active 

Active habits . J , . . rr , 

formed by exer- habits, yet can have this efficacy no otner- 

wise than by inducing us to such a course 
of action ; and that it is not being effected so and so, 
but acting, which forms those habits ; only it must be 
always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce good 
impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous ac- 
tion. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the na- 
ture of things, that effects should be wrought in us at 
once equivalent to habits,* that is, what is wrought by 
use and exercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, 
not what may be possible, but what is in fact the ap- 
pointment of nature, which is, that active habits are to 
be formed by exercise. Their progress may be so grad- 
ual as to be imperceptible in its steps ; it may be hard 
to explain the faculty by which we are capable of hab- 
its, throughout its several parts, and to trace it up to its 
original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our 
mind ; and it seems as if contrary effects were to be 
ascribed to it. But the thing in general, that our na- 
ture is formed to yield in some such manner as this, to 
use and exercise, is matter of certain experience. 

Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of ac- 
tion, we get an aptness to go on — a facility, readiness ? 

New character and often pleasure in it. The inclinations 
formed by habit. w hi c h rendered us averse to it grow weaker ; 
the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real 
ones, lessen ; the reasons for it offer themselves of course 

* [In some of the miracles there seems to have been effects pro- 
duced at once, equivalent to habits, as in the gift of tongues ; and as 
pointed out by Dr. Drought (in Dean Graves’ Works) in the miracle 
by which the blind man was enabled to use the sight which had been 
miraculously given to him. — F.] 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 131 

to our thoughts upon all occasions ; and the least glimpse 
of them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of ac- 
tion to which we have been accustomed. And practical 
principles appear to grow stronger, absolutely in them- 
selves, by exercise, as well as relatively, with regard to 
contrary principles ; which by being accustomed to sub- 
mit, do so habitually and of course. And thus a new 
character, in several respects, may be formed ; and 
many habitudes of life, not given by nature, but which 
nature directs us to acquire. 

4. III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should 
never have had these capacities of improving by experi- 
ence, acquired knowledge, and habits, had improvement 
they not been necessary, and intended to necessm-^tothe 
be made use of. And accordingly we find even the matS 
them so necessary, and so much intended, ty ° four powers * 
that without them we should be utterly incapable of 
that which was the end for which we were made, con- 
sidered in our temporal capacity only ; the employments 
and satisfactions of our mature state of life. 

Nature does in nowise qualify us wholly, much less 
at once, for this mature state of life. Even maturity of 
understanding and bodily strength are not only arrived 
to gradually, but are also very much owing to the con- 
tinued exercise of our powers of body and mind from 
infancy. But if we suppose a person brought into the 
world with both these in maturity, as far as this is con- 
ceivable, he would plainly at first be as unqualified for 
the human life of mature age as an idiot. He would 
be in a manner distracted with astonishment, and appre- 
hension, and curiosity, and suspense ; nor can one guess 
how long it would be before he would be familiarized to 
himself, and the objects about him, enough even to set 
himself to any thing. It may be questioned, too, wheth- 
er the natural information of his sight and hearing would 
be of any manner of use at all to him in acting, before 


32 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


experience. And it seems that men would be strangely 
headstrong and self-willed, and disposed to exert them- 
selves with an impetuosity which would render society 
insupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it 
not for some acquired moderation and self-government, 
some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, 
and concealing their sense of things. Want of every 
thing of this kind which is learned would render a man 
as incapable of society as want of language would ; or 
as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employ- 
ments of life would render him incapable of providing 
himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the 
necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably 
in many more of which we have no particular notion, 
mankind is left by nature an unformed, unfinished crea- 
ture, utterly deficient and unqualified, before the ac- 
quirement of knowledge, experience, and habits, for that 
mature state of life which was the end of his creation, 
considering him as related only to this world. 

5. But then, as nature has endued us with a power of 
supplying those deficiencies by acquired knowledge, ex- 

Chiidhood fa P er ^ ence » an d babits ; so, likewise, we are 

vorabie to im- placed in a condition in infancy, childhood, 
provement. . ' 

and youth, fitted for it ; fitted for our ac- 
quiring those qualifications of all sorts which we stand 
in need of in mature age. Hence children, from their 
very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects 
about them, with the scene in which they are placed, 
and to have a future part ; and learning somewhat or 
other necessary to the performance of it. The subor- 
dination to which they are accustomed in domestic life, 
teach them self-government in common behavior abroad 
and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil 
authority. What passes before their eyes, and daily 
happens to them, gives them experience, caution against 
treachery and deceit, together with numberless little 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 133 

rules of action and conduct which we could not live 
without, and which are learned so insensibly and so per- 
fectly as to be mistaken, perhaps, for instinct, though 
they are the effect of long experience and exercise ; as 
much so as language, or knowledge in particular busi- 
ness, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the 
several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of 
our days is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in 
the theory and practice of mature life. We are much 
assisted in it by example, instruction, and the care of 
others ; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do. And 
of this, as part is done easily and of course, so part re- 
quires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many 
things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what we 
should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or 
expedience of it. For that labor and industry which 
the station of so many absolutely requires they would be 
greatly unqualified for in maturity; as those in other 
stations would be for any other sorts of application, if 
both were not accustomed to them in their youth. And 
according as persons behave themselves, in the general 
education which all go through, and in the particular 
ones adapted to particular employments, their character 
is formed, and made appear; they recommend them- 
selves more or less ; and are capable of, and placed in, 
different stations in the society of mankind.* 

* [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor, 
(which is often the chief effect,) in improving or impairing his own 
powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone is not only put to an im- 
proper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this is but a 
faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again ; but how shall 
we restore a blunted sensibility, or enfeebled judgment, or a vitiated 
appetite. Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than 
on our victims, and the evil may spread disaster over our whole fu- 
ture. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose an 
occasional indulgence or impropriety may be compatible with gen- 
eral welfare and improvement. — Malcom.] 


134 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


6. The former part of life, then, is to be considered 
as an important opportunity which nature puts into our 

The probation hands, and which, when lost, is not to be 
gou^°to^t a for recovered. And our being placed in a state 
the future. 0 f <ii sc ipli ne , throughout this life, for anoth- 
er world, is a providential disposition of things, exactly 
of the same kind as our being placed in a state of dis- 
cipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condi- 
tion in both respects is uniform and of a piece, and 
comprehended under one and the same general law of 
nature. 

And if we are not able at all to discern how, or in 
what way, the present life could be our preparation for 

ignorance of another, this would be no objection against 
je^tion’to proba- the credibility of its being so. For we do 
tion - not discern how food and sleep contribute 

to the growth of the body, nor could have any thought 
that they would, before we had experience. Nor do 
children at all think, on the one hand, that the sports 
and exercises to which they are so much addicted 
contribute to their health and growth ; nor, on the oth- 
er, of the necessity which there is for their being re- 
strained in them ; nor are they capable of understanding 
the use of many parts of discipline which, nevertheless, 
they must be made to go through, in order to qualify 
them for the business of mature age. Were we not able, 
then, to discover in what respects the present life could 
form us for a future one, yet nothing would be more 
supposable than that it might, in some respects or other, 
from the general analogy of providence. And this, for 
aught I see, might reasonably be said, even though we 
should not take in the consideration of God’s moral 
government over the world. But, 

7. IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently 
that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary 
qualification for the future state, and then we may dis- 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 135 

tinctly see how, and in what respects, the present life 
may be a preparation for it; since we want , Howthemode 
and are capable of, improvement in that char- may 1)6 known ' 
acter , by moral and religious habits ; and the present life is 
fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement ; in like 
manner, as we have already observed, how and in what 
respects' infancy, childhood, and youth are a necessary 
preparation, and a natural state of discipline, for ma- 
ture age. 

8. Nothing which we at present see would lead us to 
the thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter; but, 
if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, Active virtues 
we must suppose, according to the Script- in a fllture 
ure account of it, that it will be a community. And 
there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiv- 
ing, though there be no analogy for it, that this com- 
munity will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the 
more immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, 
the more sensible, government of God. Nor is our ig- 
norance, what will be the employments of this happy 
community, nor our consequent ignorance, what partic- 
ular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of 
veracity, justice, and charity, among the members of it 
with regard to each other, any proof that there will be 
no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if 
that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there 
will be no occasion for that frame of mind or character 
which is formed by the daily practice of those particu- 
lar virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at 
least must be owned in general, that as the government 
established in the universe is moral, the character of vir- 
tue and piety must, in some way or other, be the condi- 
tion of our happiness, or the qualification for it. 

9. Now from what is above observed concerning our 
natural power of habits, it is easy to see that we are 
capable of moral improvement by discipline. And how 


[Part I. 


136 Analogy of Religion. 

greatly we want it, need not be proved to any one who 

is acquainted with the great wickedness of 

Virtuous habits . . . 

a guard against mankind, or even with those imperfections 

which the best are conscious of. But it is 
not, perhaps, distinctly attended to by every one, that 
the occasion which human creatures have for discipline 
to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is 
to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions by 
indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps 
all finite creatures, from the very constitution of their 
nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient, and in 
danger of deviating from what is right, and therefore 
stand in need of virtuous habits for a security against 
this danger.* For, together with the general principle 
of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame 
various affections toward particular external objects. 
These affections are naturally, and of right, subject to 
the government of the moral principle as to the occa- 
sions on which they may be gratified ; as to the times, de- 
grees, and manner, in which the objects of them may be 
pursued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither 
excite them nor prevent their being excited. On the 

* [It is from this point of view that Aristotle determines ovt' upa 
^vffefovTe irapa <pvoiv kyylvovrai al aperal, aXka iTScpVKoai phv ijp.lv 
defcodai avrac, TeXsiovpevoic de 61a tov kdovg. — Ethic. Nicom ., iii, i. 
“ In order to understand this, it is to be observed that virtue may be 
considered either as the quality of an action or as the quality of a per- 
son. Considered as the quality of an action, it consists, even accord- 
ing to Aristotle, in the reasonable moderation of the affection from 
which the action proceeds, whether this moderation be habitual to 
the person or not. Considered as the quality of the person, it con- 
sists in the habit of this reasonable moderation, in its having become 
the customary and usual disposition of the mind. ... If a single 
action was sufficient to stamp the character of any virtue upon the 
person who performed it, the most worthless of mankind might lay 
claim to all the virtues ; since there is no man who has not, upon 
some occasions, acted with prudence, justice, temperance, and forti- 
tude.” — Smith’s Moral Sent., part vi, sec. 2. — F.] 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 


137 

contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of 
them are present to the mind, not only before all con- 
sideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, 
but after it is found they cannot. For the natural ob- 
jects of affection continue so ; the necessaries, conven- 
iences, and pleasures of life remain naturally desirable, 
though they cannot be obtained innocently ; nay, though 
they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the 
objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained 
without unlawful means, but may be obtained by them, 
such affection, though its being excited, and its contin- 
uing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is nat- 
ural and necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have 
a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such un- 
lawful means, and therefore must be conceived as put- 
ting them in some danger of it. 

Now what is the general security against this danger 
— against their actually deviating from right? t]onsh 
As the danger is, so, also, must the security its a security 

. . against vice. 

be from within, from the practical principle 
of virtue.* And the strengthening or improving this 
principle, considered as practical or as a principle of ac- 
tion, will lessen the danger or increase the security 
against it. And this moral principle is capable of. im- 

* It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually 
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is 
meant a speculative conviction or belief that such and such indul- 
gence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than 
satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say that this sense 
of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging them- 
selves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to 
what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only coincident with 
the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea 
itself. And, it is evident, this reasonable self-love wants to be im- 
proved as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily see it 
overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by curi- 
osity, shame, love of imitation — by any thing, even indolence — es- 
pecially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the 


138 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


provement, by proper discipline and exercise ; by recol- 
lecting the practical impressions which example and 
experience have made upon us ; and, instead of follow- 
ing humor and mere inclination, by continually attend- 
ing to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we 
are engaged, be it in greater or less matters, and accus- 
toming ourselves always to act upon it, as being itself 
the just and natural motive of action ; and as this moral 
course of behavior must necessarily, under divine gov- 
ernment, be our final interest. Thus the principle of 
virtue , improved into a habit f of which improvement we are 
thus capable , will plainly be , in proportion to the strength 
of it , a security against the danger which finite creatures 
are in, from the very nature of propension or particular 
affections. This way of putting the matter supposes par- 
ticular affections to remain in a future state, which it is 
scarce possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we 
clearly see that acquired habits of virtue and self-gov- 
ernment may be necessary for the regulation of them. 
However, though we were not distinctly to take in this 
supposition, but to speak only in general, the thing really 
comes to the same. For habits of virtue thus acquired 
by discipline are improvement in virtue ; and improve- 
ment in virtue must be advancement in happiness, if 
the government of the universe be moral. 

10. From these things we may observe, and it will 

end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate men 
mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interested- 
ness and self-love ; and so little cause is there for moralists to dis- 
claim this principle. (See pp. 116, 117.) 

* [We do not understand that under the economy of grace the 
law of habit has been repealed, or any other indeed of those laws of 
our mental nature on which Butler proceeds in the reasoning of this 
chapter. Whatever the pretensions and expedients of the Gospel 
might be for the perfecting of our meetness for heaven, they super- 
sede not the efficacy of that process under which, by reason of use, the 
senses are exercised to discern between good and evil. — Chalmers.] 


Chap.V.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 139 


further show this our natural and original need of being 
improved by discipline, how it comes to pass that creat- 
ures made upright, fall ; and that those who H ow upright 
preserve their uprightness, by so doing raise bem s sfalL 
themselves to a more secure state of virtue. To say 
that the former is accounted for by the nature of liberty, 
is to say no more than that an event’s actually happen- 
ing is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happen- 
ing. But it seems, distinctly conceivable from the very 
nature of particular affections or propensions. For 
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state 
of life, for which such propensions were necessary; sup- 
pose them endued with such propensions, together with 
moral understanding, as well including a practical sense 
of virtue as a speculative perception of it ; and that all 
these several principles, both natural and moral, form- 
ing an inward constitution of mind, were in the most 
exact proportion possible ; that is, in a proportion the 
most exactly adapted to their intended state of life ; 
such creatures would be made upright, or finitely per- 
fect. Now particular propensions, from their very na- 
ture, must be felt, the objects of them being present, 
though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the 
allowance of the moral principle. But if they can be 
gratified without its allowance, or by contradicting it, 
then they must be conceived to have some tendency, in 
how low a degree soever — yet some tendency — to induce 
persons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency 
in some one particular propension may be The mode n- 
increased, by the greater frequency of occa- lustrated - 
sions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting 
others. The least voluntary indulgence in forbidden 
circumstances, though but in thought, will increase this 
wrong tendency, and may increase it further, till, pecul- 
iar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; 
and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual de- 


140 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

viation from it : a danger necessarily arising from the 
very nature of propension, and which therefore could 
not have been prevented though it might have been 
escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, 
as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for 
a person, in which such a degree of attention would 
keep him steady; but if he would not attend in this de- 
gree, any one of a thousand objects catching his eye might 
lead him out of it. Now it is impossible to say how 
much even the first full overt act of irregularity might 
disorder the inward constitution, unsettle the adjust- 
ments, and alter the proportions which formed it, and 
in which the uprightness of its make consisted. But 
repetition of irregularities would produce habits : and 
thus the constitution would be spoiled, and creatures 
made upright become corrupt and depraved in their 
settled character, proportionably to their repeated irreg- 
ularities in occasional acts. But, on the contrary, these 

How such be creatures m ight have improved and raised 
ings might rise themselves to a higher and more secure 

to a higher state. . 

state of virtue by the contrary behavior, by 
steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be 
one part of their nature, and thus withstanding that un- 
avoidable danger of defection, which necessarily arose 
from propension, the other part of it. For by thus pre- 
serving their integrity for some time their danger would 
lessen, since propensions, by being inured to submit, 
would do it more easily and of course ; and their secur- 
ity against this lessening danger would increase, since 
the moral principle would gain additional strength by 
exercise ; both which things are implied in the notion 
of virtuous habits.* 

* [Butler’s statement how creatures made upright fall, and how 
they are restored to righteousness, has been severely criticised. In 
it, Chalmers says, we see the meagerness of his Christianity. It is 
alleged that in this chapter man’s fall is represented as gradual, like 


Chap.V.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 141 

Thus, then, vicious indulgence is not only criminal in 
itself, but also depraves the inward constitution and 
character. And virtuous self-government is not only 
right in itself, but also improves the inward constitution 
or character ; and may improve it to such a degree, that 
though we should suppose it impossible for particular 
affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral 
principle, and consequently should allow that such 
creatures as have been above supposed would forever 
remain defectible ; yet their danger of actually deviat- 
ing from right may be almost infinitely lessened, and 
they fully fortified against what remains of it ; if that 
may be called danger against which there is an adequate 
effectual security. But still, this their higher perfection 
may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a 
state of discipline, and this their more complete security 
remain to proceed from them. 

And thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures with- 

the departure, by slight variations, from a straight line, and that in 
his recovery from his lost condition nothing more is required than a 
strenuous, earnest exertion to change his course, to break the power 
of old habits and form new ones. In the Scripture the fall of man is 
represented as sudden and complete. By a single act man passed 
into a state of ruin. His recovery by his own effort is impossible. 
Gracious ability must be imparted by the Holy Spirit. This is ever 
and freely offered, and under its influence, not gradually, but by one 
act, man becomes reconciled to God and justified through the merit of 
Christ. 

In the day man ate the forbidden fruit he “ died,” but in the mo- 
ment he believed on Christ he passed from death into life and justi- 
fication. The statement of Butler might have been better guarded 
against misapprehension, but we do not see that it contradicts the 
Bible doctrine. On any theory the first act must have been sudden, 
and Butler says it is impossible to tell how much disorder and evil 
might result from it ; what he says about the formation and power of 
habit cannot be denied. The fall and consequent depravity is not 
the lowest condition possible to man, nor is the state of justification 
the highest. There are degrees of guilt and goodness that under 
man’s circumstances depend on his efforts and habits.] 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


142 

out blemish as they came out of the hands of God, may be 

Perfect beings in danger of going wrong, and so may stand 
may fail. j n neec i 0 f the security of virtuous habits, 

additional to the moral principle wrought into their na- 
tures by him. That which is the ground of their dan- 
ger, or their want of security, may be considered as a 
deficiency in them, to which virtuous habits are the nat- 
ural supply. And as they are naturally capable of be- 
ing raised and improved by discipline, it may be a thing 
fit and requisite that they should be placed in circum- 
stances with an eye to it; in circumstances peculiarly 
fitted to be, to them, a state of discipline for their im- 
provement in virtue. 

11. But how much more strongly must this hold with 
respect to those who have corrupted their natures, are 

_ , 3 fallen from their original rectitude, and 

Greater need . 0 

of improvement whose passions are become excessive by 

in fallen beings. .... , . 

repeated violations of their inward constitu- 
tion ? Upright creatures may want to be improved; 
depraved creatures want to be renewed. Education 
and discipline, which may be in all degrees and sorts of 
gentleness and of severity, is expedient for those, but 
must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, dis- 
cipline, of the severer sort, too, and in the higher de- 
grees of it, must be necessary, in order to wear out 
vicious habits ; to recover their primitive strength of 
self-government, which indulgence must have weakened; 
to repair as well as raise into a habit, the moral princi- 
ple, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtu- 
ous happiness. 

12. Now whoever will consider the thing, may clearly 
This world e see t ^ iat P resent world is peculiarly fit to 
discipifne ttedf ° r a state °f discipline for this purpose to 

such as will set themselves to amend and 
improve. For, the various temptations with which we 
are surrounded — our experience of the deceits of wick- 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 143 

edness, having been in many instances led wrong our- 
selves — the great viciousness of the world — the infinite 
disorders consequent upon it — our being made acquaint- 
ed with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of 
it, or from the sight of it in others — these things, though 
some of them may, indeed, produce wrong effects upon 
our minds, yet when duly reflected upon have all of 
them a direct tendency to bring us to a settled modera- 
tion and reasonableness of temper ; the contrary both to 
thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will 
and violent bent to follow present inclination, which 
may be observed in undisciplined minds. 

Such experience, as the present state affords of the 
frailtv of our nature, of the boundless extravagance of 
ungoverned passion, of the power which an infinite 
Being has over us by the various capacities of misery 
which he has given us ; in short, that kind and degree 
of experience which the present state affords us, that the 
constitution of nature is such as to admit the possibility, 
the danger, and the actual event of creatures losing 
their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious 
and wretched ; hath a tendency to give us a practical 
sense of things very different from a mere speculative 
knowledge that we are liable to vice and capable of 
misery. And who knows whether the security of crea- 
tures in the highest and most settled state of perfection 
may not, in part, arise from their having had such a sense 
of things as this formed and habitually fixed within 
them, in some state of probation ? And passing through 
the present world with that moral attention which is 
necessary to the acting a right part in it, may leave ever- 
lasting impressions of this sort upon our minds. 

But to be a little more distinct : allurements to what 

is wrong; difficulties in the discharge of our Thl8fitnesaseen 

duty; our not being able to act a uniform in t.he efforts to 
. 0 practice virtue. 

right part without some thought and care ; 


144 


Analogy of Religion. 


i P art I 


and the opportunities which we have, or imagine we 
have, of avoiding what we dislike or obtaining what we 
desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do it 
at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones ; these 
things, that is, the snares and temptations of vice, are 
what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state 
of discipline to those who will preserve their integrity : 
because they render being upon our guard, resolution, 
and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to 
that end. And the exercise of such particular recollec- 
tion, intention of mind, and self-government, in the 
practice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature, a 
peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue, as implying 
not only a real, but also a more continued and a more 
intense exercise of the virtuous principle ; or a more 
constant and a stronger effort of virtue exerted into act. 

illustration. Thus suppose a person to know himself to 
be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any 
thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do ; con- 
tinued recollection, and keeping upon his guard, in or- 
der to make good his resolution, is a continued exerting 
of that act of virtue in a high degree , which need have 
been, and perhaps would have been, only instantaneous 
and weak had the temptation been so. 

It is, indeed, ridiculous to assert that self-denial is 
essential to virtue and piety ; but it would have been 
Use of seif- nearer the truth, though not strictly the 
demai. truth itself, to have said that it is essential 

to discipline and improvement. For though actions 
materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but 
are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, 
may possibly be done only from these particular inclina- 
tions, and so may not be any exercise of the principle of 
virtue, that is, not be virtuous actions at all ; yet, on the 
contrary, they may be an exercise of that principle, and, 
when they are, they have a tendency to form and fix the 


Chap.V.] Of a State of Moral Discipline. 145 

habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous 
principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more 
intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger, temp- 
tation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree, 
this tendency is increased proportionably, and a more 
confirmed habit is the consequence. 

13. This undoubtedly holds to a certain length, but 
how far it may hold I know not. Neither our intel- 
lectual powers nor our bodily strength can 

_ . r jo May the moral 

be improved beyond such a degree; and jwwers be over- 
both may be overwrought. Possibly there 
may be somewhat analogous to this with respect to the 
moral character, which is scarce worth considering. 
And I mention it only, lest it should come into some 
person’s thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing 
observations, which perhaps it is, but as a confutation 
of them, which it is not. And there may be several 
other exceptions. Observations of this kind cannot be 
supposed to hold minutely, and in every case. It is 
enough that they hold in general. And these plainly 
hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, 
which is all that is intended by them, that the present 
world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for our im- 
provement in virtue and piety ; in the same sense as some 
sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not 
to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as 
will, set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to 
habits of attention. 

14. Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in 

event, a discipline of virtue to the generality of men, that 

on the contrary they seem to make it a dis- _ . , ^ 

J J . The vice of the 

cipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world a disd- 

...... pline to virtue. 

world is, in different ways, the great tempta- 
tion which renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in 
the degree it is to good men. The whole end, and the 
whole occasion, of mankind’s being placed in such a 
10 


146 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted 
for. That which appears amid the general corruption 
is, that there are some persons who, having within them 
the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to and 
follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more 
clear or more obscure, which are afforded them ; and 
that the present world is not only an exercise of virtue 
in these persons, but an exercise of it in ways and de- 
grees peculiarly apt to improve it ; apt to improve it, in 
some respects, even beyond what would be by the ex- 
ercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in 
a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. 
But that the present world does not actually become a 
The failure of state of moral discipline to many, even to 
noTdisprov^the the generality, that is, that they do not im- 
ogy P rove or 8 row better in cannot be urged 
etc - as a proof that it was not intended for moral 

discipline by any who at all observe the analogy of na- 
ture. For of the numerous seeds of vegetables and 
bodies of animals which are adapted and put in the way 
to improve to such a point or state of natural maturity 
and perfection, we do not see, perhaps, that one in a 
million actually does. Far the greater part of them 
decay before they are improved to it, and appear to be 
absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does not deny 
all final causes, will deny that those seeds and bodies 
which do attain to that point of maturity and per- 
fection, answer the end for which they were really de- 
signed by nature ; and therefore that nature designed 
them for such perfection. And I cannot forbear adding, 
though it is not to the present purpose, that the appear- 
ance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to 
these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as 
unaccountable as, what is much more terrible, the pres- 
ent and future ruin of so many moral agents by them- 
selves, that is, by vice. 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 147 

15. Against this whole notion of moral discipline it 
may be objected, in another way, that so far as a course 
of behavior materially virtuous proceeds _ „ 

_ , , r J r . . , , . . Ob. Such dis- 

from hope and fear, so far it is only a disci- c^ime is only of 
pline and strengthening of self-love.* But 
doing what God commands, because he commands it, 
is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. 
And a course of such obedience will form habits 
of it : and a constant regard to veracity, justice, and 
charity, may form distinct habits of these particular vir- 
tues, and will certainly form habits of self-government, 
and' of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, just- 
ice, or charity requires it. Nor is there any foundation 
for this great nicety, with which some affect to distin- 
guish in this case, in order to depreciate all religion 
proceeding from hope or fear. For veracity, justice, and 
charity, regard to God’s authority, and to our own chief 
interest, are not only all three coincident, but each of 
them is, in itself, a just and natural motive or principle 
of action. And he who begins a good life from any one 
of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some 
degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more 
of that character which is correspondent to the consti- 
tution of nature as moral, and to the relation which God 
stands in to us as moral governor of it; nor, consequent- 
ly, can he fail of obtaining that happiness which this 
constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected 
with that character. 

16. These several observations concerning the active 
principle of virtue, and obedience of God’s 0 b. Passive vir- 
commands, are applicable to passive sub- ^otnTeded^ 
mission or resignation to his will; which is a fut ure state, 
another essential part of a right character, connected 
with the former, and very much in our power to form 

* [The reference here is no doubt to Lord Shaftesbury’s “Inquiry 
Concerning Virtue,” part iii, § 3. — F.] 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


148 


ourselves to. It may be imagined that nothing but af- 
flictions can give occasion for or require this virtue ; 
that it can have no respect to, nor be anyway necessary 
to qualify for a state of perfect happiness ; but it is not 
experience which can make us think thus. Prosperity 
itself, while any thing supposed desirable is not ours, be- 
gets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination 
is altogether as much a source of discontent as any thing 
in our external condition. It is indeed true that there 
can be no scope for patience when sorrow shall be no 
more ; but there may be need of a temper of mind, 
which shall have been formed by patience. For though 
self-love, considered merely as an active principle lead- 
ing us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uni- 
formly coincident with the principle of obedience to 
God’s commands, our interest being rightly understood, 
because this obedience and the pursuit of our own chief 
interest must be in every case one and the same thing; 
yet it may be questioned whether self-love, considered 
merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, 
can, from its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly 
coincident with the will of God, any more than particu- 
lar affections can, (page 122;) coincident in such sort 
as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in 
degrees impossible to be gratified consistently with the 
constitution of things, or the divine appointments. So 
that habits of resignation may, upon this account, be 
requisite for all creatures ; habits, I say, which signify 
what is formed by use. However, in general, it is ob- 
vious that both self-love and particular affections in 
human creatures, considered only as passive feelings, 
distort and rend the mind, and therefore stand in need 
of discipline. Now denial of those particular affections, 
in a course of active virtue and obedience to God’s will, 
has a tendency to moderate them, and seems also to 
have a tendency to habituate the mind to be easy and 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. 149 

satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted 
us, that is, to moderate self-love.* But the proper dis- 
cipline for resignation is affliction. For a right behav- 
ior under that trial, recollecting ourselves so as to con- 
sider it in the view in which religion teaches us to 
consider it, as from the hand of God — receiving it as 
what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his 
world, and under his government — this will habituate 
the mind to a dutiful submission ; and such submission, 
together with the active principle of obedience, make 
up the temper and character in us which answers to his 
sovereignty, and which absolutely belongs to the condi- 
tion of our being as dependent creatures. Nor can it 
be said that this is only breaking the mind to a submis- 
sion to mere power; for mere power may be accidental, 
and precarious, and usurped ; but it is forming within 
ourselves the temper of resignation to his rightful author- 
ity, who is, by nature, supreme over all. 

16. Upon the whole, such a character and such qual- 
ifications are necessary for a mature state of life in the 
present world, as nature alone does in nowise bestow, 
but has put it upon us in great part to acquire, in our 
progress from one stage of life to another from childhood 

* [“ Disengagement is absolutely necessary to enjoyment ; and a 
person may have so steady and fixed an eye upon his own interest, 
whatever he places it in, as may hinder him from attending to many 
gratifications within his reach, which others have their minds free and 
open to. Over fondness for a child is not generally thought to be for 
its advantage ; and if there be any guess to be made from appear- 
ances, surely the character we call selfish is not the most promising 
for happiness. Such a temper may plainly be, and exert itself in a 
degree and manner which may give unnecessary and useless solicitude 
and anxiety — in a degree or manner which may prevent obtaining 
the means and materials of enjoyment, as well as the making use of 
them. Immoderate self-love does very ill consult its own interest ; 
and how much soever a paradox it may appear, it is certainly true 
that, even from self-love, we should endeavor to get over all inordi- 
nate regard to and consideration of ourselves.” — Sermons , xi, p. 129.] 


150 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part J. 


to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giv- 
ing us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the 
beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a 
general analogy to our condition in the present world, 
as in a state of moral discipline for another. It is in 
Ob. Trouble and vain, then, to object against the credibility of 
have been avoid- the present life’s being intended for this 
e<L purposes, that all the trouble and the danger 

unavoidably accompanying such discipline might have 
been saved us by our being made at once the creatures 
and the characters which we were to be. For we experi- 
ence that what we were to be , was to be the effect of what 
we would do j and that the general conduct of nature is, 
not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capa- 
ble of going through them, and to put it upon us to do 
so. Acquirements of our own, experience and habits, 
are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security 
against our dangers ; since it is as plainly natural to set 
ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external 
things which we stand in need of. In particular, it is 
as plainly a general law of nature that we should, with 
regard to our temporal interest, form and cultivate prac- 
tical principles within us, by attention, use, and disci- 
pline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly in 
the beginning of life, but also throughout the whole 
course of it. And the alternative is left to our choice, 
either to improve ourselves and better our condition, or, 
in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and 
wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the 
analogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with 
respect to the happiness of a future state and the qual- 
ifications necessary for it. 

17. There is a third thing which may seem implied in 
This world a the present world’s being a state of proba- 
Sfapiay 0 of f< 5iM- tion, that it is a theater of action for the 
manifestation of persons’ characters, with 


Chap.VJ Of a State of Moral Discipline. i 5 1 

respect to a future one ; not, to be sure, to an all-know- 
ing being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, 
perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a state 
of probation in the other senses. However, it is not im- 
possible that men’s showing and making manifest what 
is in their heart, what their real character is, may have 
respect to a future life in ways and manners which we 
are not acquainted with ; particularly it may be a means, 
for the Author of nature does not appear to do any thing 
without means, of their being disposed of suitably to 
their characters, and of its being known to the creation, 
by way of example, that they are thus disposed of. But 
not to enter upon any conjectural account of this, one 
may just mention that the manifestation of persons’ 
characters contributes very much, in various ways, to 
the carrying on a great part of that general course of 
nature respecting mankind which comes under our ob- 
servation at present. I shall only add, that probation, 
in both these senses, as well as in that treated of in the 
foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government ; since 
by persons’ behavior under it, their characters cannot 
but be manifested, and if they behave well, improved. 


152 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,* CONSIDERED AS 
INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 

HROUGHOUT the foregoing Treatise it appears 



1 that the condition of mankind, considered as in- 
The question to habitants of this world only, and under the 
~be considered, government of God which we experience, is 
greatly analogous to our condition as designed for an- 
other world, or under that further government which 
religion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert, as a fatalist 
must, that the opinion of universal necessity is recon- 
cilable with the former, there immediately arises a ques- 
tion in the way of analogy ; whether he must not also 
own it to be reconcilable with the latter, that is, with 
the system of religion itself and the proof of it. The 
reader then will observe, that the question now before 
us is not absolute, whether the opinion of fate be recon- 
cilable with religion ; but hypothetical, whether, upon 
supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitu- 
tion of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also ? 
or what pretense a fatalist — not other persons, but a 
fatalist — has to conclude, from his opinion, that there can 
be no such thing as religion ? And as the puzzle and 
obscurity which must unavoidably arise from arguing 

* [Necessity is an ambiguous word. There is, I. Logical necessi- 
ty, which implies that a consequent follows from a premise. 2. Moral 
necessity, which requires means in order to reach ends. 3. Physical 
necessity, which implies that in the material world consequences in- 
evitably and by compulsion follow antecedents. 4. Metaphysical 
necessity, which belongs to God as existing eternally and immutably. 
The word is also used in other senses.] 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 


153 


upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal neces- 
sity will, I fear, easily be seen, it will, I hope, as easily 
be excused. 

But since it has been all along taken for granted, as a 
thing proved, that there is an intelligent author of na- 
ture, or natural governor of the world ; and t . 

. Necessity ne- 

since an objection may be made against the stroys not the 

; J 0 proof of an in- 

proof of this, from the opinion of universal teiiigent author 
necessity, as it may be supposed that such 
necessity will itself account for the origin and preserva- 
tion of all things, it is requisite that this objection be 
distinctly answered ; or that it be shown that a fatality 
supposed consistent with what we certainly experience, 
does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and 
governor of nature, before we proceed to consider, 
whether it destroys the proof of a moral governor of it, 
or of our being in a state of religion. 

2. Now, when it is said by a fatalist that the whole 
constitution of nature and the actions of men, that every 
thing, and every mode and circumstance of every thing, 
is necessary, and could not possibly have been other- 
wise, it is to be observed, that this necessity does not 
exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and Does not ex _ 
acting from certain principles, and to certain cludedesi s n - 
ends; because all this is matter of undoubted experi- 
ence, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, 
every moment, be conscious of. And from hence it fol- 
lows, that necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an 
account of the constitution of nature, and how things 
came to be and to continue as they are ; but only an ac- 
count of this circumstance relating to their origin and 
continuance, that they could not have been otherwise 
than they are and have been. The assertion, that every 
thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the 
question, Whether the world came into being as it is, by 
an intelligent agent forming it thus, or not ; but to quite 


154 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


another question, Whether it came into being as it is, in 
that way and manner which we call necessarily, or in 
th&t way and manner which we call freely. For sup- 
pose, further, that one who was a fatalist, and one who 
kept to his natural sense of things and believed himself 
a free agent were disputing together, and vindicating 
their respective opinions, and they should happen to 
instance * in a house, they would agree that it was built 
by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity 
and freedom would occasion no difference of judgment 
concerning this, but only concerning another matter, 
whether the architect built it necessarily or freely. 

Suppose, then, they should proceed to inquire con- 
cerning the constitution of nature : in a lax way of 
speaking, one of them might say it was by necessity, 
and the other by freedom ; but if they had any meaning 
to their words, as the latter must mean a free agent so 
the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent, 
whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity ; 
for abstract notions can do nothing. Indeed, we ascribe 
to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. 
For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, that is, 
immensity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, 
to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intui- 
tively that there must, and cannot but be, somewhat ex- 
ternal to ourselves answering this idea, or the archetype 
of it. And from hence (for this abstract , as much as any 
other, implies a concrete') we conclude that there is, and 
cannot but be, an infinite and immense eternal Being 
existing, prior to all design contributing to his existence, 
and exclusive of it.f And from the scantiness of lan- 

* [ Take a house as an instance or illustration.] 

f [This argument is taken by Butler from Dr. Clarke. Like all of 
Clarke’s attempted demonstrations of the being of God, it has been 
closely scrutinized, and its validity questioned. See, for instance, 
Duke’s Analysis of Butler’s Analogy, Appendix, p. 83.] 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 


155 


guage, a manner of speaking has been introduced, that 
necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of 
the existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it 
be at all intended, that every thing exists as it does by 
this kind of necessity, a necessity antecedent in nature 
to design ; it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing 
exists as it does by this kind of necessity upon several 
accounts, and particularly, because it is admitted that 
design in the actions of men contributes to many alter- 
ations in nature. For if any deny this, I shall not pre- 
tend to reason with them. 

From these things it follows, first, That when a fatal- 
ist asserts that every thing is by necessity , he Conclusions, 
must mean, by an agent acting necessarily : he must, I say, 
mean this ; for I am very sensible he would not choose 
to mean it : and, secondly, That the necessity by which 
such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude in- 
telligence and design. So that were the system of fatal- 
ity admitted, it would just as much account for the 
formation of the world as for the structure of a house, 
and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes 
a necessary agent as freedom requires and supposes a 
free agent to be the former of the world. And the ap- 
pearances of design and of final causes in the constitution 
of nature, as really prove this acting agent to be an in- 
telligent designer , or to act from choice, upon the scheme 
of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom. 

3. It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not 
destroy the proof that there is an intelligent Necesalty de . 
author of nature and natural governor of the stroys not the 

0 proof ofreligion. 

world, the present question, which the anal- 
ogy before-mentioned (page 152) suggests, and which, I 
think, it will answer, is this : Whether the opinion of 
necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, with the 
constitution of the world, and the natural government 
which we experience exercised over it, destroys all rea- 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


156 


sonable ground of belief that we are in a state of relig- 
ion ; or whether that opinion be reconcilable with relig- 
ion, with the system and the proof of it. 

Suppose, then, a fatalist to educate any one from his 
youth up in his own principles ; that the child should 
impracticable reason upon them, and conclude that since 
m education, etc. j ie canno t possibly behave otherwise than 

he does he is not a subject of blame or commendation, 
nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished; imagine 
him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and # 
commendation out of his mind by means of this system ; 
to form his temper, and character, and behavior to it ; 
and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect, 
say, from reasonable men, upon his coming abroad into 
the world ; as the fatalist judges from this system what 
he is to expect from the author of nature, and with re- 
gard to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here 
to ask, whether any one of common sense would think 
fit that a child should be put upon these speculations 
and be left to apply them to practice ? And a man has 
little pretense to reason who is not sensible that we are 
all children in speculations of this kind. However, the 
child would doubtless be highly delighted to find him- 
self freed from the restraints of fear and shame with 
which his playfellows were fettered and embarrassed, 
and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far 
beyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the 
least bad part of the influence which these principles 
must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon, during 
the course of his education. He must either be allowed 
to go on, and be the plague of all about him, and him- 
self too, even to his own destruction, or else correction 
must be continually made use of to supply the want of 
those natural perceptions of blame and commendation 
which we have supposed to be removed, and to give him 
a practical impression of what he had reasoned himself 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 


157 


out of the belief of, that he was in fact an accountable 
child, and to be punished for doing what he was forbid. 
It is therefore, in reality, impossible but that the cor- 
rection which he must meet with in the course of his 
education must convince him, that if the scheme he was 
instructed in were not false, yet, that he reasoned in- 
conclusively upon it, and, somehow or other, misapplied 
it to practice and common life ; as what the fatalist ex- 
periences of the conduct of Providence at present ought, 
in all reason, to convince him, that this scheme is misap- 
plied when applied to the subject of religion. (Page 153.) 
But supposing the child’s temper could remain still 
formed to the system, and his expectation of the treat- 
ment he was to have in the world be regulated by it, so 
as to expect that no reasonable man would blame or 
punish him for any thing which he should do, because 
he could not help doing it; upon this supposition, it is 
manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the 
world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment 
which he would receive from it would render it so to 
him ; and he could not fail of doing somewhat very soon 
for which he would be delivered over into the hands of 
civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be con- 
vinced of the obligations he was under to his wise 
instructor. 

Or suppose this scheme of fatality in any other way 
applied to practice, such practical application of it will 
be found equally absurd, equally fallacious, in a practi- 
cal sense : for instance, that if a man be destined to live 
such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no care 
of his own preservation ; or if he be destined to die before 
that time, no care can prevent it; therefore all care 
about preserving one’s life is to be neglected ; which is 
the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. No absU rdity 
But now, on the contrary, none of these mfreedom - 
practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning upon 


i 5 8 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


the supposition that we are free ; but all such reason- 
ing, with regard to the common affairs of life, is justified 
by experience. And therefore, though it were admitted 
that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true, 
yet with regard to practice, it is as if it were false, so far 
as our experience reaches ; that is, to the whole of our 
present life. For the constitution of the present world, 
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is as 
if we were free. And it may, perhaps, justly be con- 
cluded that since the whole process of action, through 
every step of it, suspense, deliberation, inclining one 
way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is 
as if we were free, therefore we are so.* But the thing 
here insisted upon is, that under the present natural 
government of the world we find we are treated and 
dealt with as if we were free, prior to all consideration 

* [Compare Berkeley’s Minute Philosopher, dial, vii, § 20 : — 

“ £ up hr. Tell me, Alciphron, do you think it involves a contra- 
diction that God should make man free ? 

“ Ale . I do not. 

“ Eup hr. It is then possible that there may be such a thing? 

“Ale. This I do not deny. 

“ Eup hr. Would not such a one think that he acted, and condemn 
himself for some actions, and approve himself for others, etc. ? Tell 
me, now, what other characters of your supposed free agent may not 
be found in man ? ” 

So Clarke, Remarks on Collins’ Inquiry, p. 24 : “As to that which 
this gentleman calls the fourth (but which is, indeed, the only) ac- 
tion of man, namely, doing as we will , or actually exerting this self- 
moving faculty. Of this I say, as before, that since, in all cases, it 
does now, by experience, seem to us to be free, that is, seems to us to 
be really a self-moving power, exactly in the same manner as it would 
do upon supposition of our being actually free agents ; the bare phys- 
ical possibility of our being so framed by the Author of nature, as to be 
unavoidably deceived in this matter by every experience of every action 
we perform, is no more any just ground to doubt the truth of our lib- 
erty, than the bare natural possibility of our being all our life-time, as 
in a dream, deceived in our belief of the existence of the material 
world, is any just ground to doubt of the reality of its existence.” F.] 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 


SI 


whether we are or not. Were this opinion, therefore, of 
necessity, admitted to be ever so true, yet such is in 
fact our condition and the natural course of Necessity mis- 
things, that whenever we apply it to life and e^tothepSs- 
practice, this application of it always mis- ent ^ future, 
leads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful 
manner, with regard to our present interest. And how 
can people think themselves so very secure, then, that 
the same application of the same opinion may not mis- 
lead them also, in some analogous manner, with respect 
to a future, a more general, and more important interest ? 
For religion being a practical subject, and the analogy 
of nature showing us that we have not faculties to apply 
this opinion, were it a true one, to practical subjects; 
whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and 
thence conclude that we are free from its obligations, it 
is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. 
There will still remain just reason to think, whatever 
appearances are, that we deceive ourselves ; in some- 
what of a like manner as when people fancy they can 
draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity. 

From these things together, the attentive reader will 
see it follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the 
evidence of religion be conclusive, it re- Nece88lty doea 
mains so upon supposition of necessity ; be- not^ destroy re- 
cause the notion of necessity is not applica- 
ble to practical subjects; that is, with respect to them 
is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain any re- 


flection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasona- 
ble. For to pretend to act upon reason in opposition 
to practical principles which the Author of our nature 
gave us to act upon, and to pretend to apply our reason to 
subjects with regard to which our own short views, and 
even our experience, will show us it cannot be depended 
upon,— and such at best the subject of necessity must 
be, — this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness. 


i6o Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

4. But this is not all. For we find within ourselves a 
will, and are conscious of a character. Now if this in 

us be reconcilable with fate, it is reconcila- 
ibS°wUh° aSd’is ble with it in the author of nature. And 
moral character, natura i government and final causes 

imply a character and a will in the governor and de- 
signer;* a will concerning the creatures whom he gov- 
erns. The author of nature, then, being certainly of 
some character or other, notwithstanding necessity, it is 
evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the partic- 
ular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in 
‘him, which attributes are the foundation of religion as 
with any other character; since we find this necessity 
no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel ; 
true, than faithless ; just, than unjust ; or, if the fatalist 
pleases, what we call unjust. For it is said, indeed, that 
what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just pun- 
ishment, upon supposition of necessity becomes mani- 
festly unjust ; because it is punishment inflicted for do- 
ing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if 
the necessity which is supposed to destroy the injustice 
of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the in- 
justice of punishing it. However, as little to the purpose 
as this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose 
to observe from it how the notions of justice and injus- 
tice remain, even while we endeavor to suppose them 
removed ; how they force themselves upon the mind, 
even while we are making suppositions destructive of 
them : for there is not, perhaps, a man in the world, 
but would be ready to make this objection at first 
thought. 

5. But though it is most evident that universal neces- 

* By will and character is meant that which, in speaking of men, 
we should express, not only by these word?, but also by the words 
temper , taste, disposition , practical principles ; that whole frame 
of mind from whence we act in one manner rather than another. 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 161 

sity, if it be reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable 
with that character in the author of nature which is the 
foundation of religion; “Yet, does it not 

. . Does not de- 

plainly destroy the proof that he is of that stroy the proof 

character, and consequently the proof of 
religion ? ” By no means. For we find that happiness 
and misery are not our fate in any such sense as not to be 
the consequences of our beha-vior, but that they are the 
consequences of it, (chap, ii.) We find God exercises 
the same kind of government over us with that which a 
father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate 
over his subjects. Now whatever becomes of abstract 
questions concerning liberty and necessity, it evidently 
appears to us that veracity and justice must be the nat- 
ural rule and measure of exercising this authority, or 
government, to a being who can have no competitions, 
or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his 
subjects. 

6. But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experi- 
ence its truth, may be perplexed with difficulties which 
run up into the most abstruse of all specu- other proofs 
lations, and as the opinion of necessity notaffected - 
seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds 
itself, it may be of some use to offer a more particular 
proof of the obligations of religion, which may dis- 
tinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion. 

The proof from final causes of an intelli- Final causes, 
gent author of nature is not affected by the opinion of 
necessity ; supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, 
and reconcilable with the constitution of things, (page 
152, etc.) And it is a matter of fact, independent on 
this or any other speculation, that he governs the world 
by the method of rewards and punishments, (chap, ii;) 
and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by which 
we distinguish between actions, and approve some as 
virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vi- 
11 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


162 


cious and of ill desert, (Dissertation ii.) Now this moral 
discernment implies, in the notion of it, a rule of action, 
and a rule of a very peculiar kind ; for it carries in it 
authority and a right of direction ; authority in such a 
sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being 
self-condemned.* And that the dictates of this moral 
faculty, which are by nature a rule to us, are moreover 
the Jaws of God, laws in a sense including sanctions, 
may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide 
of action, in creatures who are capable of considering it 
as given them by their maker, not only raises immedi- 
ately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in fol- 
lowing it, and of danger in deviating from it. A direc- 
tion of the author of nature, given to creatures capable 
of looking upon it as such, is plainly a command from 
him : and a command from him necessarily includes in 
it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or 
threatening in case of disobedience. But then the sense 
or perception of good and ill desert, (Dissertation ii,) 
which is contained in the moral discernment, renders 
the sanction explicit, and makes it appear, as one may 
say, expressed. For since his method of government is 
to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to 
some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and 
to others of ill, this surely amounts to declaring upon 
whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his re- 
wards be bestowed. For he must have given us this 
discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of 
what is to be hereafter; that is, by way of information 
beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. 
There is, then, most evident ground to think that the 
government of God, upon the whole, will be found to 
correspond to the nature which he has given us, and 
that in the upshot and issue of things happiness and 
misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue 
* Sermon ii at the Rolls. 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 163 

and vice respectively ; as he has already, in so peculiar 
a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds. 
And from hence might easily be deduced the obliga- 
tions of religious worship, were it only to be considered 
as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this 
moral government of God, and securing our obedience 
to it ; which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that 
most important duty. 

7. Now I say, no objection from necessity can lie 
against this general proof of religion ; none against the 
proposition reasoned upon, that we have Necessity pre- 
such a moral faculty and discernment ; be- Sto^his gen- 
cause this is a mere matter of fact, a thing eral P roof - 
of experience, that human kind is thus constituted : 
none against the conclusion; because it is immediate, 
and wholly from this fact. For the conclusion that God 
will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, 
is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he 
should, but from its appearing that he has told us he will. 
And this he hath certainly told us in the promise and 
threatening which, it hath been observed, the notion of 

* However, I am far from intending to deny that the will of God is 
determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ; though 
one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to 
speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intel- 
ligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his 
own happiness , then fitness of action, or the right and reason of the 
case , is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as incon- 
ceivable to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, 
preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies 
that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end to be 
the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him to discern an ab- 
stract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior to it 
to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not, therefore, ap- 
pear, that moral right is any more relative to perception than abstract 
truth is ; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and 
rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than 
to speak of abstract truth as thus founded. 


164 Analogy of Religion. [Part f. 

a command implies, and the sense of good and ill desert 
which he has given us more distinctly expresses. And 
this reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in some de- 
gree even verified, by other facts ; by the natural ten- 
dencies of virtue and of vice, (page 99 ;) and by this, that 
God, in the natural course of his providence, punishes 
vicious actions as mischievous to society, and also 
vicious actions as such, in the strictest sense, (page 90, 
etc.) So that the general proof of religion is unanswer- 
ably real, even upon the wild supposition which we are 
arguing upon. 

8. It must likewise be observed further, that natural 
religion hath, besides this, an external evi- 

Does not affect ° . . 

external evi- dence, which the doctrine of necessity, if it 
could be true, would not affect. For sup- 
pose a person, by the observations and reasoning above, 
or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion ; that 
there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral 
governor and judge of mankind, and will, upon the 
whole, deal with every one according to his works ; I 
say, suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but 
to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state 
of mankind, it would be natural for such a one to be in- 
quisitive, what was the history of this system of doc- 
trine ; at what time, and in what manner, it came first 
into the world ; and whether it were believed by any 
considerable part of it. And were he upon inquiry to 
find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of all 
proposed it as a deduction of reason, and that mankind 
were before wholly ignorant of it ; then, though its evi- 
dence from reason would remain, there would be no ad- 
ditional probability of its truth from the account of its 
discovery. But instead of this being the fact of the 
case, on the contrary, he would find what could not but 
afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth : First , 
That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer addi- 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 165 

tions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages 
and countries of which we have any certain information 
relating to this matter. Secondly , That it is certain his- 
torical fact, so far as we can trace things up, that this 
whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator 
and moral governor of the world, and that mankind is 
in a state of religion, was received in the first ages. 
And, Thirdly , That as there is no hint or intimation 
in history that this system was first reasoned out ; so 
there is express historical or traditional evidence, as an- 
cient as history, that it was taught first by revelation. 
Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. 
The first of them, general consent, shows this system to 
be conformable to the common sense of mankind. The 
second, namely, that religion was believed in the first 
ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that 
there were then any superstitious or false additions to it, 
cannot but be a further confirmation erf its truth. For it 
is a proof of this alternative — either that it came into the 
world by revelation, or that it is natural, obvious, and 
forces itself upon the mind. The former of these is the 
conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider 
how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds 
are, will, perhaps, from hence alone be strongly inclined 
to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in the sec- 
ond part (chap, ii) of this Treatise, that there is nothing 
of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the 
beginning of the world as there is supposed to be against 
subsequent ones ; a skeptic could not, I think, give any 
account which would appear more probable, even to 
himself, of the early pretenses to revelation, than by 
supposing some real original one from whence they were 
copied. And the third thing above-mentioned, that 
there is express historical or traditional evidence, as an- 
cient as history, of the system of religion being taught 
mankind by revelation ; this must be admitted as some 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


1 66 


degree of real proof of that it was so taught. For why 
should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some 
additional proof of a fact against which there is no pre- 
sumption ? And this proof is mentioned here, because 
it has its weight, to show that religion came into the 
world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the 
proper authority of any book supposed to contain it ; 
and even prior to all consideration whether the revela- 
tion itself be uncorruptly handed down and related, or 
mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical 
account which we have of the origin of religion, taking 
in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, 
no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the 
external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no 
means inconsiderable. 

9. But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be 

recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which 
Proofs liable to are on ty general, that as speculative reason 
neglect. may b e neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, 

so also may our moral understanding be impaired and 
perverted, and the dictates of it not impartially attended 
to. This, indeed, proves nothing against the reality of 
our speculative or practical faculties of perception ; 
against their being intended by nature to inform us in 
the theory of things, and instruct us how we are to be- 
have, and what we are to expect, in consequence of our 
behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are lia- 
ble, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious ad- 
monition to us to be upon our guard with respect to 
what is of such consequence as our determinations con- 
cerning virtue and religion ; and particularly not to take 
custom, and fashion, and slight notions of honor, or im- 
aginations of present ease, use, and convenience to 
mankind, for the only moral rule. (Dissertation ii.) 

10. The foregoing observations, drawn from the na- 
ture of the thing and the history of religion, amount, 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 


167 


when taken together, to a real practical proof of it not to 
be confuted ; such a proof as, considering the Necessity makes 
infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend InlTpuS- ld3 
would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, ments a1,surd - 
to influence the actions of men who act upon thought 
and reflection ; if it were admitted that there is no proof 
of the contrary. But it may be said : “ There are many 
probabilities which cannot, indeed, be confuted; that 
is, shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be over- 
balanced by greater probabilities on the other side; 
much more by demonstration. And there is no occa- 
sion to object against particular arguments alleged for 
an opinion, when the opinion itself may be clearly 
shown to be false, without meddling with such argu- 
ments at all, but leaving them just as they are. (Pages 
33, 42.) Now the method of government by rewards 
and punishments, and especially rewarding and punish- 
ing good and ill desert, as such, respectively, must go 
upon supposition that we are free, and not necessary 
agents.* And it is incredible, that the author of nature 
should govern us upon a supposition as true, which h-e 
knows to be false ; and therefore absurd to think he will 
reward or punish us for our actions hereafter ; especially 
that he will do it under the notion that they are of good 
or ill desert.” Here, then, the matter is brought to a 
point. And the answer to all this is full, and not to be 
evaded : that the whole constitution and course of 
things, the whole analogy of providence shows, beyond 
possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this rea- 
soning is false, wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine 
of freedom, indeed, dearly shows where — in supposing 
ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents. 
But upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in 
taking for granted that it is incredible necessary agents 
should be rewarded and punished. But that, somehow 
* See note at the end of this chapter. 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


1 68 


or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false, is most 

certain. For it is fact that God does gov- 

This reasoning , e 

erroneous— how ern even brute creatures by the method oi 

rewards and punishments, in the natural 
course of things. And men are rewarded and punished 
for their actions ; punished for actions mischievous to 
society as being so ; punished for vicious actions as such, 
by the natural instrumentality of each other; under the 
present conduct of Providence. Nay, even the affection 
of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the re- 
wards and punishments following from them, which in 
general are to be considered as natural, that is, from the 
author of nature : these rewards and punishments, be- 
ing naturally* annexed to actions considered as imply- 
ing good intention and good desert, ill intention and in 
desert — these natural rewards and punishments, I say, 
are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above, 
and show its falsehood, as a more exact and complete 
rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert, as such. 
So that if it be incredible that necessary agents should 
be thus rewarded and punished, then men are not nec- 
essary, but free ; since it is matter of fact that they are 
thus rewarded and punished. But if, on the contrary, 
which is the supposition we have been arguing upon, it 
be insisted that men are necessary agents, then there is 
nothing incredible in the further supposition of neces- 
sary agents being thus rewarded and punished, since 
we ourselves are thus dealt with. 

n. From the whole, therefore, it must follow that a 
necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the 
constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the 
author of nature will not, nor destroy the proof that he 
will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal govern- 
ment, render his creatures happy or miserable, by some 
means or other, as they behave well or ill. Or, tp ex 7 
* Sermon viii at the Rolls. 


Chap. VI.] Of the Opinion of Necessity. 169 

press this conclusion in words conformable to the title 
of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows opinion of no- 
us, that the opinion of necessity, considered ce8Slt y’ false * 
as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the sup- 
position above-mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of 
natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the 
proof of revealed. 

From these things, likewise, we may learn in what 
sense to understand that general assertion, that the 
opinion of necessity is essentially destructive Th0 sense in 
of all religion. First, In a practical sense; deSys^reil^ 
that by this notion atheistical men pretend ion * 
to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify 
to others their disregard to all religion. And secondly , 
In the strictest sense ; that it is a contradiction to the 
whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every 
moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns every 
thing. But by no means is this assertion to be under- 
stood, as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be 
reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what 
we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion ; 
for upon this supposition it demonstrably is so. 

[NOTE.— See page 1 67.] 

[We must carefully distinguish between the religious and the irre- 
ligious necessitarians. The question between the maintainers of free 
will and the religious necessitarians is this : When I blame [or com- 
mend] myself for an action, is there necessarily involved in this moral 
judgment the consciousness that, under all the circumstances preced- 
ing the act of volition, I might have willed otherwise? The religious 
necessitarian holds the negative : the maintainer of free will, the af- 
firmative ; and the irreligious fatalists so far agree with the latter. 
They say that the sense or persuasion of liberty is requisite to consti- 
tute the sense of responsibility for the past, — requisite as a ground of 
hope or purpose for the future ; that, without it, there would be no 
room for remorse for what we have done, or forethought for what we 
should do. But then they maintain, also, that this feeling is delusive ; 
that it may be demonstrated to be a mistake ; and that, consequently, 


170 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


here is a conflict between the rational and the moral principles of our 
nature. Such a scheme is essentially skeptical, representing the im- 
mediate judgments of the mind as contradictory of each other. It 
represents the mind as pronouncing certain volitions, when viewed 
under a speculative aspect, to fall under the law of cause and effect; 
and yet, pronouncing the same volitions, when viewed under a prac- 
tical aspect, to be exempt from it. 

Now, upon such a scheme, as there is a direct conflict between the 
independent decisions of our own consciousness, it seems clear that 
we have no more right to pronounce the moral judgment delusive 
than the rational. Each would be brought equally into doubt if this 
statement were correct. But, even upon this statement the obliga- 
tions of morality will remain. I know not, suppose, which judgment 
is true and which delusive ; but still it is not, and cannot be a matter 
of indifference which of the two I practically follow ; because, if I 
act in disregard of the moral consciousness, I am, by the very hy- 
pothesis, self-condemned. The moral faculty is the practical faculty ; 
and, when the question is, What is to be done ? I am in the sphere of 
action, not of speculation. Reason, in her province, may refuse to reg- 
ister the decree, but she does not, for she cannot, superinduce a con- 
trary practical obligation. 

The doctrine of necessity, in its religious form, takes this expres- 
sion : — that moral acts of the will are determined by their motives 
(meaning by motive all that is the result of temper, organization, ed- 
ucation, and outward circumstances) as certainly as physical conse- 
quences are by their antecedents ; but that the acts which proceed 
from certain classes of motives are approved or condemned by the 
moral faculty, as being the results of certain motives, without the im- 
plied intervention of any such consciousness of freedom as the main- 
tamers of the liberty of the will suppose. — F.] 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 


171 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A 
SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPRE- 
HENDED. 

T HOUGH it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, 
that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility 
to the general doctrine of religion, and to „ . 

D . . ... The incompre- 

the several particular things contained in it, hensibiiityofthe 

• divine govern- 

considered as so many matters of fact; and ment an answer 
likewise that it shows this credibility not to t0 ob j ectlons - 
be destroyed by any notions of necessity ; yet still, ob- 
jections maybe insisted upon against the wisdom, equity, 
and goodness of the divine government, implied in the 
notion of religion, and against the method by which this 
government is conducted, to which objections analogy 
can be no direct answer.* For the credibility, or the 
certain truth, of a matter of fact, does not immediately 

* [It is obvious that the direct way of showing a certain course of 
conduct to be wise or good is to show the precise relations which 
render it so ; the goodness of the ends and the suitability of the 
means. 

The indirect way is to show that there may be such relations, 
though we do not see them, coupled with the proof that such a course 
of conduct is the conduct of one whom we have good reason, on other 
grounds, to believe wise and good. 

Indeed, there have not been wanting persons who have chosen to 
represent Butler’s argument, throughout this analogy, as tending to 
overthrow the whole proof of God’s attributes of justice, wisdom, and 
goodness, by establishing the matter of fact of our being under a 
government no way consistent with such attributes. The object of 
the present chapter is to obviate such a misrepresentation. Compare 
throughout, part ii, chap. viii. — F.] 


1 72 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of 
it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or direct- 
ly, than show such and such things to be true or credible 
considered only as matters of fact. But still, if, upon 
supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral 
government over it, analogy suggests and makes it cred- 
ible that this government must be a scheme, system, or 
constitution of government, as distinguished from a num- 
ber of single unconnected acts of distributive justice 
and goodness; and likewise that it must be a scheme so 
imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other 
respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all objec- 
tions against the justice and goodness of it; then analogy 
is, remotely, of great service in answering those objec- 
tions, both by suggesting the answer and showing it to 
be a credible one. 

2. Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. 

How shown F° r > first , Upon supposition that God exer- 
cises a moral government over the world, the 
analogy of his natural government suggests, and makes it 
credible, that his moral government must be a scheme 
quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a 
general answer to all objections against the justice and 
goodness of it. And, secondly , A more distinct observa- 
tion of some particular things contained in God’s 
scheme of natural government, the like things being 
supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral gov- 
ernment, will further show how little weight is to be 
laid upon these objections. 

I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral gov- 
ernment over the world, the analogy of his natural gov- 

Naturai gov- ernment suggests and makes it credible that 
cSm™?eheSsibie' his moral government must be a scheme 
scheme. q U i te beyond our comprehension : and this 

affords a general answer to all objections against the 
justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious, analogy 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 173 

renders it highly credible, that upon supposition of a 
moral government it must be a scheme — for the world, 
and the whole natural government of it, appears to be so — 
to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts cor- 
respond to each other and to a whole, as really as any 
work of art, or as any particular model of a civil consti- 
tution and government. In this great scheme of the 
natural world, individuals have various peculiar relations 
to other individuals of their own species. And whole 
species are, we find, variously related to other species 
upon this earth. Nor do we know how much further 
these kinds of relations may extend. And as there is 
not any action, or natural event, which we are acquaint- 
ed with, so single and unconnected as not to have a 
respect to some other actions and events; so possibly 
each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet 
have a remote, natural relation to other actions and 
events, much beyond the compass of this present world. 
There seems, indeed, nothing, from whence we can so 
much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures, ac- 
tions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have 
relations to each other. But, as it is obvious that all 
events have future unknown consequences, so, if we 
trace any, as far as we can go, into what is connected 
with it, we shall find that if such event were not con- 
nected with somewhat further in nature unknown to us, 
somewhat both past and present, such event could not 
possibly have been at all. Nor can we give the whole 
account of any one thing whatever ; of all its causes, 
ends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, 
without which it could not have been. By this most 
astonishing connection — these reciprocal corresponden- 
cies and mutual relations — every thing which we see in 
the course of nature is actually brought about. And 
things, seemingly the most insignificant imaginable, are 
perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other 


174 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


things of the greatest importance ; so that any one thing 
whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary, be a 
necessary condition to any other. 

The natural world then, and natural government of it, 
being such an incomprehensible scheme, — so incompre- 
hensible that a man must really in the literal sense 
know nothing at all, who is not sensible of his ignorance 
in it, — this immediately suggests, and strongly shows the 
credibility, that the moral world and government of it 
may be so too.* Indeed, the natural and moral consti- 
tution and government of the world are so connected as 
to make up together but one scheme : and it is highly 
probable that the first is formed and carried on merely 
in subserviency to the latter, as the vegetable world is 
for the animal, and organized bodies for minds. But 
the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the 
administration of the natural world is subordinate to 
that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that 
one should be analogous, or similar to, the other : that 
therefore every act of divine justice and goodness may 
be supposed to look much beyond itself and its imme- 
diate object; may have some reference to other parts 

* [Maimonides makes use of the following similitude : “ Suppose 
one of good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was 
born, to be brought up on an island, where he saw no human being 
but his father, nor the female of any beast. This person when grown 
up inquires how men are produced. He is told that they are bred in 
the womb of one of the same species, and that while in the womb 
we are very small and there move and are nourished. The young 
man inquires whether, when thus in the womb, we did not eat and 
drink and breathe, as we now do, and is answered, No. Then he 
denies it and offers demonstration that it could not be so, ‘ For,’ says he, 
4 if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone ; and how could we have 
lived close shut up in a womb for months ? So if we cease to eat and 
drink we die, and how could the child live so for months ?' And thus 
he satisfies himself that it is impossible that man should come into 
existence in such a manner.” — Stillingfleet’s Origines Sacra, p. 434. 
London : 1663. Fitzgerald’s ed., p. 18 1.] 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 


175 


of God’s moral administration, and to a general moral 
plan ; and that every circumstance of this his moral 
government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to 
the whole of it. Thus for example : the determined 
length of time, and the degrees and ways in which virtue 
is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in 
which wickedness is permitted to have its progress ; the 
times appointed for the execution of justice ; the ap- 
pointed instruments of it ; the kinds of rewards and 
punishments, and the manners of their distribution ; all 
particular instances of divine justice and goodness, and 
every circumstance of them, may have such respects to 
each other as to make up altogether a whole, connected 
and related in all its parts ; a scheme, or system, which 
is as properly one as the natural world is, and of the like 
kind. And supposing this to be the case, it is most 
evident that we are not competent judges of this scheme 
from the small parts of it which come within our view 
in the present life, and therefore no objections against 
any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable 
men.* 

3. This our ignorance, and the conse- Ourl?noranoe 
quences here drawn from it, are universally | e n c ^o®^ er to ob * 
acknowledged upon other occasions; and 

* [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great histor- 
ical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant 
raises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator from the unmean- 
ing strip of foreground derive any conception of the figures yet con- 
cealed ? Much less is he able to criticise their proportions, or beauty, 
or perspective, or even the design of the artist. The small fragment 
of a tree, or a flower, or animal, or building may seem quite unmean- 
ing, and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fit- 
ness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God’s dominions within 
our survey is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe and 
its interminable duration, as an atom compared to a planet or a 
man’s age to eternity. — Malcom.] 

[Chalmers has an able note on this subject, using a different illus- 
tration taken from Leibnitz.] 


1 76 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


though scarce denied, yet are universally forgot when 
persons come to argue against religion. And it is not, 
perhaps, easy even for the most reasonable men always 
to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make 
due allowances for it. Upon these accounts it may not 
be useless to go on a little further, in order to show more 
distinctly how just an answer our ignorance is to objec- 
tions against the scheme of providence. Suppose, then, 

a person boldly to assert that the things 

Illustrations. r 

complained of — the origin and continuance 
of evil — might easily have been prevented by repeated 
interpositions, (pages 178, 179;) interpositions so guard- 
ed and circumstanced as would preclude all mischief 
arising from them ; or, if this were impracticable, that a 
scheme of government is itself an imperfection ; since 
more good might have been produced without any 
scheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued 
single unrelated acts of distributive justice and good- 
ness ; because these would have occasioned no irregu- 
larities. And further than this, it is presumed, the ob- 
jections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious ; 
that were these assertions true, still the observations 
above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine 
government, and the consequence drawn from it, would 
hold in great measure, enough to vindicate religion 
against all objections from the disorders of the present 
state. Were these assertions true, yet the government 
of the world might be just and good notwithstanding; 
for at the most they would infer nothing more than that 
it might have been better. But, indeed, they are mere 
arbitrary assertions ; no man being sufficiently acquaint- 
ed with the possibilities of things to bring any proof of 
them to the lowest degree of probability. For however 
possible what is asserted may seem, yet many instances 
may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of 
suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 


i 77 


most palpable self-contradictions, which not every one 
by any means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps 
any one at first sight suspect. 

From these things it is easy to see distinctly how our 
ignorance, as it is the common, is really a satisfactory 
answer to all objections against the justice and goodness 
of providence. If a man contemplating any one provi- 
dential dispensation which had no relation to any others, 
should object that he discerned in it a disregard to jus- 
tice, or a deficiency of goodness, nothing would be less 
an answer to such objection than our ignorance in other 
parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things no 
way related to what he was contemplating. But when 
we know not but the parts objected against may be 
relative to other parts unknown to us, and when we are 
unacquainted with what is, in the nature of the thing, 
practicable in the case before us, then our ignorance is 
a satisfactory answer ; because some unknown relation, 
or some unknown impossibility, may render what is ob- 
jected against just and good; nay, good in the highest 
practical degree. 

4. II. And how little weight is to be laid upon such 
objections will further appear, by a more distinct obser- 
vation of some particular things contained Argument from 
in the natural government of God, the like 8 P ecia i things, 
to which may be supposed, from analogy, to be contained 
in his moral government. 

First. As in the scheme of the natural world no end 
appears to be accomplished without means, so we find 
that means very undesirable often conduce Means essential 
to bring about ends in such a measure desir- 10 end8 ’ 
able, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of 
the means. And in cases where such means are con- 
ducive to such ends, it is not reason, but experience, 
which shows us that they are thus conducive. Experi- 
ence also shows many means to be conducive and nec- 
12 


178 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


essary to accomplish ends, which means, before experi- 
ence, we should have thought would have had even a 
contrary tendency. Now from these observations relat- 
ing to the natural scheme of the world, the moral being 
supposed analogous to it, arises a great credibility that 
the putting our misery in each other’s power to the de- 
gree it is, and making men liable to vice to the degree 
we are, and in general, that those things which are ob- 
jected against the moral scheme of providence may be, 
upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and pro- 
ductive of an overbalance of happiness; that is, the 
things objected against may be means by which an over- 
balance of good will, in the end, be found produced. 
And from the same observations it appears to be no pre- 
sumption against this that we do not, if indeed we do 
not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that 
they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those 
things which we call irregularities may not be so at all, 
because they may be means of accomplishing wise and 
good ends more considerable. And it may be added, 
as above, that they may also be the only means by 
which these wise and good ends are capable of being 
accomplished. 

After these observations it may be proper to add, in 
order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from 
sin and mis- an y ^ at though the constitution of 

ery not in them- our nature, from whence we are capable of 

selves beneficial. . . 1 

vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly 
does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of the 
world; and though the actual permission of evil may 
be beneficial to it, (that* is, it would have been more 
mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself ab- 
stained from his own wickedness, but that any one had 
forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted,) yet 
notwithstanding, it might have been much better for the 
world if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 


179 


most clearly conceivable that the very commission of 
wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and yet that 
it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain 
from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of 
the natural world, there are disorders which bring their 
own cures; diseases, which are themselves remedies. 
Many a man would have died, had it not been for the 
gout or a fever ; yet it would be thought madness to 
assert, that sickness is a better or more perfect state 
than health ; though the like, with regard to the moral 
world, has been asserted. But, 

5. Secondly, The natural government of the world is 
carried on by general laws. For this there 

0 Natural govern- 

may be wise and good reasons : the wisest ment and gen- 

: eral laws. 

and best, for aught we know to the contrary. 

And that there are such reasons, is suggested to our 
thoughts by the analogy of nature ; by our being made 
to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed 
all the good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this 
means, that the laws by which the world is governed are 
general. For we have scarce any kind of enjoyments 
but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental in 
procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we 
foresee likely to procure them : now this foresight could 
not be at all, were not the government of the world car- 
ried on by general laws. And though, for aught we 
know to the contrary, every single case may be at length 
found to have been provided for even by these ; yet to 
prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they arise, 
by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible 
in the nature of things, as we see it is absolutely impos- 
sible in civil government. 

But then we are ready to think that the constitution 
of nature remaining as it is, and the course special inter- 
of things being permitted to go on, in other evil rather 
respects, as it does, there might be interpo- than good * 


i8o Analogy of Religion. [Part 1 . 

sitions to prevent irregularities, though they could not 
have been prevented or remedied by any general laws. 
And there would indeed be reason to wish — which, by 
the way, is very different from a right to claim — that all 
irregularities were prevented or remedied by present 
interpositions, if these interpositions would have no 
other effect than this. But it is plain they would have 
some visible and immediate bad effects ; for instance, 
they would encourage idleness and negligence, and they 
would render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is 
ascertained by this very thing, that the course of the 
world is carried on by general laws. And further, it is 
certain they would have distant effects, and very great 
ones, too, by means of the wonderful connections be- 
fore-mentioned. (Page 173, etc.) So that we cannot so 
much as guess what would be the whole result of the 
interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad result 
might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever 
there was occasion for them ; but this again is talking 
quite at random, and in the dark. (Pages 175, 176.) 
Upon the whole, then, we see wise reasons why the 
course of the world should be carried on by general 
laws, and good ends accomplished by this means ; and, 
for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons for 
it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no 
ground to believe that all irregularities could be rem- 
edied as they arise, or could have been precluded by 
general laws. We find that interpositions would pro- 
duce evil and prevent good ; and for aught we know, they 
would produce greater evil than they would prevent, and 
prevent greater good than they would produce. And if 
this be the case, then the not interposing is so far from 
being a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of 
goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient ; and going 
further seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties. 

6. But it may be said, “ that after all, these supposed 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. i 8 i 

impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquaint- 
ed with; and we must judge of religion, as our ignorance 
of other things, by what we do know, and 
look upon the rest as nothing ; or however, rell gi° n - 
that the answers here given to what is objected against 
religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the 
proof of it, since their stress lies so very much upon our 
ignorance.” But, 

7. First, Though total ignorance, in any matter, does 
indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof 
concerning it and objections against it, yet partial ig- 
norance does not. For we may in any degree be con- 
vinced that a person is of such a character, and conse- 
quently will pursue such ends, though we are greatly 
ignorant what is the proper way of acting in order the 
most effectually to obtain those ends ; and in this case, 
objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly 
not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our 
ignorance, though the proof that such ends were intend- 
ed might not at all be invalidated by it.* Thus the 
proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of 

* [The concluding observations of this chapter are all-important 
for the vindication of Butler’s whole argument. They show most 
satisfactorily how our ignorance may invalidate the objections against, 
and yet not invalidate the proof of, the thing. The essence of the 
reasoning here lies in the distinction between our knowledge of God’s 
will and our knowledge of his ways. We have positive proof of his 
moral character, in virtue of which he wills both the righteousness 
and the happiness of his creatures ; and yet may be utterly in the 
dark as to the most effectual ways or methods of procedure by which 
these objects can be most fully accomplished. We may know the 
end, and yet not know the best means of bringing it about. A total 
ignorance would place both the objections and the proof alike beyond 
our reach, but a partial ignorance may not. God’s wisdom may be 
learned by its vestiges within the limits of a mere handbreadth, as in 
the construction of an eye ; yet, after having learned this, we may 
fail in our judgment of the subserviency of things that go out and far 
from view, whether widely in space or distantly in time. And so 


182 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


God, and consequently, that his government is moral, 
and that every one upon the whole shall receive accord- 
ing to his deserts; a proof that this is the designed end 
of his government. But we are not competent judges 
what is the proper way of acting, in order the most ef- 
fectually to accomplish this end. (Pages 40, 41.) There- 
fore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the 
conduct of providence in permitting irregularities, as 
seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so 
obvious that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer 
to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof 
of it; till it can be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that 
our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does 
the objections against it. 

8. Secondly , Suppose unknown impossibilities and un- 
known relations might justly be urged to invalidate the 
proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against 
it, and that in consequence of this the proof of it were 
doubtful, yet still, let the assertion be despised or let it 
be ridiculed, it is undeniably true that moral obligations 
would remain certain, though it were not certain what 
would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observ- 
ing or violating them. For these obligations arise im- 
mediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own 
mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate with- 
out being self-condemned. And they would be certain, 
too, from considerations of interest. For though it were 
doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue 
and vice, yet it is, however, credible that they may have 
those consequences which religion teaches us they will ; 
and this credibility is a certain * obligation, in point of 


within the homestead of one’s own conscience may we read the lesson 
of a righteous God, and yet be wholly unable to pronounce on the 
tendency or effect of those measures which enter into the policy of his 
universal government. — Chalmers.] 

* Page 35, and part ii, chap. vi. 


Chap. VII.] A Scheme Incomprehensible. 183 

prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in 
the conscientious practice of all that is good. But, 

9. Thirdly, The answers above given to the objec- 
tions against religion cannot equally be made use of to 
invalidate the proof of it. For upon the supposition 
that God exercises a moral government over the world, 
analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude that this 
moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, 
beyond our comprehension. And a thousand particular 
analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from 
their relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish 
ends which we should have thought they had no ten- 
dency at all to accomplish ; nay, ends which, before ex- 
perience, we should have thought such parts were contra- 
dictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And there- 
fore all these analogies show, that the way of arguing 
made use of in objecting against religion is delusive; be- 
cause they show it is not at all incredible that, could we 
comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of 
the disorders objected against to be consistent with 
justice and goodness, and even to be instances of them. 
Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as 
it is to the objections against it ;* and therefore cannot 
invalidate that proof, as it does these objections. 

10. Lastly, From the observations now made, it is easy 
to see that the answers above given to the objections 
against providence, though in a general way of speaking 
they may be said to be taken from our ignorance, yet 
are by no means taken merely from that, but from some- 
what which analogy shows us concerning it. For anal- 
ogy shows us positively that our ignorance in the possi- 
bilities of things, and the various relations in nature, ren- 
ders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclu- 
sions in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge 
and to object. So that the things above insisted upon 

* Sermons at the Rolls, page 312, 2d edit. 


1 84 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and 
relations ; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and 
even forced upon the observation of serious men, and 
rendered credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And 
therefore to take these things into the account is to 
judge by experience and what we do know; and it is 
not judging so to take no notice of them. 


CONCLUSION. 

T HE observations of the last chapter lead us to con- 
sider this little scene of human life, in which we 
are so busily engaged, as having a reference, 

Recapitulation. J & ° ° ’ 

of some sort or other, to a much larger plan 
of things. Whether we are any way related to the more 
distant parts of the boundless universe into which we 
are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident 
that the course of things which comes within our view 
is connected with somewhat past, present, and future, 
beyond it. (Pages 172, 173.) So that we are placed, as 
one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixed, 
but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible; in- 
comprehensible, in a manner, equally with respect to 
what has been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. 
And this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as 
wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and con- 
ception, (part ii, chap, ii,) as any thing in that of relig- 
ion. For will any man in his senses say, that it is less 
difficult to conceive how the world came to be, and to 
continue as it is, without than with an intelligent author 
and governor of it? or, admitting an intelligent govern- 
or of it, that there is some other rule of government 
more natural, and of easier conception, than that which 
we call moral? Indeed, without an intelligent author 


Ciiap. VII.] 


Conclusion. 


185 


and governor of nature no account at all can be given 
how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which 
we are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to 
be carried on as it is; nor any of its general end and 
design without a moral governor of it. That there is an 
intelligent author of nature, and natural governor of the 
world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise, 
as proved, and generally known and confessed to be 
proved. And the very notion of an intelligent author 
of nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a 
will and a character. (Page 160.) 

Now as our whole nature, the nature which he has 
given us, leads us to conclude his will and character to be 
moral, just, and good ; so we can scarce in imagination 
conceive what it can be otherwise. However, in conse- 
quence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he 
formed the universe as it is, and carries on the course 
of it as he does, rather than in any other manner; and 
has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and 
a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and 
enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted 
them, without any reflection. But one would think it 
impossible that creatures endued with reason could 
avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this ; reflecting, if 
not from whence we came, yet at least whither we are 
' going, and what the mysterious scheme in the midst of 
which we find ourselves will at length come out and pro- 
duce ; a scheme in which it is certain we are highly in- 
terested, and in which we may be interested even beyond 
conception. 

For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude 
that we shall cease to be at death. Particular analogies 
do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be 
thought strange in our being to exist in another state of 
life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong 
probability that we shall continue so; unless there be 


86 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


some positive ground, and there is none from reason or 
analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persua- 
sion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would 
surely be little reason to take pleasure in it. But indeed, 
it can have no other ground than some such imagina- 
tion, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves ; which 
is contrary to experience. Experience, too, most clear- 
ly shows us the folly of concluding from the body and 
the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the 
dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. 
And there are remarkable instances of their not affect- 
ing each other, which lead us to a contrary conclusion. 
The supposition, then, which in all reason we are to go 
upon is, that our living nature will continue after death. 
And it is infinitely unreasonable, to form an institution 
of life, or to act upon any other supposition. 

Now all expectation of immortality, whether more or 
less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes 
and our fears ; since we see the constitution of nature 
is such as to admit of misery as well as to be productive 
of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of 
both in some degree ; and since we cannot but know 
what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And 
there is no presumption against believing further, that 
our future interest depends upon our present behavior; 
for we see our present interest doth ; and that the hap- 
piness and misery which are naturally annexed to our 
actions, very frequently do not follow till long after the 
actions are done to which they are respectively annexed. 
So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether 
it were likely that the author of nature, in giving happi- 
ness and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their 
actions or not; yet, since we find by experience that he 
hath such regard, the whole sense of things which he 
has given us plainly leads us at once, and without any 
elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, 


Chap. VII.] 


Conclusion. 


187 


be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happi- 
ness, and to bad actions misery ; or that he will, upon 
the whole, reward those who do well and punish those 
who do evil. 

To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it 
has been observed, that some sort of moral government 
is necessarily implied in that natural government of God 
which we experience ourselves under ; that good and 
bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and pun- 
ished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, 
but also as virtuous and vicious; and that there is, in 
the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being 
rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than 
they are at present. And though this higher degree of 
distributive justice, which nature thus points out and 
leads toward, is prevented for a time from taking place, 
it is by obstacles which the state of this world unhappi- 
ly throws in its way, and which therefore are in their 
nature temporary. Now as these things, in the natural 
conduct of Providence, are observable on the side of 
virtue, so there is nothing to be set against them on the 
side of vice. A moral scheme of government, then, is 
visibly established, and in some degree carried into ex- 
ecution ; and this, together with the essential tendencies 
of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us 
an apprehension that it will be carried on further toward 
perfection in a future state, and that every one shall 
there receive according to his deserts. 

And if this be so, then our future and general interest, 
under the moral government of God, is appointed to 
depend upon our behavior, notwithstanding the difficul- 
ty which this may occasion of securing it, and the dan- 
ger of losing it ; just in the same manner as our temporal 
interest, under his natural government, is appointed to 
depend upon our behavior, notwithstanding the like dif- 
ficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution, 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part I. 


1 88 


and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally 
trusted with ourselves, with our own conduct, and our 
own interest. And from the same constitution of nature, 
especially joined with that course of things which is ow- 
ing to men, we have temptations to be unfaithful in this 
trust, to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run our- 
selves into misery and ruin. From these temptations 
arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our 
temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to 
miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing incredible in 
supposing there may be the like difficulty and hazard 
with regard to that chief and final good which religion 
lays before us. Indeed the whole account, how it came 
to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this, 
must be beyond our comprehension. But it is in part 
accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the char- 
acter of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualifica- 
tion for a future state of security and happiness, under 
the moral government of God ; in like manner, as some 
certain qualifications or other are necessary for every par- 
ticular condition of life, under his natural government ; 
and that the present state was intended to be a school 
of discipline, for improving in ourselves that character. 
Now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible 
by observing, that we are plainly made for improve- 
ment of all kinds ; that it is a general appointment of 
providence that we cultivate practical principles, and 
form within ourselves habits of action, in order to be- 
come fit for what we were wholly unfit for before ; that 
in particular, childhood and youth is naturally appointed 
to be a state of discipline for mature age, and that the 
present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral 
discipline. And whereas objections are urged against 
the whole notion of moral government and a probation- 
state, from the opinion of necessity, it has been shown 
that God has given us the evidence, as it were, of exoe- 


Chap. VII.] 


Conclusion. 


189 


rience, that all objections against religion on this head 
are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural gov- 
ernment, suggested an answer to all our short-sighted 
objections against the equity and goodness of his moral 
government, and in general he has exemplified to us the 
latter by the former. 

These things, which, it is to be remembered, are mat- 
ters of fact, ought in all common sense to awaken man- 
kind, to induce them to consider in earnest their condi- 
tion, and what they have to do. It is absurd — absurd 
to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not 
of so serious a kind — for men to think themselves secure 
in a vicious life, or even in that immoral thoughtlessness 
which far the greatest part of them are fallen into. And 
the credibility of religion, arising from experience and 
facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to en- 
gage them to live in the general practice of all virtue 
and piety; under the serious apprehension, though it 
should be mixed with some doubt, (part ii, chap, vi,) of 
a righteous administration established in nature, and a 
future judgment in consequence of it; especially when 
we consider how very questionable it is whether any 
thing at all can be gained by vice, (page 87 ;) how un- 
questionably little, as well as precarious, the pleasures 
and profits of it are at the best; and how soon they 
must be parted with at the longest. For in the deliber- 
ations of reason concerning what we are to pursue and 
what to avoid, as temptations to any thing from mere 
passion are supposed out of the case ; so inducements 
to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest, 
so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignifi- 
cant as, in the view of reason, to be almost nothing in 
themselves, and in comparison with the importance of 
religion, they quite disappear and are lost. Mere pas- 
sion, indeed, may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet 
as an excuse for a vicious course of life. And how sorry 


190 Analogy of Religion. [Part I. 

an excuse it is will be manifest by observing, that we 
are placed in a condition in which we are unavoidably 
inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated to 
govern them ; and to lay ourselves under the same kind 
of restraints, and as great ones, too, from temporal re- 
gards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of 
things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion, 
then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things ; for 
it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the proper 
motives to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our 
moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our 
natural apprehension of God, under the character of a 
righteous Governor and Judge; a nature, and con- 
science, and apprehension given us by him ; and from 
the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life and 
immortality brought to light by the Gospel ; and the wrath 
of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and 
unrighteousness of men. 


PART II. 

OF REVEALED RELIGION. 


CHAPTER I. 

OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 

S OME persons, upon pretense of the sufficiency of 
the light of nature,* avowedly reject all revelation 
as, in its very notion, incredible, and what 

. , r . . .... . Rejectors of rev- 

must be fictitious. And, indeed, it is certain elation, why 
no revelation would have been given, had the 
light of nature been sufficient in such a sense as to ren- 
der one not wanting and useless. But no man in serious- 
ness and simplicity of mind can possibly think it so, who 
considers the state of religion in the heathen world be- 
fore revelation, and its present state in those places 
which have borrowed no light from it, particularly the 
doubtfulness of some of the greatest men concerning 
things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural 
inattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is 
impossible to say who would have been able to have 
reasoned out that whole system which we call natural 
religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition ; 
but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the gen- 
erality could : if they could, there is no sort of probabil- 
ity that they would. Admitting there were, they would 
highly want a standing. admonition to remind them of it, 

* [This is the main argument of Tindal’s famous book, “ Chris- 
tianity as Old as the Creation ; or, the Gospel a Republication of the 
Law of Nature,” first published in 4to., London, 1730. — F.] 


192 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


and inculcate it upon them* And further still, were 
they as much disposed to attend to religion as the bet- 
ter sort of men are, yet even upon this supposition, there 
would be various occasions for supernatural instruction 
and assistance, and the greatest advantages might be 
afforded by them. So that to say revelation is a thing 
superfluous, what there was no need of, and what can be 
of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at 
random. f Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm 
that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state, 
and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction 
to suppose our condition capable of being in any respect 
better. 

2. There are other persons, not to be ranked with 

* [See an excellent statement of the argument here glanced at in 
Leland’s “Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation 
shown from the State of Religion in the Ancient Heathen World,” etc.] 

f [It may be doubted whether Christian apologists are called upon 
to demonstrate elaborately the necessity of revelation, prior to the 
consideration of its truth , as matter of fact. Paley disposes of this 
whole question in a single sentence, by simply saying, “ I deem it 
unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, 
because I have met with no serious person who thinks that even 
under the Christian revelation, we have too much light, or any degree 
of assurance which is superfluous.” Dr. Chalmers, on this topic, re- 
marks, “ Possessed as we are, of such competent proofs on the credi- 
bility of this said revelation, are we to suspend the determination of 
it, till the previous question of its necessity has been settled and set 
by? Are we to forego the consideration of the evidences which lie 
patent before us on the field of observation till we take up a matter, 
not so much, let it be noticed, of palpable fact as of recondite prin- 
ciple ? The necessity of revelation involves in it topics that stand 
related both to God and to eternity — to the hidden counsels of the 
One, to the fathomless unknown, and by us, undiscoverable, of the 
other. The truth of revelation depends on credentials which lie on 
an open platform, or certain tangible things within the circle of our 
perceptions, which have been addressed to human eyes, which have 
been heard by human ears. It is not sound dialectics to suspend the 
second of these topics on the first of them.” — Dr. Crooks.] 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 193 

these, who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, 
and as it were overlooking, revelation, as of Those who neg- 
small importance provided natural religion t^Mtuwi^re- 
be kept to. With little regard either to the Uglon * 
evidence of the former, or to the objections against it, 
and even upon supposition of its truth, “ the only design 
of it,” say they, “ must be to establish a belief of the 
moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of 
natural piety and virtue. The belief and practice of 
these things were, perhaps, much promoted by the first 
publication of Christianity; but whether they are be- 
lieved and practiced, upon the evidence and motives of 
nature or of revelation, is no great matter.”* This way 
of considering revelation, though it is not the same with 
the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and very much, 
at length, runs up into it, and requires to be particularly 
considered with regard to the persons who seem to be 
getting into this way. The consideration of it will like- 
wise further show the extravagance of the former opin- 
ion, and the truth of the observations in answer to it, 
just mentioned. And an inquiry into the importance of 
Christianity cannot be an improper introduction to a 
treatise concerning the credibility of it. 

* Invenis multos — propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi 
sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid 
mi'hi prsecepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. 
Quid mihi necessarius est Christus? Nullum homicidium, nullum 
furtum, nullum rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adul- 
terio contaminoz. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod repre- 
hendatur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. — Aug. in Psal ., 
xxxi. 

You find many who refuse to become Christians because they feel 
sufficient of themselves to lead a new life. We ought to live well, 
says one. What will Christ teach me — to live well? I do live well ; 
what need have I of Christ ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. 
I covet no man’s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some 
one find in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so may make 
me a Christian. 

13 


194 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


3. Now if God has given a revelation to mankind, and 
commanded those things which are commanded in 

Christianity, it is evident at first sight that 

Obedience not . . . . . . 

an indifferent it cannot in anywise be an indifferent mat 
ter whether we obey or disobey those com 
mands ; unless we are certainly assured that we know 
all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are 
now ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to 
ourselves in particular. And it is absolutely impossible 
we can be assured of this ; for our ignorance of these 
reasons proves nothing in the case, since the whole 
analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident, 
that there may be infinite reasons for things with which 
we are not acquainted. 

But the importance of Christianity will more distinct- 
ly appear by considering it more distinctly : first, as a 
republication and external institution of natural or essen- 
tial religion, adapted to the present circumstances of 
mankind, and intended to promote natural piety and 
virtue ; and secondly, as containing an account of a dis- 
pensation of things not discoverable by reason, in con- 
sequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined 
us. For though natural religion is the foundation and 
principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense the 
whole of it. 

4. I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion. 
Christianity im- It instructs mankind in the moral system of 
?2bhcation a the world i that it is the work of an infinite- 
natural religion. perfect Being, and under his government ; 
that virtue is his law ; and that he will finally judge 
mankind in righteousness, and render to all according 
to their works, in a future state. And which is very 
material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine sim- 
plicity, free from those superstitions with which it was 
totally corrupted, and under which it was in a manner 
lost. 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 195 

Revelation is further an authoritative publication of 
natural religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony 
for the truth of it. Indeed, the miracles _ A , „ 

j , . W hat miracles 

and prophecies recorded in Scripture were and prophecy 
intended to prove a particular dispensation pr ° Ve ’ 
of providence — the redemption of the world by the 
Messiah ; but this does not hinder but that they may 
also prove God’s general providence over the world as 
our moral governor and judge. And they evidently do 
prove it, because this character of the author of nature 
is necessarily connected with, and implied in, that par- 
ticular revealed dispensation of things : it is likewise 
continually taught expressly, and insisted upon by those 
persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the 
prophecies. So that, indeed, natural religion seems as 
much proved by the Scripture revelation as it would 
have been had the design of revelation been nothing else 
than to prove it. 

5. But it may possibly be disputed how far miracles 
can prove natural religion ; and notable objections may 
be urged against this proof of it, considered practical effect 
as a matter of speculation : but considered m£r ff The 
as a practical thing there can be none. For teacher » etc - 
suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, 
who had lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it, 
and to declare he was commissioned by God so to do ; 
suppose him, in proof of his commission, to foretell 
things future, which no human foresight could have 
guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ; feed great 
multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure all manner of 
diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; 
would not this give additional credibility to his teach- 
ing — a credibility beyond what that of a common man 
would have, and be an authoritative publication of the 
law of nature, that is, a new proof of it ? It would be a 
practical one of the strongest kind, perhaps, which 


196 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


human creatures are capable of having given them. The 
law of Moses, then, and the gospel of Christ, are author- 
itative publications of the religion of nature : they afford 
a proof of God’s general providence, as moral governor 
of the world, as well as of his particular dispensations 
of providence toward sinful creatures, revealed in the 
law and the gospel. As they are the only evidence of the 
latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former. 

6. To show this further, let us suppose a man of the 

greatest and most improved capacity, who had never 

_ , heard of revelation, convinced upon the 

i 4 on of its prac- whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the 
tical effects. .... .. . 

world, that it was under the direction and 
moral government of an infinitely perfect being, but 
ready to question whether he were not got beyond the 
reach of his faculties ; suppose him brought, by this sus- 
picion, into great danger of being carried away by the 
universal bad example of almost every one around him, 
who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at 
least, of these things ; and this, perhaps, would be as 
advantageous a situation, with regard to religion, as na- 
ture alone ever placed any man in. What a confirma- 
tion now must it be to such a person all at once to find, 
that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind 
in the name of that infinite Being whom he had, from 
principles of reason, believed in; and that the publish- 
ers of the revelation proved their commission from him 
by making it appear that he had intrusted them with a 
power of suspending and changing the general laws of 
nature. 

Nor must it, by any means, be omitted, for it is a thing 
of the utmost importance, that life and immortality are 
eminently brought to light by the gospel.* The great 

* [For even though natural religion might teach some efficacy to 
be in repentance, it could not certainly teach the efficacy of it in the 
Christian sense, that is, its efficacy wholly to cancel the punishment 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 


197 


doctrines of a future state, the danger of a course of 
wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only 
confirmed in the gospel, but are taught, especially the 
last is, with a degree of light to which that of nature is 
but darkness. 

7. Further: As Christianity served these ends and 
purposes when it was first published, by the miraculous 
publication itself ; so it was intended to serve the same 
purposes in future ages by means of the set- Design of the 
tlement of a visible Church ; * of a society 71811)16 Church ' 
distinguished from common ones and from the rest of 
the world by peculiar religious institutions, by an insti- 
tuted method of instruction, and an instituted form of 
external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the 
first preachers of Christianity in order to their introduc- 
ing it into the world ; a visible Church w r as established, 
in order to continue it, and carry it on successively 
throughout all ages. Had Moses and the prophets, 
Christ and his apostles, only taught, and by miracles 
proved, religion to their contemporaries, the benefits of 
their instructions would have reached but to a small 
part of mankind. Christianity must have been, in a 

of sin, and restore us absolutely to God’s favor. And though natural 
religion might show us much danger in wickedness, it could not show 
us, certainly, the great danger resulting from our probation being 
terminated forever by death, and the everlasting punishment which 
will then ensue. — F.] 

* [In his sermon before the Society for the Propagation of the Gos- 
pel Butler says : “ Christianity was left with Christians to be trans- 
mitted, in like manner as the religion of nature had been left with 
mankind in general. There was, however, this difference, that by an 
institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruc- 
tion and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christians into visible 
Churches , and all along to preserve them over a great part of the 
world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.” But- 
ler goes on to show that however corrupt the Churches may have be- 
come they were the repositories of the written oracles of God, and 
along with their errors carried their refutation.] 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part IT. 


198 


great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To 
prevent this appears to have been one reason why a vis- 
ible Church was instituted ; to be like a city upon a hill, 
a standing memorial to the world, of the duty which we 
owe our Maker ; to call men continually, both by ex- 
ample and instruction, to attend to it, and by the form 
of religion ever before their eyes remind them of the 
reality ; to be the repository of the oracles of God ; to 
hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, 
and propagate it throughout all generations to the end 
of the world — the light of revelation, considered here in 
no other view, than as designed to enforce natural re- 
ligion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed 
and taught in the world, religion, natural or essential 
religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid be- 
fore mankind, and brought again and again to their 
thoughts as a matter of infinite importance. 

A visible Church has also a further tendency to pro- 

The Church an mote natura ^ religion as being an instituted 
agency for edu- method of education, originally intended to 

cation. a j 

be of more peculiar advantage to those who 
would conform to it. For one end of the institution 
was, that by admonition and reproof, as well as instruc- 
tion ; by a general regular discipline, and public exer- 
cises of religion, the body of Christ, as the Scripture 
speaks, should be edified, that is, trained up in piety and 
virtue, for a higher and better state. This settlement, 
then, appearing thus beneficial ; tending, in the nature 
of the thing, to answer, and in some degree actually an- 
swering, those ends ; it is to be remembered that the 
very notion of it implies positive institutions, for the vis- 
ibility of the Church consists in them. Take away every 
thing of this kind, -and you lose the very notion itself. 
So that if the things now mentioned are advantages, the 
reason and importance of positive institutions in general 
is most obvious ; since, without them, these advantages 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 199 

could not be secured to the world. And it is mere idle 
wantonness to insist upon knowing the reasons why such 
particular ones were fixed upon, rather than others. 

The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance 
which Christianity affords to natural religion, is what 
some persons are very slow in apprehending : and yet it 
is a thing distinct in itself, and a very plain, obvious 
one. For will any in good earnest really say that the 
bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advan- 
tageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as 
they are now among us : that it was laid before them, 
and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as 
much tending to influence their practice ? 

8. The objections against all this, from the perversion 
of Christianity, and from the supposition of „ 

. . . * 1 Objection from 

its having had but little good influence, the perversion 

however innocently they may be proposed, 
yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon any prin- 
ciples but such as lead to downright atheism ; because 
the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, 
upon all principles of theism, must have been from God, 
has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same 
manner. It may, indeed, I think, truly be said, that the 
good effects of Christianity have not been small ; nor its 
supposed ill effects any effects at all of it, properly 
speaking. Perhaps, too, the things themselves done 
have been aggravated ; and if not, Christianity hath 
been often only a pretense ; and the same evils in the main 
would have been done upon some other pretense. How- 
ever, great and shocking as the corruptions Natural re iigi 0 n 
and abuses of it have really been, they can- P erverted - 
not be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon prin- 
ciples of theism. For one cannot proceed one step in 
reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon 
Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle 
that the dispensations of Providence are not to be 


200 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine 
tendencies ; not by what they do actually seem to effect, 
but by what they would effect if mankind did their part : 
that part which is justly put and left upon them. It is 
altogether as much the language of one as of the other : 
“ He that is unjust, let him be unjust still ; and he that 
is holy, let him be holy still.” Rev. xxii, n. The light 
of reason does not, any more than that of revelation, 
force men to submit to its authority : both admonish 
them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with 
the consequences of each ; and after this leave them at 
full liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed 
time of judgment. Every moment’s experience shows 
that this is God’s general rule of government.* 

9. To return, then ; Christianity being a promulgation 
of the law of nature ; being moreover an authoritative 
Christian obii- promulgation of it, with new light, and other 
fmpo?tonw Wt of circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapt- 
Christianity. e( j to the wants of mankind ; these things 
fully show its importance. And it is to be observed 
further, that as the nature of the case requires, so all 
Christians are commanded to contribute, by their pro- 
fession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and 
render it such a promulgation and enforcement of relig- 
ion. For it is the very scheme of the gospel, that each 
Christian should, in his degree, contribute toward contin- 

* [It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, 
to say that since Christianity is a remedial system, designed to obviate 
those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse 
of the light of nature, it ought not to be liable to the same perversions. 
Because, I. Christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the de- 
fects of nature , but of an unnatural state of ruin into which man- 
kind were brought by the fall And, 2. It is remedial of the defects of 
nature in a great degree by its giving additional advantages. 3. It 
might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree 
than it is, without destroying man’s free agency ; which would be to 
destroy its own end, the practice of virtue. — Fitzgerald.] 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 201 

uing and carrying it on ; all by uniting in the public pro- 
fession, and external practice of Christianity; some by 
instructing, by having the oversight, and taking care of 
this religious community — the Church of God. Now 
this further shows the importance of Christianity, and, 
which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a prac- 
tical sense, or the high obligations we are under to take 
it into our most serious consideration ; and the danger 
there must necessarily be, not only in treating it de- 
spitefully — which I am not now speaking of — but in dis- 
regarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to 
do what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those 
benefits to the world, and transmitting them down to 
future times. And all this holds, even though the only 
thing to be considered in Christianity were its subservi- 
ency to natural religion. But, 

10. II. Christianity is to be considered in a further 
view, as containing an account of a dispensation of 
things not at all discoverable by reason, in 

. Important as 

consequence of which several distinct pre- presenting new 

... ...... truths. 

cepts are enjoined us. Christianity is not 
only an external institution of natural religion, and a 
new promulgation of God’s general providence, as right- 
eous governor and Judge of the world, but it contains 
also a revelation of a particular dispensation of provi- 
dence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recov- 
ery and salvation of mankind, who are represented in 
Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence 
of this revelation being made, we are commanded to be 
baptized, not only in the name of the Father , but also of 
the Son , and of the Holy Ghost ; and other obligations of 
duty unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, 
are revealed. Now the importance of these duties may 
be judged of by observing that they arise, not from pos- 
itive command merely, but also from the offices which 
appear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons 


202 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


in the gospel dispensation, or from the relations which 
we are there informed they stand in to us. By reason is 
revealed the relation which God the Father stands in 
to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are 
under to him. In Scripture are revealed the relations 
which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence 
arise the obligations of duty which we are under to 
them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each 
of these three respects being admitted, that God is the 
governor of the world, upon the evidence of reason ; 
that Christ is the Mediator between God and man, and 
the Holy Ghost our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evi- 
dence of revelation, the truth of the case, I say, in each 
of these respects being admitted, it is no more a ques- 
tion why it should be commanded that we be baptized 
in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that 
we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter 
seems to require to be more fully stated.* 

n. Let it be remembered, then, that religion comes 
„ . , under the twofold consideration of internal 

Religion as in- 
ternal and ex- and external ; for the latter is as real a part of 

religion, of true religion, as the former. Now 
when religion is considered under the first notion, as an 
inward principle, to be exerted in such and such inward 
acts of the mind and heart, the essence of natural relig- 
ion may be said to consist in religious regards to God the 
Father Almighty j and the essence of revealed religion as 
distinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards 
to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. And the obligation we 
are under, of paying these religious regards to each of 
these Divine persons respectively, arises from the re- 
spective relations which they each stand in to us. How 
these relations are made known, whether by reason or 
revelation, makes no alteration in the case ; because the 

* See “The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sac- 
raments,” etc., and Colliber on Revealed Religion, as there quoted. 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 203 

duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of 
the manner in which we are informed of them. The 
Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great 
dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world : 
the one our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does 
not, then, the duty of religious regards to both these di- 
vine persons as immediately arise to the view of reason, 
out of the very nature of these offices and relations, as 
the inward good-will and kind intention, which we owe 
to our fellow-creatures, arises out of the common rela- 
tions between us and them? But it will be asked, 
“ What are the inward religious regards, appearing thus 
obviously due to the Son and Holy Spirit, as arising not 
merely from command in Scripture, but from the very 
nature of the revealed relations which they stand in to 
us ? ” I answer, The religious regards of reverence, 
honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope. In what ex- 
ternal manner this inward worship is to be expressed is 
a matter of pure revealed command ; as perhaps the ex- 
ternal manner in which God the Father is to be wor- 
shiped may be more so than we are ready to think ; 
but the worship — the internal worship itself — to the Son 
and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed 
command than as the relations they stand in to us are 
matter of pure revelation ; for the relations being known, 
the obligations to such internal worship are obligations 
of reason, arising out of those relations themselves. In 
short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us 
the reason of these obligations, as it shows us the mean- 
ing of the words Son and Holy Ghost. 

12. If this account of the Christian religion be just, 
those persons who can speak lightly of it, Moral impor- 
as of little consequence, provided natural re- tiaSty 0 ov^- ns ' 
ligion be kept to, plainly forget that Chris- looked * 
tianity, even what is peculiarly so called as distinguished 
from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, 


204 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


even of a moral nature. For the office of our Lord be- 
ing made known, and the relation he stands in to us, 
the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly 
moral, as much as charity to mankind is ; since this ob- 
ligation arises, before external command, immediately 
out of that his office and relation itself. Those persons 
appear to forget that revelation is to be considered as in- 
forming us of somewhat new in the state of mankind and 
in the government of the world ; as acquainting us with 
some relations we stand in, which could not otherwise 
have been known. And these relations being real, 
(though before revelation we could be under no obliga- 
tions from them, yet upon their being revealed,) there 
is no reason to think but that neglect of behaving suit- 
ably to them will be attended with the same kind of 
consequences under God’s government, as neglecting to 
behave suitably to any other relations made known to 
us by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or 
voluntary, so far as we can possibly see, will just as 
much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in the 
other : the ignorance being supposed equally unavoida- 
ble, or equally voluntary, in both cases. 

13. If, therefore, Christ be indeed the Mediator be- 
tween God and man; that is, if Christianity be true; if 

he be indeed our Lord, our Saviour, and 

Peril of neglect. 

our God, no one can say what may tollow 
not only the obstinate, but the careless, disregard to 
him in those high relations. Nay, no one can say 
what may follow such disregard, even in the way of 
natural consequence. (Pages 64, 65, etc.) For as the 
natural consequences of vice in this life are doubt- 
less to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted 
by God; so likewise, for aught we know, the judicial 
punishments of the future life may be in a like way, 
or a like sense, the natural consequence of vice, 
(chap, v;) of men’s violating or disregarding the rela- 


Chap. IJ Importance of Christianity. 205 

tions which God has placed them in here, and made 
known to them. 

Again : If mankind are corrupted and depraved in 
their moral character, and so are unfit for that state 
which Christ is gone to prepare for his disciples ; and 
if the assistance of God’s Spirit be necessary to renew 
their nature, in the degree requisite to their being qual- 
ified for that state ; all which is implied in the express, 
though figurative, declaration, “ Except a man be born 
of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God 
supposing this, is it possible any serious person can 
think it a slight matter whether or not he makes use of 
the means expressly commanded by God for obtaining 
this divine assistance ? especially since the whole anal- 
ogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect any ben- 
efits without making use of the appointed means for 
obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us noth- 
ing of the particular, immediate means, of obtaining 
either temporal or spiritual benefits. This, therefore, 
we must learn either from experience or revelation. 
And experience the present case does not admit of. 

The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Chris- 
tianity being supposed either true or credible, it is un- 
speakable irreverence, and really the most presumptuous 
rashness, to treat it as a light matter. It can never 
justly be esteemed of little consequence till it be posi- 
tively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and 
more important obligation which we are under, than 
that of examining most seriously into the evidence of it, 
supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon 
supposition of its truth. 

The two following deductions may be proper to be 
added, in order to illustrate the foregoing observations, 
and to prevent their being mistaken. 

14. First, Hence we may clearly see where lies the 
distinction between what is positive and what is moral 


206 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

in religion. Moral precepts are precepts the reasons of 
Distinction be- which we see ; positive precepts are pre- 
cepts the reasons of which we do not see.* 
Ugations. Moral duties arise out of the nature of 
the case itself, prior to external command. Positive 
duties do not arise out of the nature of the case, but 
from external command ; nor would they be duties at 
all, were it not for such command received from him 
whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner 
in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela- 
tion, is made known, this doth not denominate any duty, 
either positive or moral. That we be baptized in the 
name of the Father, is as much a positive duty as that 
we be baptized in the name of the Son ; because both 
arise equally from revealed command ; though the rela- 
tion which we stand in to God the Father is made 
known to us by reason; the relation we stand in to 
Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dis- 
pensation of the gospel admitted, gratitude as immedi- 
ately becomes due to Christ from his being the volun- 
tary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God 
the Father from his being the fountain of all good; 
though the first is made known to us by revelation only, 

* This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, con- 
sidered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have some- 
what of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them considered 
in this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike, 
in others respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the 
reasons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons 
of the former, but not of the latter. (See p. 195, etc., and p. 207.) 
[It should be further added, to prevent misconceptions, that a pre- 
cept may be positive , even though it have a ground or reason visible 
to us, if that reason do not, of itself, constitute the thing required an 
absolute duty. There are, for instance, visible reasons for the pro- 
priety of such an initiative rite as Christian baptism, and yet baptism 
is only a positive institution, because those reasons are not sufficient 
of themselves to make the observance of such a rite an absolute 
duly. — F.] 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 207 

the second by reason. Hence, also, we may see, and 
for distinctness’ sake it may be worth mentioning, that 
positive institutions come under a twofold consideration : 
They are either institutions founded on natural religion, 
as baptism in the name of the Father; though this has 
also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, 
for it is in the name of God as the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ; or they are external institutions founded 
on revealed religion, as baptism in the name of the Son 
and of the Holy Ghost. 

15. Secondly, From the distinction between what is 
moral and what is positive in religion, ap- 
pears the ground of that peculiar preference superior to posi- 
which the Scripture teaches us to be due to ve ' 

the former. 

The reason of positive institutions in general is very 
obvious, though we should not see the reason why such 
particular ones are pitched upon rather than others. 
Whoever, therefore, instead of caviling at words will at- 
tend to the thing itself, may clearly see that positive in- 
stitutions in general, as distinguished from this or that 
particular one, have the nature of moral commands ; 
since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, 
the external worship of God is a moral duty, though no 
particular mode of it be so. Care, then, is to be taken, 
when a comparison is made between positive and moral 
duties, that they be compared no further than as they 
are different; no further than as the former are posi- 
tive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons 
of which we are not acquainted with ; and as the latter 
are moral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, 
without such external command. Unless this caution 
be observed we shall run into endless confusion. 

16. Now this being premised, suppose two standing 
precepts enjoined by the same authority ; that in cer- 
tain conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both ; that 


208 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


the former is moral, that is, a precept of which we see 
T « , x the reasons, and that they hold in the par- 

If the two con- 7 J r 

met, the moral ticular case before us; but that the latter is 
to be obeyed. . . .... . 

positive, that is, a precept of which we do 
not see the reasons : it is indisputable that our obliga- 
tions are to obey the former, because there is an apparent 
reason for this preference and none against it. Further, 
positive institutions, I suppose all those which Chris- 
tianity enjoins, are means to a moral end; and the end 
must be acknowledged more excellent than the means. 
Nor is observance of these institutions any religious 
obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it 
proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to be the 
strict logical way of stating and determining this mat- 
ter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to prac- 
tice than may be thought at first sight. 

And therefore, in a more practical, though more lax 
way of consideration, and taking the words moral law 
and positive institutions in the popular sense ; I add, that 
the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed com- 
mand as positive institutions are; for the Scripture en- 
joins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are 
both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover, 
written upon our hearts ; interwoven into our very na- 
ture. And this is a plain intimation of the author of it, 
which is to be preferred, when they interfere. 

17. But there is not altogether so much necessity for 
the determination of this question as some persons seem 
The question to think. Nor are we left to reason alone to 
thorityn^rim- determine it. For, first, Though mankind 
portant. have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place 

their religion in peculiar positive rites by way of equiv- 
alent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without 
making any comparison at all between them, and conse- 
quently without determining which is to have the prefer- 
ence, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions 


Chap. I.] Importance of Christianity. 209 

of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion ; as 
they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor 
of Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular 
declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted 
of God without moral virtue. 

Secondly , Upon the occasion of mentioning together 
positive and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the 
stress of religion upon the latter and never upon the 
former; which, though no sort of allowance to neglect 
the former when they do not interfere with the latter, 
yet is a plain intimation that when they do, the latter 
are to be preferred. And further, as mankind are for 
placing the stress of their religion anywhere rather than 
upon virtue, lest both the reason of the thing, and the 
general spirit of Christianity appearing in the intimation 
now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prev- 
alent folly, our Lord himself, from whose command 
alone the obligation of positive institutions arises, has 
taken occasion to make the comparison between them 
and moral precepts, when the Pharisees censured him 
for eating with publicans and sinners ; and also when they 
censured his disciples for plucking the ears of corn on the 
Sabbath day. Upon this comparison he has determined 
expressly, and in form, which shall have the preference 
when they interfere. And by delivering his authorita- 
tive determination in a proverbial manner of expression, 
he has made it general, I will have mercy, and not sacri- 
fice. (Matt, ix, 13, and xii, 7.) The propriety of the 
word proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, though 
I think the manner of speaking is to be called so. But 
that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders 
the determination general, is surely indisputable. For 
had it, in the latter case, been said only that God pre- 
ferred mercy to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, 
even then, by parity of reasoning, most justly might we 
have argued that he preferred mercy likewise to the 
14 


210 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


observance of other ritual institutions, and in general, 
moral duties to positive ones. And thus the determina- 
tion would have been general, though its being so were 
inferred and not expressed. But as the passage really 
stands in the gospel, it is much stronger ; for the sense, 
and the very literal words of our Lord’s answer, are as 
applicable to any other instance of a comparison between 
positive and moral duties, as to this upon which they 
were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy is 
to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be 
thought that justice is to give place to them. It is re- 
markable, too, that as the words are a quotation from 
the Old Testament, they are introduced on both the fore- 
mentioned occasions, with a declaration that the Phari- 
sees did not understand the meaning of them. This, I 
say, is very remarkable ; for since it is scarce possible 
for the most ignorant person not to understand the lit- 
eral sense of the passage in the prophet, (TTosea vi,) and 
since understanding the literal sense would not have 
prevented their condemning the guiltless, (Matt, xii, 7,) it 
can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord 
really intended in that declaration was, that the Phari- 
sees had not learned from it, as they might, wherein the 
general spirit of religion consists ; that it consists in 
moral piety and virtue as distinguished from forms and 
ritual observances. However, it is certain we may learn 
this from his divine application of the passage in the 
gospel. 

But as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human 
nature, when, upon a comparison of two things, one is 

found to be of greater importance than the 

Both important. .... 

other, to consider this other as of scarce any 
importance at all; it is highly necessary that we remind 
ourselves how great presumption it is to make light of 
any institutions of divine appointment ; that our obliga- 
tions to obey all God’s commands whatever, are abso- 


Chap. IJ Importance of Christianity. 


2 1 1 


lute and indispensable ; and that commands merely pos- 
itive, admitted to be from him, lay us under a moral 
obligation to obey them ; an obligation moral in the 
s rictest and most proper sense. 

To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the ac- 
count now given of Christianity most strongly shows and 
enforces upon us the obligation of searching the Script- 
ures, in order to see what the scheme of revelation real- 
ly is, instead of determining beforehand from reason 
what the scheme of it must be. (Chap, iii.) Indeed, if 
in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming 
meaning of which is contrary to natural religion, we may 
most certainly conclude such seeming meaning not to 
be the real one.* But it is not any degree of a pre- 
sumption against an interpretation of Scripture, that 
such interpretation contains a doctrine which the light 
of nature cannot discover, (pages 213, 214,) or a precept 
which the law of nature does not oblige to. 

* [This sentiment must be received with caution and applied with 
care. It has often been used for evil purposes by those unfriendly to 
religion. Christianity cannot contradict any truth , but the results of 
imperfect investigations in science or natural religion must not hasti- 
ly be assumed as true. Hitherto time has greatly modified or en- 
tirely removed what at first seemed to be formidable objections. 
The presumption is in favor of the received teachings of Christianity, 
and they must not be set aside for every hypothesis that opposers 
may wantonly and presumptuously set forth.] 


212 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


CHAPTER II. 

OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVE- 
LATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS. 

H AVING shown the importance of the Christian 
revelation, and the obligation which we are un- 
der seriously to attend to it, upon supposition of its truth 
or its credibility ; the next thing in order is, to consider 
the supposed presumptions against revelation in general ; 
,which shall be the subject of this chapter; and the ob- 
jections against the Christian in particular, which shall 
be the subject of some following ones. (Chapters iii-vi.) 
For it seems the most natural method to remove these 
prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the 
consideration of the positive evidence for it, and the 
objections against that evidence. (Chap, vii.) 

It is, I think, commonly supposed that there is some 
peculiar presumption, from the analogy of nature, against 
the Christian scheme of things, at least against miracles ; 
so that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth 
and reality of them, than would be sufficient to con- 
vince us of other events or matters of fact. Indeed, the 
consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but 
be thought very insignificant by many persons ; yet as 
it belongs to the subject of this treatise, so it may tend 
to open the mind, and remove some prejudices, how- 
ever needless the consideration of it be, upon its own 
account. 

No presumption 2. I. I find no appearance of a presump- 
erai scheme of tion, from the analogy of nature, against the 
Christianity. general scheme of Christianity, that God 


Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 213 

created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ, 
and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, 
that is, render to every one according to his works ; and 
that good men are under the secret influence of his 
Spirit. Whether these things are or are not to be called 
miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words ; or, 
however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy 
of nature raises any presumption against this general 
scheme of Christianity, it must be either because it is 
not discoverable by reason or experience, or else because 
it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy 
raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme 
upon either of these accounts. 

3. First, There is no presumption, from analogy, 
against the truth of it, upon account of its not being 
discoverable by reason or experience. For 

J 1 . None, because 

suppose one who never heard of revelation, not discovered 

. , . . , , . 'by reason. 

of the most improved understanding, and 
acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy 
and natural religion, such a one could not but be sensi- 
ble that it was but a very small part of the natural and 
moral system of the universe which he was acquainted 
with. He could not but be sensible that there must be 
innumerable things in the dispensations of Providence 
past, in the invisible government over the world at pres- 
ent carrying on, and in what is to come, of which he 
was wholly ignorant, (pages 174, 176,) and which could 
not be discovered without revelation. Whether the 
scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or 
not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imag- 
ination. And doubtless that part of it which is open to 
our view is but as a point in comparison of the whole 
plan of Providence, reaching throughout eternity past 
and future; in comparison of what is even now going on 
in the remote parts of the boundless universe : nay, in 
comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And 


214 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


therefore, that things lie beyond the natural reach of 
our faculties is no sort of presumption against the truth 
and reality of them ; because it is certain there are in- 
numerable things, in the constitution and government 
of the universe, which are thus beyond the natural reach 
of our faculties. 

Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any 
of the things contained in this general doctrine of Script- 
ure now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike 
___ . the known course of nature. For there is 

None, because 

unlike known no presumption at all, from analogy, that the 

courseof nature. A 1 . 

whole course of things, or divine government, 
naturally unknown to us, and every thing in it, is like to 
any thing in that which is known ; and therefore no pe- 
culiar presumption against any thing in the former, upon 
account of its being unlike to any thing in the latter. 
And in the constitution and natural government of the 
world, as well as in the moral government of it, we see 
things, in a great degree unlike one another, and there- 
fore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between 
things visible and invisible. However, the scheme of 
Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme 
of nature ; as will appear in the following part of this 
treatise. 

The notion of a miracle,* considered as a proof of a 
divine mission, has been stated with great exactness by 
divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every 
one. There are also invisible miracles :f the incarna- 
tion of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot 

* [For a beautiful development of the idea of a miracle the reader 
is referred to Mr. Trench’s work on the Miracles, preliminary essay.] 

\ [Papists have claimed transubstantiation as an invisible miracle. 
But in the case of an invisible miracle the circumstances exclude ex- 
amination, while transubstantiation invites and is favorable to exam- 
ination. It is claimed to be public and constant, yet it cannot be 
discovered to be a miracle. “ It supposes the working of a second 
miracle to make the first invisible.”] 


Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 215 

be alleged as a proof of such a mission, but require 
themselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revela- 
tion itself, too, is miraculous, and miracles are the proof 
of it ; and the supposed presumption against these shall 
presently be considered. All- which I have been ob- 
serving here is, that, whether we choose to call every 
thing in the dispensations of Providence not discovera- 
ble without revelation, nor like the known course of 
things, miraculous ; and whether the general Christian 
dispensation now mentioned is to be called so or not, 
the foregoing observations seem entirely to show, that 
there is no presumption against it, from the analogy of 
nature. 

4. II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against 
some operations which we should now call miraculous ; 
particularly, none against a revelation at the 

.. No presumption 

beginning of the world; nothing of such against a mirac- 
. ... ulous revelation 

presumption against it as is supposed to be at the beginning 

■ v a , • j . 7 of the world. 

implied or expressed in the word miraculous. 

For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a course 
of nature ; and implies somewhat different from it, con- 
sidered as being so. Now, either there was no course 
of nature at the time which we are speaking of ; or, if 
there were, we are not acquainted what the course of 
nature is upon the first peopling of worlds. And there- 
fore the question, whether mankind had a revelation 
made to them at that time, is to be considered, not as a 
question concerning a miracle, but as a common ques- 
tion of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more 
or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this 
question, and concerning common matters of fact of the 
same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the earth was 
first peopled. 

Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this state, 
there was a power exerted totally different from the 
present course of nature. Now, whether this power, thus 


21 6 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


wholly different from the present course of nature, for 
we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous ; 
whether this power stopped immediately after it had 
made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giv- 
ing him a revelation, is a question of the same kind as 
whether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a par- 
ticular degree and manner or not. 

Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the 
world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be called 
by that name, the case will not be different ; since it 
must be acknowledged that such a power was exerted. 
For supposing it acknowledged that our Saviour spent 
some years in a course of working miracles ; there is no 
more presumption worth mentioning, against his having 
exerted this miraculous power in a certain degree great- 
er, than in a certain degree less ; in one or two more 
instances, than in one or two fewer ; in this, than in 
another, manner* 

* [This observation applies with great force against the modem 
rationalistic attempts to explain away some of our Saviour’s miracles 
into natural events, as long as it is confessed that he wrought real 
miracles, or that his mission was really miraculous. Such explana- 
tions are really more improbable than the common ones which sup- 
pose a miracle, because there is no general improbability in supposing 
that a person endowed with the power of working miracles exerted it 
upon a particular occasion ; whereas there is an improbability in sup- 
posing that an unusual natural event occurred ; and when this system 
of interpretation is carried on, and applied to a great number of cases, 
the improbability of a whole series of strange natural events taking 
place unaccountably one after the other, amounts, I think, to a far 
greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles ; 
because every thing that is improbable in th & physical strangeness of 
miracles applies to such a series of odd events, while we are deprived 
of the means of accounting for them by supposing an extraordinary 
interposition of the Deity. A romance made up wholly of natural 
occurrences which happen sometimes, but very rarely, is just as in- 
credible as a romance made up of stories about genii and enchanters, 
and things wholly supernatural. The improbability of both, with 
respect to physical strangeness , is just the same. “ Some infidels,” 


Ch. IIJ Presumption against a Revelation. 217 

It is evident, then, that there can be no peculiar pre- 
sumption, from the analogy of nature, against supposing 
a revelation when man was first placed upon the earth. 

Add, that there does not appear the least intimation 
in history or tradition that religion was first reasoned 
out ; but the whole of history and tradition makes for 
the other side, that it came into the world by revelation. 
Indeed, the state of religion in the first ages, of which 
we have any account, seems to suppose and imply that 
this was the original of it among mankind. And these 
reflections together, without taking in the peculiar au- 
thority of Scripture, amount to real and a very material 
degree of evidence that there was a revelation at the 
beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirma- 
tion of natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the 
former part of this treatise, (page 164, etc.,) so likewise, 
it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a 
subsequent revelation. 

5. III. But still it maybe objected, that there is some 
peculiar presumption, from analogy, against 

. , . , . . Noneafter the 

miracles; particularly against revelation, course of nature 
after the settlement and during the contin- was estabhshed - 
uance of a course of nature. 

Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is 
to be observed in general, that before we can have 
ground for raising what can, with any propriety, be 
called an argument from analogy, for or against revela- 
tion considered as somewhat miraculous, we must be 

says the Archbishop of Dublin, “ have labored to prove, concerning 
some one of our Lord’s miracles, that it might have been the result of 
an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances ; next they en- 
deavor to prove the same concerning another , and so on ; and thence 
infer that all of them, occurring as a series, might have been so. 
They might argue, in like manner, that because it is not very im- 
probable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, 
therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hun- 
dred times running.” — Logic , book iii, § 11. — F.] 


218 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


acquainted with a similar or parallel case. But the 
history of some other world, seemingly in like circum- 
stances with our own, is no more than a parallel case ; 
and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet 
could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a 
revelation, from being informed whether such world had 
one, or not ; such a proof, being drawn from one single 
instance only, must be infinitely precarious. More 
particularly : 

6. First of all, There is a very strong presumption 
against common speculative truths, and 

Presumption . x 

against common against the most ordinary facts, before the 

facts — Cesar. r r .u r- , \ • , 

proof of them ; which yet is overcome by 
almost any proof.* There is a presumption of millions 

* [Mr. Mill (Logic, chap, xxiv, § 5) has pointed out a mistake into 
which writers against Hume’s Essay on Miracles have fallen, in con- 
founding the improbability that an event will occur, with the improb- 
ability it has occurred — improbability before the fact and improba- 
bility after it. La Place, differing widely from these writers on 
religious subjects, has sanctioned the same error in his Essay on 
Probabilities. 

The presumption against a miracle cannot be estimated by com- 
paring with the presumption of a previously conceived story, but with 
the presumption against the truth of a story already refuted, which 
relates to events not miraculous. 

“Many events are altogether improbable to us before we are in- 
formed of their happening, which are not in the least incredible when 
we are informed of them, because not contrary to any, even approxi- 
mate, induction.” 

Suppose a thousand numbers to be put in a box, and that it is pro- 
posed to draw out the number 87. Now there are nine hundred 
and ninety-nine chances to one against drawing that or any other 
given number. But if any person of common veracity tells you he 
drew out a number which proved to be 87, you at once believe him, 
for as some number was drawn, it was as likely to be this as any other. 

Butler can hardly be said to have fallen into the error noticed by 
Mr. Mill. He says, “ There is a very strong presumption against com- 
mon speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before 
the proofs which yet is overcome by almost any proof.” 

In the view of improbability above taken, “ the proof of Christian- 


Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 219 

to one against the story of Cesar , or of any other man. 
For suppose a number of common facts so and so cir- 
cumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should 
happen to come into one’s thoughts ; every one would, 
without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. 
And the like maybe said of a single common fact. And 
from hence it appears, that the question of importance 
as to the matter before us is, concerning the degree of 
the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles ; 
not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all 
against them. For, if there be the presumption of mill- 
ions to one against the most common facts, what can a 
small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though 
it be peculiar ? It cannot be estimated, and is as noth- 
ing.* The only material question is, whether there be 

ity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong. There are many pre- 
dictions, for instance, that Christ should be born at a certain time and 
place, and under very particular circumstances. The probabilities 
against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite, yet they hap- 
pened exactly as foretold.”] 

* [Butler supposes, in the first instance, a series of events to have 
come gratuitously into one’s mind ; and, after stating the almost in- 
finite number of chances against its being true, supposes, in the second 
instance, these very events to be deponed to by a credible witness. 
Now, that both the first and the second of these things should happen 
in coincidence together were the strongest possible unlikelihood ; and 
Butler says truly, that the presumption against a miracle is a small 
presumption additional to this ; for, in fact, this were itself a miracle. 
The proper way of estimating the strength of the presumption 
against, or of the proof that would be necessary for the establishment 
of a miracle, is to bring it into comparison, not with the presumption 
against the truth of a previously conceived story, but with the pre- 
sumption against the truth of an already reported story that related 
to events which were not miraculous. There will be found in this 
case a difference very much greater than the small additional pre- 
sumption which Butler speaks of ; and so, however striking or orig- 
inal his observation may be, there seems nothing in it which can 
guide us into a right track for the solution of the difficulty that since 
his time has so exercised the skill of controversialists. — Chalmers.] 


220 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


any such presumption against miracles as to render them 
in any sort incredible ? 

7. Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of relig- 
ion, we are in such total darkness upon what causes, 

Aside from re- occasions, reasons, or circumstances the 
mice o^causesj present course of nature depends, that there 
etc - does not appear any improbability for or 

against supposing, that five or six thousand years may 
have given scope for causes, occasions, reasons, or cir- 
cumstances from whence miraculous interpositions may 
have arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing 
observation, it will follow, that there must be a presump- 
tion, beyond all comparison greater, against the particu- 
lar common facts just now instanced in, than against 
miracles in general ; before any evidence of either. 

8. But, thirdly , Take in the consideration of religion, 

or the moral system of the world, and then we see dis- 
„ ^ . tinct particular reasons for miracles ; to af- 

Religion affords ... . 

reasons for mir- ford mankind instruction additional to that 
acles. . 

of nature, and to attest the truth of it. And 
this gives a real credibility to the supposition, that it 
might be part of the original plan of things that there 
should be miraculous interpositions. 

9. Then, lastly, Miracles must not be compared to 
common natural events ; or to events which, though 

Miracles not uncommon, are similar to what we daily ex- 
with 3 SoSmJ? perience ; but to the extraordinary phenom- 
events. ena nature ^nd then the comparison will 

be between the presumption against miracles, and the 
presumption against such uncommon appearances, sup- 
pose, as comets, and against there being any such powers 
in nature as magnetism and electricity, so contrary to 
the properties of other bodies not endued with these 
powers. And before any one can determine, whether 
there be any peculiar presumption against miracles more 
than against other extraordinary things, he must consider 


Ch. II.] Presumption against a Revelation. 221 

what, upon first hearing, would be the presumption 
against the last-mentioned appearances and powers to a 
person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and an- 
nual course of nature respecting this earth, and with 
those common powers of matter which we every day see. 

10. Upon all this I conclude, that there certainly is 
no such presumption against miracles as to render them 
in anywise incredible ; that on the contrary, our being 
able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credi- 
bility to the history of them, in cases where those rea- 
sons hold ; and that it is by no means certain that there 
is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even 
in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished 
from other extraordinary phenomena; though it is not 
worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the 
abstract nature of evidence in order to determine a 
question which without such inquiries we see (page 
217, etc.) is of no importance. 


222 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


CHAPTER III. 

OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE 
EXPECTED IN A REVELATION ; AND THE CREDIBIL- 
ITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS 
APPEARING LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.* 

B ESIDES the objections against the evidence for 
Christianity, many are alleged against the scheme 
of it ; against the whole manner in which it 

Objections to ° 

Christianity it- is put and left with the world, as well as 
against several particular relations in Script- 
ure : objections drawn from the deficiencies of revela- 
tion ; from things in it appearing to men foolishness, 
(i Cor. i, 28;) from its containing matters of offense 
which have led, and it must have been foreseen would 

* [The object of this chapter is to prove the likelihood, in the gen- 
eral, of a revelation being liable to objections, or at least that its be- 
ing so forms no proper ground for the rejection of it. This reduces 
us to the consideration of its proofs, as the only relevant inquiry that 
we have to do with. Doubtless every objection against these proofs 
must be entertained, and satisfactorily disposed of. But this is differ- 
ent from objections against the subject-matter of a revelation. These 
form what are here called its internal improbabilities, much insisted 
on by Deists ; but all proceeding on the competency of the human 
understanding to decide upon a topic which is here shown to be much 
too high for it, we being no more judges beforehand of what a reve- 
lation ought to be, either in the way it ought to be conducted or what 
it should contain, than we are judges anterior to experience of what 
ought to be the course of nature. The alleged imperfections and 
anomalies in the methods by which Christianity distributed and gave 
forth her lessons, are most effectually met by the analogous imperfec- 
tions and anomalies, if such they must be called, as contrary to all 
the likelihoods of previous expectation, that might be observed in the 
gifts and teaching of nature. — Chalmers.] 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 223 

lead, into strange enthusiasm and superstition, and 
made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness ; 
from its not being universal ; and, which is a thing of 
the same kind, from its evidence not being so convinc- 
ing and satisfactory as it might have been ; for this last 
is sometimes turned into a positive argument against 
its truth. (Chap, vi.) 

It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate 
the several particulars comprehended under the objec- 
tions here referred to, they being so various according 
to the different fancies of men. There are persons who 
think it a strong objection against the authority of 
Scripture that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed 
upon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the 
scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic 
parts of Scripture are treated ; partly through the rash- 
ness of interpreters, but very much also on account of 
the hieroglyphical and figurative language in which they 
are left us. 

2. Some of the principal things of this sort shall be 
particularly considered in the following chapters. But 
my design at present is, to observe in general, with re- 
spect to this whole way of arguing, that such objections 
upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly fnvolous - 
credible, beforehand, we should be incompetent judges 
of it to a great degree ; and that it would contain many 
things appearing to us liable to great objections, in case 
we judge of it otherwise than by the analogy of nature. 
And, therefore, though objections against the evidence of 
Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet ob- 
jections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure, 
frivolous; almost all objections against it, excepting 
those which are alleged against the particular proofs of 
its coming from God. I express myself with caution, 
lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason, which is, in- 
deed, the only faculty we have wherewith to judge con- 


224 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part IT. 


ceding any thing, even revelation itself ; or be misun- 
derstood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be 
proved false from internal characters. For it may contain 
clear immoralities or contradictions ; and either of these 
would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, 
that nothing else can possibly render any supposed rev- 
elation incredible. Yet still the observation above is, I 
think, true beyond doubt, that objections against Chris- 
tianity, as distinguished from objections against its evi- 
dence, are frivolous. To make out this is the general 
design of the present chapter. And with regard to the 
whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish that the proofs 
might be attended to, rather than the assertions caviled 
at upon account of any unacceptable consequences, 
whether real or supposed, which may be drawn from 
them. For after all, that which is true must be admit- 
ted ; though it should show us the shortness of our fac- 
ulties, and that we are in nowise judges of many things 
of which we are apt to think ourselves very competent 
ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable 
men ; at least upon second thought it will not be any 
objection with such, against the justness of the following 
observations i— 

3. As God governs the world, and instructs his crea- 
tures, according to certain laws or rules in the known 
course of natufe, known by reason together with expe- 
Being incom- rience ; so the Scripture informs us of a 
thfnlmrafdia- scheme of divine providence additional to 
more at 8o n of 1 the this * It: relates that God has, by revelation, 
revealed. instructed men in things concerning his gov- 
ernment which they could not otherwise have known, 
and reminded them of things which they might other- 
wise know ; and attested the truth of the whole by mir- 
acles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation 
of things are both from God — if they coincide with each 
other, and together make up one scheme of providence 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 225 

— our being incompetent judges of one must render it 
credible that we may be incompetent judges also of the 
other. Since, upon experience, the acknowledged con- 
stitution and course of nature is found to be greatly dif- 
ferent from what, before experience, would have been 
expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie greaf^ ob- 
jections against : this renders it beforehand highly cred- 
ible that they may find the revealed dispensation, like- 
wise, if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of 
nature, very different from expectations formed before- 
hand; and liable, in appearance, to great objections: 
objections against the scheme itself, and against the de- 
grees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by 
which it was attested and carried on. Thus suppose a 
prince to govern his dominions in the wisest illustration— 
manner possible, by common known laws ; ™mmon°kwsf 
and that upon some exigencies he should etc- 
suspend these laws, and govern, in several instances, in 
a different manner: if one of his subjects were not a 
competent judge beforehand by what common rules the 
government should or would be carried on, it could not 
be expected that the same person would be a competent 
judge in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to what 
degree, those laws commonly observed would be sus- 
pended or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the 
wisdom of the ordinary administration, there is no rea- 
son to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the 
extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against 
the former, doubtless it is highly supposable he might 
think, also, that he had objections against the latter. 
And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes 
whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience 
and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of 
nature, it is evidently supposable beforehand that we 
should fall into as great in pretending to judge, in like 
manner, concerning revelation. Nor is there any more 
15 


226 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


ground to expect that this latter should appear to us 
clear of objections than that the former should. 

4. These observations relating to the whole of Chris- 
tianity, are applicable to inspiration in particular. As 

we are in no sort judges beforehand by what 

This analogy . ® J 

applied to in- laws or rules, in what degree or by what 

spiration. . . . , . 

means, it were to have been expected that 

God would naturally instruct us; so upon supposition 
of his affording us light and instruction by revelation, 
additional to what he has afforded us by reason and ex- 
perience, we are in no sort judges by what methods, 
and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this 
supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. 
We know not beforehand what degree or kind of natu- 
ral information it were to be expected God would afford 
men, each by his own reason and experience ; nor how 
far he would enable and effectually dispose them to 
communicate it, whatever it should be, to each other ; 
nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly 
probable, or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given 
with equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could 
we guess, upon any good ground I mean, whether natu- 
ral knowledge, or even the faculty itself by which we 
are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at 
once, or gradually. 

In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what degree 
of new knowledge it were to be expected God would 
give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of his af- 
fording one ; or how far, or in what way, he would in- 
terpose miraculously to qualify them to whom he should 
originally make the revelation, for communicating the 
knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to 
the age in which they should live ; and to secure its be- 
ing transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant, 
whether the evidence of it would be certain, or highly 
probable, or doubtful, (see chap, vi ;) or whether all 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 227 

who should have any degree of instruction from it, and 
any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the 
same : or whether the scheme would be revealed at 
once, or unfolded gradually. Nay, we are not in any 
sort able to judge whether it were to have been expected 
that the revelation should have been committed to writ- 
ing, or left to be handed down, and consequently cor- 
rupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if 
mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are per- 
mitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as they will. 

5. But it may be said, “that a revelation in some of 
the above-mentioned circumstances, one, for instance, 
which was not committed to writing, and t 

. Objection to an 

thus secured against danger of corruption, unwritten reve- 
would not have answered its purpose.” I 
ask, what purpose ? It would not have answered all the 
purposes which it has now answered, and in the same 
degree ; but it would have answered others, or the same 
in different degrees. And which of these were the pur- 
poses of God, and best fell in with his general govern- 
ment, we could not at all have determined beforehand. 

Now since it has been shown that we have no princi- 
ples of reason upon which to judge, beforehand, how it 
were to be expected revelation should have been left, or 
what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, 
in any of the fore-mentioned respects ; it must be quite 
frivolous to object afterward, as to any of them, against 
its being left in one way rather than another ; for this 
would be to object against things upon account of their 
being different from expectations, which have been 
shown to be without reason. 

6. And thus we see that the only question concern- 
ing the truth of Christianity is, whether The only ques- 
it be a real revelation ; not whether it be Christianity’ *a 
attended with every circumstance which we real revelatlon? 
should have looked for : and concerning the authority 


228 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to be ; 
not whether it be a book of such sort, and so pro- 
mulgated, as weak men are apt to fancy a book con- 
taining a divine revelation should. And, therefore, 
neither obscurity nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor 
various readings, nor early disputes about the authors 
of particular parts, nor any other things of the like kind, 
though they had been much more considerable in de- 
gree than they are, could overthrow the authority of the 
Scripture; unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord, 
had promised, that the book, containing the divine rev- 
elation, should be secure from those things. Nor, in- 
deed, can any objections overthrow' such a kind of 
revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are 
no objections against the morality of it, (page 217, etc..,) 
but such as can show that there is no proof of miracles 
wrought originally in attestation of it ; no appearance of 
any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor 
any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human 
sagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the 
proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, then 
is revelation overturned. But were it allowed that the 
proof of any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed ; 
yet while any proof of them remains, revelation will stand 
upon much the same footing it does at present, as to all 
the purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the 
like influence upon our behavior. 

7. From the foregoing observations, too, it will follow, 
and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation 
Modes of ar- will find it worth remarking, that there are 
cable 6 to Script- several ways of arguing, which, though just 
with regard to other writings, are not appli- 
cable to Scripture ; at least not to the prophetic parts 
of it. We cannot argue, for instance, that this cannot 
be the sense or intent of such a passage of Scripture, for 
if it had it would have been expressed more plainly, or 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 229 

have been represented under a more apt figure or hiero- 
glyphic; yet we may justly argue thus with respect to 
common books. And the reason of this difference is 
very evident ; that in Scripture we are not competent 
judges, as we are in common books, how plainly it were 
to have been expected, what is the true sense should 
have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. 
The only question is, what appearance there is that this 
is the sense ? and scarce at all, how much more de- 
terminately or accurately it might have been expressed 
or figured ? 

8. “ But is it not self-evident, that internal improba- 
bilities of all kinds weaken external proba- objection, in- 
ble proof? ” Doubtless. But to what prac- mesweakentx- 
tical purpose can this be alleged here, when ternal P roof - 
it has been proved before, (page 217, etc.,) that real in- 
ternal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certain- 
ty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony ? and 
when it now has been made appear, that we scarce know 
what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here 
considering ? as will further appear from what follows. 

For though from the observations above made it is 
manifest that we are not in any sort competent judges 
what supernatural instruction were to have been ex- 
pected ; and though it is self-evident that the objections 
of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous ; yet it 
may be proper to go one step further, and observe that 
if men will be regardless of these things, and pretend to 
judge of the Scriptures by preconceived expectations, 
the analogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it 
is highly credible they may, but also probable that they 
will, imagine they have strong objections against it, how- 
ever really unexceptionable ; for so, prior to experience, 
they would think they had, against the cir- Similar objec- 

1-1 , 1 , tions against 

cumstances, and degrees, and the whole scripture and 
- , . . , • , . rr i j instruction from 

manner of that instruction, which is afforded nature. 


230 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction 
which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and 
mere propensions, and to mankind by these together 
with reason, matter of probable proof, and not of certain 
observation, it would be rejected as incredible, in many 
instances of it, only upon account of the means by which 
this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, 
the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances 
of it. For instance: would it not have been thought 
highly improbable that men should have been so much 
more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the gen- 
eral laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and rev- 
olutions of the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and 
cures of distempers, and many other things in which 
human life seems so much more nearly concerned than 
in astronomy ? How capricious and irregular a way of 
information, would it be said, is that of invention , by 
means of which nature instructs us in matters of science, 
and in many things upon which the affairs of the world 
greatly depend ; that a man should by this faculty be 
made acquainted with a thing in an instant, when per- 
haps he is thinking of somewhat else, which he has in 
vain been searching after, it may be, for years. 

So, likewise, the imperfections attending the only 
method by which nature enables and directs us to com- 
municate our thoughts to each other are innumerable. 
Language is, in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, 
liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so 
liable to it from design, that every man can deceive and 
betray by it. And to mention but one instance more, 
that brutes without reason should act, in many respects, 
with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what 
men have in those respects, would be thought impossible. 
Yet it is certain they do act with such superior fore- 
sight ; whether it be their own, indeed, is another ques- 
tion. From these things it is highly credible before- 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 231 

hand, that upon supposition God should afford men 
some additional instruction by revelation, it would be 
with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects 
which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections 
against the credibility of. Nor are the objections against 
the Scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all 
more or greater than the analogy of nature would be- 
forehand, — not perhaps give ground to expect, for this 
analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground 
an expectation upon, — but no more nor greater than 
analogy would show it, beforehand, to be supposable 
and credible, that there might seem to lie against reve- 
lation. 

9. By applying these general observations to a partic- 
ular objection, it will be more distinctly seen how they 
are applicable to others of the like kind ; and, indeed, 
to almost all objections against Christianity as distin- 
guished from objections against its evidence. It appears 
from Scripture, that as it was not unusual objection to 
in the apostolic age for persons, upon their E^tE s !h*- 
conversion to Christianity, to be endued orderl y use - 
with miraculous gifts ; so, some of those persons exer- 
cised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly 
manner; and this is made an objection against their be- 
ing really miraculous. Now the foregoing observations 
quite remove this objectioq, how considerable soever it 
may appear at first sight. For, consider a person en- 
dued with any of these gifts, for instance, that of tongues ; 
it is to be supposed that he had the same power over this 
miraculous gift as he would have had over it had it been 
the effect of habit, of study, and use, as it ordinarily is; or 
the same power over it, as he had over any other natural 
endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same 
manner he did any other ; either regularly and upon prop- 
er occasions only, or irregularly and upon improper ones ; 
according to his sense of decency, and his character of 


232 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


prudence.* Where, then, is the objection ? Why, if 
this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to 
propagate Christianity, and attest the truth of it, we 
might, it seems, have expected that other sort of persons 
should have been chosen to be invested with it; or that 
these should, at the same time, have been endued with 
prudence; or that they should have been continually 
restrained and directed in the exercise of it : that is, 
that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, 
in a different manner or higher degree. But, from the 
observations made above, it is undeniably evident that 
we are not judges in what degrees and manner it were 
to have been expected he should miraculously inter- 
pose ; upon supposition of his doing it in some degree 
and manner. Nor, in the natural course of providence, 
are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and 
other talents of great influence, conferred only on per- 
sons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed 
to make the properest use of them. Nor is the instruc- 
tion and admonition naturally afforded us for the con- 
duct of life, particularly in our education, commonly 
given in a manner the most suited to recommend it ; but 

* [Warburton, as quoted by Fitzgerald, points out the distinction 
between such supernatural endowments as the gift of tongues and oth- 
ers. “ The power of healing or working miracles is, during the whole 
course of its operation, one continual arrest or diversion of the gen- 
eral laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fitting that this 
power should be given occasionally, But the speaking with tongues , 
when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural 
power ; just as the free and perfect use of the members of the body, 
after they have been restoi'ed by miracles to the exercise of their nat- 
ural functions. Indeed, to have lost the gift of tongues after this 
temporary use of it would imply another miracle ; for it must have 
been by actual deprivation, unless we supppse the apostles were ir= 
rational organs through which divine sounds were conveyed. . . , Jn 
healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle ; 
and in speaking strange tongues, as the persons on whom the miracle 
is performed.”] 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 233 

often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against 
such instruction. 

10. One might go on to add, that there is a great re- 
semblance between the light of nature and of revelation, 
in several other respects.* Practical Chris- other analogies 
tianity, or that faith and behavior which ren- SaSty and h na- 
ders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvi- ture ' 
ous thing; like the common rules of conduct, with 
respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more 
distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the 
study of which the apostle calls “ going on unto perfec- 
tion” and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many 
parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may require 
very exact thought and careful consideration. The 
hinderances too, of natural and of supernatural light and 
knowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is 
owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet under- 
stood, so, if it ever comes to be understood before the 
“ restitution of all things,” and without miraculous inter- 
positions, it must be in the same way as natural knowl- 
edge is come at, by the continuance and progress of 
learning and of liberty, and by particular persons at- 
tending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations scat- 
tered up and down it, which are overlooked and disre- 
garded by the generality of the world. For this is the 
way in which all improvements are made; by thought- 

* [This passage marks the essential difference between the Protest- 
ant and Roman notions of developments. The Protestant are : I. Not 
developments of the faith , but of the wisdom , of the gospel ; whereas 
the Roman are developments of mere necessary articles of faith. 
2. The Protestant developments are arrived at by the free examina- 
tion of Scripture with all the helps of learning and reason ; whereas 
the Roman are principally drawn from tradition, and were elaborated 
in ages when the study of the original languages having been gener- 
ally abandoned, and sound principles of criticism but little known, 
the Church was destitute of adequate means for developing the sense 
of the sacred writings. — Fitzgerald.] 


234 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


ful men’s tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped 
us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into 
our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a 
book which has been so long in the possession of man- 
kind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. 
For all the same phenomena, and the same faculties of 
investigation, from which such great discoveries in nat- 
ural knowledge have been made in the present and last 
age, were equally in the possession of mankind several 
thousand years before. And possibly it might be in- 
tended, that events, as they come to pass, should open 
and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. 

n. It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a 
Objection. Nat- material respect ; for that natural knowledge 
is of little or n0 consequence. But I have 
tance. been speaking of the general instruction 

which nature does or does not afford us. And besides, 
some parts of natural knowledge, in the more common, 
restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest conse- 
quence to the ease and convenience of life. But sup- 
pose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect, 
yet it might be abundantly supplied from the whole 
constitution and course of nature; which shows that 
God does not dispense his gifts according to our notions 
of the advantage and consequence they would be of to 
us. And this in general, with his method of dispensing 
knowledge in particular, would together make out an 
analogy full to the point before us. 

12. But it may be objected still further, and more 
Objection from generally — “The Scripture represents the 
diJuiSn 7 ^f the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity 
Christianity. as an ex p e( ii en t to recover it, to help in 
these respects where nature fails; in particular, to sup- 
ply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then, 
that so many ages should have been let pass before a 
matter of such a sort, of so great and so general impor- 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 235 

tance, was made known to mankind ? and then that it 
should be made known to so small a part of them ? Is 
it conceivable, that this supply should be so very defi- 
cient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, 
be liable to the like perversions ; in short, lie open to all 
the like objections, as the light of nature itself?” 
(Chap, vi.) 

Without determining how far this in fact is so, I an- 
swer ; it is by no means incredible that it might be so, 
if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same 
hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases ; for which 
God, in his good providence, has provided natural rem- 
edies. (Chap, v.) But remedies existing in nature have 
been unknown to mankind for many ages ; are known 
but to few now ; probably many valuable ones are not 
known yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and 
difficulty, in the nature and application of them.* Cir- 
cumstances seem often to make them very improper 
where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long 
labor and study, and many unsuccessful endeavors, that 
they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after high 
contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we 
have ; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed 
to be endless. The best remedies, too, when unskillful- 
ly, much more if dishonestly, applied, may produce new 
diseases ; and with the rightest application, the success 
of them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not 
at all effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly : 
and the application of them, and the necessary regimen 
accompanying it, is, not uncommonly, so disagreeable, 
that some will not submit to them ; and satisfy them- 
selves with the excuse that if they would, it is not cer- 
tain whether it would be successful. And many per- 
sons, who labor under diseases, for which there are 
known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be al- 
ways, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the reme- 


236 Analogy of Religion. [Part IT. 

dies which nature has provided for diseases are neither 
certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed the same 
principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude 
that they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude 
that there could be no occasion for them ; that is, that 
there could be no diseases at all. And therefore our 
experience that there are diseases, shows that it is 
credible beforehand, upon supposition nature has pro- 
vided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, 
as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor 
perfect, nor universal ; because it shows, that the prin- 
ciples upon which we should expect the contrary are 
fallacious. 

13. And now, what is the just consequence from all 
these things ? Not that reason is no judge of what is 
The province offered to us as being of divine revelation, 
of reason. For ^jg wou id be to infer that we are una- 

ble to judge of any thing because we are unable to judge 
of all things. Reason can, and it ought, to judge not 
only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evi- 
dence, of revelation. 

First. It is the province of reason to judge of the 
morality of the Scripture ; that is, not whether it con- 
tains things different from what we should have expect- 
ed from a wise, just, and good Being; for objections 
from hence have been now obviated, but whether it con- 
tains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or 
goodness ; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. 
And I know nothing of this sort objected against Script- 
ure, excepting such objections as are formed upon sup- 
positions which would equally conclude that the consti- 
tution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or 
goodness ; which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there 
are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to par- 
ticular persons, requiring actions which would be im- 
moral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 237 

it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind as that 
the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of 
the action ; and both constitutes and shows that not to 
be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must 
have appeared and really have been, so : which may 
well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to im- 
mutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate 
the principles, and act from the spirit of treachery, in- 
gratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the 
nature of the case, or of the action, in any of these in- 
stances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which re- 
quire only the doing an external action ; for instance, 
taking away the property or life of any. For men have no 
right to either life or property, but what arises solely from 
the grant of God : when this grant is revoked, they cease 
to have any right at all in either ; and when this revoca- 
tion is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it 
must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And 
though a course of external acts, which without com- 
mand would be immoral, must make an immoral habit, 
yet a few detached commands have no such natural 
tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the 
few Scripture precepts, which require not vicious ac- 
tions, but actions which would have been vicious had it 
not been for such precepts ; because they are sometimes 
weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon 
objections drawn from them. But to me there seems 
no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises 
from their being offenses; that is, from their being 
liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked 
designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, 
and, perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. 
And objections from this head are not objections 
against revelation, but against the whole notion of re- 
ligion as a trial : and against the general constitution 
of nature. 


238 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


Secondly. Reason is able to judge, and must, of the 
evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged 
against that evidence ; which shall be the subject of a 
following chapter. (Chap, vii.) 

14. But the consequence of the foregoing observations 
is, that the question upon which the truth of Christian- 
We need con- ity depends, is scarce at all, what objections 
tions ° against °* there are against its scheme, since there are 
proof. none against the morality of it ; but what ob- 

jections there are against its evidence : or, what proof there 
remains of it, after due allowa 7 ices made for the objections 
against that proof : because it has been shown, that the 
objections against Christianity , as distinguished from objec- 
tions against its evidence , are frivolous. For surely every 
little weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of 
arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the gen- 
eral constitution of nature, experience shows not to be 
conclusive : and such, I think, is the whole way of ob- 
jecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolv- 
able into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which 
mislead us to think that the Author of nature would 
not act as we experience he does ; or would act, in such 
and such cases, as we experience he does not in like 
cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of object- 
ing will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the 
chief things thus objected against are justified, as shall 
be further shown,* by distinct, particular, and full anal- 
ogies, in the constitution and course of nature. 

But it is to be remembered, that as frivolous as objec- 
tions of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, 
when a supposed revelation is more consistent with it- 
self, and has a more general and uniform tendency to 
promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could 
have been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; 
this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from 
* Chap, iv, latter part ; and v, vi. 


Chap. III.] Of Credibility of Revelation. 239 

them, and so of its truth ; because we are competent 
judges what might have been expected from enthusiasm 
and political views.* 

* [In arguing that a revelation cannot have come from perfect 
wisdom, because there are in it things which seem to us foolishness, 
we are arguing in the dark. But in arguing that it cannot have come 
from human fraud or enthusiasm, we are dealing with matters which 
we may perfectly understand, because coming within the sphere of 
our daily experience. See the latter argument admirably pressed in 
the Archbishop of Dublin’s Essay on the Peculiarities of the Chris- 
tian Religion, and on the Omissions of Scripture. — F.] 


240 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


CHAPTER IV. 

OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CON- 
STITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 

I T hath been now shown * that the analogy of nature 
renders it highly credible, beforehand, that suppos- 
ing a revelation to be made, it must contain 

Objections to be & 

expected. How many things very different from what we 

answered. 

should have expected, and such as appear 
open to great objections; and that this observation, in 
good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or 
rather, precludes them. But it may be alleged that this 
is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very un- 
satisfactory way of obviating them ; because it doth not 
show at all, that the things objected against can be wise, 
just, and good ; much less that it is credible they are so. 
It will, therefore, be proper to show this distinctly, by 
applying to these objections against the wisdom, justice, 
and goodness of Christianity, the answer above f given 
to the like objections against the constitution of nature ; 
before we consider the particular analogies in the latter 
to the particular things objected against in the former. 
Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections 
against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the consti- 
tution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or 
scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; a scheme, in which 
means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which 
is carried on by general laws. For from these things it 
has been proved, not only to be possible, but also to be 

* In the foregoing chapter, 
f Part i, chap, vii, to which this all along refers. 


Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 241 

credible, that those things which are objected against 
may be consistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; 
nay, may be instances of them : and even that the con- 
stitution and government of nature may be perfect in 
the highest possible degree. If Christianity, then, be a 
scheme, and of the like kind, it is evident the like ob- 
jections against it must admit of the like answer. And, 
2. I. Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our compre- 
hension. The moral government of God is 

, „ . . . Christianity be- 

exercised by gradually conducting things yond our com- 
so, in the course of his providence, that 
every one, at length, and upon the whole, shall receive 
according to his deserts ; and neither fraud nor violence, 
but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is 
a particular scheme under this general plan of provi- 
dence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion with 
regard to mankind : consisting itself also of various 
parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been car- 
rying on from the time the world came into its present 
wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, 
by a divine person, the Messiah ; who is “ to gather to- 
gether in one the children of God that are scattered 
abroad,” (John xi, 52,) and establish “ an everlasting 
kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness.” 2 Pet. iii, 13. 
And in order to it, after various manifestations of things 
relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, 
through a succession of many ages ; — (for “ the Spirit of 
Christ, which was in the prophets, testified beforehand 
his sufferings, and the glory that should follow : unto 
whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but 
unto us, they did minister the things which are now 
reported unto us by them which have preached the 
gospel; which things the angels desire to look into,” 
(1 Pet. i, 11, 12:) — after various dispensations, looking 
forward and preparatory to this final salvation, “ in the 
fullness of time,” when Infinite Wisdom thought fit, He, 
16 


242 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


‘‘being in the form of God, made himself of no reputa- 
tion, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was 
made in the likeness of men ; and being found in fash- 
ion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient 
to death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God 
also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which 
is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every 
knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in 
earth, and things under the earth ; and that every tongue 
should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory 
of God the Father.” Phil, ii, 6-n. Parts, likewise, of 
this economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy 
Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good men; 
the invisible government which Christ at present exer- 
cises over his Church ; that which he himself refers 
to in these words, “ In my Father’s house are many 
mansions — I go to prepare a place for you,” (John xiv, 
2 ;) and his future return to “judge the world in right- 
eousness,” and completely re-establish the kingdom of 
God. “For the Father judgeth no man; but hath com- 
mitted all judgment unto the Son ; that all men should 
honor the Son, even as they honor the Father.” John 
v, 22, 23. “ All power is given unto him in heaven and 

in earth.” Matt, xxviii, 18.. “ And he must reign, till he 

hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the 
end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to 
God, even the Father ; when he shall have put down all 
rule, and all authority, and power. And when all things 
shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also him- 
self be subject unto him, that put all things under him, 
that God may be all in all.” 1 Cor. xv, 25-28. Now 
little, surely, need be said to show, that this system or 
scheme of things is but imperfectly comprehended by 
us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And 
indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this “ great 
mystery of godliness,” (1 Tim. iii, 16,) but what imme- 


Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 


243 


diately runs up into something which shows us our ig- 
norance in it, as every thing in nature shows us our 
ignorance in the constitution of nature. And whoever 
will seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme 
which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much more 
unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the pur- 
poses of judging and objecting, we know as little of it as 
of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, 
is as much an answer to our objections against the per- 
fection of one as against the perfection of the other. 
(Page 172, etc.) 

3. II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispen- 
sation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, means 
are made use of to accomplish ends. And Means used to 
the observation of this furnishes us with the accom P U8hend8 - 
same answer to objections against the perfection of 
Christianity, as to objections of the like kind against the 
constitution of nature. It shows the credibility, that 
the things objected against, how foolish (1 Cor. i) soever 
they appear to men, may be the very best means of ac- 
complishing the very best ends. And their appearing 
foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme 
so greatly beyond our comprehension. (Page 178.) 

4. III. The credibility that the Christian dispensa- 
tion may have been, all along, carried on by general 
laws, (pages 179, 180,) no less than the As in nature, so 
course of nature, may require to be more Sed^&n by 
distinctly made out. Consider, then, upon general laws - 
what ground it is we say, that the whole common course 
of nature is carried on according to general foreordained 
laws. We know, indeed, several of the general laws of 
matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of liv- 
ing agents is reducible to general laws. But we know in a 
manner nothing, by what laws storms and tempests, 
earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments 
of destruction to mankind. And the laws, by which 


244 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


persons born into the world at such a time and place, 
are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws, by 
which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of 
cases ; and by which innumerable things happen, of the 
greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the 
world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we 
call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; 
though all reasonable men know certainly, that there 
cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance ; and 
conclude that the things which have this appearance 
are the result of general laws and may be reduced 
into them. It is, then, but an exceeding little way, 
and in but a very few respects, that we can trace 
up the natural course of things before us to gen- 
eral laws. And it is only from analogy that we con- 
clude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced 
into them; only from our seeing that part is so. It is 
from our finding that the course of nature, in some re- 
spects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we con- 
clude this of the rest. And if that be a just ground for 
such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to con- 
clude yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and cred- 
ible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that 
God’s miraculous interpositions may have been all along, 
in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that 
miraculous powers should be exerted at such times, 
upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and 
with regard to such persons rather than others ; that the 
affairs of the world being permitted to go on in their 
natural course so far, should just at such a point have a 
new direction given them by miraculous interpositions ; 
that these interpositions should be exactly in such de- 
grees and respects only ; all this may have been by gen- 
eral laws. These laws are unknown, indeed, to us ; but 
no more unknown than the laws from whence it is that 
some die as soon as they are born and others live to ex- 


Chap. IV.] Of Christianity as a Scheme. 245 


treme old age ; that one man is so superior to another 
in understanding ; with innumerable more things, which, 
as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws 
or rules at all; though it is taken for granted they are 
as much reducible to general ones as gravitation. Now, 
if the revealed dispensations of Providence and mirac- 
ulous interpositions be by general laws, as well as God’s 
ordinary government in the course of nature, made 
known by reason and experience ; there is no more rea- 
son to expect that every exigence, as it arises, should be 
provided for by these general laws of miraculous inter- 
positions than that every exigence in nature should, 
by the general laws of nature ; yet there might be 
wise and good reasons, that miraculous interpositions 
should be by general laws ; and that these laws should not 
be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles. 

5. Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficien- 
cies and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a 
scheme but in part made known, and of such The scheme 
a certain particular kind in other respects. christfanSy im- 
Now we see no more reason why the frame stood Ctl 'The d in- 
and course of nature should be such a ference - 
scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the 
former is such a scheme, renders it credible that the lat- 
ter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And 
as it is manifest that Christianity is a scheme revealed 
but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use 
of to accomplish ends, like to that of nature ; so the 
credibility that it may have been all along carried on 
by general laws, no less than the course of nature, has 
been distinctly proved. And from all this it is before- 
hand credible that there might, I think probable that 
there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and 
irregularities in Christianity as in nature ; that is, that 
Christianity would be liable to the like objections, as 
the frame of nature. And these objections are answered 


246 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


by these observations concerning Christianity ; as the 
like objections against the frame of nature are answered 
by the like observations concerning the frame of nature. 


6. The objections against Christianity, considered as 
a matter of fact, (page 222, etc.,) having in general been 
obviated in the preceding chapter ; and the same con- 
sidered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it 
having been obviated in this ; the next thing, according to 
the method proposed, is to show that the principal objec- 
tions, in particular against Christianity, may be answered 
by particular and full analogies in nature. And as one 
of them is made against the whole scheme of it togeth- 
er, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, 
rather than in a distinct chapter by itself. 

The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel 
is, “ that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the 
Objection. God necessity of a long series of intricate means 
compeiiedto use i n order to accomplish his ends, the recov- 
to^rv^hkp^- er y an d salvation of the world ; in like sort 
pose - as men, fc^[ want of understanding or power, 

not being able to come at their ends directly, are forced to 
go round-about ways, and make use of many perplexed 
contrivances to arrive at them.” Now every thing which 
we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objec- 
tion against the truth of Christianity. For according to 
our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of 
means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural 
course of providence, for the accomplishment of all 
his ends. Indeed, it is certain there is somewhat in 
this matter quite beyond our comprehension ; but the 
mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity. We 
know what we ourselves aim at as final ends, and what 
courses we take merely as means conducing to those 
ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are 


Chap. IVJ Of Christianity as a Scheme. 247 

considered by the Author of nature, under the single 
notion of means and ends; so as that it may be said, 
this is merely an end, and that merely means, in his re- 
gard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurd- 
ity in our very manner of conception concerning this 
matter, somewhat contradictory, arising from our ex- 
tremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. 

However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natu- 
ral world, and government of it, is a scheme or system ; 
not a fixed, but a progressive one ; a scheme in which 
the operation of various means takes up a great length 
of time before the ends they tend to can be attained. 
The change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the 
earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this ; 
and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those 
of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up 
by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, 
who animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed 
to form each his own manners and character by the 
gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a 
long course of action. Our existence is not only suc- 
cessive, as it must be of necessity, but one state of our 
life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation 
for another ; and that to be the means of attaining to 
another succeeding one : infancy to childhood ; child- 
hood to youth ; youth to mature age. Men are impa- 
tient, and for precipitating things ; but the Author of 
nature appears deliberate throughout his operations ; 
accomplishing his natural ends by slow, successive steps.* 

* [“We shall find that all the great developments of the moral be- 
ing have resulted in the advantage of society, and that all the great 
developments of the social condition have raised the character of 
humanity. The movement takes its peculiar character from which- 
ever of the two facts predominates and lends its luster. 

“ Sometimes, long intervals of time, a thousand transformations and 
obstacles, occur before the second fact is developed, and comes as it 
were to complete the civilization which the first had commenced. 


248 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part IX. 


And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which 
from the nature of it, requires various systems of means, 
as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its 
several parts into execution. Thus in the daily course of 
natural providence, God operates in the very same man- 
ner as in the dispensation of Christianity, making one 
thing subservient to another; this to somewhat further; 
and so on, through a progressive series of means which 
extend both backward and forward, beyond our utmost 
view. Of this manner of operation, every thing we see 
in the course of nature is as much an instance as any 
part of the Christian dispensation. 

But close observation convinces us of the bond which unites them. 
The ways of Providence are not confined within narrow limits ; he 
hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the principle 
that he yesterday laid down ; he will draw it out in the lapse of ages, 
when the hour is come ; and even according to our reasoning, logic 
is not the less sure because it is slow. Providence is unconcerned as 
to time ; his march (if I may be allowed the simile) is like that of the 
fabulous deities of Homer through space ; he takes a step, and ages 
have elapsed. How long a time, how many events, before the regen- 
eration of the moral man by Christianity exercised its great and le- 
gitimate influence upon the regeneration of the social state ! It has 
succeeded, however ; who can at this day gainsay it ? ” — Guizot's 
Lectures on Civilization in Europe , Lecture I.] 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 


249 


CHAPTER V. 

* 

OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY * THE 
APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMP- 
TION OF THE WORLD BY HIM. 

T HERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Chris- 
tianity which has been more objected against than 
the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. 
Yet, upon thorough consideration, there seems nothing 
less justly liable to it.* For, 

I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined 
presumption against the general notion of The analogy of 
“ a Mediator between God and man." (1 Tim. the U ohieSon V to 
ii, 5.) For we find all living creatures are aMediator - 
brought into the world, and their life in infancy is pre- 
served, by the instrumentality of others ; and every sat- 
isfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the 
like means. So that the visible government which God 
exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality and 
mediation of others. And how far his invisible govern- 

* [Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes when they 
judge of the divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus ; it 
would be contrary to his wisdom or his justice, etc. But while they 
make these peremptory assertions, they show themselves to be unac- 
quainted with the fundamental rules of their own science and with 
the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin 
the other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God 
has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and then , 
from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. 
Thus might they learn “ the invisible things of God from those which 
are clearly seen,” the things which are not accomplished from those 
which are. — Powell’s Use and Abuse of Philosophy, quoted by 
Malcom.] 


250 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part IL 


ment be, or be not so, it is impossible to determine at 
all by reason. And the supposition that part of it is so, 
appears, to say the least, altogether as credible as the 
contrary. There is, then, no sort of objection, from 
the light of nature, against the general notion of a me- 
diator between God and man, considered as a doctrine 
of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensa- 
tion ; since we find by experience that God does appoint 
mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us, 
the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the 
objection here referred to is urged, not against media- 
tion in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense in which 
Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole 
notion itself of a mediator at all. 

2. II. As we must suppose that the world is under the 
proper moral government of God, or in a state of relig- 
PunishmentwM ion, before we can enter into consideration 
Mturar^Me- of the revealed doctrine concerning the re- 
quence. demption of it by Christ ; so that supposi- 

tion is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now the 
divine moral government which religion teaches us, im- 
plies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in 
some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. 
That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his 
appointment, is necessarily implied. But as it is not in 
any sort to be supposed that we are made acquainted with 
all the ends or reasons for which it is fit future punish- 
ments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed 
such and such consequent misery should follow vice ; 
and as we are altogether in the dark how or in what 
manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or 
by the instrumentality of what means ; there is no ab- 
surdity in supposing, it may follow in a way analogous to 
that, in which many miseries follow such and such courses 
of action at present ; poverty, sickness, infamy, untime- 
ly death by diseases, death from the hands of civil jus- 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 


251 


tice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punish- 
ment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or 
in the way of natural consequence, from God’s original 
constitution of the world ; from the nature he has given 
us, and from the condition in which he places us; or in 
a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a preci- 
pice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down ; in 
the way of natural consequence, breaks his limbs, sup- 
pose ; in the way of natural consequences of this, with- 
out help, perishes.* 

3. Some good men may perhaps be offended with 
hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the fu- 
ture punishments of wickedness may be in the way of 

* [There is a clear distinction between right and wrong, and inno- 
cence and guilt. Right and wrong depend on unchangeable rela- 
tions, and consequent obligations ; while innocence and guilt depend 
on conscious and avoidable revelations of God’s love. Obedience to 
God’s laws, whether intentional or not, whether rendered by a Chris- 
tian or an infidel, brings naturally a degree of favor and benefit, just 
as cases of disobedience cause evil and suffering. Whether rashly and 
foolishly or ignorantly a man approaches a precipice and falls over, 
he will suffer and perhaps lose his life. If he takes poison intention- 
ally or ignorantly he will suffer and die. 

This natural relation between obedience or disobedience of law 
and consequences, good or evil, is readily perceived in ordinary life ; 
but the same natural connection exists between willful sin and pun- 
ishment, present and future. In no sense is this punishment merely 
arbitrary, which in any individual case the Divine will might suspend 
or remove. The principles of the Divine government that connect 
happiness with virtue and misery with vice were established before 
the existence of the sinner, and are as unchangeable as the character 
of Jehovah. God could as readily send a sinless archangel to perdition 
as free an unrepenting sinner from the consequences of sin and raise 
him to heaven. Both are impossible. In this, view we can see how 
God consistently, with tenderness and earnestness, entreats man to 
turn from his evil way, and yet when he refuses leaves him to the 
consequences of guilt. 

In Christ the law is satisfied and made honorable, and in the ap- 
pointed way man may be saved, but God cannot save him otherwise. 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


252 

natural consequence ; as if this were taking the execu- 
tion of justice out of the hands of God and 

Objection. Then ... 1 

nature, not God, giving it tO nature. But they should re- 
executes justice. . , . . 

member that when things come to pass ac- 
cording to the course of nature, this does not hinder 
them from being his doing who is the God of nature ; 
and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments to 
divine justice which are known to be natural ; and 
which must be called so, when distinguished from such 
as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or 
rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only by 
way of illustration of the subject before us. For since 
it must be admitted that the future punishment of wick- 
edness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of 
reason, equity, and justice; it comes, for aught I see, to 
the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in 
a way analogous to that in which the temporal punish- 
ments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. 
And though there were a difference, it is allowable in 
the present case to make this supposition, plainly not 
an incredible one, that future punishment may follow 
wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or ac- 
cording to some general laws of government already 
established in the universe. 

4. III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we 
may observe somewhat, much to the present purpose, in 
Natural escape the constitution of nature, or appointments 
pu“shm!nt en of of Providence : the provision which is made 
vice ' that all the bad natural consequences of 

men’s actions should not always actually follow ; or that 
such bad consequences as, according to the settled 
course of things, would inevitably have followed if not 
prevented, should in certain degrees be prevented. We 
are apt presumptuously to imagine that the world might 
have been so constituted as that there would not have 
been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 


253 


we find the Author of nature permits it. But then he 
has provided reliefs, and, in many cases, perfect reme- 
dies for it, after some pains and difficulties ; reliefs and 
remedies even for that evil which is the fruit of our own 
misconduct, and which, in the course of nature, would 
have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for 
such remedies. And this is an instance both of severity 
and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature. Thus 
all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man’s 
trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And 
though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper 
interposition, if not rejected ; by another’s coming to 
the rash man’s relief, with his own laying hold on that 
relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may 
do a great deal themselves toward preventing the bad 
consequences of their follies ; and more maybe done by 
themselves, together with the assistance of others, their 
fellow-creatures ; which assistance nature requires and 
prompts us to. This is the general constitution of the 
world. 

Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after 
such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to 
draw after them misery to the doer, it should This naturally 
have been no more in human power to have 
prevented that naturally consequent misery, ture ‘ 
in any instance, than it is in all ; no one can say wheth- 
er such a more severe constitution of things might not 
yet have been really good. But that, on the contrary, 
provision is made by nature, that we may and do, to so 
great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our fol- 
lies ; this may be called mercy, or compassion, in the 
original constitution of the world; compassion as dis- 
tinguished from goodness in general. And the whole 
known constitution and course of things affording us in- 
stances of such compassion, it would be according to 
the analogy of nature to hope, that, however ruinous the 


254 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


natural consequences of vice might be, from the general 
laws of God’s government over the universe, yet provis- 
ion might be made, possibly might have been originally 
made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from 
inevitably following; at least from following universally, 
and in all cases. 

5. Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this 
made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubt- 

Presumption ful. The generality of mankind are so far 
cape^yetgrourfd from having that awful sense of things, 
for hope. which the present state of vice and misery 

and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they 
have scarce any apprehension, or thought at all, about 
this matter, any way ; and some serious persons may 
have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us ob- 
serve, what we experience to be, and what, from the 
very constitution of nature, cannot but be, the conse- 
quences of irregular and disorderly behavior ; even of 
such rashness, willfulness, neglects, as we scarce call 
vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend that the bad 
consequences of irregularity will be greater, in propor- 
tion as the irregularity is so. And there is no compari- 
son between these irregularities and the greater instances 
of vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion ; 
if there be any thing at all in religion. For consider 
what it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to 
introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom 
of God which mankind have in fact introduced; to 
blaspheme the sovereign Lord of all ; to contemn his 
authority ; to be injurious, to the degree they are, to 
their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God. Add that 
the effects of vice, in the present world, are often ex- 
treme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death : and 
upon putting all this together it will appear, that as no 
one can say in what degree fatal the unprevented con- 
sequences of vice may be, according to the general rule 


Chap. VJ Appointment of a Mediator. 


255 


of Divine government; so it is by no means intuitively 
certain how far these consequences could possibly, in 
the nature of the thing, be prevented, consistently with 
the eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fact, the 
moral constitution of nature. However, there would be 
large ground to hope, that the universal government 
was not so severely strict, but that there was room for 
pardon, or for having those penal consequences pre- 
vented. Yet, 

6. IV. There seems no probability that any thing we 
could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent we can in no 
them ; prevent their following, or being inflict- J5Z e P conse- 
ed. But one would think, at least, it were im- <i uence8 - 
possible that the contrary should be thought certain. For 
we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. We 
are not informed of all the reasons which render it fit that 
future punishments should be inflicted ; and therefore 
cannot know whether any thing we could do would make 
such an alteration as to render it fit that they should 
be remitted. We do not know what the whole natural 
or appointed consequences of vice are, nor in what way 
they would follow, if not prevented ; and therefore can 
in no sort say whether we could do any thing which 
would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance 
being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy of na- 
ture, or providence. For though this may be but a 
slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon in this 
matter, yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary as- 
sertion, without any kind of evidence urged by way of 
objection against a doctrine the proof of which is not 
reason, but revelation. Consider then : people ruin 
their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases up- 
on themselves by excess ; they incur the penalties of 
civil laws, and surely civil government is natural ; will 
sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the 
future, alone and of itself prevent the natural conse- 


256 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


quences of them ? On the contrary, men’s natural abil- 
ities of helping themselves are often impaired ; or if not, 
yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of 
others, upon several accounts and in different ways : 
assistance which they would have had no occasion for 
had it not been for their misconduct: but which, in the 
disadvantageous condition they have reduced them- 
selves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery and 
retrieving their affairs. Now since this ia our case, con- 
sidering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world, 
and as having a temporal interest here, under the natu- 
ral government of God, which, however, has a great deal 
moral in it ; why is it not supposable that this may be 
our case also, in our more important capacity, as under 
his perfect moral government, and having a more general 
and future interest depending? If we have misbehaved 
in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnox- 
ious to the future punishment which God has annexed 
to vice, it is plainly credible, that behaving well for 
the time to come, may be — not useless, God forbid — 
but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent 
that punishment, or to put us in the condition which we 
should have been in had we preserved our innocence.* 
And though we ought to reason with all reverence, 
whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet 


* [Mr. Newman notices a distinction between the facts of revela- 
tion and its principles, and considers the argument from analogy- 
more concerned with the latter than the former. “ The revealed 
facts are special and singular from the nature of the case, but the re- 
vealed principles are common to all the works of God ; and if the 
Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the 
principles discussed in them will be the same, and form a connecting 
link between them. In this identity of principle lies the analogy of 
natural and revealed religion in Butler’s sense of the word. The incar- 
nation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature ; the 
doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified in 
nature.” — Essay on Developments, quoted by Malcom.] 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 257 

it may be added, that it is clearly contrary to all our 
notions of government, as well as to what 

. . . Reformation 

is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, gives no hope of 
to suppose that doing well for the future 

should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial bad conse- 
quences of having done evil, or all the punishment an- 
nexed to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing 
from whence to determine in what degree, and in what 
cases, reformation would prevent this punishment, even 
supposing that it would in some. And though the effi- 
cacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what man- 
kind had rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recov- 
er what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon in oppo- 
sition to Christianity ; yet, by the general prevalence of 
propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this no- 
tion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, 
appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind. 

Upon the whole, then; had the laws, the general 
laws, of God’s government been permitted to operate 
without any interposition in our behalf, the future pun- 
ishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have 
any reason to think, must inevitably have followed, not- 
withstanding any thing we could have done to prevent 

it. Now, 

7. V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it 
which you please, revelation comes in ; confirms every 
doubting fear which could enter into the pardon taught 
heart of man concerning the future unpre- by revelation - 
vented consequence of wickedness ; supposes the world 
to be in a state of ruin ; (a supposition which seems the 
very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if 
not provable by reason, yet it is in nowise contrary to 
it;) teaches us, too, that the rules of divine government 
are such as not to admit of pardon immediately and di- 
rectly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it : 
but then teaches at the same time, what nature might 
17 


258 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


justly have hoped, that the moral government of the uni- 
verse was not so rigid, but that there was room for an in- 
terposition to avert the fatal consequence of vice ; which, 
therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Reve- 
lation teaches us, that the unknown laws of God’s more 
general government, no less than the particular laws by 
which we experience he governs us at present, are com- 
passionate, (page 252, etc.,) as well as good, in the more 
general notion of goodness ; and that he hath mercifully 
provided that there should be an interposition to pre- 
vent the destruction of human kind, whatever that de- 
struction unprevented would have been. “ God so loved 
the world, that he gave his only. begotten Son, that who- 
soever believeth,” not, to be sure, in a speculative, but 
^in a practical sense, “ that whosoever believeth in him 
should not perish,” (John iii, 16 ;) gave his Son in the 
same way of goodness to the world as he affords particu- 
lar persons the friendly assistance of their fellow- crea- 
tures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would be 
the certain consequence of their follies ; in the same 
way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and 
infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God “ loved 
us, and gave himself for us,” with a love which he him- 
self compares to that of human friendship ; though, in 
this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of 
the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He inter- 
posed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual 
to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners which 
God had appointed should otherwise have been execut- 
ed upon them : or in such a manner, as to prevent that 
punishment from actually following, which, according 
to the general laws of divine government, must have 
followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such 
interposition.* 

* It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory read- 
er, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said in 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 


259 


If any thing here said should appear, upon first 
thought, inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, I 
am persuaded, will entirely remove that ap- objection, is 
pearance. For were we to suppose the & ™ P a e 8 t r Sge 
constitution of things to be such as that the state? 
whole creation must have perished, had it not been for 
somewhat which God had appointed should be in order 
to prevent that ruin ; even this supposition would not be 
inconsistent, in any degree, with the most absolutely 
perfect goodness. But still it may be thought that this 
whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes 
mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly 
so it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us 
into this state. Whoever will consider the manifold 
miseries and the extreme wickedness of the world ; that 
the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, 
which they complain of, and endeavor to amend ; but 
that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt 

this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general redemp- 
tion, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with 
it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that several 
questions, which have been brought into the subject before us, and 
determined, are not in the least entered into here ; questions which 
have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rash- 
ness, contrary ways. For instance : Whether God could have saved 
the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with 
the general laws of his government ? And, had not Christ come into 
the world, what would have been the future condition of the better 
sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom 
Manasses, in his prayer* asserts repentance was not appointed ? The 
meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous ; and 
neither of them can properly be answered without going upon that 
infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. 
And perhaps, the very inquiry, What would have followed if God 
had not done as he has ? may have in it some very great impropriety ; 
and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help 
our partial and inadequate conception of things. 

* The Prayer of Manasses is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament 
which next precedes “ Maccabees.” 


26 o 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


with age : that heathen moralists thought the present 
state to be a state of punishment ; and what might be 
added, that the earth, our habitation, has the appear- 
ance of being a ruin; whoever, I say, will consider all 
these, and some other obvious things, will think he has 
little reason to object against the Scripture account, that 
mankind is in a state of degradation ; against this being 
the fact; how difficult soever he may think it to account 
for, or even to form a distinct conception of, the occa- 
sions and circumstances of it. But that the crime of 
our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in 
a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout, 
and particularly analogous to what we see, in the daily 
course of natural providence ; as the recovery of the 
world, by the interposition of Christ, has been shown to 
be so in general. 

8. VI. The particular manner in which Christ inter- 
posed in the redemption of the world, or his office as 
TT Mediator, in the largest sense, between God 

terposes as a and man , is thus represented to us in the 
mediator. . .. . 

Scripture : He is the light of the world ;” * * * § 
the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent 
sense : he is a propitiatory sacrifice ;f the “ Lamb of 
God ;” X and as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is 
styled our High-priest. § And, which seems of peculiar 
weight, he is described beforehand, in the Old Testa- 
ment, under the same characters of a priest, and an ex- 
piatory victim.|| And whereas it is objected, that all 
this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the 
Mosaic law, the apostle, on the contrary, affirms, that 

* John i, and viii, 12. 

j- Rom. iii, 25, and v, n ; 1 Cor. v, 7 ; Eph. v, 2 ; 1 John ii, 2 ; 
Matt, xxvi, 28. 

\ John i, 29, 36, and throughout the Book of Revelation. 

§ Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. 

|j Isa. liii ; Dan. ix, 24 ; Psa. cx, 4. 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 261 

“ the law was a shadow of good things to come, and not 
the very image of the things,” (Heb. x, 1 ;) and that the 
“ priests that offer gifts according to the law — serve un- 
to the example and shadow of heavenly things as Moses 
was admonished of God when he was about to make 
the tabernacle. For see,” saith he, “that thou make all 
things according to the pattern showed to thee in the 
mount,” (Heb. viii, 4, 5 ;) that is, the Levitical priest- 
hood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ, in like 
manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was accord- 
ing to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood 
of Christ, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the orig- 
inals : of the former of which, the Levitical priesthood 
was a type; and of the latter, the tabernacle made by 
Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then 
plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the 
great and final atonement to be made by the blood of 
Christ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor 
can any thing be more express and determinate than the 
following passage : “ It is not possible that the blood of 
bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore, 
when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and 
offering ” — that is, of bulls and of goats — “ thou wouldst 
not, but a body hast thou prepared me — Lo, I come to 
do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified, 
through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for 
all.” Heb. x, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. And to add one passage 
more of the like kind : “ Christ was once offered to bear 
the sins of many ; and unto them that look for him shall 
he appear the second time, without sin;” that is, with- 
out bearing sin, as he did at his first coming, by being 
an offering for it ; without having our iniquities again 
laid upon him , without being any more a sin-offering : — 
“ Unto them that look for him shall he appear the sec- 
ond time, without sin unto salvation.” Heb. ix, 28. Nor 
do the inspired writers at all confine themselves to this 


262 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, 
but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for 
us additional to, and beyond mere instruction, example, 
and government, in great variety of expression : “ That 
Jesus should die for that nation,” the Jews, “and not 
for that nation only, but that also,” plainly by the effi- 
cacy of his death, “ he should gather together in one the 
children of God that were scattered abroad:”* that 
“he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust :”f that 
“he gave his life — himself — a ransom that “we are 
bought — bought with a price :” § that “he redeemed us 
with his blood : redeemed us from the curse of the 
law, being made a curse for us:” || that “he is our ad- 
vocate, intercessor, and propitiation:”!" that “he was 
made perfect (or consummate) through sufferings ; and 
being thus made perfect, he became the author of salva- 
tion :”** that “ God was in Christ, reconciling the world 
to himself, by the death of his Son by the cross ; not 
imputing their trespasses unto them:” ft and, lastly, 
that “ through death he destroyed him that had the 
power of death.” JJ Christ, then, having thus “ humbled 
himself, and become obedient to death, even the death 
of the cross, God also hath highly exalted him, and giv- 
en him a name which is above every name ; hath given 
all things into his hands; hath committed all judgment 
unto him ; that all men should honor the Son, even as 
they honor the Father.” §§ For, “worthy is the Lamb 
that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, 

* John xi, 51, 52. f I Pet. iii, 18. 

\ Matt, xx, 28 ; Mark x, 45 ; 1 Tim. ii, 6. 

§ 2 Pet. ii, 1 ; Rev. xiv, 4 ; 1 Cor. vi, 20. 

|| 1 Pet. i, 19 ; Rev. v, 9 ; Gal, iii, 13. 

! Heb. vii, 25 ; 1 John ii, 1, 2. ** Heb. ii, 10 ; v, 9. 

ff 2 Cor. v, 19 ; Rom. v, 10 ; Eph. ii, 16. 

XX Heb. ii, 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, 
xxxiii, 24. 

§§ Phil, ii, 8, 9 ; John iii, 35, and v, 22, 23. 


Chap. V.J Appointment of a Mediator. 263 

and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing! And 
every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard 
I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be 
unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the 
Lamb, for ever and ever.” Rev. v, 12, 13. 

9. These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend 
and express the chief parts of Christ’s office, as mediator 
between God and man, so far, I mean, as the nature of 
this his office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by- 
divines under three heads. 

First. He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet : 
“ that Prophet that should come into the Christ as a 
world,” (John vi, 14,) to declare the divine Prophet ‘ 
will. He published anew the law of nature which men 
had corrupted ; and the very knowledge of which, to 
some degree, was lost among them. He taught man- 
kind — taught us authoritatively — to “live soberly, right- 
eously, and godly, in this present world,” in expectation 
of the future judgment of God. He confirmed the truth 
of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional 
evidence of it, the evidence of testimony. (Page 195.) 
He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would 
be worshiped, the efficacy of repentance, and the re- 
wards and punishments of a future life. Thus he was a 
prophet, in a sense in which no other ever was. To 
which is to be added, that he set us a perfect “ example, 
that we should follow his steps.” 

10. Secondly. He has a “ kingdom, which is not of this 
world.” He founded a Church, to be to Christ as a 
mankind a standing memorial of religion Kmg ’ 

and invitation to it ; which he promised to be with al- 
ways, even to the end. He exercises an invisible gov- 
ernment ove,r it, himself, and by his Spirit ; over that 
part of it which is militant here on earth, a government 
of discipline, “ for the perfecting of the saints, for the 
edifying of his body ; till we all comejn the unity of the 


264 


Analogy of Religion. LPart IT. 


faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a 
perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the full- 
ness of Christ.” (Eph. iv, 12, 13.) Of this Church, all 
persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience 
to his laws, are members. For these he is gone to pre- 
pare a place , and will come again to receive them unto him- 
self, that where he is, there they may be also ; and reig?i 
with him for ever and ever, (John xiv, 2, 3; Rev. iii, 
21, and xi, 15;) and likewise “to take vengeance on 
them that know not God and obey not his gospel.” 
2 Thess. i, 8. 

Against these parts of Christ’s office I find no objec- 
tions but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this 
chapter. 

11. Lastly. Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacri- 

christ as a fice, and made atonement for the sins of the 

world ; which is mentioned last, in regard 
to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation 
were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most 
other nations, from tradition, whose original probably 
was revelation. And they were continually repeated 
both occasionally and at the returns of stated times, 
and made up great part of the external religion of man- 
kind. “But now once in the end of the world Christ 
appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.” 
Heb. ix, 26. And this sacrifice was in the highest de- 
gree, and with the most extensive influence, of that effi- 
cacy for obtaining pardon of sin which the heathens 
may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to 
have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were, 
in some degree, and with regard to some persons. 

12. How, and in what particular way, it had this effi- 
How Christ’s cacy, there are not wanting persons who 

cSf isnofex- have endeavored to explain ; but I do not 
plained. find t h at t jj e Scripture has explained it. 

We seem to b>e very much in the dark cQncej-ning thg 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 


265 


manner in which the ancients understood atonement to 
be made, that is, pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. 
And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this mat- 
ter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left some- 
what in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, 
if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has 
any one reason to complain for want of further informa- 
tion, unless he can show his claim to it. 

Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what 
Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the 
Scripture has authorized ; others, probably because they 
could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and 
confining his office as Redeemer of the world to his in- 
struction, example, and government of the Church. 
Whereas, the doctrine of the gospel appears to be, not 
only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren- 
dered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and 
suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of 
having our repentance accepted unto eternal life : not 
only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a 
capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it; but 
moreover, that he put them into this capacity of salva- 
tion by what he did and suffered for them ; put us into 
a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining 
future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to 
accept the benefit, by performing the conditions upon 
which it is offered on our part, without disputing how it 
was procured on his. For, 

13. VII. Since we neither know by what means pun- 
ishment in a future state would have followed wicked- 
ness in this ; nor in what manner it would objections 
have been inflicted, had it not been pre- MedktoTdidtb- 
vented ; nor all the reasons why its inflic- 8urd * 
tion would have been needful ; nor the particular na- 
ture of that state of happiness which Christ is gone to 
prepare for his disciples ; and since we are ignorant 


266 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


how far any thing which we could do would, alone and of 
itself, have been effectual to prevent that punishment to 
which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness 
which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are not 
judges, antecedently to revelation, whether a mediator 
was or was not necessary to obtain those ends ; to pre- 
vent that future punishment, and bring mankind to the 
final happiness of their nature. And for the very same 
reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, 
we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of 
the whole nature of his office, or the several parts of 
which it consists : of what was fit and requisite to be 
assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine 
Providence in the appointment. And from hence it 
follows, that to object against the expediency or useful- 
ness of particular things revealed to have been done or 
suffered by him, because we do not see how they were 
conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing 
is more common to be met with than this absurdity. 
But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not 
judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, 
with any shadow of reason, be urged against any partic- 
ular part of Christ’s mediatorial office revealed in Script- 
ure till it can be shown postively not to be requisite or 
conducive to the ends proposed to be accomplished ; or 
,that it is in itself unreasonable. 

14. And there is one objection made against the sat- 
isfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive 
Objection God kind : that the doctrine of his being appoint- 

represented as ed to suffer for the sins of the world repre- 
causing the in- . ..... r 

nocent to suffer sents God as being indifferent whether he 

with the guilty. . . . . 

punished the innocent or the guilty. Now 
from the foregoing observations we may see the extreme 
slightness of all such objections, and (though it is most 
certain all who make them do not see the consequence) 
that they conclude altogether as much against God’s 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 267 

whole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily 
course of divine Providence, in the government of the 
world, that is, against the whole scheme of theism and 
the whole notion of religion, as against Christianity. 
For the world is a constitution, or system, whose parts 
have a mutual reference to each other ; and there is a 
scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the 
course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has 
appointed us in various ways to contribute. And when, 
in the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed 
that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the 
guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the 
instance we are now considering. The infinitely great- 
er importance of that appointment of Christianity which 
is objected against, does not hinder, but it may be, as it 
plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind with 
what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if 
there were any force at all in the objection, it would be 
stronger, in one respect, against natural providence than 
against Christianity ; because under the former we are 
in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, 
whether we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others; 
whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. 

The world’s being under the righteous government of 
God does indeed imply that finally, and upon the whole, 
every one shall receive according to his personal de- 
serts : and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture 
is, that this shall be the completion of the divine gov- 
ernment. But during the progress, and for aught we 
know, even in order to the completion of this moral 
scheme, vicarious punishments maybe fit, and absolute- 
ly necessary. Men, by their follies, run themselves into 
extreme distress ; into difficulties which would be abso- 
lutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and 
assistance of others. God commands by the law of na- 
ture that we afford them this assistance, in many cases 


268 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


where we cannot do it without very great pains, and 
labor, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what 
variety of ways one person’s sufferings contribute to the 
relief of another; and how, or by what particular means, 
this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and 
laws of nature, which come under our notice : and be- 
ing familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So 
that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the 
foregoing kind against the satisfaction of Christ is either 
that they do not consider God’s settled and uniform ap- 
pointments as his appointments at all, or else they for- 
get that vicarious punishment is a providential appoint- 
ment of every day’s experience : and then, from their 
being unacquainted with the more general laws of nature, 
or divine government over the world, and not seeing 
how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the 
redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, 
they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it 
any other way. And yet, what has been often alleged 
in justification of this doctrine, even from the apparent 
natural tendency of this method of our redemption — its 
tendency to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and 
deter his creatures from sin ; this has never yet been 
answered, and is, I think, plainly unanswerable : though 
I am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the 
case. But without taking this into consideration, it 
abundantly appears, from the observations above made, 
that. this objection is not an objection against Christian- 
ity, but against the whole general constitution of nature. 
And if it were to be considered as an objection against 
Christianity, or, considering it as it is, an objection 
against the constitution of nature, it amounts to no more 
in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment can- 
not be necessary or expedient, because the objector 
does not discern it to be so ; though he must own that 
the nature of the case is such as renders him incapable 


Chap. V.] Appointment of a Mediator. 269 

of judging whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be 
necessary though it were so. 

15. It is indeed a matter of great patience to reason- 
able men to find people arguing in this manner, object- 
ing against the credibility of such particular objections 
things revealed in Scripture, that they do i^oran^eunrea- 
not see the necessity or expediency of them. Bonable * 

For though it is highly right, and the most pious exer- 
cise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence 
into the ends and reasons of God’s dispensations ; yet 
when those reasons are concealed, to argue, from our 
ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, 
is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of 
objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And 
the folly of them is yet greater when they are urged, as 
usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous, 
or like, to those natural dispensations of Providence which 
are matter of experience. Let reason be kept to ; and if 
any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of 
the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary 
to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; 
but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting 
against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the neces- 
sity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reason- 
ing ; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in 
the present case, parts which we are not actively con- 
cerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, 

16. Lastly. That not only the reason of the thing, but 
the whole analogy of nature, should teach us not to ex- 
pect to have the like information concern- Equal informa- 
ing the Divine conduct as concerning our the Divine con- 
own duty. God instructs us by experi- ^Sty not d to°be 
ence, (for it is not reason, but experience, ex P ected - 
which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences 
will follow from our acting in such and such manners ; 
and by this he directs us how we are to behave 


270 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed 
for the common purposes of life, yet it is but an almost 
infinitely small part of natural providence which we are 
at all let into’ The case is the same with regard to rev- 
elation. The doctrine of a Mediator between God and 
man, against which it is objected that the expediency 
of some things in it is not understood, relates only to 
what was done on God’s part in the appointment, and 
on the Mediator’s in the execution of it. For what is 
required of us, in consequence of this gracious dispen- 
sation, is another subject, in which none can complain 
for want of information. The constitution of the world 
and God’s natural government over it is all mystery, 
as much as the Christian dispensation. Yet under the 
first, he has given men all things pertaining to life ; and 
under the other, all things pertaining unto godliness. 
And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be 
accounted for in any of the common precepts of Chris- 
tianity ; though if there were, surely a Divine command 
is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest 
obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the rea- 
sons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive 
institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and 
propagate religion among mankind. And our duty to 
Christ, the internal and external worship of him, this 
part of the religion of the gospel manifestly arises out 
of what he has done and suffered, his authority and 
dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand 
in to us. (Page 201, etc.) 


Chap. VIJ Revelation not Universal. 


271 


CHAPTER VI. 

OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION ; 
AND OF THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF 
OF IT. 

I T has been thought by some persons, that if the evi- 
dence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself 
turns into a positive argument against it; 0 b j ection8 
because it cannot be supposed, that, if it 
were true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evi- 
dence. And the objection against revelation, from its 
not being universal, is often insisted upon as of great 
weight. 

Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown, by 
observing the suppositions on which they are founded, 
which are really such as these : — that it cannot be 
thought God would have bestowed any favor at all upon 
us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and 
which, we imagine, would be most to our particular ad- 
vantage ; and also, that it cannot be thought he would 
bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same 
upon all : suppositions which we find contradicted, 
not by a few instances in God’s natural government 
of the world, but by the general analogy of nature 
together. 

2. Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as 
doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive 
argument against it, should be put upon w e act on 
considering what that evidence, indeed, is, <jence jn impor- 
whiclTthey act upon with regard to their 
temporal interests. For it is not only extremely diffi- 


272 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

cult, but in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance 
pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to 
be able to say on which side the overplus is. There are 
the like difficulties and impossibilities in making the 
due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for 
satiety, disgusts, ill health ; any of which render men 
incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained, what 
they most eagerly desired. Numberless, too, are the 
accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may 
even probably disappoint the best concerted schemes ; 
and strong objections are often seen to lie against them, 
not to be removed or answered, but which seem over- 
balanced by reasons on the other side ; so as that the 
certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by 
every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of 
the appearing greater advantages in case of success, 
though there be but little probability of it. Lastly. 
Every one observes our liableness, if we be not upon 
our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and 
the false appearance of things ; and this danger must be 
greatly increased if there be a strong bias within, sup- 
pose from indulged passion, to favor the deceit. Hence 
arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, 
wherein our temporal interest really consists ; what are 
the most probable means of attaining it ; and whether those 
means will eventually be successful. And numberless 
instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which 
all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though 
the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to 
make such provision for themselves as it is supposable 
they may have occasion for, though the plain, acknowl- 
edged probability is, that they never shall. 

3. Then those who think the objection against reve- 
Anaiogy shows lation, from its light not being universal, to 
versluty ta^o be of weight, should observe that the Author 
objection. G f na t ure? i n numberless instances, bestows 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 


273 


that upon some which he does not upon others, who 
seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed, he appears 
to bestow all his gifts, with the most promiscuous varie- 
ty, among creatures of the same species : health and 
strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, 
means of improvement, riches, and all external advan- 
tages. And as there are not any two men tound of ex- 
actly like shape and features, so, it is probable, there are 
not any two of an exactly like constitution, temper, and 
situation, with regard to the goods and evils of life. 
Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties, 
God does exercise a natural government over the world ; 
and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent 
institution of life, with regard to our health and our 
affairs, under that his natural government. 

As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have 
been universal, and as they have been afforded to a 
greater or less part of the world, at different times, so 
likewise, at different times, both revelations have had 
different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived dur- 
ing the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till 
after the captivity, had higher evidence of the truth 
of their religion than those who had lived in the interval 
between the last-mentioned period and the coming of 
Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence 
of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity 
than what we have now. They had also a strong pre- 
sumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much 
greater force in way of argument than many think, of 
which we have very little remaining ; I mean, the pre- 
sumptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it 
had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. 
And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it 
which they could not have, from the conformity between 
the prophetic history and the state of the world, and of 

Christianity. 

18 


274 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


And further: if we were to suppose the evidence 
which some have of religion to amount to little more 
than seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in 
great doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence 
and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the 
rule of life; others, to have a full conviction of the 
truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; 
and others severally, to have all the intermediate de- 
grees of religious light and evidence which lie between 
these two — if we put the case, that for the present it 
was intended revelation should be no more than a small 
light in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwith- 
standing it, with ignorance and darkness ; that certain 
glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed, 
to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who 
really partook of it should not discern from whence it 
originally came ; that some, in a nearer situation to it, 
should have its light obscured, and, in different ways 
and degrees, intercepted ; and that others should be 
placed within its clearer influence, and be much more 
enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet, that 
even to these it should be no more than a light shining 
in a dark place : all this would be perfectly uniform, and 
of a piece with the conduct of providence in the distri- 
bution of its other blessings. If the fact of the case 
really were, that some have received no light at all from 
the Scripture ; as many ages and countries in the hea- 
then world : that others, though they have, by means of 
it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their 
consciences, yet have never had the genuine Scripture 
revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to their con- 
sideration ; and the ancient Persians and modern Mo- 
hammedans may possibly be instances of people in a situ- 
ation somewhat like to this : that others, though they 
have had the Scripture laid before them as of divine 
revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 275 

of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, 
the evidence so blended with false miracles, as to leave 
the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty 
about the whole; which may be the state of some 
thoughtful men in most of those nations who call them- 
selves Christian ; and lastly , that others have had Chris- 
tianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and 
with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and 
Churches of civil and of Christian liberty ; but, however, 
that even these persons are left in great ignorance in 
many respects, and have by no means light afforded 
them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regu- 
late their life, to teach them their duty, and encourage 
them in the careful discharge of it ; I say, if we were to 
suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the 
degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, which 
were intended to be afforded mankind, and of what has 
actually been and is their situation in their moral and 
religious capacity, there would be nothing in all this 
ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty — in all these 
varieties and supposed disadvantages of some in com- 
parison of others, respecting religion — but may be par- 
alleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensa- 
tions of providence at present, and considering ourselves 
merely in our temporal capacity. 

4. Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which 
would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration 
in nature, if we would really keep in mind ah to be judged 
that every one shall be dealt equitably with ; JSknowiedge 
instead of forgetting this, or explaining it and ablli< y- 
away, after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of 
injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this vari- 
ous economy of providence, would be lost, if we would 
keep in mind that every merciful allowance shall be 
made, and no more be required of any one than what 
might have been equitably expected of him, from the 


2 76 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


circumstances in which he was placed ; and not what 
might have been expected, had he been placed in other 
circumstances : that is, in Scripture language, that every 
man shall be accepted “ according to what he had, not 
according to what he had not.” 2 Cor. viii, 12. This, 
however, doth not by any means imply that all persons’ 
condition here is equally advantageous with respect to 
futurity. And providence, designing to place some in 
greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is 
no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get 
out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it, 
than why ignorant and slow people, in matters of other 
knowledge, should not endeavor to learn, or should not 
be instructed. 

5. It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same 
wise and good principle, whatever it was, which dis- 

. posed the Author of nature to make differ- 
knowledge not e nt kinds and orders of creatures, disposed 

more unreason- 1 . 

able than in ca- him also to place creatures of like kinds 

pacities. . . . . 

in different situations; and that the same 
principle which disposed him to make creatures of dif- 
ferent moral capacities, disposed him also to place crea- 
tures of like moral capacities in different religious situ- 
ations : and even the same creatures, in different periods 
of their being. And the account or reason of this, is 
also most probably the account why the constitution of 
things is such as that creatures of moral natures or ca- 
pacities, for a considerable part of that duration in 
which they are living agents, are not at all subjects of 
morality and religion ; but grow up to be so, and grow 
up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood 
to mature age. 

6. What, in particular, is the account or reason of 
The reason of these things, we must be greatly in the dark 

these things is . - ^ . ... 

that of our ig- were it only that we know' so very little even 

norance relative r ^ 

to them. of our own case. Our present state may 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 


277 


possibly be the consequence of somewhat past, which 
we are wholly ignorant of ; as it has a reference to some- 
what to come, of which we know scarce any more than 
is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in 
its notion, implies variety : and so complicated a one 
as this world, very great variety. So that were revela- 
tion universal, yet from men’s different capacities of un- 
derstanding, from the different lengths of their lives, 
their different educations, and other external circum- 
stances, and from their difference of temper and bodily 
constitution ; their religious situations would be widely 
different, and the disadvantage of some in comparison of 
others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And 
the true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such 
a part of mankind, are placed in this condition of igno- 
rance, must be supposed also the true account of our 
further ignorance in not knowing the reasons why, or 
whence it is, that they are placed in this condition. But 
the following practical reflections may deserve the seri- 
ous consideration of those persons who think the cir- 
cumstances of mankind, or their own, in the fore-men- 
tioned respects, a ground of complaint. 

First. The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, 
may constitute one particular part of some men’s trial in 
the religious sense : as it gives scope for a This want of 
virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect, of their light a part of 

. our trial. 

understanding, in examining or not examin- 
ing into that evidence. There seems no possible reason 
to be given why we may not be in a state of moral pro- 
bation with regard to the exercise of our understanding 
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to 
our behavior in common affairs. The former is as much 
a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And 
I suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same 
character, the same inward principle, which, after a man 
is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obe- 


278 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


dient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus con- 
vinced, set him about an examination of it, upon its 
system and evidence being offered to his thoughts ; 
and that in the latter state, his examination would be 
with an impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, propor- 
tionable to what his obedience is in the former. And as 
inattention, negligence, want of all serious concern, about 
a matter of such a nature and such importance, when of- 
fered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct con- 
viction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and disso- 
luteness as neglect of religious practice after such con- 
viction ; so active solicitude about it, and fair impartial 
consideration of its evidence before such conviction, is as 
really an exercise of a morally right temper as is religious 
practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively true, 
but a matter of deduction and inference; that a convic- 
tion of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left 
to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to 
premises : this as much constitutes religious probation — 
as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and 
wrong behavior — as any thing whatever does. And their 
manner of treating this subject, when laid before them, 
shows what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. 

8. Secondly . It appears to be a thing as evident, though 
it is not so much attended to, that if, ; upon considera- 
Doubtfui evi- tion of religion, the evidence of it should 
fnTnS pro 11 - seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest 
bati°n. supposable degree ; even this doubtful evi- 

dence will, however, put them into a general state of pro- 
bation^ the moral religious sense. For, suppose a man 
to be really in doubt whether such a person had not done 
him the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal 
interest did not depend upon that person ; no one who 
had any sense of gratitude and of prudence could possi- 
bly consider himself in the same situation, with regard 
to such persons, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 279 

it is as just to say that certainty and doubt are the same 
as to say the situations now mentioned would leave a 
man as entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or pru- 
dence, as he would be were he certain he had received 
no favor from such person, or that he no way depended 
upon him. And thus, though the evidence of religion 
which is afforded to some men should be little more 
than that they are given to see the system of Christian- 
ity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible, 
this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical ap- 
prehension that it may be true. And even this will 
afford matter of exercise, for religious suspense and de- 
liberation, for moral resolution and self-government; 
because the apprehension that religion may be true, 
does as really lay men under obligations as a full con- 
viction that it is true. It gives occasion and motives to 
consider further the important subject ; to preserve at- 
tentively upon their minds a general implicit sense that 
they may be under divine moral government, an awful 
solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. 
Such apprehension ought to turn men’s eyes to every 
degree of new light which may be had, from whatever 
side it comes, and induce them to refrain, in the mean 
time, from all immoralities, and live in the conscientious 
practice of every common virtue. Especially are they 
bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute 
profaneness, for this the very nature of the case for- 
bids ; and to treat with highest reverence a matter upon 
which their own whole interest and being, and the fate 
of nature, depends. This behavior, and an active en- 
deavor to maintain within themselves this temper, is the 
business, the duty, and the wisdom of those persons 
who complain of the doubtfulness of religion ; is what 
they are under the most proper obligations to ; and such 
behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to im- 
prove in them, that character which the practice of all 


280 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


the several duties of religion, from a full conviction of 
its truth, is an exertion of and has a tendency to improve 
in others ; others, I say, to whom God has afforded such 
conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of 
religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be 
said in general that whoever will weigh the matter thor- 
oughly, may see there is not near so much difference as 
is commonly imagined between what ought in reason to 
be the rule of life to those persons who are fully con- 
vinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious 
doubting apprehension that it may be true. Their hopes, 
and fears, and obligations will be in various degrees; but, 
as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same, 
so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they are 
bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. 

9. It is to be observed, further, that from a character 

of understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, 
„ some persons have it in their power to do 

Religious doubt 1 

does not lessen infinitely more harm or good by setting an 

responsibility. - r ° J 

example of profaneness and avowed disre- 
gard to all religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, 
though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and 
of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness, than 
they can do by acting well or ill in all the common in- 
tercourses among mankind ; and consequently they are 
most highly accountable for a behavior which they 
may easily foresee is of such importance, and in which 
there is most plainly a right and a wrong ; even admit- 
ting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is 
pretended. 

10. The ground of these observations, and that which 
renders them just and true, is that doubting necessarily 

Doubt implies implies some degree of evidence for that of 
evidence. which we doubt. For no person would be 
in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts 
so and so circumstanced which should accidentally pome 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 281 

into his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. 
And though, in the case of an even chance, and where 
consequently we were in doubt, we should in common 
language say that we had no evidence at all for either 
side ; yet that situation of things which renders it an 
even chance and no more, that such an event will hap- 
pen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where 
there is such evidence on both sides of a question (In- 
troduction) as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the 
truth. Indeed, in all these cases there is no more evi- 
dence on the one side than on the other; but there is 
(what is equivalent to) much more for either than for 
the truth of a number of facts which come into one’s 
thoughts at random. And thus, in all these cases, doubt 
as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evi- 
dence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty high- 
er still. Any one who will a little attend to the nature 
of evidence, will easily carry this observation on, and 
see that between no evidence at all, and that degree of 
it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many in- 
termediate degrees as there are between that degree 
which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And 
though we have not faculties to distinguish these de- 
grees of evidence with any sort of exactness, yet in pro- 
portion as they are discerned, they ought to influence 
our practice. For it is as real an imperfection in the 
moral character not to be influenced in practice by a 
lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in the 
understanding not to discern it. And as, in all subjects 
which men consider, they discern the lower as well as 
the higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their 
capacity of understanding ; so, in practical subjects, they 
are influenced in practice by the lower as well as higher 
degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and hon- 
esty. And as in proportion to defects in the under- 
standing, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evi- 


282 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


dence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is 
not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases ; 
so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they 
seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no 
regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it 
be not overbearing. From these things it must follow, 
that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree 
of evidence for it as, joined with the consideration of its 
importance, unquestionably lays men under the obliga- 
tions before-mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in 
all their behavior. 

n. Thirdly. The difficulties in which the evidence 
of religion is involved, which some complain of, is no 

Difficulties more a J ust ground of complaint than the 
in evidence no external circumstances of temptation which 

more a cause of 1 

complaint than others are placed in, or than difficulties in 

in practice. . 

the practice of it after a full conviction of 
its truth. Temptations render our state a more improv- 
ing state of discipline (part i, chap, v) than it would be 
otherwise; as they give occasion for a more attentive 
exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and 
strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive ex- 
ercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are, in 
this respect, of the very same nature with these external 
temptations. For the evidence of religion not appear- 
ing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, 
without any consideration at all ; and therefore requires 
such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle seri- 
ously to consider that evidence, as there would be no 
occasion for but for such temptation. And the sup- 
posed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been in 
some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair 
mind of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from 
itself, that evidence which it might see : and also for 
men’s encouraging themselves in vice, from hopes of 
impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least, 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 283 

that these hopes are uncertain : in like manner as the 
common temptation to many instances of folly, which 
end in temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope 
of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity ; 
that is, the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that 
such foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. 
On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence 
of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise 
of the virtuous principle in fairly yielding themselves up 
to the proper influence of any real evidence, though 
doubtful; and in practicing conscientiously all virtue, 
though under some uncertainty whether the govern- 
ment in the universe may not possibly be such as that 
vice may escape with impunity. And in general, temp- 
tation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to 
wrong, and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as 
well as the greater ones ; temptation, I say, as such, and 
of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous 
efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been 
wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and im- 
provement of virtue, as well as probation of it, in the 
other senses of that word. (Part i, chap, iv, and page 150.) 
So that the very same account is to be given why the 
evidence of religion should be left in such a manner as 
to require, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps pain- 
ful exercise of their understanding about it; as why 
others should be placed in such circumstances as that 
the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction 
of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, 
and pains; or why appearing doubtfulness should be 
permitted to afford matter of temptation to some ; as 
why external difficulties and allurements should be per- 
mitted to afford matter of temptation to others. The 
same account also is to be given, why some should be 
exercised with temptations of both these kinds, as why 
others should be exercised with the latter in such very 


284 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


high degrees as some have been, particularly as the 
primitive Christians were. 

12. Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing 
that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence 
„ , x . of religion is involved may make even the 

Speculative dif- . . & J 

Acuities to some principal part of some persons trial. For 

the chief trial. r r 

as the chief temptations of the generality of 
the world are the ordinary motives to injustice or unre- 
strained pleasure ; or to live in the neglect of religion, 
from that frame of mind, which renders many persons 
almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which 
is not the object of their senses ; so there are other per- 
sons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a 
deeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who not 
only see, but have a general practical feeling that what 
is to come will be present, and that things are not less 
real for their not being the objects of sense; and who, 
from their natural constitution of body and of temper, 
and from their external condition, may have small temp- 
tations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in 
the common course of life. Now when these latter per- 
sons have a distinct, full conviction of the truth of relig- 
ion, without any possible doubts or difficulties, the prac- 
tice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a 
constant violence to their own minds ; and religion is 
scarce any more a discipline to them, than it is to crea- 
tures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may 
possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise 
in a higher degree than they would have by such an 
easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for 
reasons unknown to us, that they should give some fur- 
ther manifestation (page 15 1) what is their moral char- 
acter, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it 
would be. Thus in the great variety of religious situa- 
tions in which men are placed, what constitutes — what 
chiefly and peculiarly constitutes — the probation, in all 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 


28s 


senses, of some persons, may be the difficulties in which 
the evidence of religion is involved ; and their principal 
and distinguished trial may be, how they will behave 
under and with respect to these difficulties. Circum- 
stances in men’s situation in their temporal capacity, 
analogous in good measure to this respecting religion, 
are to be observed. We find some persons are placed 
in such a situation in the world, as that their chief diffi- 
culty, with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is 
prudent when it is known, for this, in numberless cases, 
is as easy as the contrary, but to some the principal ex- 
ercise is recollection, and being upon their guard against 
deceits — the deceits, suppose, of those about them — 
against false appearances of reason and prudence. To 
persons in some situations, the principal exercise with 
respect to conduct is attention, in order to inform them- 
selves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and 
prudent part to act. 

13. But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition that 

men’s dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not 

owing to their neglects or prejudices; it clssatl8facl|on 

must be added, on the other hand, in all the fault of the 
, _ . 1 r objector. 

common reason, and as what the truth 01 
the case plainly requires should be added, that such dis- 
satisfaction possibly may be owing to those — possibly 
may be men’s own fault. For, 

If there are any persons who never set themselves 
heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion ; if 
there are any who secretly wish it may not prove true, 
and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties, 
and more to objections than to what is said in answer to 
them ; these persons will scarce be thought in a likely 
way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were 
most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully 
proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this 
subject usually in the way of mirth and sport; if they 


286 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


attend to forms and representations, and inadequate 
manners of expression, instead of the real things intend- 
ed by them, (for signs often can be no more than inad- 
equately expressive of the things signified,) or if they 
substitute human errors in the room of divine truth ; 
why may not all, or any of these things, hinder some 
men from seeking that evidence which really is seen by 
others ; as a like turn of mind, with respect to matters 
of common speculation and practice, does, we find by 
experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge 
and right understanding in matters of common specula- 
tion and practice which more fair and attentive minds 
attain to ? And the effect will be the same, whether 
their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of 
religion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, 
proceed from mere carelessness or from the grosser 
vices ; or whether it be owing to this, that forms, and 
figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, ad- 
minister occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, 
and the truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a 
ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and 
prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as it seems, to im- 
pair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, care- 
lessness, passion, and prejudice, do hinder us from being 
rightly informed with respect to common things ; and they 
may, in like manner, and perhaps in some further provi- 
dential manner, with respect to moral and religious sub- 
jects ; may hinder evidence from being laid before us, 
and from being seen when it is. The Scripture* does de- 

* Dan. xii, io. See also Isa. xxix, 13, 14 ; Matt, vi, 23, and xi, 
25, and xiii, 11,12 ; John iii, 19, and v, 44 ; 1 Cor. ii, 14, and 2 Cor. 
iv, 4; 2 Tim. iii, 13 ; and that affectionate, as well as authoritative 
admonition, so very many times inculcated, “He that hath ears to 
hear, let him hear.” Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in 
these, and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say, that 
the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been, 
for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis esset 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 


287 


clare, that every one shall not understand. And it makes 
no difference by what providential conduct this comes 
to pass ; whether the evidence of Christianity was, orig- 
inally and with design, put and left so, as that those who 
are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see 
it, and that honest-minded persons should, or whether 
it comes to pass by any other means. 

14. Further : the general proof of natural religion and 
of Christianity does, I think, lie level to p r0 of level to 
common men: even those the greatest part 0011111:1011 men - 
of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken up 
with providing, for themselves and their families, the 
common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life ; 
those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of ask- 
ing after proof or attending to it. Common men, were 
they as much in earnest about religion as about their 
temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced, upon 
real evidence, that there is a God who governs the 
world ; and they feel themselves to be of a moral na- 
ture, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity 

Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur . De Ver., R. C., lib. 
2, toward the end. [We give the passage from Grotius in full: “If 
there be any one who is not satisfied with the arguments hitherto al- 
leged for the truth of the Christian religion, but desires more power- 
ful ones, he ought to know that different things must have different 
kinds of proof; one sort in mathematics, another in the properties of 
bodies, another in doubtful matters, and another in matters of fact. 
And we are to abide by that whose testimonies are void of all suspi- 
cion ; if this be not admitted, not only all history is of no further use, 
and a great part of physic ; but all that natural affection, which is be- 
tween parents and children, is lost, who can be known no other way. 
And it is the will of God, that those things which he would have us 
believe, so as that faith should be accepted from us as obedience, 
should not be so very plain, as tho. e things we perceive by our senses, 
and by demonstration ; but only so far as is sufficient to procure the 
belief, and persuade a man of the thing, who is not obstinately bent 
against it : So that the gospel is, as it were, a touchstone, to try men's 
honest dispositions by.” — Dr. Crooks.] 


288 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, 
so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of 
being made to see that there is evidence of miracles 
wrought in. attestation of it, and many appearing com- 
pletions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and 
conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run 
up into difficulties; which, however, persons who are 
capable, not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are 
capable also of seeing through ; that is, not of clearing 
up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, 
for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect 
to any one thing in nature ; but capable of seeing that 
the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by 
these objections. But then a thorough examination 
into religion with regard to these objections, which 
cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of 
pretty large compass, and from the nature of it re- 
quires some knowledge as well as time and attention 
to see how the evidence comes out upon balancing 
one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is 
the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked 
up these objections from others, and take for grant- 
ed they are of weight, upon the word of those from 
whom they received them, or by often retailing of 
them come to see, or fancy they see, them to be of 
weight, will not prepare themselves for such an exami- 
nation, with a competent degree of knowledge, or will 
not give that time and attention to the subject which, 
from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such infor- 
mation ; in this case they must remain in doubtfulness, 
ignorance, or error; in the same way as they must with 
regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, 
if they neglect the necessary means of being informed 
in them. 

15. But still, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a 
prince or common master were to send directions to a 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 


289 


servant, he would take care that they should always 
bear the certain marks who they came from, ob. The evi- 
and that their sense should be always plain, 
so as that there should be no possible doubt, master toas^-v- 
if he could help it, concerning the author- ant 
ity or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to 
all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy 
lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect 
to Him who is the governor of the world ; and particu- 
larly, that he does not afford us such information, with 
respect to our temporal affairs and interests, as experi- 
ence abundantly shows. However, there is a full an- 
swer to this objection, from the very nature of religion. 
For the reason why a prince would give his directions 
in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such 
an external action should be done, without concerning 
himself with the motive or principle upon which it is 
done ; that is, he regards only the external event, or the 
things being done, and not at all, properly speaking, the 
doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole of moral- 
ity and religion, consisting merely in action itself, there 
is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if the 
prince be supposed to regard only the action ; that is, 
only to desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the 
understanding or loyalty of a servant, he would not al- 
ways give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be 
proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality 
and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as 
only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus 
that we should act virtuously in such given circum- 
stances ; not that we should be brought to act so by his 
changing of our circumstances. And if God’s will be 
thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and 
strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will ; which is 
a most weighty consideration. Or his will may be con- 
sidered only as conditional — that if we act so and so, we 
19 


290 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


shall be rewarded; if otherwise, punished; of which 
conditional will of the Author of nature, the whole con- 
stitution of it affords most certain instances. 

16. Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion 
necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation : 

Probation im- and the credibility of our being at all in 
beln uie lc «Sg8 such a state being admitted, there seems no 
objected to. peculiar difficulty in supposing our proba- 
tion to be, just as it is, in those respects which are above 
objected against. There seems no pretense, from the 
reason of the thing , to say that the trial cannot equitably 
be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably to 
certain information, or such as admits no room for 
doubt ; so as that there can be no danger of miscar- 
riage, but either from their not attending to what they 
certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying 
them on to act contrary to it. For since ignorance and 
doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as really 
as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since the two 
former are to be put to the same account as difficulties 
in practice; men’s moral probation may also be, whether 
they will take due care to inform themselves by impar- 
tial consideration, and afterward whether they will act 
as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, 
however doubtful. And this, we find by experience , is 
frequently our probation, (pages 77, 282, etc.,) in our 
temporal capacity. For the information which we want, 
with regard to our worldly interests, is by no means al- 
ways given us of course, without any care of our own. 
And we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward 
secret prejudices; and also to the deceit of others. So 
that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often 
requires much and difficult consideration. Then after 
we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon 
which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetu- 
ally doubtful to a very high degree. And the constitution 


Chap. VI.] Revelation not Universal. 291 

and course of the world in fact is such, as that want of 
impartial consideration what we have to do, and ventur- 
ing upon extravagant courses, because it is doubtful 
what will be the consequences, are often naturally, that 
is, providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct oc- 
casioned by heedless -inattention to what we certainly 
know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion. 

17. Several of the observations here made may well 
seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. 
But if the persons for whose sake they are w 

1 J We acton evi- 

made think so ; persons who object as above, deuce lower than 
and throw on all regard to religion under 
pretense of want of evidence ; I desire them to consider 
again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing 
unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not 
having such a sense of religion, and serious solicitude 
about it,, as even their state of skepticism does in all 
reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflec- 
tion of these persons that our nature and condition nec- 
essarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act 
upon evidence much lower than what is commonly 
called probable ; to guard not only against what we ful- 
ly believe will, but also against what we think it sup- 
posable may, happen ; and to engage in pursuits when 
the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible 
that possibly we may succeed in them. 


292 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


CHAPTER VII. 

OF THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.* 

T HE presumptions against revelation, and objections 
against the general scheme of Christianity, and 

Proof aside P articular thin g s relating to it, being re- 
from miracles moved, there remains to be considered, what 

and prophecy. . . 

positive evidence we have for the truth of 
it : chiefly in order to see what the analogy of nature 
suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections 
against it ; or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the 
plain, natural rule of judgment and of action in our 
temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same 
kind of evidence, and the same kind of objections 
against it, that we have in the case before us. 

Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seem to 
be several things of great weight, not reducible to the 

* [At the place where we now find ourselves, Butler makes a transi- 
tion in his argument : he passes from the subject-matter of Christian- 
ity to its evidence. He has hitherto been employed in removing the 
objections against Christianity itself by the argument of analogy, and 
by the same engine he now proceeds to remove the objections that 
maybe leveled against the proof of it. The two objects are altogeth- 
er distinct. ... In the discharge of this second service, he is not 
called upon to propound very fully, or in the way of positive vindi- 
cation, the evidences of Christianity. He adverts to them ; he states 
what they are ; he even renders a passing homage to their authority 
and force ; but his proper task is to do by them what he had before 
done by the subject-matter of revelation, that is, clear away the ob- 
jections, not now against the doctrine of Christianity, but against the 
proof of it, and that by showing that the similar or analogous objec- 
tions in other cases are not admitted to have the validity which, in 
the case of the evangelical story, the opponents of the gospel would 
fain allow to them.— CHALMERS.] 


Chap. VI IJ Evidence for Christianity. 


293 


head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy, 
in the common acceptation of the words. But these 
two are its direct and fundamental proofs ; and those 
other things, however considerable they are, yet ought 
never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but al- 
ways to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of 
Christianity will be a long series of things reaching, as 
it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present 
time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the 
direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up, all 
of them together, one argument; the conviction arising 
from which kind of proof may be compared to what they 
call the effect in architecture or other works of art — a re- 
sult from a great number of things so and so disposed, 
and taken into one view. I shall, therefore, first, make 
some observations relating to miracles, and the appear- 
ing completion of prophecy, and consider what anal- 
ogy suggests in answer to the objections brought against 
this evidence. And secondly , I shall endeavor to give 
some account of the general argument now mentioned, 
consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, 
considered as making up one argument : this being the 
kind of proof upon which we determine most questions 
of difficulty concerning common facts alleged to have 
happened, or seeming likely to happen ; especially ques- 
tions relating to conduct. 

2. First , I shall make some observations upon the di- 
rect proof of Christianity from miracles and 
prophecy, and upon the objections alleged 
against it. 

I. Now the following observations, relating to the his- 
torical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of 
Christianity, appear to be of great weight. 

1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical 
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets 
as of the common civil history of Moses and the kings 


294 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


of Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. 
And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same histor- 
ical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles 
as of the common matters related in them.* This in- 
deed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable 
man, if the authors of these books, like many other his- 
torians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner 
of writing their aim ; though they had interspersed mir- 
acles in their works, at proper distances, and upon prop- 
er occasions. These might have animated a dull rela- 
tion, amused the reader, and engaged his attention. 
And the same account would naturally have been given 
of them, as of the speeches and descriptions of such 
authors; the same account, in a manner, as is to be 
given why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. 
But the facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, 
are related in plain, unadorned narratives ; and both of 
them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same 
footing of historical evidence. 

Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an ac- 
_ . , count of miracles fully sufficient to prove 

Scripture quot- ... r 

ed from age t# the truth of Christianity, are quoted as gen- 
uine, from the age in which they are said 
to be written down to the present: and no other parts 

* [This was clearly observed and distinctly stated by Lord Boling- 
broke : “ The miracles in the Bible are not like those in Livy, de- 
tached pieces that do not disturb the civil* history, which goes on very 
well without them. But the miracles of the Jewish historian are in- 
timately connected with all the civil affairs, and make a necessary 
and inseparable part. The whole history is founded in them ; it con- 
sists of little else ; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a 
history of nothing.” — Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, vol. iii, p. 279. 
The state of the case seems to be, that the gravity, distinctness, and 
good sense of the Scripture histories, in relating civil affairs, prove 
those narratives not to be mythical , that is, not to be the product of 
imagination. And the intimate connection of the miraculous with 
the natural facts, proves that the former are not merely introduced 
for the sake of ornament. — F.] 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


295 


of them, material in the present question, are omitted to 
be quoted in such manner as to afford any sort of proof 
of their not being genuine. And as common history, 
when called in question in any instance, may often be 
greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events 
more known and acknowledged; and as the common 
Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed ; 
so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in 
particular instances, but in general. For the establish- 
ment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were 
events contemporary with the miracles related to be 
wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, 
these events are just what we should have expected, 
upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to 
attest the truth of these religions. These miracles are 
a satisfactory account of those events, of which no other 
satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at 
all but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to 
be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and di- 
rect account of this history, how it came to be written, 
and to be received in the world as a true history, is, that 
it really is so ; nor can any other account of it be easy 
and direct. Now though an account not at all obvious, 
but very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be and 
often is, the true account of a matter; yet it cannot be 
admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere 
guess, supposition, and possibility, when opposed to his- 
torical evidence, prove nothing but that historical evi- 
dence is not demonstrative. 

3. Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is, 
that the Scripture history, in general, is to be admitted 
as an authentic genuine history till some- scripture his- 
what positive be alleged sufficient to invali- 
date it. But no man will deny the conse- idated - 
quence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by 
as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none ; 


296 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

even though the evidence now mentioned for its author- 
ity were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted 
by historical evidence on the other side, if there be any ; 
or general incredibility in the things related, or incon- 
sistence in the general turn of the history, would prove 
it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face of the 
matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is 
that it is an authentic history, it cannot be determined 
to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. And 
the following observations, in support of these, and co- 
incident with them, will greatly confirm the historical 
evidence for the truth of Christianity. 

4. 2. The epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epis- 
tolary writing, and moreover from several of them being 
Evidence from written, not to particular persons, but to 
fodependerdand Churches, carry in them evidences of their 
peculiar. being genuine beyond what can be, in a 

mere historical narrative, left to the world at large.* 
This evidence, joined with that which they have in 
common with the rest of the New Testament, seems not 
to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying 
their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of 
fact or of criticism. I say , particular pretence for deny- 
ing it j because any single fact of such a kind and such 
antiquity may have general doubts raised concerning it, 
from the very nature of human affairs and human testi- 
mony. There is also to be mentioned a distinct and 
particular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle 
chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians : 
from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Ro- 
manus, in an epistle of his own to that Church.f Now 
these epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached 

* [The argument here hinted at is forcibly presented in Paley’s 
admirable work, “ Horae Paulinae.” See also Blunt’s “ Undesigned 
Coincidences both of the Old and New Testaments.”] 

f Clem. Rom., Ep. I, ch. xlvii. 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


297 


from all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight ; 
and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. 
For, 

In them the author declares, that he received the 
Gospel in general, and the institution of the communion 
in particular, not from the rest of the apostles, or jointly 
together with them, but alone from Christ himself ; whom 
he declares, likewise, conformably to the history in the 
Acts, that he saw after his ascension.* So that the tes- 
timony of St. Paul is to be considered as detached from 
that of the rest of the apostles. 

And he declares lurther that he was endued with a 
power of working miracles, as what was publicly known 
to this very people ; speaks of frequent arid great varie- 
ty of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very 
Churches to which he was writing ; which he was reprov- 
ing for several irregularities, and where he had personal 
opposers : he mentions these gifts incidentally, in the 
most easy manner, and without effort; by way of re- 
proof to those who had them, for their indecent use of 
them ; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison 
of moral virtues. In short, he speaks to these Churches 
of these miraculous powers in the manner any one would 
speak to another of a thing which was as familiar, and 
as much known in common to them both, as any thing 
in the world. f And this, as hath been observed by 
several persons, is surely a very considerable thing. 

5. 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact that Chris- 
tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be re- 
ceived, upon the allegation, that is, as un- Christianlty 
believers would speak, upon the pretense of avowedly found- 
miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth 
of it in such an age ; and that it was actually received by 

* Gal. i ; 1 Cor. xi, 23, etc. ; 1 Cor. xv, 8. 

f Rom. xv, 19 ; 1 Cor. xii, 8-28, etc., and chap, xiii, 1, 2, 8, and 
the whole xivth chap. ; 2 Cor. xii, 12, 13 : Gal. iii, 2, 5. 


298 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed 
belief of the reality of these miracles. And Christianity, 
including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems 
distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean 
that this does not appear to be the case with regard to 
any other. For surely it will not be supposed to lie 
upon any person to prove, by positive historical evidence, 
that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Moham- 
medanism was first received in the world upon the foot- 
ing of supposed miracles,* that is, public ones ; for, as 
revelation is itself miraculous, all pretense to it must 
necessarily imply some pretense of miracles. And it is 
a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, 
propagated by other means. And as particular institu- 
tions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be con- 
firmed by miracles, after those institutions had obtained 
are not to the purpose ; so, were there what might be 
called historical proof, that any of them were introduced 
by a supposed divine command, believed to be attested 
by miracles, these would not be in any wise parallel. 
For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted 
for, after parties are formed, and have power in their 
hands ; and the leaders of them are in veneration with 
the multitude ; and political interests are blended with 
religious claims and religious distinctions. But before 
any thing of this kind, for a few persons, and those of 
the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great 
numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received 
upon the particular evidence of miracles — this is quite 
another thing. 

And I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary 

* See the Koran, chap, xiii and xvii. [The infidel says, unless 
a sign be sent down unto him from his Lord, we will not believe ; 
thou art a preacher only. — Sale’s Trans., p. 201, ed. 4to. “Nothing 
hindered us from sending thee with miracles, except that the former 
nations have charged them with imposture.”] 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 299 

that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the circum- 
stances of it, is peculiar to the Christian religion. How- 
ever, the fact itself is allowed, that Chris- 

, . , , . _ In this peculiar. 

tianity obtained, that is, was professed to be 
received, in the world, upon the belief of miracles, im- 
mediately in the age in which it is said those miracles 
were wrought : or that this is what its first converts 
would have alleged as the reason for their embracing it. 
Now certainly it is not to be supposed that such num- 
bers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, 
should forsake the religion of their country, in which 
they had been educated ; separate themselves from their 
friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemni- 
ties, to which the common people are so greatly addicted, 
and which were of a nature to engage them much more 
than any thing of that sort among us; and embrace 
a religion, which could not but expose them to many in- 
conveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up 
the world in a great degree, even from the very first, 
and before the empire engaged in form against them : 
it cannot be supposed that such numbers should make 
so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change 
in their whole institution of life, unless they were 
really convinced of the truth of those miracles upon 
the knowledge or belief of which they professed to 
make it. 

And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that 
the generality of the first converts to Christianity must 
have believed them; that as, by becoming p lrstconTCrt8 
Christians, they declared to the world they J*^ eved mha - 
were satisfied of the truth of those miracles, 
so this declaration was to be credited. And this their 
testimony is the same kind of evidence for those mira- 
cles as if they had put it in writing, and these writings 
had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because 
it is of facts which they had capacity and full opportu- 


300 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


nity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct from the 
direct or express historical evidence, though it is of the 
same kind ; and it would be allowed to be distinct in all 
cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more 
ancient historians, and disputed in after ages : that this 
fact is acknowledged to have been believed, by great 
numbers of the age in which the historian says it was 
done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, 
quite distinct from the express testimony of the histo- 
rian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and 
the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged 
too ; and their backwardness even to believe, and great- 
er still to practice, what makes against their interest. 
And it must particularly be remembered, that education, 
and prejudice, and authority were against Christianity 
in the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate 
conversion of such numbers is a real presumption of 
somewhat more than human in this matter : * I say 
presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof, alone 
and by itself. Nor need any one of the things men- 
tioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by it- 
self ; and yet all of them together may be one of the 
strongest. 

6. Upon the whole : as there is large historical evi- 
dence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles 

* [Arnobius, one of the earliest Christian writers, says : “ Shall we 
say that the men of those times were inconsiderate, deceitful, and 
brutish enough to feign having seen what they never saw ? And that 
when they might have lived in peace and comfort they chose gratui- 
tous hatred and obloquy ? ” 

The rejection of Christianity by so many in the first ages was the 
result of the cqptinual action of personal hereditary prejudice and 
depravity capable of resisting any supposable evidence. But the 
reception of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences, and 
to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was 
enough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by 
some does not countervail the acceptance by others. — Malcom.] 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


301 


wrought in attestation of Christianity, collected by those 
who have writ upon the subject, it lies upon unbeliev- 
ers to show why this evidence is not to be 
credited. This way of speaking is, I think, ^th den unbeiiev- 
just, and what persons who write in de- eis ' 
fense of religion naturally fall into. Yet in a matter of 
such unspeakable importance, the proper question is, not 
whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, 
to maintain or confute objections ; but whether there 
really are any, against this evidence, sufficient in reason 
to destroy the credit of it ? However, unbelievers seem 
to take upon them the part of showing that there are. 

They allege that numberless enthusiastic people, in 
different ages and countries, expose themselves to the 
same difficulties which the primitive Chris- 

r . # Objections 

tians did, and are ready to give up their founded on en- 
lives for the most idle follies imaginable. 

But it is not very clear to what purpose this objection is 
brought. For every one, surely, in every case, must 
distinguish, between opinions and facts. And though 
testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any 
opinions at all ; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to be 
a proof of facts. And a person’s laying down his life in 
attestation of facts, or of opinions, is the strongest proof 
of his believing them. And if the apostles and their 
contemporaries did believe the facts in attestation of 
which they exposed themselves to sufferings and death, 
this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof 
of those facts; for they were such as came under the 
observation of their senses. And though it is not of 
equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the 
next age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses 
of those facts, as were the apostles and their contempo- 
raries, had, however, full opportunity to inform them- 
selves whether they were true or not, and gave equal 
proof of their believing them to be true. 


302 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


7. But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evi- 
dence of testimony, even for facts, in matters relating to 

„ , . religion ; some seem to think it totally and 
weakens evi- absolutely destroys the evidence of testi- 
mony upon this subject. And, indeed, the 
powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate 
in a like manner, are very wonderful in particular in- 
stances. But if great numbers of men, not appearing in 
any peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar sus- 
picion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard 
such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and 
are admitted to be in earnest ; such testimony is evi- 
dence of the strongest kind we can have for any matter 
of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, strong as it 
is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by con- 
trary testimony. And in an instance where one thought 
it was so overcome, it might be just to consider how far 
such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm : 
for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to 
be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or 
contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be ex- 
pected that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an 
account of such testimony, as that of enthusiasm must 
be ; an account so strange, that the generality of man- 
kind can scarce be made to understand what is meant 
by it ; it cannot, I say, be expected, that such account 
will be admitted of such evidence, when there is this 
direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that people real- 
ly saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they 
affirm sincerely, and with full assurance, that they did 
see and hear. 

Granting, then, that enthusiasm is not (strictly speak- 

The objection ffig) an absurd, but a possible account of 

supposes the r 

things attested such testimony, it is manifest that the very 

incredible, hence ... J 

of no force. mention of it goes upon the previous suppo- 

sition that the things so attested are incredible, and 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 303 

therefore need not be considered till they are shown to 
be so. Much less need it be considered after the con- 
trary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, 
to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a rev- 
elation in general, or in such a one as the Christian in 
particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly 
liable to enthusiasm, it may just be observed, that prej- 
udices almost without number, and without name, ro- 
mance, affectation, humor, a desire to engage attention 
or to surprise, the party spirit, custom, little competi- 
tions, unaccountable likings and dislikings ; these influ- 
ence men strongly in common matters. And as these 
prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by 
the persons themselves who are influenced by them, 
they are to be considered as influences of a like kind to 
enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common matters 
is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding. 

8. It is intimated further, in a more refined way of 
observation, that though it should be proved self-deception 
that the apostles and first Christians could combirlS^tL 
not, in some respects, be deceived them- apostles - 
selves, and in other respects cannot be thought to have 
intended to impose upon the world, yet it will not follow 
that their general testimony is to be believed, though 
truly handed down to us ; because they might still in 
part, that is, in other respects, be deceived themselves, 
and in part also designedly impose upon others; which, 
it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture 
of real enthusiasm and real knavery, to be met with in 
the same characters. 

And I must confess, I think the matter of fact con- 
tained in this observation upon mankind is not to be 
denied; and tffat somewhat very much akin to it, is 
often supposed in Scripture, as a very common case, and 
most severely reproved. But it were to have been ex- 
pected, that persons capable of applying this observa- 


304 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


tion, as applied in the objection, might also frequently 
have met with the like mixed character in instances 
where religion was quite out of the case. The thing 
plainly is, that mankind are naturally endowed with rea- 
son, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and 
falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with verac- 
ity, or a regard to truth in what they say : but from 
many occasions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and 
biased, and deceived themselves, and capable of intend- 
ing to deceive others, in every different degree ; inso- 
much that, as we are all liable to be deceived by preju- 
dice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing 
for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not 
invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to 
propagate it with heightening circumstances, after it is 
once invented and set agoing. And others, though they 
would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree 
of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But 
notwithstanding all this, human testimony remains still 
a natural ground of assent ; and this assent, a natural 
principle of action. 

9. It is objected further, that, however it has hap- 
pened, the fact is, that mankind have in different ages 
Delusions from been strangely deluded with pretenses to 
alleged miracles. m i rac i es anc [ WO nders. But it is by no 

means to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or 
are at all more liable to be, deceived by these pretenses 
than by others. 

It is added, that there is a very considerable degree 
of historical evidence for miracles which are on all 
hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose that 
there were even the like historical evidence for these to 
what there is for those alleged in proof *of Christianity, 
which yet is in nowise allowed, but suppose this ; the 
consequence would not be, that the evidence of the lat- 
ter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


305 


world who, in common cases, would conclude thus. 
For what would such a conclusion really amount to but 
this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or 
any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other 
evidence neither confuted nor overbalanced ? To argue 
that because there is, if there were, like evidence from 
testimony for miracles acknowledged false, as for those 
in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in 
the latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as 
to argue, that if two men of equally good reputation had 
given evidence in different cases no way connected, and 
one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted 
the testimony of the other. 

10. Upon the whole, then, the general observation 
that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from 
enthusiasm in religion, and principles equiv- Testimony may 
alent to enthusiasm in common matters, and be weakened yet 

not destroyed. 

in both from negligence ; and that they are 
so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; 
this does, indeed, weaken the evidence of testimony in 
all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these 
things will appear to different men to weaken the evi- 
dence of testimony in different degrees ; in degrees pro- 
portionable to the observations they have made, or the 
notions they have any way taken up, concerning the 
weakness, and negligence, and dishonesty of mankind ; 
or concerning the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices 
equivalent to it. But it seems to me, that people do not 
know what they say, who affirm these things to destroy 
the evidence from testimony which we have of the truth 
of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of 
testimony in any case but a proof, or probability, that 
persons are not competent judges of the facts to which 
they give testimony; or that they are actually under 
some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular 
case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human 
20 


30 6 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


actions require that testimony be admitted. It can 
never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evi- 
dence, indolently to say, that there are so many princi- 
ples from whence men are liable to be deceived them- 
selves, and disposed to deceive others, especially in 
matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. 
And it is surprising persons can help reflecting, that this 
very manner of speaking supposes, they are not satisfied 
that there is nothing in the evidence of which they speak 
thus ; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make 
this reflection, that it is, on such a subject, a very 
material one.* 

n. And over against all these objections, is to be set 
the importance of Christianity, as what must have en- 
The importance gaged the attention of its first converts, so 
prev?Jted ia id\e as to have rendered them less liable to be 
delusions. deceived from carelessness than they would 
in common matters; and, likewise, the strong obliga- 
tions to veracity which their religion laid them under : 
so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that 
they could not ,be deceived themselves, nor would de- 
ceive others. And this presumption, in this degree, is 
peculiar to the testimony we have been considering. 

In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and 
have an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very 
What unbeiiev- easy; yet they are necessary, and necessary 
ers must admit. tQ i n order to connect a dis- 

course, and distinctly to lay before the view of the read- 
er what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as 
proved. Now the conclusion from the foregoing obser- 
vations is, I think, beyond all doubt this : that unbe- 
lievers must be forced to admit the external evidence 
for Christianity, that is, the proof of miracles wrought to 
attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable ; 
though they cannot allow it to be sufficient to convince 
* See the foregoing chapter. 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 307 

them of the reality of those miracles. And as they must, 
in all reason, admit this, so it seems to me, that upon 
consideration they would in fact admit it ; those of them, 
I mean, who know any thing at all of the matter : in 
like manner as persons, in many cases, own they see 
strong evidence from testimony for the truth of things, 
which yet they cannot be convinced are true ; cases, 
suppose, where there is contrary testimony, or things 
which they think, whether with or without reason, to be 
incredible. But there is no testimony contrary to that 
which we have been considering; and it has been fully 
proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity in 
general, or in any part of it. 

12. II. As to the evidence for Christianity from 
prophecy I shall only make some few gen- prophecy— ob- 
eral observations, which are suggested by the Sfvaiidate^its 11 
analogy of nature ; that is, by the acknowl- proo£ 
edged natural rules of judging in common matters con- 
cerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. 

1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a 
prophecy does not in any degree invalidate the proof 
of foresight, arising from the appearing completion of 
those other parts which are understood. For the case 
is evidently the same as if those parts which are not un- 
derstood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an 
unknown tongue. Whether this observation be com- 
monly attended to or not, it is so evident that one can 
scarce bring one’s self to set down an instance in com- 
mon matters to exemplify it. However, suppose a writ- 
ing, partly in cypher, and partly in plain words at length, 
and that in the part one understood, there appeared 
mention of several known facts; it would never come 
into any man’s thoughts to imagine, that if he under- 
stood the whole, perhaps he might find that those facts 
were not in reality known by the latter. Indeed, both 
in this example, and the thing intended to be exempli- 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


308 


fied by it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, 
suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes 
occasion a doubt whether one understood the literal 
meaning of such a part ; but this comes under another 
consideration. 

For the same reason, though a man should be incapa- 
ble, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or 
from not having turned his studies this way, even so 
much as to judge, whether particular prophecies have 
been throughout completely fulfilled ; yet he may see, 
in general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, 
as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight 
more than human in such prophecies, and of such events 
being intended by them. For the same reason, also, 
though by means of the deficiencies in civil history, and 
the different accounts of historians, the most learned 
should not be able to make out to satisfaction that such 
parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and 
throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof of foresight 
may arise from that general completion of them which 
is made out : as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the 
Giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by 
such parts of prophecy. 

13. 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to 
such and such events, is itself a proof that it was intend- 
... ed of them ; as the rules by which we natu- 

The applicabil- ’ J 

ity of a series rally judge and determine, in common cases 

of prophecies is „ , 

proof of intend- parallel to this, will show. This observa- 

ed application. . . 

tion I make in answer to the common ob- 
jection against the application of the prophecies, that 
considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not 
at all appear that they were intended of those particular 
events to which they are applied by Christians ; and 
therefore it is to be supposed, that, if they meant any 
thing, they were intended of other events unknown to 
us, and not of these at all. 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


309 


Now there are two kinds of writing which bear a great 
resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter 
before us; the mythological and the satirical, where the 
satire is, to a certain degree, concealed. And a man 
might be assured that he understood what an author in- 
tended by a fable or parable, related without any appli- 
cation or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capa- 
ble of such application, and that such a moral might 
naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully 
assured that such persons and events were intended in 
a satirical writing, merely from its being applicable to 
them. And agreeably to the last observation, he might 
be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not 
enough informed in affairs or in the story of such per- 
sons, to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction 
that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, 
of these writings, would be greater or less, in proportion as 
he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such 
application, and in proportion to the number of partic- 
ular things capable of it. And thus if a long series of 
prophecy is applicable to the present state of the Church 
and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the 
world, some thousand years after these prophecies were 
delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before 
the coming of Christ is applicable to him ; these things 
are in themselves a proof that the prophetic history was 
intended of him, and of those events; in proportion as 
the general turn of it is capable of such application, and 
to the number and variety of particular prophecies ca- 
pable of it. And though in all just way of considera- 
tion, the appearing completion of prophecies is to be 
allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine 
their meaning; yet it is to be remembered further, that 
the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a Messiah 
before his coming, in much the same manner as Chris- 
tians do now ; and that the primitive Christians inter- 


3io 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


preted the prophecies respecting the state of the Church 
and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the 
event seems to confirm and verify. And from these 
things it may be made to appear, 

14. 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if 
that could be, that the prophets thought of some other 
events, in such and such predictions, and 

Mistakes as . . 

to the meaning not those at all which Christians allege to 

of prophecy do , „ . , , . 

not weaken its be completions or those predictions ; or that 
such and such prophecies are capable of be- 
ing applied to other events than those to which Christians 
apply them — that this would not confute or destroy the 
force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard 
to those very instances. For, observe how this matter 
really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author 
of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied 
to any degree, that one knew the whole of what he in- 
tended in it, one should be assured or satisfied to such 
a degree, that one knew the whole meaning of that book ; 
for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning 
of the author. But if one knew a person to have com- 
piled a book of memoirs which he received from anoth- 
er of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, 
especially if it were a book full of great intricacies and 
difficulties, it would in nowise follow, that one knew the 
whole meaning of the book from knowing the whole 
meaning of the compiler; for the original memoirs, 
that is, the author of them, might have, and there would 
be no degree of presumption, in many cases, against 
supposing him to have, some further meaning than the 
compiler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures and the 
things contained in them can have no other or further 
meaning than those persons thought or had who first 
recited or wrote them, is evidently saying that those 
persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of 
those books, that is, that they are not inspired; which 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 31 i 

is absurd, while the authority of these books is under 
examination, that is, till you have determined they are 
of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, 
it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they 
have, for this is taking for granted that they are inspired, 
but that they may have some further meaning than what 
the compilers saw or understood. And upon this sup- 
position, it is supposable also that this further meaning 
may be fulfilled. 

Now events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted 
in a different meaning from that in which the prophets 
are supposed to have understood them ; this affords, in 
a manner, the same proof that this different sense was 
originally intended, as it would have afforded, if the 
prophets had not understood their predictions in the 
sense it is supposed they did ; because there is no pre- 
sumption of their sense of them being the whole sense 
of them. And it has been already shown, that the ap- 
parent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be 
explanatory of its meaning. So that the question is, 
whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a 
natural or proper, that is, in any real sense of the words 
of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight 
more than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, 
supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I 
say, supposed; for though I think it clear that the 
prophets did not understand the full meaning of their 
predictions, it is another question, how far they thought 
they did, and in what sense they understood them. 

15. Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those 
persons busy themselves who endeavor to prove that 
the prophetic history is applicable to events Fulfillment 
of the age in which it was written, or of confinSi' topast 
ages before it. Indeed, to have proved this ages> 
before there was any appearance of a further completion 
of it, might have answered some purpose ; for it might 


312 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part IT. 


have prevented the expectation of any such further com- 
pletion. Thus, could Porphyry have shown that some 
principal parts of the Book of Daniel, for instance, the 
seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Chris- 
tians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to 
events which happened before or about the age of An- 
tiochus Epiphanes; this might have prevented them 
from expecting any further completion of it. And un- 
less there was then, as I think there must have been, 
external evidence concerning that book more than is 
come down to us, such a discovery might have been a 
stumbling-block in the way of Christianity itself; con- 
sidering the authority which our Saviour has given to 
the Book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme 
of Christianity presupposes the truth of it. But even 
this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of 
very little weight with reasonable men now ; if this pas- 
sage, thus applicable to events before the age of Por- 
phyry, appears to be applicable also to events which 
succeeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I 
mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate that the 
division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was 
divided into about that number, were alone and by it- 
self of any moment in verifying the prophetic history ; 
but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. 
And thus, upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evi- 
dently must be, as above put, Whether the prophecies 
are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of the 
world and of the Church ; applicable in such a degree 

* It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this 
way. For Jerome on the place says : “ Duas posteriores bestias — in 
uno Macedonum regno ponit.” And as to the ten kings: “Decern 
reges enumerat, qui, fuerunt soevissimi ; ipsosque reges non unius 
ponit regni, verbi gratia, Macedoniae, Syriae, Asiae.et yEgypti ; sed de 
diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem.” And in this way of in- 
terpretation, any thing may be made of any thing. 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 313 

as to imply foresight : not whether they are capable 
of any other application ; though I know no pretense 
for saying the general turn of them is capable of any 
other. 

16. These observations are, I think, just, and the evi- 
dence referred to in them real ; though there may be 
people who will not accept of such imper- Defects in char- 
feet information from Scripture. Some, too, ^ r er leS of n evi- 
have not integrity and regard enough to truth dence - 

to attend to evidence which keeps the mind in doubt, per- 
haps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort 
from what they expected. And it plainly requires a de- 
gree of modesty and fairness beyond what every one 
has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to himself, 
that there is a real appearance of somewhat of great 
weight in this matter, though he is not able thoroughly 
to satisfy himself about it ; but it shall have its influence 
upon him, in proportion to its appearing reality and 
weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with 
the negligence, presumption, and willfulness of the gen- 
erality, to determine at once, with a decisive air, there 
is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that abso- 
lute contempt and scorn with which this evidence is 
treated in the world I do not mention. For what, in- 
deed, can be said to persons who are weak enough in 
their understandings to think this any presumption 
against it ; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in 
their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon 
such a subject ? 

17. I shall now, Secondly , Endeavor to give some ac- 
count of the general argument for the truth of Christian- 
ity, consisting both of the direct and cir- Generalargu . 
cumstantial evidence, considered as making ment Reasons 

7 for stating it 

up one argument. Indeed, to state and ex- 
amine this argument fully would be a work much be- 
yond the compass of this whole treatise ; nor is so much 


3H 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II* 


as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Vet 
the present subject requires to have some brief account 
of it given. For it is the kind of evidence upon which 
most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are 
determined ; evidence arising from various coincidences, 
which support and confirm each other, and in this man- 
ner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under 
consideration. And I choose to do it also : first , be- 
cause it seems to be of the greatest importance, and not 
duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revela- 
tion is, not some direct and express things only, but a 
great variety of circumstantial things also ; and that 
though each of these direct and circumstantial things is 
indeed to be considered separately, yet they are after- 
ward to be joined together; for that the proper force 
of the evidence consists in the result of those several 
things, considered in their respects to each other, and 
united into one view ; and, in the next place, because it 
seems to me, that the matters of fact here set down, 
which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be ac- 
knowledged by them also to contain together a degree 
of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to 
lay these several things before themselves distinctly, 
and then with attention consider them together ; in- 
stead of that cursory thought of them to which we are 
familiarized. For being familiarized to the cursory 
thought of things, as really hinders the weight of them 
from being seen, as from having its due influence upon 
practice. 

1 8. The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to 
be inquired into, is this : that over and above our rea- 
The point to son and affections, which God has given us 
be proved. f or information of our judgment and the 
conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, 
given us an account of himself and his moral govern- 
ment over the world, implying a future state of rewards 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


3i5 


and punishments ; that is, hath revealed the system of 
natural religion ; for natural religion may be externally 
(page 194, etc.) revealed by God, as the ignorant may 
be taught it by mankind, their fellow-creatures — that 
God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as 
well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this moral 
system ; together with an account of a particular dis- 
pensation of providence, which reason could no way 
have discovered, and a particular institution of religion 
founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their 
present wretched condition, and raising them to the per- 
fection and final happiness of their nature. 

19. This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be 
considered as wholly historical. For prophecy is noth- 
ing but the history of events before they The revelation 
come to pass ; doctrines, also, are matters 18 hlstoncal - 
of fact; and precepts come under the same notion. 
And the general design of Scripture, which contains in 
it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be 
said to be, to give us an account of the world in this 
one single view — as God’s world ; by which it appears 
essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as 
I have found, except such as are copied from it. It be- 
gins with an account of God’s creation of the world, in 
order to ascertain and distinguish from all others who 
is the object of our worship by what he has done ; in 
order to ascertain who he is concerning whose provi- 
dence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this sa- 
cred book all along treats; the Maker and Proprietor 
of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of 
nature : in order likewise to distinguish him from the 
idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings, 
that is, no beings at all ; or else part of that creation, 
the historical relation of which is here given. And St. 
John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account 
of the creation, begins his gospel with an account of our 


3i 6 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


Saviour’s pre-existence, and that “all things were made 
by him, and without him was not any thing made that 
was made,” (John i, 3 ;) agreeably to the doctrine of St. 
Paul, that “God created all things by Jesus Christ.” 
Eph. iii, 9. This being premised, the Scripture, taken 
together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an 
abridgment of the history of the world in the view just 
now mentioned: that is, a general account of the con- 
dition of religion and its professors during the continu- 
ance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness 
which it every-where supposes the world to lie in. 
And this account of the state of religion carries with it 
some brief account of the political state of things, as 
religion is affected by it. Revelation, indeed, considers 
the common affairs of this world, and what is going on 
in it, as a mere scene of distraction, and cannot be sup- 
posed to concern itself with foretelling at what time 
Rome, or Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, 
should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and 
dissoluteness which all places equally aspire to be ; can- 
not, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild 
scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some 
very general account of the chief governments of the 
world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or 
shall be affected by them, from the first transgression, 
and during the whole interval of the world’s continuing 
in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of 
both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, 
and in great variety of expression; “The times of the 
restitution of all things,” (Acts iii, 21 ;) when “ the mys- 
tery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his 
servants the prophets,” (Rev. x, 7 ;) when “ the God of 
heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be de- 
stroyed ; and the kingdom shall not be left to other peo- 
ple,” (Dan. ii, 44,) as it is represented to be during this 
apostasy, but “judgment shall be given to the saints,” 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 317 

(Dan. vii, 22,) and “they shall reign,” (Rev. xxii, 5 ;) 
“and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of 
the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to 
the people of the saints of the Most High.” Dan. vii, 27. 

20. Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would 
remark, how great a length of time the whole relation 
takes up, near six thousand years of which The length oi 
are past : and how great a variety of things it 
treats of ; the natural and moral system or ed * 
history of the world, including the time when it was 
formed, all contained in the very first book, and evi- 
dently written in a rude and unlearned age ; and in 
subsequent books, the various common and prophetic 
history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. 
Now all this together gives the largest scope for criti- 
cism ; and for confutation of what is capable of being 
confuted, either from reason, or from common history, 
or from any inconsistence in its several parts. And it 
is a thing which deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that 
whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the 
evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that 
it is not true ; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a 
positive argument that it is true. For could any com- 
mon relation, of such antiquity, extent, and variety, (for 
in these things the stress of what I am now observing 
lies,) be proposed to the examination of the world ; that 
it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be 
confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfac- 
tion of reasonable men ; this would be thought a strong 
presumptive proof of its truth. And, indeed, it must 
be a proof of it, just in proportion to the probability, 
that if it were false it might be shown to be so; and 
this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon 
principles and in ways of arguing which have been 
clearly obviated. (Chap, ii, iii, etc.) Nor does it at all 
appear that any set of men who believe natural religion 


3 1 8 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

are of the opinion that Christianity has been thus con- 
futed. But to proceed : — 

21. Together with the moral system of the world, the 
Old Testament contains a chronological account of the 

beginning of it, and from thence, an unbroken 

Its contents. ° ° 

genealogy of mankind for many ages before 
common history begins ; and carried on as much further 
as to make up a continued thread of history of the 
length of between three and four thousand years. It 
contains an account of God’s making a covenant with a 
particular nation, that they should be his people, and 
he would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of his often 
interposing miraculously in their affairs ; giving them 
the promise, and, long after, the possession, of a partic- 
ular country ; assuring them of the greatest national 
prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposi- 
tion to the idols which the rest of the world worshiped, 
and obey his commands, and threatening them with un- 
exampled punishments if they disobeyed him, and fell 
into the general idolatry ; insomuch, that this one nation 
should continue to be the observation and the wonder 
of all the world. It declares particularly, that “ God 
would scatter them among all people, from one end 
of the earth unto the other;” but that “when they 
should return unto the Lord their God, he would have 
compassion upon them, and gather them, from all the 
nations whither he had scattered them ; that Israel 
should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salva- 
tion, and not be ashamed or confounded, world without 
end.” And as some of those promises are conditional, 
others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed, that 
the time should come when “ the people should be all 
righteous, and inherit the land forever; that though 
God would make a full end of all nations whither he 
had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end 
of them : that he would bring again the captivity of his 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


319 


people Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they 
should be no more pulled up out of their land ; that the 
seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation for- 
ever.”* It foretells that God would raise them up a 
particular person, in whom all his promises should final- 
ly be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who should be, in a high 
and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Saviour. 
This was foretold in such a manner as raised a general 
expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears 
from the New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact ; 
an expectation of his coming at such a particular time, 
before any one appeared claiming to be that person, and 
when there was no ground for such an expectation but 
from the prophecies; which expectation, therefore, must 
in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those 
prophecies, if there were any doubt about their mean- 
ing. It seems, moreover, to foretell that this person 
should be rejected by that nation to whom he had been 
so long promised, and though he was so much desired 
by them.f And it expressly foretells, that he should be 
the Saviour of the Gentiles ; and even that the comple- 
tion of the scheme contained in this book, and then be- 
gun and in its progress, should be somewhat so great, 
that, in comparison with it, the restoration of the Jews 
alone would be but of small account : “ It is a- light 
thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the 
tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel : 

I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou 
mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth.” 
And, “ In the last daysj the mountain of the Lord’s 
house shall be established in the top of the mountains, 
and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations 
shall flow into it — for out of Zion shall go forth the law, 

* Deut. xxviii, 64 ; xxx, 2, 3 ; Isa. xlv, 17 ; lx, 2 1 ; Jer. xxx, n ; 
xlvi, 28 ; Amos ix, 15 ; Jer. xxxi, 36. 

| Isa. viii, 14, 15 ; xlix, 5 ; liii ; Mai. i, 10, 11, and iii. 


320 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he 
shall judge among the nations — and the Lord alone 
shall be exalted in that day, and the idols he shall ut- 
terly abolish.” * The Scripture further contains an 
account, that at the time the Messiah was expected a 
person rose up in this nation claiming to be that Mes- 
siah, to be the person whom all the prophets referred to, 
and in whom they should center ; that he spent some 
years in a continued course of miraculous works, and 
endued his immediate disciples and followers with a 
power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that 
religion which he commissioned them to publish ; that, 
invested with this authority and power, they made 
numerous converts in the remotest countries, and set- 
tled and established his religion in the world ; to the 
end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic 
account of the state of this religion among mankind. 

22. Let us now suppose a person, utterly ignorant of 
history, to have all this related to him out of the Script- 
ure. Or, suppose, such a one, having the 

Facts submit- . . _ . _ . ° 

ted to a candid Scripture put into his hands, to remark these 
things in it, not knowing but that the whole, 
even its civil history, as well as the other parts of it, 
might be, from beginning to end, an entire invention ; 
and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the reve- 
lation here related was real or a fiction ? And instead 
of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told 
the following confessed facts, and then to unite them 
into one view. 

Let him first be told, in how great a degree the pro- 
fession and establishment of natural religion, the belief 
that there is one God to be worshiped, that virtue is his 

* Isa. xlix, 6 ; ii ; xi ; lvi, 7 ; Mai. i, n. To which must be add- 
ed the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testa- 
ment, and very many in the Old, which describe what t shall be the 
completion of the revealed plan of Providence. 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


321 


law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished 
hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; Truths ortei- 

J J nated by revela- 

m how very great a degree, I say, the pro- tion. itsimpor- 
fession and establishment of this moral sys- thority. 
tern in the world is owing to the revelation, whether 
real or supposed, contained in this book ; the establish- 
ment of this moral system, even in those countries 
which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the 
Scripture. (Page 274.) Let him be told also what num- 
ber of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. 
Let him then take in the consideration, of what impor- 
tance religion is to mankind. And upon these things 
he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed rev- 
elation’s obtaining and being received in the world, with 
all the circumstances and effects of it, considered to- 
gether as one event, is the most conspicuous and im- 
portant event in the story of mankind : that a book of 
this nature, and thus promulged and recommended to 
our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, 
to have its claims most seriously examined into ; and 
that before such examination, to treat it with any kind 
of scoffing and ridicule is an offense against natural piety. 
But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the 
establishment of natural religion in the world is owing 
to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the 
proof of religion from reason ; any more than the proof 
of Euclid's Elements is destroyed by a man’s knowing, or 
thinking, that he should never have seen the truth of 
the several propositions contained in it, nor had those 
propositions come into his thoughts but for that math- 


ematician. 

25. Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in 
the next place, informed of the acknowl- its antiquity, 
edged antiquity of the first parts of this firmed and cred- 
book ; and that its chronology, its account ible * 
of the time when the earth and the several parts of it 
21 


322 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


were first peopled with human creatures is no way con- 
tradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and 
civil history of the world, collected from common his- 
torians, from the state of the earth, and from the late in- 
vention of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture con- 
tains an unbroken thread of common and civil history, 
from the creation to the captivity, for between three and 
four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking of 
be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it 
is not contradicted, but is confirmed, by profane his- 
tory, as much as there would be reason to expect upon 
supposition of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole 
history itself to give any reasonable ground of suspicion 
of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally 
true genealogy of men, and series of things. I speak 
here only of the common Scripture history, or of the 
course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished 
from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In all the 
Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise 
out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There 
appears nothing related as done in any age, not con- 
formable to the manners of that age; nothing in the 
account of a succeeding age, which one would say could 
not be true, or was improbable, from the account of 
things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the 
characters which would raise a thought of their being 
feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable of their 
being real. It is to be added, also, that mere genealo- 
gies, bare narratives of the number of years which per- 
sons called by such and such names lived, do not carry 
the face of fiction; perhaps do carry some presump- 
tion of veracity : and all unadorned narratives, which 
have nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry some- 
what of the like presumption too. And the domestic 
and the political history is plainly credible. There may 
be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in the 


Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianity. 323 

naked way they are told, may appear strange, especially 
to persons of other manners, temper, education ; but 
there are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or 
most persons’ lives, which, in the same circumstances, 
would appear to the full as strange.* There may be 
mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or 
seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted 
for; but there are certainly no more things of this kind 
in the Scripture than what were to have been expected 
in books of such antiquity ; and nothing, in any wise, 
sufficient to discredit the general narrative. Now, that 
a history claiming to commence from the creation, and 
extending in one continued series through so great a 
length of time, and variety of events, should have such 
appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture, 
is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favor. 
And as all this is applicable to the common history of 
the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and 
a very high one, given to it by profane authors ; many 

* [See this thought presented in a most agreeable and lively form 
in the Archbishop of Dublin’s “ Historic Doubts” concerning Napo- 
leon Bonaparte. Compare the following conversation given in Bos- 
well’s Life of Johnson, (ann. 1763 :) “ Talking of those who deny the 
truth of Christianity, he said, ‘ It is always easy to be on the negative 
side. ... I deny that Canada is taken, and I can support my denial by 
pretty good arguments. The French are a much more numerous 
people than we, and it is not likely that they would allow us to take 
it.’ ‘ But the ministry have assured us, in all the formality of a Ga- 
zette, that it is taken.’ ‘Very true. But the ministry have put us to 
an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest 
to persuade us that we have got something for our money.’ ‘ But the 
fact is confirmed by thousands of men who were at the taking of 
it.’ ‘Aye, but these men have still more interest in deceiving us. 
They don’t want that you should think the French have beat them, 
but that they have beat the French. Now, suppose you should go 
over and find that it really is taken ; that would only satisfy yourself : 
for when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you 
have been bribed.’” — F.] 


324 


Analogy of Religion. [Part IJ. 


of these writing of the same times, and confirming the 
truth of customs and events which are incidentally, as 
well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this cred- 
ibility of the common Scripture history gives some cred- 
ibility to its miraculous history : especially as this is 
interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each 
other, and both together make up one relation. 

24. Let it then be more particularly observed to this 
Antiquity of the P erson > that it is an acknowledged matter 

jews whose re- of fact, which is indeed implied in the fore- 
ligion preserved . ... 

their national going observation, that there was such a na- 
tion as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, 
whose government and general polity was founded on 
the law here related to be given them by Moses as from 
heaven : that natural religion, though with rites addi- 
tional, yet no way contrary to it, was their established 
religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world ; 
and that their very being, as a nation, depended upon 
their acknowledgment of one God, the God of the uni- 
verse. For suppose, in their captivity in Babylon, they 
had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there 
would have remained no bond of union to keep them a 
distinct people. And while they were under their own 
kings in their own country, a total apostasy from God 
would have been the dissolution of their whole govern- 
ment. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged 
and worshiped the Maker of heaven and earth, when 
the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered 
them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And this, so 
remarkable an establishment and preservation of natural 
religion among them, seems to add some peculiar credi- 
bility to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses 
and the prophets ; because these miracles are a full, sat- 
isfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to 
be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. 

25. Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of his- 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


325 


tory, be acquainted further, that one claiming to be the 
Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when 
this nation, from the prophecies above-men- „ . _ 

1 r Messiah came, 

tioned, expected the Messiah : that he was and, according 

. to prophecy, suf- 

rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold fered and tri- 
be should, by the body of the people, under 
the direction of their rulers : that in the course of a very 
few years he was believed on, and acknowledged as the 
promised Messiah, by great numbers among the Gentiles, 
agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon 
the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles, (page 297, etc.,) 
of which miracles we also have strong historical evi- 
dence ; (by which I mean here no more than must be 
acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and 
follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they 
destroy, our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of 
Christianity, (page 305, etc.;) that this religion approv- 
ing itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own 
evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its sys- 
tem, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts 
of it which require to be believed upon the mere au- 
thority of its Author; that this religion, I say, gradually 
spread and supported itself for some hundred years, not 
only without any assistance from temporal power, but 
under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest 
persecutions from it, and then became the religion of 
the world : that in the mean time, the Jewish nation 
and government were destroyed in a very remarkable 
manner, and the people carried away captive and dis- 
persed through the most distant countries, in which 
state of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred 
years : and that they remain a numerous people, united 
among themselves, and distinguished from the rest of 
the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the 
profession of his law ; and every-where looked upon in 
a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to 


326 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

express, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, 
given so many ages before it came to pass : “ Thou shalt 
become an astonishment, a proverb and a by-word, 
among all nations whither the Lord shall lead thee/’ 
Deut. xxviii, 37. 

26. The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews 
remaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the 

The Jews pre- confirmation which this event appears to 
tin r ct ed p a e S opie dis ' give to the truth of revelation, may be 
This a miracle, thought to be answered by their religion’s 
forbidding them intermarriages with those of any other, 
and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their 
food, by which they are debarred from the means of in- 
corporating with the people in whose countries they 
live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that 
which it pretends to account for. But what does it pre- 
tend to account for? The correspondence between this 
event and the prophecies ; or the coincidence of both, 
with a long dispensation of providence of a peculiar na- 
ture toward that people formerly ? No. It is only the 
event itself which is offered to be thus accounted for; 
which single event, taken alone, abstracted from all such 
correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not 
have appeared miraculous; but that correspondence 
and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be 
supposed not. Thus, the concurrence of our Saviour’s 
being born at Bethlehem with a long foregoing series of 
prophecy, and other coincidences, is doubtless miracu- 
lous — the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, 
and the event, being admitted : though the event itself, 
his birth at that place, appears to have been brought 
about in a natural way ; of which, however, no one can 
be certain. 

27. And as several of these events seem, in some degree, 
expressly to have verified the prophetic history already ; 
so likewise, they may be considered further, as having a 


Chap. VIIJ Evidence for Christianity. 32 7 

peculiar aspect toward the full completion of it ; as af- 
fording some presumption that the whole of The past fumn- 
it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Sy n JeSde P rs°the 
Thus, that the Jews have been so wonder- future P ro1 ,able - 
fully preserved in their long and wide dispersion ; which 
is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is 
now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet 
to come; that natural religion came forth from Judea, 
and spread in the degree it has done over the world, be- 
fore lost in idolatry ; which, together with some other 
things, have distinguished that very place, in like man- 
ner as the people of it are distinguished : that this great 
change of religion over the earth was brought about un- 
der the profession and acknowledgment that Jesus was 
the promised Messiah : things of this kind naturally turn 
the thoughts of serious men toward the full completion 
of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration 
of that people; concerning the establishment of the 
everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of the 
Messiah; and the future state of the world under this 
sacred government. Such circumstances and events, 
compared with these prophecies, though no completions 
of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing 
in the argument by a person upon his fiist being in- 
formed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history 
of things still future, give it some additional credibility, 
have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the 
full completion of it. 

Indeed, it requires a good degree of knowledge, and 
great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge 
thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity 
from that part of the prophetic history which relates to 
the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the 
state of the Church from the establishment of Christian- 
ity to the present time. But it appears, from a general 
view of it, to be very material. And those persons who 


328 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were 
men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least 
liable to imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as de- 
terminately conclusive. 

28. Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, 
first to recollect the passages above-mentioned out of 

Scripture without knowing but that the 

Recapitulation. 1 . _ . . 

whole was a late fiction, then to be mtormed 
of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite 
them all into one view: that the profession and estab- 
lishment of natural religion in the world is greatly ow- 
ing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed 
revelation which it contains ; that it is acknowledged to 
be of the earliest antiquity ; that its chronology and 
common history are entirely credible; that this ancient 
nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to 
have been, in fact, the people of God in a distinguished 
sense ; that, as there was a national expectation among 
them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to ap- 
pear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claim- 
ing to be that Messiah ; that he was rejected by this 
nation but received by the Gentiles, not upon the evi- 
dence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he 
taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, 
gained ground, and at length became the religion of the 
world; that in the meantime the Jewish polity was ut- 
terly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face 
of the earth ; that, notwithstanding this, they have re- 
mained a distinct and numerous people for so many 
centuries, even to this day ; which not only appears to 
be the express completion of several prophecies concern- 
ing them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible 
and easy possibility that the promises made to them as 
a nation may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknowl- 
edged truths, let the person we have been supposing 
add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 


3 2 9 


it or not, the obvious appearances which there are of 
the state of the world, in other respects besides what re- 
lates to the Jews, and of the Christian Church, having 
so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic 
history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the 
things before-mentioned out of the Scripture, and seri- 
ously compared with them ; the joint view of both to- 
gether must, I think, appear of very great weight to a 
considerate, reasonable person ; of much greater, indeed, 
upon having them first laid before him than is easy for 
us, who are so familiarized to them, to conceive, without 
some particular attention for that purpose. 

29. All these things, and the several particulars con- 
tained under them, require to be distinctly These points 
and most thoroughly examined into ; that dai rth cons f ide?n- 
the weight of each may be judged of, upon tion * 
such examination, and such conclusion drawn as re- 
sults from their united force. But this has not been at- 
tempted here. I have gone no further than to show, 
that the general imperfect view of them now given, the 
confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the many 
obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together 
with the collateral things * here mentioned, and there 
are several- others of the like sort ; that all this together, 
which, being fact, must be acknowledged by 

70 . Necessary con- 

unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of cessions of un- 

. believers. 

somewhat more than human m this matter; 
evidence much more important than careless men, who 
have been accustomed only to transient and partial 
views of it, can imagine ; and, indeed, abundantly suffi- 
cient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must 
be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may 
say that the historical evidence of miracles, wrought in 

* All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible 
to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of proph- 
ecy. See pages 292, 293. 


330 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince 
them that such miracles were really wrought, they can- 
not deny that there is such historical evidence, it being 
a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the 
conformity between the prophecies and events is by ac- 
cident : but there are many instances in which such 
conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with 
regard to such kind of collateral things as those above- 
mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without 
meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful 
people ; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain 
way, will make out a thousand coincidences which seem 
to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk 
thus; but no one who is serious can possibly think these 
things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of 
collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in 
the evidence of probability, as distinguished in nature 
from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases, 
indeed, it seems to require the truest judgment to de- 
termine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evi- 
dence ; but it is very often altogether as convincing as 
that which is the most express and direct. 

30. This general view of the evidence for Christianity, 
considered as making one argument, may also serve to 
„ , recommend to serious persons to set down 

Force of the . 1 

proof from the every thing which they think may be of any 

combination of . .. ... ... . . 

these considera- real weight at all in proof of it, and parti- 
ularly the many seeming completions of 
prophecy : and they will find, that, judging by the nat- 
ural rules by which we judge of probable evidence in 
common matters, they amount to a much higher degree 
of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be sup- 
posed upon considering them separately, at different 
times, how strong soever the proof might before appear 
to them upon such separate views of it. For probable 
proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence, 


Chap. VII.] Evidence for Christianity. 331 

but multiply it.* Nor should I dissuade any one from 
setting down what he thought made for the contrary 
side. But, then, it is to be remembered, not in order to 
influence his judgment but his practice, that a mistake 
on one side may be, in its consequences, much more 
dangerous than a mistake on the other. And what 
course is most safe, and what most dangerous, is a con- 
sideration thought very material, when we deliberate, 
not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our 
temporal affairs. To be influenced by this considera- 
tion in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is 
indeed as much prejudice as any thing whatever. And 
like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways in differ- 
ent men. For some are inclined to belie.ve what they 
hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest 
unreasonableness to apply to men’s passions in order to 
gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning 
conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires 
to be taken into the account, than the importance of it. 
For suppose it doubtful what would be the consequence 
of acting in this, or in a contrary manner; still, that 
taking one side could be attended with little or no bad 
consequences, and taking the other might be attended 
with the greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason 
of the highest moment toward determining how we are 
to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of 

* [If the thing to be proved have in it an apparent character of 
truth, this constitutes an improbability of its falsehood. If it have 
another character of truth, this constitutes another improbability of 
its falsehood. If this were a complete statement of the argument to 
be drawn from the coexistence of the two characters of truth, the 
second improbability would only require to be added to the first to 
give the value of the whole. But in reality the argument is much 
stronger. For the improbability that they should simultaneously ex- 
ist in the thing under examination, and yet that thing be false, is evi- 
dently different from the sum of the improbabilities that each sepa- 
rately should exist in it if false. — F.] 


332 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence 
taken together. And unless the whole series of things 
which may be alleged in this argument, and every particu- 
lar thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been 
by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Chris- 
tianity lies,) then is the truth of it proved ; in like man- 
ner as if, in any common case, numerous events ac- 
knowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other 
event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would 
be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged 
ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of 
them singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged 
events taken together, could not in reason be supposed 
to have happened unless the disputed one were true. 

It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this 
evidence gives to those persons who attack Christian- 
ity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, 
in a short and lively manner, that such and such things 
are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of 
little weight in itself ; but impossible to show, in like 
manner, the united force of the whole argument in one 
view. 

31. However, lastly, as it has been made appear that 
there is no presumption against a revelation as miracu- 

Christian evi- lous i that the § eneral scheme of Christian- 
^nce cann ot be ity, and the principal parts of it, are con- 
formable to the experienced constitution of 
things, and the whole perfectly credible ; so the account 
now given of the positive evidence for it shows that this 
evidence is such as, from the nature of it, cannot be 
destroyed, though it should be lessened. 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 


333 


CHAPTER VIII. 

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST 
ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RE- 
LIGION. 

I F every one would consider, with such attention as 
they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider, 
what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of 
this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, 
superseded. But since this is not to be expected ; for 
some we find do not concern themselves to understand 
even what they write against ; since this treatise, in 
common with most others, lies open to objections which 
may appear very material to thoughtful men at first 
sight ; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the 
objections of such as can judge without thinking, and 
of such as can censure without judging; it may not be 
amiss to set down the chief of these objections which 
occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And 
they are such as these : — 

2. “ That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in rev- 
elation by saying that there are the same in natural re- 
ligion ; when what is wanting is to clear 
, , ’ , . . . Five objections. 

both of them, of these their common, as 
well as other their respective difficulties : but that it is a 
strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations 
of religion, to show them that they have as little reason 
for their worldly pursuits ; and a strange way of vindi- 
cating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, 
and of removing the objections against both, to which 
the system of religion lies open, to show that the like 


334 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


objections lie against natural providence ; a way of an- 
swering objections against religion, without so much as 
pretending to make out that the system of it, or the 
particular things in it objected against, are reasonable — 
especially, perhaps, some may be inattentive enough to 
add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed 
that analogy is no answer to such objections; that when 
this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it 
can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in 
a very unsatisfied state : and that it must be unaccounta- 
ble ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be pre- 
vailed with to forego their present interests and pleas- 
ures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.” 

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, 
that appearance will be found in a great measure owing 
to half views, which show but part of an object, yet 
show that indistinctly; and to undeterminate language. 
By these means weak men are often deceived by others, 
and ludicrous men by themselves. And even those who 
are serious and considerate cannot always readily dis- 
entangle, and at once clearly see through, the perplexities 
in which subjects themselves are involved : and which 
are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of 
words. To this latter sort of persons the following re- 
ply to each part of this objection severally may be of 
some assistance, as it may also tend a little to stop 
and silence others. 

3. First. The thing wanted, that is, what men require, 
is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least 
Answer to the for any thing we know to the contrary, it 
to1h 0 e bj mode n of may be, the same as requiring to compre- 
tiis^wStls hend the Divine nature, and the whole plan 
wanted. 0 f p rov idence from everlasting to everlast- 

ing. But it hath always been allowed to argue, from 
what is acknowledged to what is disputed. And it is in 
no other sense a poor thing to argue from natural relig- 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 335 

ion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it 
is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduc- 
tion and inference in matters of conduct, which we are 
continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed 
the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to 
great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the 
things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor 
thing for a physician to have so little knowledge in the 
cure of diseases as even the most eminent have ? to act 
upon conjecture and guess where the life of man is 
concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison 
of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being 
obliged to act wholly in the dark. 

4. Further: since it is as unreasonable as it is com- 
mon to urge objections against revelation which are of 
equal weight against natural religion ; and 0b j ections 
those who do this, if they are not confuted against reveia- 

, 1 11 r • 1 -1 1 tion as strong 

themselves, deal unfairly with others in against natural 
, . . . . . religion. 

making it seem that they are arguing only 
against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in 
reality they are arguing against moral providence ; it is 
a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are 
as much leveled against natural religion as against re- 
vealed. And objections which are equally applicable 
to both, are, properly speaking, answered by its being 
shown that they are so, provided the former be admit- 
ted to be true. And without taking in the considera- 
tion how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very 
material to observe, that as the things objected against 
in natural religion are of the same kind with what is 
certain matter of experience in the course of providence, 
and in the information which God affords us concerning 
our temporal interest under his government ; so the ob- 
jections against the system of Christianity and the evi- 
dence of it are of the very same kind with those which 
are made against the system and evidence of natural 


336 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


religion. However, the reader, upon review, may see 
that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the 
latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to 
have more taken for granted than is in the former ; that 
there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the 
world : and Christianity is vindicated, not from its anal- 
ogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to 
the experienced constitution of nature. 

5. Secondly. Religion is a practical thing, and consists 
in such a determinate course of life, as, being what there 
is reason to think is commanded by the 

Answer to sec- . 

ond objection as Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, 

to men’s having . / 

as little reason be our happiness under his government. 

for worldly pur- ._ . . , , . . 

suits as reiig- Now if men can be convinced that they have 
the like reason to believe this, as to believe 
that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their 
advantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument 
to them for the practice of religion. And if there be 
really any reason for believing one of these, and endeav- 
oring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessa- 
ries and conveniences of it ; then there is reason also for 
believing the other, and endeavoring to secure the inter- 
est it proposes to us. And if the interest which religion 
proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole tem- 
poral interest, then there must be proportionably great- 
er reason for endeavoring to secure one than the other : 
since, by the supposition the probability of our secur- 
ing one is equal to the probability of our securing the 
other. This seems plainly unanswerable; and has a 
tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what 
our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are 
naturally appointed to act; and who are disposed to 
acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend 
to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, 
which is afforded us. 

But the chief and proper force of the argument re- 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 337 

ferred to in the objection, lies in another place. For it 
is said that the proof of religion is involved in such in- 
extricable difficulties as to render it doubt- „ „ , 

. . Force of the 

ful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that, if objection. God 

. . , , , , would not give 

it were true, it would be left upon doubtful doubtful evi- 
evidence. Here then, over and above the 
force of each particular difficulty or objection, these dif- 
ficulties and objections taken together, are turned into 
a positive argument against the truth of religion ; which 
argument would stand thus: If religion were true, it 
would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the 
degree in which it is : therefore, that it is thus left, not 
only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its 
force in proportion to the weight of such objections ; but 
also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of 
its being so. Now the observation that from the natural 
constitution and course of things we must, in our tem- 
poral concerns, almost continually, and in matters of 
great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and 
degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this 
argument ; because it shows, that it is according to the 
conduct and character of the Author of nature to ap- 
point we should act upon evidence like to that, which 
this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to ap- 
point we should act upon : it is an instance, a general 
one made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat 
in his dealing with us similar to what is said to be in- 
credible. And as the force of this answer lies merely 
in the parallel which there is between the evidence 
for religion and for our temporal conduct, the an- 
swer is equally just and conclusive ; whether the parallel 
be made out by showing the evidence of the former to 
be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. 

6. Thirdly. The design of this treatise is not to vindi- 
cate the character of God, but to show the obligations 
of men ; it is not to justify his providence, but to show 
22 


338 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and 
ought not to be confounded. And though they may at 
Answer to third length run up into each other, yet observa- 
the^mode ofvin- tions may immediately tend to make out the 
jliSfndfS- latter, which do not appear, by any imme- 
thingswnfound” diate connection, to the purpose of the 
ed - former; which is less our concern than 

many seem to think. 

For, first, It is not necessary we should justify the dis- 
pensations of Providence against objections any further 
than to show that the things objected against may, for 
aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. 
Suppose, then, that there are things in the system of this 
world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which, tak- 
en alone, would be unjust; yet it has been shown unan- 
swerably, that if we could take in the reference which 
these things may have to other things present, past, and 
to come; to the whole scheme, which the things object- 
ed against are parts of; these very things might, for 
aught we know, be found to be not only consistent with 
justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shown, 
by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that 
this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus 
objections drawn from such things are answered, and 
Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its 
vindication necessary. 

Hence it appears, secondly, That objections against 
the divine justice and goodness are not endeavored to 
be removed by showing that the like objections, allowed 
to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence ; 
but those objections being supposed, and shown not to 
be conclusive, the things objected against,, considered as 
matters of fact, are further shown to be credible from 
their conformity to the constitution of nature; for in- 
stance, that God will reward and punish men for their 
actions hereafter, from the observation that he does re- 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 339 

ward and punish them for their actions here. And this, 
I apprehend, is of weight. 

And I add, thirdly, It would be of weight, even though 
those objections were not answered. For, there being 
the proof of religion above set down, and religion imply- 
ing several facts; for instance again, the fact last men- 
tioned, that God will reward and punish men for their 
actions hereafter ; the observation that his present meth- 
od of government is by rewards and punishments, shows 
that future fact not to be incredible: whatever objec- 
tions men may think they have against it, as unjust or 
unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and 
mercy ; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. 
I say, as improbable , for it is evident no objection against 
it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity ; since this no- 
tion as much destroys injustice as it does justice. 

Then, fourthly, Though objections against the reason- 
ableness of the system of religion cannot, indeed, be 
answered without entering into consideration of its rea- 
sonableness, yet objections against the credibility or 
truth of it may : Because the system of it is reducible 
into what is properly matter of fact; and the truth, the 
probable truth, of facts, may be shown without considera- 
tion of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though 
in some cases and respects it is highly useful and proper, 
yet it is not necessary, to give proof of the reasonable- 
ness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particu- 
lar dispensation of Providence which comes into the 
system of religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly a per- 
son of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection 
of the Divine nature and conduct, the further he will 
advance toward that perfection of religion which St. 
John (1 John iv, 18) speaks of. But the general obliga- 
tions of religion are fully made out, by proving the rea- 
sonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice 
of religion is reasonable, maybe shown, though no more 


340 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


could be proved than that the system of it may be so, 
for aught we know to the contrary; and even without 
entering into the distinct consideration of this. And 
from hence, fifthly, It is easy to see that though the 
analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objec- 
tions against the wisdom, the justice, or goodness, of any 
doctrine or precept of religion, yet it may be, as it is, an 
immediate and direct answer to what is really intended 
by such objections; which is to show, that the things 
objected against are incredible. 

7. Fourthly. It is most readily acknowledged, that the 
foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory ; very far, 
indeed, from it : but so would any natural 

Answer to . , J 

fourth objection institution of life appear, if reduced into a 

that the argu- 7 : 

ment is unsatis- system, together with its evidence. Leav- 

factory. Thisis . .. , c . ,. ., , 

true in ordinary mg religion out of the case, men are divided 
in their opinions, whether our pleasures 
overbalance our pains; and whether it be, or be not, 
eligible to live in this world. And were all such con- 
troversies settled, which perhaps in speculation would 
be found involved in great difficulties ; and were it de- 
termined, upon the evidence of reason, as # nature has de- 
termined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved ; 
yet still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford 
us for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its sat- 
isfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, 
and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and 
precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we 
informed by nature, in future contingencies and acci- 
dents, so as to render it at all certain what is the best 
method of managing our affairs. What will be the suc- 
cess of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of 
the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be 
the success of them in the proper sense of the word ; 
that is, what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by 
them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed, the 


Chap. VIIIJ Objections against Analogy. 341 

unsatisfactory nature of the evidence with which we 
are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is 
scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away 
life, or disregard the interest of it, upon account of this 
doubtfulness. 

The evidence of religion, then, being admitted real, 
those who object against it as not satisfactory, that is, as 
not being what they wish it, plainly forget The objectl<m 
the very condition of our being : for satis- overiooksthena- 

. . ture of our be- 

faction, m this sense, does not belong to ing, also of re- 

u . . , & ligion. 

such a creature as man. And, which is more 
material, they forget also the very nature of religion. For 
religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it, a 
certain degree of integrity and honesty ; which it was 
intended to try whether men have or not, and to exer- 
cise, in such as have it, in order to its improvement. 
Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same 
sense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands 
the language in which you speak ; or as warning a man 
of any danger, presupposes that he hath such a regard 
to himself as that he will endeavor to avoid it. And, 
therefore, the question is not at all, Whether the evi- 
dence of religion be satisfactory : but, whether it be, in 
reason, sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue 
which it presupposes ? Now the evidence of it is fully 
sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how far 
soever it is from being satisfactory as to the purposes of 
curiosity, or any other ; and, indeed, it answers the pur- 
poses of the former in several respects, which it would 
not do, if it were as overbearing as is required. One 
might add further, that whether the motives or the evi- 
dence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning 
here by that word, what satisfies a man that such a 
course of action will in event be for his good ; this need 
never be, and I thfnk, strictly speaking, never is, the 
practical question in common matters. But the practi- 


342 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


cal question in all cases is, Whether the evidence for a 
course of action be such as, taking in all circumstances, 
makes the faculty within us which is the guide and judge 
of conduct, (see Dissertation ii,) determine that course 
of action to be prudent ? Indeed, satisfaction that it 
will be for our interest or happiness, abundantly deter- 
mines an action to be prudent ; but evidence, almost infi- 
nitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too, 
even in the conduct of every day. 

8. Fifthly. As to the objection concerning the influ- 
ence which this argument, or any part of it, may or may 
not be expected to have upon men, I ob- 

Answer to fifth v \ , 

objection that serve, as above, that religion being intended 

such evidence . .. , . - 

will not influ- for a trial and exercise of the morality of 
ence practice. ever y person’s character who is a subject of 

it ; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for 
it as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace 
it; to object that it is not to be imagined mankind will 
be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the pur- 
pose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is 
not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind are ; but, 
what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, 
requires they should be: to show how, in reason, they 
ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave. 
This depends upon themselves, and is their own con- 
cern ; the personal concern of each man in particular. 
And how little regard the generality have to it, experi- 
ence indeed does too fully show. But religion, consid- 
ered as a probation, has had its ends upon all persons to 
whom it has been proposed, with evidence sufficient in 
reason to influence their practice ; for by this means 
they have been put into a state of probation, let them 
behave as they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, 
but reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of re- 
ligion being laid before men, the designs of Providence 
are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 343 

but likewise with regard to those who will not, be influ- 
enced by it. However, lastly , the objection here re- 
ferred to allows the things insisted upon in this treatise 
to be of some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will 
have some influence. And if there be a probability that 
it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, 
though not in degree, to lay it before men, as there 
would be if it were likely to have a greater influence. 

6. And further, I desire it may be considered, with 
respect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in 
this treatise I have argued upon the princi- The author has 
pies of others,* not my own; and have pSpiesSfoth- 
omitted what I think true, and of the utmost er8, 
importance, because by others thought unintelligible or 
not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of 
the Fatalists, which I do not believe; and have omitted 
a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe — 
the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to all 
will whatever : which I apprehend as certainly to deter- 
mine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and false- 
hood necessarily determine the Divine judgment. In- 
deed, the principle of liberty, and that of moral fitness, 
so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, the 
ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language 
upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though 
I have endeavored to avoid it ; and, in order to avoid it 
have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a man- 
ner which will appear strange to such as do not observe 
the reason for it; but the general argument here pursued 
does not at all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles. 

Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and 

* By arguing upon the principles of others , the reader will observe 
is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but notwith- 
standing them. Thus religion is proved, not from the opinion of 
necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding , or even though , that 
opinion were admitted to be true. 


344 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered 
in no other view than merely as a question of fact ; and 
in this view it is here considered. It is obvious that 
Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical. 
And even natural religion is properly a matter of fact. 
For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is 
so ; and this proposition contains the general system of 
natural religion. But then, several abstract truths, and 
in particular those two principles, are usually taken into 
consideration in the proof of it ; whereas it is here treat- 
ed of only as a matter of fact. To explain this : that the 
three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is 
an abstract truth ; but that they appear so to our mind 
is only a matter of fact. And this last must have been 
admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient skeptics, 
who would not have admitted the former ; but pretend- 
ed to doubt, whether there were any such thing as truth ; 
or whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties 
of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. 

So, likewise, that there is, in the nature of things, an 
original standard of right and wrong in actions, independ- 
ent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the 
will of God, to exercise that moral government over the 
world which religion teaches, that is, finally and upon 
the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they 
act right or wrong ; this assertion contains an abstract 
truth, as well as matter of fact. But suppose, in the 
present state, every man, without exception, was reward- 
ed and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or 
transgressed that sense of right and wrong which God 
has implanted in the nature of every man ; this would 
not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. 
And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, 
yet the very same difficulties might be raised as are now 
concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral 
fitness : and we should have a proof, even the certain 


Chap. VIII.] Objections against Analogy. 345 

one of experience, that the government of the world was 
perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of 
those questions : and this proof would remain, in what 
way soever they were determined. 

And thus God, having given mankind a moral faculty, 
the object of which is actions, and which naturally ap- 
proves some actions as right and of good desert, and 
condemns others as wrong and of ill desert ; that he will, 
finally and upon the whole, reward the former, and pun- 
ish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, 
but of what is as mere a fact as his doing so at present 
would be. This future fact I have not indeed proved 
with the force with which it might be proved, from the 
principles of liberty and moral fitness ; but without them, 
have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, 
which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of 
nature ; a proof easily caviled at, easily shown not to be 
demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ; but impos- 
sible, I think, to be evaded or answered. And thus the 
obligations of religion are made out, exclusively of the 
questions concerning liberty and moral fitness ; which 
have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse rea- 
sonings as every thing may. 

10. Hence, therefore, may be observed distinctly what 
is the force of this treatise. It will be, to such as are 
convinced of religion, upon the proof arising Force of this 
out of the two last-mentioned principles, an treati8e - 
additional proof and a confirmation of it : to such as do 
not admit those principles an original proof of it, (pages 
1 61, etc.,) and a confirmation of that proof. Those who 
believe will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared 
of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar man- 
ner strengthened : those who do not believe, will at least 
be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christian- 
ity false; the plain, undoubted credibility of it; and, I 
hope, a good deal more. 


346 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


And thus, though some, perhaps, may seriously think 
that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid 
upon it ; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be 
applied to show the argument from it in a disadvantage- 
ous light ; yet there can be no question but that it is a 
real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, im- 
plying in it numerous facts ; analogy, being a confirma- 
tion of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the 
only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one 
to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side 
of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it ought to 
be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow 
nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. 


Part II.] 


Conclusion. 


347 


CONCLUSION. 

W HATEVER account may be given of the strange 
inattention and disregard, in some ages and 
countries, to a matter of such importance as 

.. . . . The incredible 

religion, it would, before experience, be m- disregard of re- 
credible that there should be the like disre- 
gard in those who have had the moral system of the 
world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often 
inculcated upon them ; because this moral system car- 
ries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon 
its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no 
need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions to convince 
an unprejudiced understanding that there is a God who 
made and governs the world, and will judge it in right- 
eousness ; though they may be necessary to answer ab- 
struse difficulties when once such are raised; when the 
very meaning of those words which express most intelli- 
gibly the general doctrine of religion is pretended to be 
uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itself is ob- 
scured by the intricacies of speculation. But to an un- 
prejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of 
design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitive- 
ly manifest, that creatures ought to live under a dutiful 
sense of their Maker; and that justice and charity must 
be his laws to creatures whom he has made social, and 
placed in society. 

2. Indeed, the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so 
called, is not self-evident, but requires ex- Imn , or?lt?m . 
ternal proof in order to its being received, per of mind im- 

. . .... plied. 

Yet inattention, among us, to revealed relig- 
ion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral 


348 Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 

temper of mind as inattention to natural religion ; be- 
cause, when both are laid before us, in the manner they 
are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to 
inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition 
of their truth, are obligations of the same nature. For 
revelation claims to be the voice of God ; and our obli- 
gation to attend to his voice is surely moral in all cases. 
And as it is insisted that its evidence is conclusive, 
upon thorough consideration of it ; so it offers itself to 
us with manifest obvious appearances of having some- 
thing more than human in it, and, therefore, in all rea- 
son, requires to have its claims most seriously examined 
into. 

3. It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, 
in what manner soever afforded us, is equally from God ; 
_ . . .. yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar 

highest claims tendency, from the first principles of our na- 

to attention. J r . 

ture, to awaken mankind, and inspire them 
with reverence and awe : and this is a peculiar obliga- 
tion, to attend to what claims to be so with such appear- 
ances of truth. It is, therefore, most certain, that our 
obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of 
Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to em- 
brace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the 
highest and most proper sense. Let us, then, suppose, 
that the evidence of religion in general, and of Chris- 
tianity, has been seriously inquired into by all reasona- 
ble men among us. Yet we find many professedly to 
reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity. 
And all of them do not content themselves with a bare 
neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary free- 
dom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. 
They deride God’s moral government over the world : 
they renounce his protection, and defy his justice : they 
ridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the Au- 
thor of it ; and take all occasions to manifest a scorn 


Part II.] 


Conclusion. 


349 


and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active 
setting themselves against religion ; to what may be 
considered as a positive principle of irreligion; which 
they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they in- 
tend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man 
does the contrary principle. And others, who are 
not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in 
avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be 
groundless. 

4. Now admitting, which is the supposition we go 
upon, that these persons act upon what they think prin- 
ciples of reason, and otherwise they are not „ 

x ... Rejecters have 

to be argued with; it is, really, inconceiva- no just notion of 
ble that they should imagine they clearly 
see the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be 
nothing at all ; nor do they pretend this. They are far, 
indeed, from having a just notion of its evidence ; but 
they would not say its evidence was nothing if they 
thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were 
credible, like other matters of science or history. So 
that their manner of treating it must proceed either from 
such kind of objections against all religion as have been 
answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise ; 
or else from objections and difficulties supposed more 
peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they entertain prejudices 
against the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous 
interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether 
in incidental passages or in the general scheme of it, 
which appear to them unreasonable. They take for 
granted, that if Christianity were true, the light of it 
must have been more general, and the evidence of it 
more satisfactory, or rather overbearing ; that it must 
and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and 
left than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the 
evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but 
quite another thing. It is being fortified against the 


350 


Analogy of Religion. [Part II. 


evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking 
they see the system of Christianity, or somewhat which 
appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be 
incredible or false : fortified against that evidence, 
which might otherwise make great impression upon 
them. Or lastly, if any of these persons are, upon 
the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christian- 
ity ; their behavior seems owing to their taking for 
granted, through strange inattention, that such doubt- 
ing is in a manner the same thing as being certain 
against it. 

5. To these persons, and to this state of opinion con- 
cerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For 
This treatise all the general objections against the moral 
Sbfe P cters!° S R? system of nature having been obviated, it is 
capitulation. shown that there is not any peculiar pre- 
sumption at all against Christianity, either considered as 
not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so 
discovered ; nor any worth mentioning against it as mi- 
raculous, if any at all ; none, certainly, which can render 
it in the least incredible. It is shown that upon supposi- 
tion of a divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders 
it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, that many 
things in it must appear liable to great objections, and 
that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great de- 
gree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, 
and of the very utmost importance : but it is urged, as I 
hope it will be understood, with great caution of not 
vilifying the faculty of reason, which is “ the candle of 
the Lord within us though it can afford no light where 
it does not shine ; nor judge, where it has no principles 
to judge upon. The objections here spoken of being 
first answered in the view of objections against Chris- 
tianity as a matter of fact, are in the next place consid- 
ered as urged more immediately against the wisdom, 
justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation. 


Part II.] 


Conclusion. 


351 


And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the 
like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections 
against the constitution of nature admit of : that, as par- 
tial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, 
upon further consideration and knowledge of their rela- 
tions to other things, are found just and good; so it is 
perfectly credible that the things objected against the 
wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation may 
be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness by their 
reference to other things beyond our view; because 
Christianity is a scheme as much above our compre- 
hension as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in 
which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and 
which, as is most credible, may be carried on by gen- 
eral laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this 
is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our 
ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which our 
observation shows us. For to like objections the 
like answer is experienced to be just, in numberless 
parallel cases. 

The objections against the Christian dispensation, and 
the method by which it is carried on, having been thus 
obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them are 
considered distinctly, and the particular things objected 
to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each 
apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be 
fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and 
infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our 
recovery ; it were to have been expected, it is said, that 
this should have been effected at once, and not by such 
a long series of means, and such a various economy of 
persons and things ; one dispensation preparatory to an- 
other, this to a further one, and so on through an in- 
definite number of ages, before the end of the scheme 
proposed can be completely accomplished ; a scheme 
conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty 


352 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every 
thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus 
carried on, shows such expectations concerning revela- 
tion to be highly unreasonable, and is a satisfactory an- 
swer to them, when urged as objections against the 
credibility that the great scheme of Providence in the 
redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be 
accomplished in this manner. 

As to the particular method of our redemption, the 
appointment of a Mediator between God and man ; this 
has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the 
general conduct of nature, that is, the God of nature, in 
appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as 
we experience in the daily course of Providence. The 
condition of this world, which the doctrine of our re- 
demption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with 
natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it 
from those appearances ; inferred, that human nature 
was fallen from its original rectitude, and in conse- 
quence of this degraded from its primitive happiness. 
Or, however this opinion came into the world, these ap- 
pearances must have kept up the tradition and con- 
firmed the belief of it. And as it was the general opin- 
ion, under the light of nature, that repentance and 
reformation alone, and by itself, was not sufficient to do 
away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties 
annexed to it; and as'the reason of the thing does not 
at all lead to any such conclusion ; so every day’s ex- 
perience shows us that reformation is not, in any sort, 
sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and mis- 
eries which, in the natural course of things, God has 
annexed to folly and extravagance. 

Yet there may be ground to think that the punish- 
ments which, by the general laws of divine government, 
are annexed to vice, may be prevented ; that provision 
may have been even originally made that they should 


Part II.] 


Conclusion. 


353 


be prevented, by some means or other, though they 
could not by reformation alone. For we have daily in- 
stances of such mercy, in the general conduct of nature ; 
compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases, 
friends against enemies. There is provision made, in 
the original constitution of the world, that much of the 
natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons 
themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by 
the assistance of others ; assistance which nature enables, 
and disposes, and appoints them to afford. By a method 
of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in 
wickedness, and consequently, in ruin, “ God so loved 
the world, that he gave his only begotten Son,” to save 
it ; and, “ he being made perfect by suffering, became 
the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey 
him.” John iii, 16 ; Heb. v, 9. Indeed, neither reason 
nor analogy would lead us to think in particular, that 
the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which he 
did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of 
the world which the Scripture teaches us it was : but 
neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that 
other particular means would be of the efficacy which 
experience shows they are, in numberless instances. 
And therefore, as the case before us does not admit of 
experience ; so that neither reason nor analogy can 
show how, or in what particular way, the interposition 
of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy 
which it is there represented to be ; this is no kind or 
degree of presumption against its being really of that 
efficacy. 

Further: the objections against Christianity, from the 
light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong 
as might possibly be given us, have been answered by 
the general analogy of nature. That God has made 
such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the 
* Sermon vi, at tlie Rolls. 


23 


354 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


former; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety, 
both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same 
species, and even to the same individuals at different 
times, is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it 
is so far from being the method of Providence, in other 
cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some 
require in proof of Christianity, that, on the contrary, 
the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to 
act, in common matters, throughout a very great part of 
life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the 
fact, that God has afforded to some no more than doubt- 
ful evidence of religion, the same account may be given 
of it as of difficulties and temptations with regard to 
practice. But as it is not impossible, (page 284,) surely, 
that this alleged doubtfulness may be men’s own fault, 
it deserves their most serious consideration, whether it 
be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies 
a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt ; and 
that this degree of evidence as really lays us under ob- 
ligations as demonstrative evidence. 

6. The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible; 
nor is there, I think, any thing relating to the revealed 
dispensation of things more different from the experi- 
enced constitution and course of nature, than some 
parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts 
of it. And if so, the only question which remains is, 
What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of 
Christianity ? This too, in general, has been considered 
and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, there- 
fore, what is to be deducted from that evidence upon 
account of any weight which may be thought to remain 
in these objections after what the analogy of nature has 
suggested in answer to them ; and then consider, what 
are the practical consequences from all this, upon the 
most skeptical principles one can argue upon, (for I am 
writing to persons who entertain these principles ;) and 


Part II.] 


Conclusion. 


355 


upon such consideration it will be obvious that immor- 
ality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly 
aggravated in persons who have been made The aggravated 
acquainted with Christianity, whether they lmmordllty - 
believe it or not ; because the moral system of nature, 
or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us, 
approves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind 
upon seeing it proposed. 

In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will 
be observed that there is a middle between a full satis- 
faction of the truth of it and a satisfaction The middl0 
of the contrary. The middle state of mind 8tateofmind - 
between these two consists in a serious apprehension 
that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so. 
And this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is 
as far toward speculative infidelity as any skeptic can at 
all be supposed to go who has had true Christianity, 
with the proper evidence of it, laid before him, and has 
in any tolerable measure considered them. For I would 
not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard 
of it ; because it seems evident, that in many countries 
called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence 
are fairly laid before men. And in places where both 
are, there appear to be some who have very little at- 
tended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn 
proportionate to their inattention, and yet are by no 
means without understanding in other matters. Now it 
has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Chris- 
tianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obli- 
gations of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of 
their life ; a regard, not the same exactly, but in many 
respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of 
its truth would lay them under. 

Lastly , it will appear, that blasphemy and 

„ ^ \ ' . Blasphemy, 

profaneness, I mean with regard to Chris- etc., without ex- 
tianity, are absolutely without excuse. For cuse ‘ 


356 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Part II. 


there is no temptation to it, but from the wantonness 
of vanity or mirth ; and these, considering the infinite 
importance of the subject, are no such temptations as 
to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account 
of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard 
Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a 
demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to 
think they would alter their behavior to any purpose, 
though there were a demonstration of its truth. 


DISSERTATION'S 


PERSONAL IDENTITY AND THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.* 


Dissertation I. — Of Personal Identity. 



HETHER we are to live in a future state, as it 


V V is the most important question which can possi- 
bly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can 
be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have 
been raised about the meaning of that identity, or same- 
ness of person, which is implied in the notion of our liv- 
ing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments. 
And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger 
than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity 
has been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry 
concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, 
the persons who are making it. And though few men 
can be misled by such subtleties, yet it may be proper 
a little to consider them. 

Now, when it is asked wherein personal identity con- 
sists, the answer should be the same as if it were asked, 
wherein consists similitude or equality ; that all attempts 
to define, would but perplex it. Yet there is no diffi- 
culty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two 

* In the first copy of these Papers I had inserted the two follow- 
ing Dissertations into the chapters, Of a Future Life , and Of the 
Moral Government of God ; with which they are closely connected. 
But as they do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing 
Treatise, and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, 
it seemed more proper to place them by themselves. 


358 


Analogy of Religion. 


CDiss. I. 


triangles being compared or viewed together, there 
arises to the mind the idea of similitude ; or upon twice 
two and four, the idea of equality ; so likewise, upon 
comparing the consciousness of one’s self, or one’s own 
existence in any two moments, there as immediately 
arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And 
as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas 
of similitude and equality, but also show us that two 
triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal ; so 
the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of per- 
sonal identity, but also shows us the identity of our- 
selves in those two moments; the present, suppose, and 
that immediately past ; or the present, and that a month, 
a year, or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by re- 
flecting upon that which is myself now, and that which 
was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, 
but one and the same self. 

But though consciousness of what is past does thus 
ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say 
that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our 
being the-same persons, is to say that a person has not 
existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what 
he can remember; indeed, none but what he reflects 
upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that 
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and 
therefore cannot constitute, personal identity, any more 
than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth 
which it presupposes. 

This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from 
hence, that to be endued with consciousness, is insepara- 
ble from the idea of a person, or intelligent being. For 
this might be expressed inaccurately thus — that con- 
sciousness makes personality; and from hence it might 
be concluded to make personal identity. But though 
present consciousness of what we at present do and feel 
is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet 


Diss. I.] 


Personal Identity. 


359 


present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not 
necessary to our being the same persons who performed 
those actions or had those feelings. 

The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the 
common acceptation of the word, does not appear to 
have any relation to this of personal identity ; because 
the word same, when applied to them and to person, is 
not only applied to differeat subjects, but it is also used 
in different senses. For when a man swears to the same 
tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he 
means only the same as to all the purposes of property 
and uses of common life, and not that the tree has been 
all that time the same in the strict philosophical sense of 
the word. For he does not know whether any one par- 
ticle of the present tree be the same with any one parti- 
cle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years 
ago. And if they have not one common particle of 
matter, they cannot be the same tree, in the proper phil- 
osophic sense of the word same ; it being evidently a 
contradiction in terms to say they are, when no part of 
their substance, and no one of their properties, is the 
same : no part of their substance by the supposition ; 
no one of their properties, because it is allowed that the 
same property cannot be transferred from one substance 
to another. And, therefore, when we say the identity, 
or sameness, of a plant consists in a continuation of the 
same life, communicated under the same organization, 
to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or 
not, the word same, when applied to life and to organiza- 
tion, cannot possibly be understood to signify what it 
signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. 
In a loose and popular sense, then, the life, and the or- 
ganization, and the plant, are justly said to be the same, 
notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. 
But in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no 
man, no being, no mode of being, no any thing, can be 


360 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Diss. I. 


the same with that with which it hath, indeed, nothing 
the same. Now, sameness is used in this latter sense 
when applied to persons. The identity of these, there- 
fore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. 

The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I 
think, determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these 
words, Whether it, that is, the same self or person, be the 
same identical substance ? And he has suggested what is 
a much better answer to the question than that which 
he gives it in form. For he defines person, a thinking , 
intelligent being, etc., and personal identity, the sameness 
of a rational being * The question then is, whether the 
same rational being is the same substance ; which needs 
no answer, because being and substance, in this place, 
stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, 
whether the same person be the same substance, is said 
to be this: that the consciousness of our own existence, 
in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive 
moments, is not the same individual actio?i,\ that is, not 
the same consciousness, but different successive con- 
sciousnesses. Now, it is strange that this should have 
occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceiv- 
able that a person may have a capacity of knowing some 
object or other to be the same now which it was when 
he contemplated it formerly ; yet in this case, where, by 
the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, 
the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one 
and the same perception. And thus, though the suc- 
cessive consciousnesses which we have of our own exist- 
ence are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of 
one and the same thing or object; of the same person, 
self, or living agent. The person of whose existence the 
consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year 
ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the 
same person ; and therefore is one and the same. 

* Locked Works, vof i, page 146. \ Locke, pages 1^6, 147. 


Diss. I.] 


Personal Identity. 


361 


Mr. Locke’s observations upon this subject appear 
hasty: and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with 
suppositions which he has made relating to it.* But 
some of those hasty observations have been carried to a 
strange length by others, whose notion, when traced and 
examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this : f 
“ That personality is not a permanent, but a transient 
thing; that it lives and dies, begins and ends, continu- 
ally : that no one can any more remain one and the 
same person two moments together, than two successive 
moments can be one and the same moment : that our 
substance is, indeed, continually changing; but whether 
this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose ; 
since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which 
constitutes personality ; which consciousness being suc- 
cessive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor 
consequently the personality constituted by it.” And 
from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon our- 
selves to charge our present selves with any thing 
we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in 
any thing which befell us yesterday, or that our present 
self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow : 
since our present self is not, in reality, the same with 
the self of yesterday, but another like self or person 
coming in its room, and mistaken for it ; to which an- 
other self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must 
follow : for if the self or person of to-day, and that of 
to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons, the 
person of to-day is really no more interested in what will 
befall the person of to-morrow than in what will befall 
any other person. 

It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just rep- 
resentation of the opinion we are speaking of ; because 

* Locke, page 152. 

f See an answer to Dr. Clarke’s third defense of his letter to Mr. 
Dodwell, 2d edition, pages 44, 56, etc. 


362 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Diss. I. 


those who maintain it allow, that a person is the same 
as far back as his remembrance reaches. And, indeed, 
they do use the words identity and same person. Nor 
will language permit these words to be laid aside: since, 
if they were, there must be, I know not what ridiculous 
periphrasis substituted in the room of them. But they 
cannot, consistently with themselves, mean that the per- 
son is really the same. For it is self-evident that the 
personality cannot be really the same, if, as they ex- 
pressly assert, that in which it consists is not the same. 
And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I 
think, it appears they do not, mean that the person is 
really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious 
sense: in such a sense only as they assert; for this they 
do assert, that any number of persons whatever may be 
the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and 
laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confuta- 
tion of it. However, since great stress is said to be put 
upon it, I add the following things : — 

First. This notion is absolutely contradictory to that 
certain conviction which necessarily, and every moment, 
rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon our- 
selves : when we reflect upon what is past, and look for- 
ward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily 
change of that living agent which each man calls him- 
self for another, or of any such change throughout our 
whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural 
sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his 
wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or 
affairs, from a suspicion that though he should live to- 
morrow he should not, however, be the same person he 
is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act with re- 
spect to a future life upon this notion, that personality 
is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it with respect 
to the present. Here, then, is a notion equally applica- 
ble to religion and to our temporal concerns ; and every 


Diss. IJ Personal Identity. 363 

one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in 
the latter case. If, therefore, any can take up with it in 
the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the 
thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness, and 
secret corruption of heart. 

Secondly. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or qual- 
ity, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, 
of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly 
continue the same during the whole time of their exist- 
ence. Consider, then, a living being now existing, and 
which has existed for any time alive : this living being 
must have done, and suffered, and enjoyed, what it has 
done, and suffered, and enjoyed formerly, (this living 
being, I say, and not another,) as really as it does, and 
suffers, and enjoys what it does, and suffers, and en- 
joys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoy- 
ments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and 
sufferings, of the same living being. And they are so, 
prior to all consideration of its remembering or for- 
getting; since remembering or forgetting can make no 
alteration in the truth of past matter of fact. And sup- 
pose this being endued with limited powers of knowl- 
edge and memory, there is no more difficulty in con- 
ceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the 
same living being which it was some time ago, of re- 
membering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoy- 
ments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to 
know, or remember, or forget, any thing else. 

Thirdly. Every person is conscious that he is now the 
same person or self he was as far back as his remem- 
brance reaches; since, when any one reflects upon a 
past action of his own, he is just as certain of the per- 
son who did that action, namely, himself, the person who 
now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was 
at all done. Nay, very often a person’s assurance of 
an action having been done, of which he is absolutely 


364 


Analogy of Religion. 


LDiss. I. 


assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he 
himself did it. And this he, person or self, must either 
be a substance or the property of some substance. If 
he, if person, be a substance ; then consciousness that he 
is the same person is consciousness that- he is the same 
substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a sub- 
stance, still consciousness that he is the same property, 
is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, 
as consciousness that he remains the same substance 
would be ; since the same property cannot be trans- 
ferred from one substance to another. 

But, though we are thus certain that we are the same 
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were 
as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is asked, 
whether we may not possibly be deceived in it ? And 
this question may be asked at the end of any demon- 
stration whatever ; because it is a question concerning 
the truth of perception by memory. And he who can 
doubt whether perception by memory can in this case 
be depended upon, may doubt also whether perception 
by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, 
or, indeed, whether intuitive perception, can. Here, 
then, we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to at- 
tempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose 
truth we can no otherwise prove than by other percep- 
tions of exactly the same kind with them, and which 
there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt 
to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no other- 
wise be proved than by the use or means of those very 
suspected faculties themselves. 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 365 


Dissertation II. — Of the Nature of Virtue. 

That which renders beings capable of moral govern- 
ment is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties 
of perception and of action. Brute creatures are im- 
pressed and actuated by various instincts and propen- 
sions ; so also are we. But additional to this, we have 
a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and 
making them an object to our thought : and on doing 
this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, 
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous, and of 
good-desert, and disapprove others, as vicious and of 
ill-desert. That we have this moral approving and dis- 
approving * faculty is certain from our experiencing it 
in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. It ap- 
pears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the appro- 
bation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; 
from the words right and wrong, odious and amiable , base 
and worthy , with many others of like signification in all 
languages, applied to actions and characters ; from the 
many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since 
it cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout 
all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to 
their words, or a meaning merely chimerical : from our 
* This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made use 
of as seeming the most full, and the least liable to cavil. And the 
moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, doKtfxaa- 
tlkt/ and a'KoSoK.inaaTLK.r], upon a double account ; because, upon a 
survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines 
them to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be 
the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other fac- 
ulties or natural principles of action : in the very same manner, as 
speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth 
and falsehood ; and, at the same time, is attended with a conscious- 
ness, upon reflection , that the natural right to judge of them belongs 
to it. 


* Arr., Epict., lib. i, cap. 1. 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Diss. II. 


366 


natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction 
between merely being the instrument of good and in- 
tending it ; from the like distinction, every one makes 
between injury and mere harm, which, Hobbes says, is 
peculiar to mankind; and between injury and just pun- 
ishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the con- 
sideration of human laws. 

It is manifest, great part of common language, and of 
common behavior over the world, is formed upon sup- 
position of such a moral faculty ; whether called con- 
science, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason ; 
whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding 
or as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the 
truth, as including both.* Nor is it at all doubtful in 
the general, what course of action this faculty, or prac- 
tical discerning power within us, approves, and what it 
disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed 
wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt 
there may be about particulars, yet, in general, there 
is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of 
it. It is that which all ages and all countries have 
made profession of in public ; it is that which every 
man you meet puts on the show of ; it is that which the 
primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions, 
over the face of the earth, make it their business and 
endeavor to enforce the practice of upon mankind ; 
namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. 
It being manifest, then, in general, that we have such a 

* [Butler’s meaning appears to be, that, if it be referred to the un- 
derstanding, it differs from other acts of the understanding in partak- 
ing of the nature of feeling ; and that, if it be referred to the heart 
or feelings, it must be allowed to partake of the nature of perception. 
Compare the language of Adam Smith, in describing the system of 
Hutcheson. “ This sentiment being of a peculiar nature, distinct 
from every other, and the effect of a particular power of perception, 
they give it a particular name, and call it a moral sense.” — Part vi, 
chap, iii, page 356. — F.] 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 367 

faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to re- 
mark some things, more distinctly concerning it. 

First. It ought to be observed, that the object of this 
faculty is actions,* comprehending under that name act- 
ive or practical principles ; those principles from which 
men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave 
them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any 
person, we call his character. It does not appear that 
brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distin- 
guished from events ; or that will and design, which 
constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all 
an object to their perception. But to ours they are ; 
and they are the object, and the only one, of the approv- 
ing and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behav- 
ior, abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact and 
event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object 
of the moral discernment, as speculative truth and false- 
hood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and 
such consequences, indeed, is always included ; for it 
is part of the action itself : but though the intended 
good or bad consequences do not follow, we have ex- 
actly the same sense of the action as if they did. In 
like manner, we think well or ill of characters, abstracted 
from all consideration of the good or the evil which per- 
sons of such characters have it actually in their power 
to do. We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame 
either ourselves or others for what we enjoy or what we 
suffer, or, for having impressions made upon us which 
we consider as altogether out of our power; but only for 
what we do or would have done had it been in our 
power ; or for what we leave undone which we might 
have done, or would have left undone though we could 
have done it. 

Secondly. Our sense or discernment of actions, as 

* ovde 7 } aperrj nai naitia — hv neiaei, uXkii hvepyeia. M. Anton., lib. 
g t x6 # — Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Offic., lib. i, c. 6. 


368 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Diss. II. 


morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or discern- 
ment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be diffi- 
cult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the 
questions which may be asked concerning it ; but every 
one speaks of such actions as deserving punishment ; 
and it is not, I suppose, pretended that they have ab- 
solutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the 
meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good 
of society, that the doer of such actions should be made 
to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved that a man 
who, by some innocent action, was infected with the 
plague, should be left to perish, lest, by other people’s 
coming near him the infection should spread ; no one 
would say, he deserved this treatment. Innocence and 
ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always sup- 
poses guilt ; and if one be not part of the other, yet they 
are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. 
The sight of a man in misery raises our compassion 
toward him ; and, if this misery be inflicted on him by 
another, our indignation against the author of it. But 
when we are informed that the sufferer is a villain, and 
is punished only for his treachery or cruelty, our com- 
passion exceedingly lessens, and, in many instances, our 
indignation wholly subsides. Now, what produces this 
effect, is the conception of that in the sufferer which we 
call ill desert. Upon considering, then, or viewing to- 
gether, our notion of vice and that of misery, there re- 
sults a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in 
human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural 
and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this 
association were merely artificial or accidental, it were 
nothing ; but being most unquestionably natural, it great- 
ly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavoring to 
explain it away. 

It may be observed, further, concerning our percep- 
tion of good and of ill desert, that the former is very 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 369 

weak with respect to common instances of virtue. One 
reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a 
spectator how far such instances of virtue proceed from 
a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is 
prevalent ; since a very weak regard to virtue may be 
sufficient to make men act well in many common in- 
stances. And on the other hand, our perception of ill 
desert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the 
temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. 
For vice, in human creatures, consisting chiefly in the 
absence or want of the virtuous principle, though a man 
be overcome, suppose, by tortures, it does not from 
thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was 
wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such 
a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; but possibly 
he had it in a degree which would have rendered him 
proof against common temptations. 

Thirdly. Our perception of vice and ill desert arises 
from, and is the result of, a comparison of actions with 
the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere 
neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many 
cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest de- 
gree vicious. And this determination must arise from 
such comparison, and be the result of it ; because such 
neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other na- 
tures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the same 
also with respect to positive vices, or such as con- 
sist in doing what we ought not. For, every one has a 
different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman, or 
child, and by one of mature and common understand- 
ing; though the action of both, including the intention, 
which is part of the action, be the same : as it may be, 
since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capa- 
ble not only of doing mischief, but also of intending it. 
Now, this difference must arise from somewhat discerned 
in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the 
24 


370 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. II. 

action vicious; and the want of which in the other, ren- 
ders the same action innocent or less vicious ; and this 
plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon 
or not, between the action and capacities of the agent, 
previous to our determining an action to be vicious. 
And hence arises a proper application of the epithets, 
incongruous, unsuitable , disproportionate , unfit , to actions 
which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. 

Fourthly. It deserves to be considered, whether men 
are more at liberty, in point of morals, to make them- 
selves miserable without reason, than to make other 
people so ; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater 
good for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than 
they are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has 
committed to their care. It should seem, that a due 
concern about our own interest or happiness, and a rea- 
sonable endeavor to secure and promote it, which is, I 
think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in 
our language ; it should seem, that this is virtue, and 
the contrary behavior faulty and blamable : since in 
the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and 
condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and oth- 
ers. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether 
different from mere desire of our own, or of their happi- 
ness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object 
or occasion of this last kind of perception, is satisfaction 
or uneasiness; whereas the object of the first is active 
behavior. In one case, what our thoughts fix upon, is 
our condition ; in the other, our conduct. 

It is true, indeed, that nature has not given us so 
sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly either 
in ourselves or others , as of falsehood, injustice, and cruel- 
ty ; I suppose, because that constant habitual sense of 
private interest and good, which we always carry about 
with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less neces- 
sary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglect- 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 


37i 


ing our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, 
than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injur- 
ing others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and 
constant a regard ; and also, because imprudence and 
folly, appearing to bring its own punishment more imme- 
diately and constantly than injurious behavior, it less 
needs the additional punishment, which would be inflict- 
ed upon it by others had they the same sensible indig- 
nation against it as against injustice, and fraud, and 
cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natu- 
ral object of compassion, the unhappiness which people 
bring upon themselves, though it be willfully, excites in 
us some pity for them ; and this, of course, lessens our 
displeasure against them. But still it is matter of expe- 
rience, that we are formed so, as to reflect very severely 
upon the greater instances of imprudent neglects and 
foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In in- 
stances of this kind, men often say of themselves with 
remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they 
deserved to suffer such calamities, because they brought 
them upon themselves, and would not take warning. 
Particularly, when persons come to poverty and distress 
by a long course of extravagance, and after frequent 
admonitions, though without falsehood or injustice; we 
plainly do not regard such people as alike objects of 
compassion with those who are brought into the same 
condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things 
it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly 
of vice : meaning by folly, somewhat quite different from 
mere incapacity ; a thoughtless want of that regard and 
attention to our own happiness which we had capacity 
for. And this the word properly includes, and as it 
seems, in its usual acceptation ; for we scarce apply it 
to brute creatures. 

However, if any person be disposed to dispute the 
matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words 


37 2 Analogy of Religion. [Diss. II. 

virtue and vice as not applicable to prudence and folly ; 
but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us, 
which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent ac- 
tions, and disapproves imprudent ones ; I say, prudent 
and imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly 
from the happiness or misery which they occasion. And, 
by the way, this observation may help to determine what 
justness there is in that objection against religion, that 
it teaches us to be interested and selfish. 

Fifthly. Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, 
virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the 
want of it ; it may be proper to observe that benevolence, 
and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the 
whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in 
the review of one’s own character, or that of others, our 
moral understanding and moral sense would be indiffer- 
ent to every thing but the degrees in which benevolence 
prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. 
That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to 
some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove injus- 
tice and falsehood upon any other account than merely as 
an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be 
produced by the first, and of misery by the second. But 
now, on the contrary, suppose two men competitors for 
any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage 
to each of them ; though nothing, indeed, would be 
more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to 
get one of them preferred to the other; yet such en- 
deavor would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefac- 
tor, abstracted from all consideration of distant conse- 
quences : as that examples of gratitude and the cultiva- 
tion of friendship would be of general good to the world. 
Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, 
take from another the fruit of his labor, with intent to 
give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much 
pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 


373 


the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, 
and his vexation in the loss of it ; suppose also that no 
bad consequences would follow ; yet such an action 
would surely be vicious. Nay, further, were treachery, 
violence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious than as fore- 
seen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to socie- 
ty ; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself 
as great advantage by an act of injustice as the whole 
foreseen inconvenience likely to be brought upon others 
by it would amount to, such a piece of injustice would 
not be faulty or vicious at all, because it would be no 
more than, in any other case, for a man to prefer his own 
satisfaction to another’s in equal degrees. 

The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted 
so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injus- 
tice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably 
to others, abstracted from all consideration which con- 
duct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness 
or misery. And therefore, were the Author of nature to 
propose nothing to himself as an end but the production 
of happiness, were his moral character merely that of 
benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposi- 
tion, indeed, the only reason of his giving us the above- 
mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons 
rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, un- 
provoked violence, and injustice, must be, that he fore- 
saw this constitution of our nature would produce more 
happiness than forming us with a temper of mere general 
benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, 
falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and 
benevolence, to some preferably to others, virtue, ab- 
stracted from all consideration of the overbalance of 
evil or good which they may appear likely to produce. 

Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral 
nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral fac- 
ulty the natural object of which is actions; moral gov- 


374 


Analogy of Religion. 


[Diss. II. 


ernment must consist in rendering them happy and un- 
happy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, 
neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action inter- 
woven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this 
moral faculty ;* in rewarding and punishing them upon 
account of their so doing. 

I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, 
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But 
some of great and distinguished merit have, I think, ex- 
pressed themselves in a manner which may occasion 
some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole 
of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the 
best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of 
mankind in the present state ; and the whole of vice, in 
doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to 
produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it ; than which 
mistakes none can be conceived more terrible. For it 
is certain, that some of the most shocking instances of 
injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of perse- 
cution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the 
appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance 
of misery in the present state ; perhaps sometimes may 
have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might 
easily be carried on ; but I forbear. The happiness of 
the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and the 
Proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about, 
when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in 
any ways, but those which he has directed ; that is, in- 
deed, in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice. 
I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeav- 
oring, in some sort, to do good without regard to these. 
But the truth seems to be, that such supposed endeav- 
ors proceed almost always from ambition, the spirit of 
party, or some indirect principle, concealed, perhaps, in 
great measure from persons themselves. And though it 
* Part i, chap, vi, page 167. 


Diss. II.] The Nature of Virtue. 


375 


is our business and our duty to endeavor, within the 
bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease* 
convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion, of 
our fellow-creatures ; yet from our short views, it is 
greatly uncertain whether this endeavor will, in partic- 
ular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness 
upon the whole ; since so many and distant things must 
come into the account. And that which makes it our 
duty, is, that there is some appearance that it will, and 
no positive appearance sufficient to balance this, on the 
contrary side ; and also, that such benevolent endeavor 
is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous 
principles, the active principle of benevolence. 

However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be 
our rule of life ; it must be added, otherwise a snare will 
be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of 
common forms of speech, generally understood, cannot 
be falsehood, and in general that there can be no de- 
signed falsehood without designing to deceive. It must 
likewise be observed, that in numberless cases a man 
may be under the strictest obligations to what he fore- 
sees will deceive, without his intending it. For it is 
impossible not to foresee that the words and actions 
of men in different ranks and employments, and of dif- 
ferent educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each 
other; and it cannot but be so, while they will judge 
with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what 
they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent 
judges of, even though they considered it with great 
attention. 








INDEX 


♦ 


Abstract Reasoning, 

May mislead, page 159. 

To be applied to practical subjects with 
great caution, 159. 

Maybe, with propriety, joined with the 
observation of facts, 37. 

From the opinion of necessity, falla- 
cious, 157, 159. 

Abstract 

Truths and matter of fact, how distin- 
guished, 844. 

Accidental 

Events of which we know not the laws, 
so termed, 244. 

Action, 

This world a theater of, 150. 

As distinguished from the thing done, 
the chief object of religion, 289. 

Actions, 

Meaning of the term in moral ques- 
tions, 868. 

Pleasure and pain the consequences of 
our, 69, 70. 

To be distinguished from their moral 
quality, as virtuous or vicious, 92. 

The provision made that all their bad 
consequences should not always ac- 
tually follow, 252. 

Will and design constitute their nature 
as such, 367. 

Distinguished from events, 858. 

What, exercise the principle of virtue, 
145. 

Outward and inward, 128. 

Affections, 

Particular, form part of our inward 
frame, 136. 

In what respects subject, of right, to 
conscience, 136. 

Necessarily excited by the presence of 
their objects, 137. 

Need restraint, 137. 

Bee Passions. 

Affliction, 

The proper discipline for resignation, 
148, 149. 


Analogy, 

Butler’s, a work demanded by the times 
in which it was written, page 21. 
Force of the argument in the, 22. 

Topics embraced in the, 42. 

The objection against, as being unsatis- 
factory, answered. 340, 341. 

Upon what principles the argument in 
is conducted, 342, 343. 

In general, a just and conclusive mode 
of reasoning, 36. 37. 

Origen’s remark upon, 37. 

May reasonably be admitted to deter- 
mine our judgment, 35. 

Lays us under an obligation to regard 
it in practice, 35. 

Requires the cases compared to be ap- 
parently similar in the respects which 
are the ground of inference, 64, 217. 
Plan of the, examined in this treatise, 
42, 43. 

What is assumed in this. 38. 

Can directly only show things credible 
as matters of fact, 164. 

Yet suggests an answer to objections 
against the goodness and wisdom of 
the Divine conduct, 172. 

Whether it would be likely to influence 
men’s practice, 345. 

This uulikelihood, though granted, no 
decisive objection against its use, 342. 
Design o£ not to justify God’s provi- 
dence, but to show our duties, 337. 
When applied to religion, superior to 
hypothesis and speculation, 37-39. 
Affords no ground for believing that 
death will destroy our living pow- 
ers, 49. 

Confirms the proof of the indiscerpti- 
bility of living agents, 52. 

Of the case of brutes no objection, 58, 59. 
Of vegetables, 64. 

Gives credibility to the doctrine of fu- 
ture rewards and punishments, 76. 
Answers objections against future pun- 
ishments, 77-81. 

Between our state of trial in our tem- 
poral and religious capacities, 114. 

In respect of the sources of danger, 
115, 116. 

In respect of men’s behavior under 
it, 117, 118. 

In respect of difficulties increased by 
outward circumstances, 118, 119. 


378 


Index. 


Analogy, — continued. 

Force of, in answering objections, and 
raising a positive presumption, page 
122 . 

Suggests that this life is a preparation 
for another, 124-134. 

Although we saw not how, 134. 

Leads us to expect that the future state 
will be a community, 135. 

May subsist between limitations of pos- 
sible perfectibility in moral character, 
and powers bodily and intellectual, 

145. 

Of the waste of seeds, as answering the 
objection, that the present state is 
not, to many, a discipline in virtue, 

146. 

Between the speculative reason and 
the moral understanding, 166. 

Argument from, not affected by the 
scheme of necessity, 152-172. 

Answers objections against the wisdom 
and goodness of God’s government, 
indirectly , 171. 

Between God’s natural and his moral 
government, as to their vastness and 
incomprehensibleness, 172, 174. 

Between the natural and the moral 
world, as regards means and ends, 
177, 178. 

"What objections it cannot answer di- 
rectly, 171. 

Affords no argument against the gen- 
eral scheme of Christianity, 212. 

No presumption from, against a reve- 
lation at the beginning of the world, 
considered as miraculous, 215-217. 

Supposed presumptions against mira- 
cles answered, 217-221. 

Shows objection against Christianity it- 
self, as distinguished from objections 
against its evidence, to be frivolous, 
223-226. 

Makes it probable that, if we judge of 
Christianity by preconceived expec- 
tations, we shall find many things 
seeming liable to objections, 225, 226. 

Between natural information and in- 
spiration, 226, 227. 

More particularly between the limita- 
tions and hinderances of natural in- 
formation and the instruction afford- 
ed us by revelation, 230, 233. 

Between the use of miraculous gifts 
and the use of the gifts of memory, 
eloquence, etc., 231, 232. 

Makes it credible that the Scripture 
contains truths as yot undiscovered, 
233. 

Between Christianity, as a remedia 
system, and the natural remedies for 
disease, 235, 236. 

Answers objections against the wisdom 
of the means used by Christianity, 
243. 

Makes it credible that the Christian 
dispensation may have been all along 
carried on by gen eral laws, 243. 


Analogy, —continued . 

Answers objections against Christian- 
ity, as being a slowly- operating and 
complicated scheme, page 246, 247. 

Removes all presumption against the 
general notion of a Mediator, 249. 

Makes it supposable that future pun- 
ishment may follow vice by way of 
natural consequence, 250. 

Shows that we have no reason to be- 
lieve that repentance alone will pre- 
vent future punishment, 255, 256. 

Answers the objection that the death 
of Christ represents God as indiffer- 
ent whether he punishes the inno- 
cent or the guilty, 266-270. 

Shows that we cannot expect to have 
the like information concerning God’s 
conduct as concerning our own duty, 
269, 270. 

Answers objections from the want of 
universality in revelation and the 
doubtfulness of its evidence, 271, 272. 

Of a prince sending directions to his 
servants, whether applicable to God, 
289. 

Between prophecy and satirical and 
mytliologic writing, 309, 310. 

Between a prophet and a compiler of 
memoirs, 310. 

Objections against arguing from the 
analogy of nature to religion, 333- 
346. 

See Objections. 

Antiquity 

Of religion, as one of its evidences, 164. 

Antoninus, M. 

Quoted, 63, 367 n. 

Aristotle, 

Quoted, 136, n. 

Arnobius, 

Quoted, 300 n. 

Atonement, 

Our ignorance of the manner in which 
the ancients understood it to be 
made, 265. 

See Sacrifice. 

Attention, 

Moral, how exercised and disciplined 
by the circumstances of our trial, 143. 

Necessary when we consider Christi- 
anity, 314. 

Augustine, 

Quoted, 193, n. 

Author of Nature, 

Existence of, assumed in this treatise. 
38. 

Reveals himself to us as a righteous 
Governor, 86. 

Is deliberate in his operations, 246, 247 


Index. 


379 


Bayle, P., 

Probably referred to by Butler, 39, n. 

Quoted, page 60, n. 

Behavior, 

Of men in their present state of trial, 
117, 118. 

Benevolence, 

Absolute, defined : whether it is the 
only character of God, 85. 

God’s, toward us, how limited, 86. 

The want of it, not the whole of virtue 
and vice, 372, 373. 

Active principle of, the most excellent 
of all virtuous principles, 375. 

True, implies a regard to justice and 
veracity, 101, 102. 

Berkeley, Bishop, 

Quoted, 91 n, 158 n. 

Body, 

Our present, relation of, to us not nec- 
essary to thinking, 52. 

Bodies. 

Our organized, may be presumed to be 
no part of ourselves, 52. 

Made up of organs and instruments of 
perception and motion, 55-58. 

Boswell, 

His life of Johnson quoted, 323 n. 

Brahmins, 

Their notion of death, 63, n. 

Brown, Dr. John, 

91, n. 

Brute Force, 

Natural tendency of reason to prevail 
over, 99-102. 

Brutes, 

Question of their natural immortality 
argued, 58, 59. 

Instinct of, superior in some things to 
the reason of men, 230. 

Have no reflex sense of actions, as dis- 
tinguished from events, 230. 

Cato, 

Quoted, 51. 

Certainty, 

Moral, highest degree of probable evi- 
dence, 33. 

What it means, 35. 

Chalmers, Dr., 

Quoted, 84, 91, 113, 117, 120, 124, 138, 
181, 219, 222, 292. 

Chance, 

In reality no such thing as, 244. 


Changes, 

Which we have already undergone 
afford a presumption in favor of a 
future existence, page 45, 50-53. 

The, which various creatures may un- 
dergo without destruction, 45, 46. 

Character, 

What is meant by, 160 n. 

Our capability of forming a new, 131. 

Of virtue and piety, a necessary quali- 
fication for a future state, 134. 

Our capacity of improvement therein, 
135-142. 

Our moral, to be manifested to the cre- 
ation by means of a state of trial, 150. 

Childhood, 

A state of discipline for mature age, 132. 

Christ, 

Our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, 
204. 

The scriptural representation of his in- 
terposition as Mediator, 260-262. 

His prophetical, regal, and priestly of- 
fices, 263, 264. 

His sacrifice not an allusion to the Mo- 
saic sacrifices, 264. 

Ground of the efficacy of his sacrifice 
not explained in Scripture, 264. 

Objection against the death of, as a pro- 
pitiatory sacrifice, 266-270. 

Sufferings of, voluntary, 267. 

Christians, 

Primitive, their conversion and zeal, as 
proving the reality of the Scripture 
miracles, 299, 300. 

Christianity, 

Not, if it be from God, of small impor- 
tance, 194. 

A republication of natural religion, and 
with what circumstances of advan- 
tage, 194-201. 

Has brought life and immortality to 
light, 196. 

Preserves the knowledge of religion for 
all ages, by means of a visible Church, 
197. 

Good effects of, not small, and alleged 
ill effects do not properly belong to 
it, 199. 

Contains an account of a dispensation, 
not discoverable by reason, carried 
on by the Son and Spirit, 201. 

Enjoins, in consequence, new duties, 
not otherwise to be ascertained, 201, 
202 . 

No presumption against the general 
scheme of, whether considered mir- 
aculous or not, 212-215. None, be- 
cause it is not discoverable by reason 
or experience, 213, 215. None, be- 
cause it is unlike the known course 
of nature, 214, 215. 


380 


Index. 


C hristianity , — continued. 

Objections against, as distinguished 
from objections against its evidence, 
frivolous, page 223. 

True question concerning if, -whether 
it be a real revelation, not whether it 
is such a one as we might have ex- 
pected. 227. 

What objections against, would be va- 
lid. 22s. 

Practical part of, plain and obvious. 233. 

Objections against, from the long delay 
of its publication to the world. 234. 

Objections against the goodness and 
wisdom of not valid, 240. 245. 

See Revelation, Revealed Religion. 

Christian Dispensation, 

The, may appear natural to some be- 
ings in the universe, 66. 

Church, 

The visible, desisn of the institution ot 
197, 19S. 

The carrying out of its design implies 
positive institutions, 19$. 

Men are bound to become members of 
the, 200. 

Circumstantial evidences of Christian - 
ity, 292. 314. 

Often as convincing as direct testimo- 
ny, 330. 

Coincidence of natural and revealed re- 
ligion, 224, 233. 

Coincidences of Scripture, 296. 
Cicero, 

Quoted, 57. 

Clarke, Dr. Samuel, 

His u Demonstration,'” 154 n. * 

Coleridge, 

Quoted, 93 n, 103 n. 

Collins, Anthony, 

Quoted, 51 n. 

Comparison, 

In what we are apt to be misled by a 
comparison of things of greater or 
less importance, 210. 

What, the ground of our moral percep- 
tions and ill desert, 369. 

Compassion, 

Evidence of, in the original constitution 
of the world, 252. 

Unhappiness the natural object of 370. 

Conscience, 

What proof it affords of God’s moral 
government, 92. 93. 

How it appears that we have the facul- 
ty so called, 365, 366. 

Includes both a sentiment of the un- 
derstanding and a perception of the 
heart, 366. 

Has for its object actions, 366, 367. 


Consciousness, 

Indivisibility of. a proof of the indivisi- 
bility of the conscious being, page 51. 

Does "not constitute personal identity, 
but ascertains it to ourselves, 35$, 
359. 

The doubt on this subject shown to be 
groundless. 359. 

Contemplation 

Of the theory of virtue may harden 
the heart. 12$. 

Continuance 

Of all things, natural presumption in 
favor ot 47. 

Correspondence 

Between our nature and our condition 
necessary to life and happiness, 125. 

Creation, 

Scripture begins with the, in order to 
ascertain for us the true object of our 
worship, 315. 

Creature, 

Notion of an upright and finitely per- 
fect one. 187. 

In what way such a one may fall, 139. 

Credibility 

Of a truth or matter of fact distin- 
guished from the wisdom and good- 
ness of it, 171. 

Crooks, G. B.., 

Quoted, 192 n. 

Dangers, 

Implied in our state of probation for a 
future life, 118. 

Perception of a natural excitement of 
passive fear and active caution. 1^9. 

Daniel, 

The book ot referred to. 312. 

Had probably greater external evidence 
formerly than what has come down 
to us, 312. 

Death, 

Known to us onlv in some of its effects. 
49. 

Not likely, from any thing we know, 
to destroy living agents. 4$. Nor 
their present powers of reflection, 
60, 61. Nor even to suspend the ex- 
ercise of those powers, 62—64. 

Like our birth, may put us into a more 
_ enlarged state of "life. 63. 

Notion of the Brahmins concerning, 
63 n. 

Definitions, 

Sometimes serve only to perplex, 357. 

Degradation, 

Marks of our being in a state of 119 

120 . ’ 


Index. 


381 


Demonstration, 

As distinguished from probable evi- 
dence, page 33. 

Descartes, 

An example of those thinkers who 
would frame a world upon hypoth- 
esis, 38. 

Desert, 

Good and ill, the perception of, de- 
fined, 868. 

Destruction 

Of living powers, what it means, 48 n. 

Different 

Degrees of evidence in religious mat- 
ters consistent with justice, 274. 

Difference 

Of men’s situations in religious mat- 
ters, to be accounted for in the same 
manner as their different situations 
in other respects, 276. 

Would not be prevented, though reve- 
lation were universal, 277. 

Difficulties 

As to the evidence of religion, are anal- 
ogous to those attending the practice 
of it, 282. 

These may be the principal part of 
some persons’ trial, 284. 

In religion, unreasonab ! e to expect to 
have them all cleared, 340-342. 

Discipline, 

Effect ot, to improve the principle of 
virtue in us, 138. 

Needed by upright creatures, 136-140. 

Indispensably necessary for corrupt 
creatures, 142. 

This world peculiarly fit to be a place 
of, for our moral improvement, 142- 
145. 

Diseases 

Of the body and the mind, analogy be- 
tween the remedies for. 235, 236. 

Mortal diseases, not affecting our intel- 
lectual powers, afford a presumption 
that those powers will not be de- 
stroyed by them, 61. 

Are sometimes themselves remedies, 
179. 

Some operate like enthusiasm, 802. 

Distress, 

In others, the perception of a natural 
excitement to passive piety and ac- 
tive relief, 129. 

Doubt 

Implies some degree of evidence for 
that of which we doubt, 280. 

With regard to religion, implies an ob- 
ligation to regard it in practice, 2S2. 


Dreams, 

Our experience of, what it shows us, 
page 56. 

Duties, 

Our, to the Son and Spirit, arise out of 
their relations to us, and. are strictly 
moral, 202, 203. 

Moral and positive, distinguished, 205. 

Earth, 

Whether its appearance confirms the 
Scripture accounts of the fall, 260. 

Ecclesiastes 

Quoted, 126 n. 

End, 

We are greatly ignorant how far any 
thing is a final end in God’s regard, 
246. 

The whole, for which God made and 
governs the world, may be utterly 
beyond the reach of our faculties, 72. 

See Means and Ends. 

Enthusiasm, 

Christianity not such a scheme as 
would have been expected from, 238. 

As an objection to the Christian ev- 
idences, considered and answered, 
301-305. 

Will not account for the conversion and 
zeal of the first Christians, 302. 

Religion not peculiarly liable to, 303. 

The case of enthusiasm and knavery 
combined considered, 303, 304. 

General observations upon, cannot over- 
throw direct historical evidence, 305, 
306. 

Epictetus, 

Quoted, 365 n. s 

Evidence, 

Probable and demonstrative, distin- 
guished, 83. See Probable Evidence. 

The external, for natural religion, 164, 
165. 

Of Scripture, reason competent to judge 
of, 238. 

Doubt implies some degree of, 280. 

Circumstantial, often as convincing as 
the most direct, 330. 

Not only increased, but multiplied, by 
the adding together of separate prob- 
able proofs, 350. 

Evidence of Christianity, 

The state in which it is left, not incon- 
sistent with justice, 275. Not incon- 
sistent with wisdom and goodness, 
276-284. 

Doubtfulness of, may put men into a 
state of trial, 27S-281. A state of trial 
similar to that from external cir- 
cumstances of temptation, 2S2-285. 

Our dissatisfaction with, may be our 
own fault, 285, 2S6. 


382 


Index. 


Evidence of Christianity — con’d. 

Lies level to men of common capacity, 
pages 2S7, 2S8. 

Total result of the direct and collateral, 
may be compared with the effect in 
architecture, 293. 

Direct and circumstantial, view of, as 
forming one argument, 313-332. 

Safer to admit it, than lo reject it, 331. 

Cannot, from its nature, be destroyed, 
though it may be lessened, 332. 

True question with regard to, 341. 

Evil, 

Origin of, 71, 124. 

Prevalence of, no argument against the 
power or goodness of God, 71 n. 

Permission of, may be beneficial to the 
world, 178. 

Yet would have been better if men had 
refrained from it, 179. 

Reliefs and remedies originally provided 
for, 253. 

Example and Education, 

Effect of a bad, in increasing the dan- 
gers of our state of trial, 118. 

Existence, 

Necessary, in what sense attributed to 
God, 153. 

Experience 

Teaches us the good and bad conse- 
quences of our actions, 269. 

How it confirms the unitv of the mind, 
52. 

Experimental 

Observations cannot prove the simplic- 
ity of a living agent, 53. 

External 

Objects, as related to the particular 
affections of our nature, 136. 

Circumstances, one of the sources of 
trial in our present state, 1 15. 

Faculties, 

Human, not given us in their full per- 
fection at'our birth, 131. 

Not adequate to discover how the world 
might be best constituted, 39, 40. 

Ridiculous to attempt to prove the 
truth of, 364. 

Fall of Man, 

Explicable, from the nature of particu- 
lar affections, 189. 

Not accounted for, solely from the 
principle of liberty, 139, 140. 

Appearances of a, in nature, 119. 

Our condition resulting from the, does 
not afford just matter of complaint, 
119. 

The Christian dispensation grounded 
upon the supposition of a, 257. 

The scriptural account of it analogous 
and conformable to what we see and 
experience, 260. 


Falsehood, 

The several kinds of it, page 304. 

Whether the use of certain forms of 
speech is, 375. 

Fatalist, The, 

His scheme of the world stated, 153. 

Shown, by pertinent examples, to be 
absurd in practice, 156-159. 

His objection to the justice of punish- 
ments refuted, 160. 

Religious and irreligious fatalists dis- 
tinguished, 169, 170. 

Fate. 

See Necessity. 

Fear and Hope, 

Legitimate moral motives, 147. 

Of future punishment and reward, can- 
not be got rid of by greater part of 
the world, 94. 

Final Causes, 

The notion of, does not always imply 
that the end designed is answered, 
146. 

The pleasures and pains attending our 
actions, instances of,- 76. 

The proof from, of the existence oi 
God, not destroyed by the schemes 
of necessity, 154, 155. 

Fitness, Moral, 

Whether, and in what sense, it deter- 
mines the will of God, 163 n. 

The proof of religion from, not in- 
sisted on in this treatise, 163, 343. 

And unfitness of actions, in what sense 
understood, 369, 370. 

Fitzgerald, Professor, 

Quoted, 33, 37. 46, 71. 87, 104. 108, 111, 
130, 136, 15S, 169 171. 191, 196, 206, 
216, 233, 239, 294, 323, 866. 

Folly, 

• 

Defined and shown to be akin to vice, 
370, 871. 

Of mankind, as to present and future 
interests compared, 116, 117. 

Future State, 

A, will probably be a social one, 65, 
135. 

Question of, why so important to us, 
69. 

Three questions relative to, considered, 
62 n. 

Demonstration of, not of itself a proof 
of religion, 66. Yet implied in re- 
ligion, 66. 

Security of the good in, may be de- 
rived from the habits formed in a 
state of probation, 143. 

This life a state of discipline for, p. 1. 
ch. v. 


Index. 


383 


Future Rewards and Punish- 
ments, 

Will differ only in degree from those 
of our pi-esent state, page 109. 

As conceived by natui’al reason, and 
as specially described in Scripture, 
80 n. 

Future Punishments, 

General consideration of, belongs to 
natural religion, 110. 

Doctrine of, shown by analogy to be 
altogether credible, 77-81. 

May follow vice, by way of natural 
consequence, 250. 

Reformation and repentance alone in- 
sufficient to prevent them, 256. 

See Punishments. 

General Laws, 

The manifest wisdom of carrying on 
the natural government of the world 
by means of, 179. 

Interruptions of, would produce evil 
and prevent good, 180. 

Credible that the Christian dispensation 
may have been, all along, carried on 
by, 243-245. 

Miracles may proceed from, 244. 

Only from analogy that we conclude 
the whole coui*se of nature to be car- 
ried on by, 244. 

Gifts, 

Superior, not always bestowed on per- 
sons of prudence and decency, 231, 
232. 


God, 

True idea of, that of a governor, 76. 
His existence: Why taken for granted 
in this treatise, 38. 

His existence: Not disproved by the 
scheme of fatalism, 153, 154. 

His existence : In what sense necessa- 


ry, 154. 

His will: How determined, 163 n. 

His will may be considered as absolute 
or conditional, 270. 

Resignation to his will, an essential part 
of virtue. 148, 149. 

What temper of mind in us corre- 
sponds to his sovereignty, 149. 

His character, what is meant by, as 


applied to him, 160. 

His goodness: May seek to make only 
the good happy, 72. 

His goodness shown by experience to 
be no good gx-ound for expecting him 
to make us happy all at once, 150. 

Does not give us the same information 
concerning his conduct as concerning 


our duty, 269, 270. 

Dictates of conscience concerning, the 


laws of, 162. 

Our duties to God the Father: to the 
Son and to the Holy Spirit, 201-203. 


God’s Government, 

End of, probably beyond the reach of 
our faculties, page 72. 

His natural government of us, by re- 
wards and punishments, 69-82. 

The course of nature but another name 
for, 75. 

Not the less certainly established, 
though in it he act not immediate- 
ly, 74, 75. 

His Moral : Proofs of its existence and 
operation, 85-112. 

Not yet, in this present state, earned 
on to its perfection, 87. Yet tends to 
perfection, 99. 

His natural and moral government 
compai-ed, 171-183. 

Natural and Moral, may both together 
make up one scheme, 173, 174. 

Likely that, as his natural government 
is a' scheme beyond our comprehen- 
sion, the moral may be such a one 
too, 172-177. 

His visible government over the world 
exercised by the mediation of others, 
91, 249. 

God’s Providence, 

The series of his providential dispensa- 
tions progressive, 233, 234. 

Objections to his providence usually 
founded on our ignorance, 175. 

How far we ai-e concerned to answer 
objections against, 337-339. 

Good and Evil, 

Natural, the great variety and seeming 
inequality of their distribution, 271, 
272. 

Good Men, 

Disposed to befi-iend good men, as 
such, 94. 

Difficulties in the way of their union 
with each other here, 103. 

Goodness, 

The Divine. See God. 

Government, 

The formal notion of, what it consists 
in, 74. 

Natural and moral defined, and distin- 
guished from each other, 84, 85. 

Domestic and civil, ordained of God, 
95. 

Punishes vice as such, and as hurtful 
to society, 95. 

Grotius, 

Quoted, 286 n. 

Guilt, 

The idea of, always associated in our 
minds with that of ill desert, 369. 

Guizot, 

Quoted, 248 n. 


384 


Index. 


Habits, 

Defined, 127. 

Our capacity of acquiring them, 127. 

Distinguished as habits of perception 
and habits of action, habits of body, 
and habits of mind, page 127. 

Active, may be growing stronger, while 
passive impressions are becoming 
weaker, 128, 129. 

Of mind, produced by the exertion of 
inward practical principles, 128. 

The acquisition of, necessary to us, 131. 

Of virtue, necessary to all rational crea- 
tures, whether virtuous or depraved, 
135. 

Happiness, 

Our present, mainly depends upon our 
own behavior, 69, 70. 

"Why not given to all promiscuously, 
without regard to conduct, 70, 72. 

A result from our nature and condition 
jointly, 125. 

Of virtue, possibility of exceptions to, 
88, 98. 

Virtue produces, and tends to produce 
it in a still higher degree than at pres- 
ent, 89-95, 99-106. 

The fact that our present, is not to 
be secured without difficulty and 
trial, makes it credible that the same 
may be true of our future , 116, 117. 

Of mankind, the aiming at, without re- 
gard to veracity and justice, not a 
correct idea of virtue, 374. 

Heathen 

World, state of, shows the importance 
of revealed religion, 191. 

Different relations of the, to the genu- 
ine Scripture revelation, 274. 

Hinder ances, 

The present, of the natural tendencies 
of virtue, only accidental, 111. 

History, 

What account it gives of the origin of 
religion, 166, 217. 

The whole of revelation, including 
prophecy and doctrine, may be con- 
sidered as a history, 815. 

The common , in Scripture, altogether 
credible, 322. 

The failure to invalidate the Scripture 
history, a strong argument in its fa- 
vor, 317, 318. 

Hume, 

Referred to, 108 n., 21 S n. 

Identity, 

Or sameness, different senses of the 
word, 358. 

In what sense applied to persons, 357. 

Not constituted by consciousness, but 
ascertained by it, 358. 

Absurdity of the supposition that we 
are not the same beings in successive 
periods of time, 362, 863. 


Ignorance, Our, 

IIow this life is a preparation for an- 
other, no objection against the credi- 
bility of its being so, page 134. 

Of the' scheme of nature and of Provi- 
dence, 174, 175. 

Partial and total, distinguished, 181. 

When an answer to objections against 
God’s method of government, and 
when not, 177, 181. 

Even total ignorance of the conse- 
quences of our actions would not in- 
validate moral obligation, 1S2. 

The argument from, cannot be used 
equally for or against religion, 183. 

Arguments from, rather taken from 
what analogy teaches us about it, 
183. 

In connection with the question of the 
credibility of miracles, 219, 244. 

In matters of religion, owing frequent- 
ly to men’s negligence and prejudices, 
2S5, 286. 

Of the nature of our condition, natural 
and moral, and the reasons why we 
are placed in it, 275, 276. 

Imagination, 

The source of erroneous presumptions 
that death will destroy us, 50. 

Must not be substituted for experience, 
64. 

Men of warm, apt to fancy coincidences, 
330. 

Immorality, 

The charge of, against certain precepts 
in Scripture, 237, 238. 

Not valid, 237. 

Improvement, 

Of our faculties, in all respects gradual, 
131, 132. 

Our capacity for, 125-131. 

Necessity for our, in virtue, 131-134. 

Effected by the acquisition of moral 
and religious habits, 135. 

Innocent, 

Persons, are appointed, in the course 
of nature, to suffer for the guilty, 
267. 

Inspiration, 

In what manner or degree it should 
be vouchsafed to mankind, not ascer- 
tainable by reason, 226, 227. 

Interest, 

Sense of, defined, 137 n. 

In what sense consistent with virtue, 
and part of its idea, 137 n. As coin- 
cident with virtue, needs strengthen- 
ing by discipline, 137 n. 

Irregularities, 

Apparent, in nature and in Christian- 
ity, whence they arise, 245. 

Unreasonable to expect them to be 
remedied by occasional interposi- 
tions, 180. 


« 


Index. 


38S 


Irreligion, 

Its aggravated guilt, beyond that of 
other vice, page 254. 

Especially in persons of high rank and 
character, 280. 

Not justifiable upon any pretense of 
want of evidence in religion, 282. 

Jews, 

A summary of their history, as a na- 
tion, 324-326. 

Their history, as contained in Script- 
ure, confirmed by known fact, 324. 
God’s dealing with them, 325. 
Continuance of the, as a distinct people 
in their dispersion, a standing mira- 
cle, and a confirmation of the truth 
of Scripture, 326. 

Final restoration of the, 327. 

John, Saint, 

To what he probably alludes in the be- 
ginning of his Gospel, 315. 

His doctrine of Christ’s pre-existence 
conformable to that of St. Paul, 316. 
His description of the perfection of re- 
ligion, 339. 

Kingdom, 

Idea of a perfectly virtuous and happy, 
105,106. 

Christ’s, as described in Scripture, 263. 

Knowledge, 

Our, of Scripture, will be perfected in 
the same way as our knowledge of 
nature, 233. 

Natural and ordinary methods of im- 
proving it, 233. 

Analogy of the progress of natural and 
religious, 234. 

Koran, 

Quoted, 298 n. 

Language, 

In its very nature, liable to infinite 
abuse, 230. 

Law, Bishop, 

Quoted, 73 n. 

Liberty, 

Does not, of itself, account for the fall 
of finite creatures, 139. 

Why the proof of religion from, is 
omitted in this treatise, 343, 344. 
Implied in the constitution of the world, 
and our condition therein, 158. 
Doctrine of, shows where the fallacy 
lies in the scheme of necessity, when 
reduced to practice, 167. 

Life, 

Our present, a probation for a future 
one. As implying trial and danger, 
113-122. As intended for moral dis- 
cipline, 125-150. For the manifesta- 
tion of character, 150. 
gee Future Life. 

25 


Likeness, 

Various species of, defined, page 33 n. 

Living Powers, 

Twofold sense of the phrase, 48 n. 

Our, not likely to be destroyed by 
death, 4S-64. 3 

Their not being exercised, does not 
imply their non-existence, 49. 

Locke, 

Quotation from his chapter on Proba- 
bility, 34. 

His notion of personal identity exam- 
ined, 360, 361. 

Locomotive 

Powers, to what they properly belong, 
56. 

Mohammedanism 

Was not received in the world on the 
foot of public miracles, 298. 

Maimonides, 

Quoted, 174 n. 

Manasses, 

Prayer of, quoted, 259 n. 

Mandeville, Dr., 

Quoted, 91 n. 

Man, 

An inferior part of creation, 119. 
Capable of improvement, 135. 
Connected with present, past, and fu- 
ture, 184. 

Dealt with as if free, 158. 

Has a moral nature, 96. 

His fall not accounted for by his free 
agency, 139. 

Knows nothing fully, 174. 

May become qualified for new states, 
126. 

Not a competent judge of the schemes 
of God, 175. 

Requires moral culture, 135. 

Accepted according to what he hath, 
276. 

His circumstances no ground of com- 
plaint, 277. 

His obligation to study the Scriptures, 
211, 290. 

Must be renewed, 205. 

Martyrs, 

The primitive : their sufferings a testi- 
mony to the truth of the Christian 
miracles, 299, 300. 

Matter, 

Indiscerptibility of its elementary par- 
ticles by any natural power, 53. 

Our being affected by, does not prove 
it to be part of ourselves, 53. 

See Body. 


386 


Index. 


Matter of Fact, 

The system of religion viewed as, irre- 
spective of all speculation, page 161. 

Distinguished from abstract, truth, 311. 

Objections to Christianity as, answered, 
Part II, chap. iii. 

Means and Ends, 

Events are related to each other as, 1 77. 

Our incompetency, prior to experience, 
to judge of either, 178. 

No presumption against the wisdom of 
the means used by Christianity, 248. 

The objection that they are complicat- 
ed, and of slow operation, answered, 
246-248. 

Mediator, 

No presumption from the course of na- 
ture against the general notion of a, 
249. 

Scripture view of his office, 260-264. 

Christian doctrine of, in what respect 
most objected to, 266. 

This objection answered, 267-270. 

See Sacrifice. 

Microscopes and Glasses, 

Our organs of perception compared 
with, 55, 65. 

Mill, J. S., 

Quoted, 218 n. 

Miracles 

Prove the system of natural religion 
as well as the revealed, 195, 196. 

No presumption against, at the begin- 
ning of the world, 215, 216. 

The incarnation of Christ an invisible 
miracle, 214. 

No argument from analogy against, 
after the settlement of the course of 
nature, 217. 

No greater presumption against, than 
against ordinary facts before proof, 
219. 

Occasions may arise for, in the course 
of ages, 220. 

The moral system of the world gives 
distinct reasons for, 220. 

Must be compared with the extraordi- 
nary phenomena of nature, 220. 

May be subject to general laws, 244, 
245. 

The Christian, are recorded in books of 
authentic, genuine history, 298-296. 

The reality and truth of, affirmed in 
the epistles of St. Paul, 296, 297. 

Christianity first preached and received 
upon the allegation of, 297-800. 

Mohammedan and Popish not parallel, 
298, 299. 

Scripture history gives the same evi- 
dence for, as for common facts, 293. 

Truth of them, accounts for the his- 
tory, 295. 

How referred to in St. Paul’s epistles, 
297. 


Miracles, — continued. 

What proof of their reality from the 
conversion and zeal of the first Chris- 
tians, page 299. 

Miraculous 

Gifts, in the apostolic age ; the objection 
from their disorderly exercise an- 
swered, 281, 232. 

What events, seemingly natural, may 
be so esteemed, 326. 

Mistakes 

Of transcribers of Scripture: no more 
than were to have been expected in 
books of such anti<juity, 323. 

Moral 

Action, whether the nature of, can be 
altered by a command, 237. 

Duties, arise from revealed relations, 
as well as from those made known by 
reason, 206. 

Faculty, our: its dictates the laws of 
God, in a sense including sanctions , 
162. 

Hence, affords a proof of religion not 
to be invalidated by fatalism, 162. 

See Conscience. 

Government. See Government. 

Evil, voluntary in its very notion, 124. 

Our inability to account for, 124. 

Part of religion, why preferred in 
Scripture to the positive, 208-211. 

Precepts. See Positive. 

Understanding, our, liable to be im- 
paired and perverted, 166. 

Morality, 

Of Scripture, reason competent to judge 
of, 236, 237. 

Of actions, depends chiefly on the in- 
tention of the agent, 365, 366. 

Partly, also, on a comparison of his in- 
tentions with his nature and capaci- 
ties, 367. 

Motion, 

Supposed indivisible, compared with 
consciousness, 51. 

Mysteries 

To be expected, if we judge from ex- 
perience, in such a scheme as Chris- 
tianity, 224, 243. 

As great in nature as in Christianity, 
244, 245, 266-270. 

Nature, 

Light of, insufficient, 191. 

Teachings of, as to a future state, and 
the efficacy of repentance, 79 n, 254- 
257. 

Course of, implies an operating agent, 
78, 252. 

No presumption against revealed relig- 
ion, from its being unlike the, 213, 
214. 


Index. 


38; 


Nature, — continued. 

How ascertained to be by general laws, 
pages 243, 244. 

Is not a fixed, but a progressive scheme, 
65. 

Our ignorance of the causes, etc., on 
which it depends, 220. 

We know not what is the, upon the 
first peopling of worlds, 215. As a 
source of our trial, 115, 116. 

Natural, 

True sense of the term, 65. 

Our notion of what is, may be enlarged 
by a greater knowledge* of the works 
and the providence of God, 65. 

God’s natural government probably 
subservient to his moral, 174. 

Religion, Christianity a republication, 
and an external institution, of, 194- 
200 . 

See Government — Religion. 

Necessary 

Existence of God, in what sense to be 
understood, 154. 

Necessity, 

Opinion of, Butler’s mode of consider- 
ing, 152. 

Does not exclude deliberation and 
choice, 154. 

Does not destroy the proof of an intelli- 
gent author and governor of nature, 
155. 

Supposed reconcilable with the course 
of nature, is reconcilable also with 
the system of religion, 155-160. 

Does not destroy the proof of religion, 
161-164. 

However true in speculation, yet shown 
by experience to be false in practice, 
156-159. 

The attributes of veracity, benevolence, 
and justice in God, reconcilable with, 
160. 

The conclusion from, that it is incred- 
ible that God should reward and pun- 
ish us, fallacious, 166, 16S. 

In what sense destructive of religion, 
and in what sense not, 169. 

Negligence 

No more excusable in matters of re- 
vealed, than of natural religion, 200. 

Is one source of our dissatisfaction with 
the evidence of religion, 286, 287. 

Newman, 

Quoted, 256 n. 

Objections, 

Against a proof, and against the thing 
to be proved, different, 42. 

How far analogy answers both, in the 
case of religion. 42. 

Against the wisdom and goodness of 
things, not directly answered by anal- 
ogy, 171. 


Objections, — continued. 

Against the scheme of Christianity, as 
distinguished from its evidence, gen- 
erally frivolous, pages 212, 222-227. 

What would be valid, 228. 

Drawn from ignorance, when peculiar- 
ly absurd, 269 

What qualifications requisite for the 
due considering, 2S8. 

May be seen through, though not cleared 
up, 288. 

Against the whole way of reasoning 
from analogy of nature to religion, 
considered, Part II, chap. viii. 

1. That it does not clear up difficul- 
ties, 834. 

2. That it does not show the evi- 
dence of religion not to be doubt- 
ful, 836-338. 

3. That it does not vindicate God’s 
character, 338. 

4. That it is not satisfactory, 840. 

5. That it is not likely to have influ- 
ence, 342. 

Against our natural immortality from 
the case of brutes, 5S. 

From that of vegetables, 64. 

Aganst the credibility of future punish- 
ments, 77. 

Against the final triumph of virtue, 10S. 

Against this world’s being a state of 
trial, how answered by analogy, 1 22. 

A state of discipline in virtue, from 
ignorance of the mode, 1134. 

From its proving, in fact, a discipline in 
vice, 145. 

From its being a discipline in self-love, 
147. 

No practical, from the scheme of neces- 
sity, against religion, 152, 168. 

Against the scheme of Providence, gen- 
erally mere arbitrary assertions, 176. 

Drawn from seeming irregularities in 
the moral world, answered by the 
analogy of the natural, 177. 

Against the dispensations of Provi- 
dence, how far we are concerned to 
answer them, 388. 

Against Christianity, from the suffi- 
ciency of the light of nature, 191, 192. 

Against its proof, from the supposed 
incredibility of miracles, 212-220. 

Why the matter of Christianity must 
appear liable to, Part II, chap. iii. 

From the unequal distribution of relig- 
ious knowledge, 226. 

From its complex contrivances and 
slow development, 234. 

From supposed immorality of some of 
its precepts, 236. 

From its disappointing anticipations, 

230. 

From the abuse of miraculous gifts, 

231. 

From its being perverted, and having 
little influence, 199. 

From its mysteriousness, 241, 269. 

From its want of universality, 272-276. 


383 


Index 


Objections, — continued. 

From supposed deficiency of proofs 
pages 2S0-291. 

Against the Scripture doctrine of a Me- 
diator, Part II, chap. v. 

Against Christ’s sacrifice, as involving 
an unjust punishment of the inno- 
cent for the guilty, 266. 

This objection, if of force, would hold 
more strongly against the course of 
nature, Why? 267. 

Against the particular evidence for 
Christianity, Part II, chap. vii. 

Against the evidence for miracles, 299- 
304. 

From enthusiasm, 301-303. 

From the mixture of enthusiasm and 
knavery, 303. 

From stories of false miracles, 304, 305. 

To the evidence of prophecy, 296-313. 

From the obscurity of some parts of 
prophecy, 307. 

From the application of particular 
prophecies not appearing when con- 
sidered each distinctly, 308, 309. 

From the supposition that the proph- 
ets intended something else, 310-312. 

Against Christianity offered in conver- 
sation, what advantage they have, 
332. 

Obligations 

Of duty, arising from the supposable- 
ness or credibility of religion, 182, 
278, 279. 

Our, to the Son and Holy Spirit, from 
what they arise, 202, 203. 

Obscurities 

In the Scriptures, no valid objection 
against them, 228, 229, 

Optimism, 

Keligious and irreligious, distinguished, 
87 n. 

Origen, 

His observation relative to the Script- 
ures and nature, 37. 

Passions, 

As making part of our state of trial, 116. 

Are excited toward particular objects, 
whether we will or no, 186. 

Bare excitement of, not criminal, 137. 

Yet always dangerous, 137. 

The principle of virtue the intended 
security against this danger, 137. 

How the fall may be accounted for from 
them, 139. 

Supposable that they may remain in a 
future state, 138. 

Are often inconsistent with reasonable 
self-love, as well as with virtue and 
religion, 116. 

Passive Impressions 

Grow weaker by repetition, 128. 

Were intended to lead to the formation 
of active, practical habits, 128, 180. 


Paul, Saint. 

His testimony : to bo considered as de- 
tached from that of the rest of the 
apostles, page 297. 

His epistles: evidence of their genu- 
ineness, 296. 

A distinct proof of Christianity to be 
derived from them, 296. 

Perception. 

Our organs of sense merely the instru- 
ments of, 55. 

Our power of, in dreams, without the 
organs of sense, 56. 

Eidiculous to dispute the truth of our 
perceptions, 364. 

Perfect 

Creatures described, 139. May be im- 
proved by habits of virtue, 140. 

Moral government, what is, 85. 

Perfection 

Of religion, what, 339. 

Of moral government, 85. 

Person 

Defined, 60. 

Sameness of, independently of all con- 
sideration of consciousness, 357. 

Personality, 

Whether constituted by consciousness, 
361-363. 

Plato 

Quoted, 57, 93. 

Pleasure and pain 

The consequence of our own actions, 70. 

The annexing of, to our actions, the 
proper notion of government, 75. 

Pleasure, attending the gratification of 
our passions, whether and how far 
intended to put us upon gratifying 
them, 74. 

Attached to actions when a reward, 
85, 98. 

Whether our pleasures overbalance our 
pains, 340. 

See Happiness. 

Porphyry. 

His objections to the book of Daniel, 
312, 313. 

Positive Institutions 

Implied in the notion of a visible 
Church, 197. 

Are founded on natural religion, as 
well as on revealed, 207, 208. 

In general, have the nature of moral 
commands, 207. 

Mankind prone to place the whole of 
religion in the observance of, with- 
out regard to moral, precepts, 208. 

Great presumption to make light of, 

210 . 


Index. 


389 


Positive — continued. 

Precepts, wherein different from moral, 
page 206. 

In what cases they must yield to moral, 
207, 208. 

Duties, distinguished from moral, 206. 

And moral duties should be compared 
no further than as they are different, 
207. 

Christ’s decision upon the relation be- 
tween them, 209, 210. 

Powers 

May be improved by exercise, 127. 

May be overtasked, 145. 

May exist and not be exercised, 49. 

No reason for supposing that death will 
destroy them, 50. 

Practice, 

By what evidence matters of, are de- 
termined, 336, 337, 340-342. 

In matters of, their importance is al- 
ways to be considered, 36, 331. 

In matters of, less proof than convinces 
judgment should influence behavior, 
85, 278, 279, 291. 

Precepts, 

None in Scripture, contrary to immu- 
table morality, 237. 

Prejudices, 

Several sorts of, 303. 

May hinder us from being rightly in- 
formed upon moral and religious sub- 
jects, 285, 286. 

Arising from contempt and scorn, weak- 
ness of yielding to them, 313. 

Present existence 

Affords a presumption of continuance, 
47. 

Presumption, 

A slight, does not beget that degree of 
conviction, implied in calling a thing 
probably true, 33. 

The slightest possible, of the nature of 
probability, 33. 

That death will destroy us, 50. 

That it will suspend our existence, 62. 

Presumptuousness 

Unjustifiable, 83. 

Priest, 

Christ described as our, 263, 264. 

Probable evidence 

Defined and distinguished from demon- 
stration, 33. 

Foundation of, 33. Eelative to finite 
beings only, 35. 

Men, of necessity, influenced and gov- 
erned by, both in speculation and in 
practice, 35, 36. 

Probable proofs, being added together, 
uiultip y the evidence, 330. 


Probation, 

The peculiar, of persons of a reflective 
cast of mind, page 2S4. 

Implied in religion, 290. 

Eeligion, considered as a probation, has 
had its end on all persons to whom it 
has been proposed, with evidence suf- 
ficient to influence practice, 342. 

See Trial. 

Prophecy, 

The primary design of the prophecies 
recorded in Scripture. 195. 

How they confirm natural religion, 195. _ 

Proof of foresight from the completion ' 
of intelligible parts of prophecy, not 
invalidated by the obscurity of others, 

The proof of foresight made out by a 
general cbmpletion of, 307, 308. 

The applicability of a long series of, to 
certain events, a proof that it was in- 
tended of them, 308, 309. 

The analogy, in this respect, between 
prophecy and satirical and mytholog- 
ical composition, 309, 310. 

How particular prophecies were inter- 
preted by the ancient Jews and the 
primitive Christians, 309. 

Proof from, not destroyed by showing 
that the prophets applied them to 
other events than we do, or that we 
do not apply them to right ones, 310, 
311. 

Of the future condition of the Jews, 
confirmed by their past and present 
history, 326, 327. 

The qualifications requisite to take the 
force of the argument from, 327. 

Conformity between the prophecies and 
the events, not accidental, 330. 

Prophet, 

A, compared with a compiler of mem- 
oirs received from another person, 
310. 

Christ a, in what sense, 263. 

Providence, 

Never hasty, 24S n. 

Objections to, useless. 

The course of, progressive, 248. 

See God. 

Prudence, 

Meaning of the word, 870. 

When a course of action may be called 
prudent, 342. 

And imprudence, akin to virtue and 
vice, 90, 369, 370. 

Public spirit, 

The true notion of, 101. 

Punishment, 

The proper notion of, 76. 

Natural, circumstances in, analogous 
to what religion teaches of future, 
77-81. 


390 


Index. 


Punishment — continued. 

Of vice, as folly, page 89. As mischiev- 
ous to society, 90, 91. Of vice, as 
such , 91-94. 

Of virtuous persons, and of virtuous 
actions, by society explained, 91. 

Why, in the natural course of things, 
punishment does not always reach 
the vicious, 98. 

Ascribed, in Scripture, to God’s justice, 
252. 

Future. See Future Punishment. 

Vicarious, instances of, in the daily 
course of Providence, 267. 

As the method of our redemption ; the 
objection against, answered, 266-269. 

What is meant by deserving punish- 
ment, 36S, 369. 

Reason, 

Can, and ought to judge of the meaning, 
the evidence, and the morality of 
Scripture, 236, 237. 

Natural tendency of, to prevail over 
brute force, 99, 100. 

Inability of, to determine for us wheth- 
er the future punishment of sin could 
be prevented, 254, 255. 

Hopes and fears of, confii’med by rev- 
elation, 257, 258. 

A very incompetent judge of the con- 
duciveness of means to ends, 177. 

Could not have discovered the scheme 
of Christianity, 203. No presumption 
against the scheme of Christianity on 
this account, 213. 

An incompetent judge of what was to 
be expected in revelation, 222, 223. 

Incompetent to judge beforehand, how 
revelations should have been left in 
the world, 226-228. 

Folly of objections to Christianity, upon 
supposed principles of reason, 349. 

Reasoning, 

Upon the principles of others, what it 
means, 342. 

Abstruse, when necessary in matters 
of religion, 357. 

Upon the course of nature, without at- 
tending to known facts, apt to be fal- 
lacious, 37. 

See Abstract. 

Redemption, 

Scripture doctrine of, stated, 260-265. 

Illustrated by the analogy of natural 
remedies, 252. 

Agreeable to our natural notions, our 
hopes and our fears, 256-258. 

The manner of its efficacy not made 
known, nor discoverable by reason, 
etc., 265. 

Rashness of seeking to explain it far- 
ther than Scripture has done, 265. 

See Mediator , Punishment , Sacri- 
fice. 


Reflection, 

Our present powers of, not likely to 
be destroyed or suspended by death, 
pages 60, 61. 

Does not depend upon our bodily pow- 
ers of sensation, 62. 

May be improved by death, 63. 

Reformation 

Does not always preclude punishment, 
256. 

Regard 

Due to the Son and Holy Spirit, 202. 

Due to God as Creator, the essence of 
natural religion, 203. 

Relations, 

Of the several species and individuals 
in the natural world, impossible for 
us to say ho w far they extend, 1 73, 174. 

The revealed relations of the Son and 
the Holy Spirit to us, 201. 

Duties arising from, strictly moral, 
202, 203. 

Religion, 

The whole of, consists in aotion, 288. 

A practical thing, 336. 

Wherein it consists, 336. 

External and internal, 202. 

Essence of natural religion, 202. 

Revealed, 202. 

Wherein the general spirit of, consists, 

210 . 

The perception of, what, 339. 

The stress of, where laid by Scripture, 
209. 

In what view considered by Butler, 340. 

How religion presupposes integrity in 
those who embrace it, 341. 

If founded in God’s moral character, 
161. 

Implies a future state, 66. 

W ould not be proved by even a demon- 
strative proof of one, why, 66. 

Implies God’s government by rewards 
and punishments, 76. 

Implies God's perfect moral govern- 
ment, 108. 

Proper proof of, in this view, 109-112. 

Collateral and practical proof, 108-112. 

Teaches our being in a state of pro- 
bation, 113. 

As a matter of fact, proof of, 161. 

Obligations not destroyed by the opiu- 
iou of necessity, 162. 

Proper motives to, 189, 190. 

Affords distinct particular reasons for 
miracles, 220. 

Degrees of knowledge of religion dif- 
ferent among different men. 272-274. 

Why its evidence may have been left 
doubtful, 282-287. 

Such doubtfulness does not destroy its 
obligation, 278. 

Its importance, 189. 


Index. 


39 1 


Religion — continued. 

Impugned on supposed principles of 
reason, page 848. 

Origin of, according to history and tra- 
dition, 165-217. 

General truth of, proved by a dilemma 
from its state in the first ages of the 
world, 165. 

State of, in the heathen world, 191. * 

Apparently uncorrupted in the first 
ages, 165. 

Natural, the system of, what, 42, 43, 
164, 320. 

Not the only object of our regard, 193. 

Has external evidences, 165. 

Whether it could have been reasoned 
out, 191, 321. 

Taught by Christianity in its purity, 
194, 195. 

IIow confirmed by the miracles and 
prophecies recorded in Scripture, 195. 

How promoted by the settlement of a 
visible Church, 197, 198. 

General proof o^ level to common men, 
287. 

The obligations of, as included by Chris- 
tianity, lie obvious to all apprehen- 
sions, 354. 

What it teaches of a future life, and 
what not, 79, 80 n. 

Of the efficacy of repentance, 255. 

The profession and establishment oi, 
how much owing to Scripture, 320. 

Even in countries not acknowledging 
the authority of Scripture, 321. 

Proof of, from reason, not destroyed 
hereby, 321. 

Analogy of, properly used to remove 
objections to revealed, 334, 335. 

Revealed, See Revelation. 

Religious knowledge. 

See Knowledge — Analogy . 

Remedies, 

Some diseases are, 179. 

Analogy between natural, and Chris- 
tianity, as a remedial provision for 
us, 235, 236. 

The provision of, an instance of com- 
passion in the original constitution of 
the world, 353. 

Repentance, 

Its insufficiency to expiate guilt argued 
from analogy, 257. Argued also from 
the general sense of mankind, 257. 

Its efficacy, whence derived, 264. 

Resignation 

To God’s will an essential part of vir- 
tue, 147. 

Afflictions, the proper discipline for, 149. 

Prosperity and imagination may give 
occasion for, 148. 

Revelation, 

The particular scheme of the universe 
cannot be known without, 105. j 


Revelation — continued . 

Would not have been given if the light 
of nature rendered it superfluous, 
•page 191. 

Manifestly not superfluous, 192. 

The great service it renders to natural 
religion, 194-199. 

Republishes and confirms natural re- 
ligion in its purity, 194-198. 

Supplies new means for its preservation, 
197-199. 

If really given, cannot be safely neglect- 
ed, 194. 

Itself, in what sense miraculous, 215. 

At the beginning of the world, whether 
miraculous, 215. 

No presumption from analogy against 
such a, 215. 

Primitive, how far the belief of pure re- 
ligion in the first age of the world 
favors the notion of one, 165. 

Historical and traditionary evidence of, 
as ancient as history, 165, 217. 

The early pretenses of false, probably 
imply a true one, 165. 

Supposed presumption against, as mi- 
raculous, considered. Part II, chap. ii. 

We are incompetent judges of what 
were to be expected in a, Part II, 
chap. iii. 

What reason can judge of in a revelation, 
236-238. 

Discovers new relations, and conse- 
quently imposes new duties, 201-203. 

Probable origin of sacrifices, 264. 

Revealed religion 

(The Christian) a fit subject of analog- 
ical reasoning, 38. 

What is implied in the scheme of, 42, 
43, 204, 205, 212, 241, 242. 

Mav be considered as whollv historical, 
3*15. 

Summary of, under that view, 315-317. 

Internal, as distinguished from natural, 
wherein the essence of, consists, 193. 

No presumption against its general 
scheme from the analogy of nature, 
212 . 

A particular scheme under the general 
plan of Providence, 241. 

Consists of various parts, and is carriod 
on through a length of time, 241. 

Supposes mankind in a state of degra- 
dation, 234, 250, 259. 

The help of the Holy Spirit necessary 
to renew our nature, 205. 

Repentance naturally insufficient to 
present all the bad consequences of 
sin, 204, 205, 257-259. 

Its dispensation, whether carried on by 
general laws, 243, 244. 

May appear natural to some beings, 65. 

Evidence of. See Evidence. 

Objections to. See Objection*. 

Analogy of, to natural, and the con- 
stitution and course of nature. See 
Analogy. 


392 


Index. 


Rewards and punishments, 

According to the natural constitution of 
things, correspond to virtue and vice, 
page 98. * 

Though not equally distributed now, 
yet, in all probability, will be hereafter, 
102 . 

Hope of reward, a legitimate motive to 
obedience, 147. 

See Punishment. 

Ridicule, 

How, obstructs men’s seeing the evi- 
dence of religion, 285. 

Though applied to show the argument 
from analogy in a disadvantageous 
light, yet cannot invalidate it, 75, 846. 

Roman Empire, 

Plainly, was divided into about ten 
parts, 812. 

Bearing of that circumstance on the 
prophecy of Daniel, 812. 

Rome, Babylon, and Greece, 

How noticed in prophecy, 316. 

Sacrifices, 

Propitiatory, what the general preva- 
lence of, shows us, 257. 

How they originated among the Jews, 
and other ancient nations, 264. 

The death of Christ a proper sacrifice, 
260-262. 

Its efficacy, 264. 

Manner of its efficacy not explained, 265. 

Objections against it on this ground 
highly absurd, 265, 266. 

See Media tor. 

Skepticism 

Will not justify a presumptuous fear- 
lessness with regard to what may be 
hereafter, 82. 

Implies a general state of probation, in 
the moral and religious sense, 278, 279. 

The immorality and irreligion of skep- 
tics utterly inexcusable. 318. 

How far toward speculative infidelity 
a skeptic can go, who has had true 
Christianity, with its proper evidence 
laid before him, and has considered 
them, 355. 

See Doubting. 

Scorn 

Of religion, to what owing, 348-356. 

Great weakness to be influenced by it, 
313. 

Parts of the prophetical writings, why 
treated with. 223. 

Scripture 

Considered in an historical view, 315. 

How distinguished, by its design, from 
all other books, 315. 

Why it begins with an account of the 
creation of the world, 315, 81G. 


Scripture, — continued. 

In what view, contains an abridgment 
of the history of the world, page 316. 

With what its notices terminate, 316, 
317. 

Considering the variety and extent of 
its matter, its not being confuted from 

. reason, history, or internal inconsist- 
ency, is a strong presumption of its 
truth, 817. 

Summary of its contents, 318-320. 

Antiquity of its first part, 321. 

Its chronology confirmed by the natural 
and civil history of the world, 321. 

Its common history as much confirmed 
as we could expect by profane history, 
322. 

Has internal appearance of credibility, 
322, 323. 

No more appearances of strangeness, or 
mistakes of transcribers in Scripture, 
than in other writings of like antiq- 
uity, 323. 

Credibility of the common history of 
Scripture, how it gives credibility to 
the miraculous, 293, 324. 

Not always to be interpreted on the 
same rules as a common book, why ? 
211, 310, 311. 

Its relations of miracles not easily ac- 
counted for on the supposition of 
their falsehood, 293, 294. 

The truth of them, the obvious and di- 
rect account of their composition and 
reception, 294. 

The profession and establishment of nat- 
ural religion, how far owing to, 320. 

Some precepts of, matters of offense, 
why? 237. 

The province of reason to judge of its 
morality and evidence, 236-238. 

May contain things not yet discovered, 
233. 

The ordinary means of discovering its 
meaning, 233. 

The duty of searching, 211. 

When we may determine the seeming 
meaning, not the true one, 202. 

Its authority, the only question con- 
cerning, 227. 

See Analogy — History — Inspiration 
— St. Pauls Epistles — Prophecy — 
Revelation. 

Self, 

Invisible, 50. Its sameness does not 
depend on the sameness of the body, 
52, 53. 

Self-denial, 

The fact that it is necessary for our 
present happiness, makes it credible 
that it may be likewise necessary for 
our future, 115, 116, 120-122. 

Necessity of, argued from the nature of 
particular affections, 139. 

Productive of resignation to God’s will, 
147. 


Index. 


393 


Self-love, 

Reasonable, is coincident with virtue, 
page 137 n. 

Is daily seen to be overmatched by pas- 
sion, 116, 137 n. 

No cause for its being disclaimed by 
moralists as a motive, 138 n. 

Has need to be approved and disciplined, 
137 n, 148. 

Shaftesbury, Lord, 

His writings referred to, 87. 

Simplicity, 

Of a living agent, argument to prove, 
51. 

Sin, 

Why not kept out of the world, 179. 

Son of God 

The gift of the, to tho world, 258. 

Sorrow 

Cannot of itself restore abused benefits, 
255. 

Soul, 

A simple substance, 51. 

Not destroyed with the body, 48. 

Not naturally immortal, 50. 

Brutes, souls of, 58. 

Speaking with tongues, 231. 

Special interpositions of Providence, 179, 
180. 

Speculative difficulties similar to external 
temptations, 282. 

The chief trial of some, 284-286. 

Spread of Christianity unaccountable if 
it were an imposture, 325. 

Stages of existence, 46. 

Standing ministry, what for, 197. 

State of probation, chap. iv. 

State of discipline and improvement, 
chap. v. 

Strangeness of some Scripture events, 823. 

Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, 299. 

Submissive temper necessary, 149. 

Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, 132. 

Subserviences in nature, 174. 

Subserviences, the world a system of, 247. 

Success, temporal, always uncertain, 340. 

Sufferings may be avoided, 70. 

Not necessary to the cultivation of vir- 
tue, 113. 

Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it 
either in temporal or spiritual things, 
204. 


Sufferings of Christ vindicate God’s law, 

page 267. 

Sufferings of the early Christians, 299. 

Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, 

191. 

Summary of Jewish history, 318. 

Of the historical evidence of Scripture, 
828. 

Supernatural instructions necessary from 

the first, 216. 

Temptations, 

Implied in the idea of a state of proba- 
tion, 114. 

Sources of our, 115-117. 

Those of our temporal and of our re- 
ligious trial compared, 115-122. 

A means of disciplining the moral prin- 
ciple, 143, 144. 

Virtuous habits the proper security 
against, 136, 137. 

The supposition of them lessens, in cer- 
tain cases, the perception of ill-desert, 
369. 

Tendency, 

Ambiguity of the word, 111 n. 

Tendencies of virtue will probably here- 
after become effect, 111. 

Testimony, 

When only it can be destroyed, 306. 

See Evidence , Evidence of Christian- 
ity. 

Trial, 

Our, in our temporal, compared with 
that in our religious capacity, 115- 
118. 

Proceeds in both from the same causes, 
and has the same effect upon behav- 
ior, 117, 118. 

Difficulties of, increased by misbehav- 
ior of others, 118. Also by our own 
errors and follies, 119. 

Equitableness of our present state of, 
vindicated, 118, 119. 

Not possible for us to understand all the 
reasons of our being placed- in, 124. 

End of, our improvement in virtue and 
piety, as a qualification for a future 
state, 125. 

May also be intended for the manifes- 
tation of our characters to the rest 
of the creation, 151. 

Tho present state of the evidence of 
religion may be part of some men’s 
trial, 276-287. And perhaps the chief 
part, 284, 2S5. 

Difficulties of belief afford a trial anal- 
ogous to external temptations, 282- 
285. 

Ultimate 

Design of man, 74 n. 


394 


Index. 


Understanding, 

Our probation with regard to tho exer- 
cise of the, pages 277, 278. 

May be perverted, 166. 

Uneasiness produced by former .sins, 88. 

Union of good beings, 104. 

Universality, 

Objections to Christianity from the 
want of, considered, 271-291. 

Universe and its government immense, 

105. 

Unjustifiableness of religious indiffer- 
ence, 83. 

Upright creatures may fall, 139. 

Need good habits, 140. 

Vegetables, 

The destruction of, not analogous to 
the death of living agents, 64. 

What is meant by their identity, 859, 
360. 

Veracity, 

Our natural regard to it, 373. When 

violated, 875. 

Vice, 

What it chiefly consists in, 368. 

Does not consist merely in the inten- 
tion to produce unhappiness, 372. 

Whether folly be a species of it, 369- 
372. 

Manner in which the habit of it is 
formed, 139, 140. 

This life is to some practically a disci- 
pline in, 145. 

Punished as imprudent. 89. As hurt- 
ful, 90. As vice, 92-97. 

Whether ever rewarded as such, 92-9S. 

How the appearance of it is brought 
about, 98. 

The pleasures of it scarce worth tak- 
ing into account, 189. 

Passion a sorry excuse for it, 189. 

Natural bad consequences of, to be es- 
teemed judicial punishments inflicted 
by God, 204. 

Private, may be public benefits, and yet 
upon the whole it were more bene- 
ficial that men would refrain from 
them, 179. 

Hinderances of its complete punish- 
ment accidental , 99-109. 

Must be the misery of every creature, 
41. 

Considerations showing its enormity, 
253. 

Vicious 

Actions never rewarded by society be- 
cause they are vicious, 91. 

Persons, prosperity of, reconciled with 
moral government, 98. 


Viciousness 

Of the world fits it for a state of trial 
to good men, page 146, 

Virtue, 

Possibility of exceptions to the happi- 
ness of, 88. 

Social advantages of, a proof of an es- 
tablished moral government, 94. 

Conditions necessary to its complete 
triumph over vice, 100, 101. 

Its natural tendencies hindered in our 
present state, 103. May be more ad- 
vantageously situated hereafter, 104. 

A bond of union among all endured 
with it, 104. 

Happy effects of, set forth in the in- 
stance of a perfectly virtuous king- 
dom, 105, 106. 

Habit of, not formed by merely think- 
ing and talking of virtue, 128. 

And piety a necessary qualification 
for a future state, 185. Our capa- 
city of improvement therein, by 
moral and religious habits, 135. Ne- 
cessity of improvement argued, 136- 
142. 

Habit of, the security against the undue 
operation of particular affections, 137- 
141. 

There is a universally acknowledged 
standard of, 367. 

Corresponds to our notion of good de- 
sert, 368. 

Common instances of, do not raise a 
strong perception of good desert, and 
why, 369. 

Prudence a part of, 871, 372. 

Does not consist entirely in benevo- 
lence, 372, 373. 

Virtuous 

Actions never punished by society be- 
cause they are virtuous, 91. 

Persons, afflictions of, how reconciled 
with moral government, 9S. 

Beings need virtuous habits, 142. 

Habits a security, 138. How formed, 
128. Improve virtue, 138. Neces- 
sary in a future state, 135. 

Virtue and Vice 

Are, in the natural course of things, re- 
warded and punished, as such, 91. 

As qualities of actions, effects of, on 
men’s minds, 92, 94, 96. 

Tendency of, to produce their effects 
in a greater degree than they do at 
present, 99-108. 

Overbalance of happiness or misery not 
the standard of, 373, 374. 

Y oice of nature is for virtue, 99. 

Warburton, Bishop, 

Quoted, 91 n, 232 n. 

Waste of seeds, 146. 


Index. 


395 


Waterland, Dr., 

Quoted, page 202 n. 

Whately, Archbishop, 

Quoted, 217 n. 

Wickedness, 

May produce some benefits, 179. 
Voluntary, 124. 

Will and Character, 

Explained, 160 n. 

May be affirmed of the Author of Na- 
ture, notwithstanding the scheme of 
necessity, 160. 


World, 

The present, fit to be a state of disci- 
pline for moral improvement, pages 
142-145. 

A theater for the manifestation of per- 
sons 1 characters, 150. 

Natural, intended to be subordinate to 
the moral, 174. 

History of, how viewed in Scripture, 
315. 

Governed by fixed law r s, 90. 

Wickedness of, 259. 

Youth. 

The great importance of right direc- 
tion in, 78, 132, 133. 

Its beneficial subordinations, 132. 
































































































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